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A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union

Clifford J. Carrubba and Matthew J. Gabel

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Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06572-7 - International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements:
A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union

Clifford J. Carrubba and Matthew J. Gabel

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