Introduction

What flower is traditionally worn by British people on Remembrance Day? Where do you register the birth of a child in the Netherlands? When can a political party be banned in Germany? These are examples of real questions that have appeared in national integration exams in the respective Western European states. They reflect a range in test content, including cultural knowledge, practical information on day-to-day activity, and an understanding of the rule of law. More than mere trivia, being able to correctly answer these questions in the national language determines whether an immigrant can acquire citizenship or long-term residence. Therefore, preparing for an exam plays a key role in immigrant integration, while successfully passing it is decisive for obtaining political membership.

Assessing language proficiency and knowledge of the country and its values are relatively new strategies for promoting integration and regulating membership inclusion in Western Europe. They represent the cornerstone of a new policy known as “civic integration.” This concept is the embodiment of a belief that active and productive participation by immigrants in society and the labor market is possible through their acquiring a set of “citizen-like,” or civic, skills that include speaking the language of the host country, having knowledge of the country’s history, culture, and rules, and understanding and following the liberal-democratic values that underscore their new home. In other words, civic integration policies uniquely express the idea that successful incorporation into a host society rests not only on employment (economic integration) and civic engagement (political integration), but also on individual commitment to characteristics typifying national citizenship, i.e., full membership in society.

Civic integration policy promotes these characteristics through the use of new assessment tools such as integration tests, courses, and contracts. These instruments serve as gatekeepers, where the path of transitioning from an outsider to an insider is marked by these mandatory integration requirements as a condition for obtaining various legal statuses.
This points to a paradoxical dimension of civic integration: immigrants – sometimes both new and old – are required to obtain these skills of autonomy. Immigrants enter into a metaphorical (or, in some cases, physical) contract with the state, whereby the former has an obligation to integrate, while the latter sets standards and defines avenues for doing so. Without completion of civic requirements, immigrants are ineligible to obtain citizenship, permanent and long-term residence permits, and in some cases, entry and permits for family reunification. This dimension – promoting positive skills through sanctions – has imbued civic integration with a particularly negative connotation. Scholars have referred to these practices as an instance of “repressive liberalism,”¹ later modified to “illiberal liberalism,”² as well as the anchor of a “restrictive backlash” of obligations against the expansion of rights and liberalization typifying citizenship policy change in the 1990s. Setting aside normative implications, however, the tethering of new integration requirements to different legal stages indisputably secures a new, closer role for the state in promoting and, indeed, ensuring integration. Policymakers play a key role in defining the content of (a) new identity, and civil servants ensure adherence to these new norms where assessment is largely facilitated by state institutions or contracted proxies.

Yet civic integration is significant not merely because new requirements impact the immigrant experience of settling in a new society, in which the state plays a closer role, but ultimately because these requirements redefine what it is that immigrants are asked to join. By highlighting shared rules of society and concepts of belonging, states are articulating (some for the very first time) concrete and, in principle, accessible definitions of what it means to “be British” or “Dutch” or “German.” In this, civic integration represents the latest iteration of the ongoing project of nation-building. I label this most recent articulate of belonging as “state identity.”³ In contrast to national identity, forged in the heyday of nationalism to justify distinct statehood projects by underlining “sameness” in groups, state identity promotes “togetherness” among different groups, where individuals can join the larger national community through initiative and commitment and not resemblance to inherited or ascriptive attributes. This new functional identity is reflected in the content of integration courses and exams, where immigrants are asked to obtain an understanding of political institutions and learn values of


³ While, in principle, civic integration foments a civic identity, I adopt the term “state identity” to avoid conflation with the civic vs. ethnic paradigm of nationalism in drawing a contrast to national identity. Though there are overlaps (see Chapter 1), temporal differences require conceptual distinction as even national identity created out of civic nationalism (e.g., France) adopts civic integration strategies to define contemporary membership.
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political liberalism (from the German test: “What is the function of regular elections in a democracy?”), as well as acquire information for everyday life, such as how to contact a doctor, obtain a prescription, enroll a child at school, volunteer, etc., prominent in both the Dutch and British exams. History is emphasized for the purposes of understanding the origins of political institutions, practices, and contemporary culture, not to establish religious or ethnic criteria for community. Though there are clear overlaps in content of national and state identity, showing that these two identities are not mutually exclusive and are concomitant in time, state identity creates contemporary possibilities of membership for immigrants where national identity does not.

The difference between state identity and national identity is particularly visible in the orientation and audience of civic integration requirements. Specifically, we see the promotion of civic qua citizen-like values and skills to decidedly non-citizen stages. The term civic integration is the English translation of the Dutch inburgering, which appears at the heart of the primogenitary 1998 Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (subsequently referred to as WIN), translated as The Newcomers Civic Integration Act. Inburgering is a verbal noun, fusing the concept of citizen (burger) with the process or performance of becoming (indicated by the suffix -ing). Marie-Claire Foblets succinctly interprets inburgering as “citizenization.” But, importantly, this is distinct from naturalization, the process whereby eligible immigrants become citizens. “Citizenization” is the promotion of participation-enabling skills among a variety of non-citizen populations, from persons seeking citizenship to immigrants seeking entry and permanent residence. Achieving civic integration milestones, therefore, establishes state identity among persons both in and outside of citizenship.

While it is not unique for traditional countries of immigration to forge identity with the outsider in mind, the introduction of language, society knowledge, and value requirements has been among the most visible if not the most significant of the policy changes for addressing the aggregate impact of mass immigration to Western Europe. States as diverse as Germany, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Italy, and Luxemburg, are all strong practitioners of civic integration, through tests, courses, interviews, etc. in order to exhibit language skills and knowledge in exchange for legal status acquisition. In their adoption, we witness the fundamental transformation of the European nation-state from passive labor importer (in other words, a country that merely receives immigrants) into a country of immigration, where “the nation” is treated as a form of illiberal particularism and immigrant-related


5 The United States, for example, has practiced assessment of language/literacy and civic knowledge for the better part of a century.
diversity – for better or worse – assists in and serves as the catalyst for defining criteria for national membership and belonging.

This book is not the first examination of civic integration in Western Europe; to describe immigration and citizenship scholars as preoccupied with civic integration would be an understatement. In political theory, there has never been more interest in reconciling multicultural realities with liberalism.6 Perhaps, as a result, examining the role of the state in managing ethnic diversity vis-à-vis civic integration has largely proceeded in normative not empirical assessment. Among descriptive work, there have been volumes dedicated to detailing, categorizing, and comparing new policies.7 Surprisingly, however, none have puzzled over the empirical diversity of civic integration policy design or have any presented systematic, comparative explanations for policy variation. In fact, in one account, Christian Joppke strangely dismisses this variety altogether, stating in the same breadth that “despite obvious national variation in the scope and level of restrictive-ness of civic integration policies across Europe, a focus on ‘obligation’ (and reverse de-emphasis on ‘rights’) is a shared feature of all of them”8 and, therefore, “the notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did.”9 As such, an overwhelming academic consensus has settled on identifying the empirical landscape as one of widespread and restrictive convergence, accounting for a uniform,
“civic turn”\textsuperscript{10} as a shared response to large-scale demographic change,\textsuperscript{11} the general presence of an “integration crisis,”\textsuperscript{12} indicators of “integration failure,” including unemployment and welfare state dependence,\textsuperscript{13} the “rightist turn of the political climate,”\textsuperscript{14} elite consensus over the idea of civic integration,\textsuperscript{15} and shifts in the welfare state from public to private accountability.\textsuperscript{16} These studies provide important insight on the background conditions in which change is likely to take place, but not into why states ultimately design what we see as quite different policy configurations. Civic integration requirements significantly vary in terms of design (how requirements are organized), scope (which legal categories are targeted), sequencing (the ordering of requirements), and, as this book primarily aims to show, purpose.

Building upon this state of the literature, this book seeks to make three central contributions to our existing understanding of the increasingly prolific practice of mandatory integration politics in Europe as a contemporary practice of nation-building. First, it identifies and examines variation in civic integration policy in Western Europe. European states face common pressures to articulate a coherent identity in the face of immigrant-related diversity and to define avenues for inclusion for these now-permanent populations. Navigating out of membership problems may involve similar, obligatory instruments, but the case studies in this book show how states design these instruments as part of different strategies to address different problems.

The second significant contribution is in providing an explanation for what we see as meaningful empirical diversity. I argue that missing from these aforementioned explanations for integration policy adoption – aside from the mischaracterization of the civic integration phenomenon as convergent – is the existing institutional context that enables actors to interpret significant but ultimately indeterminate variables, like influx, politics, or welfare state realignment. Specifically, existing approaches do not account for inherited citizenship

\textsuperscript{11} Joppke, “Transformation of immigrant integration in Western Europe: Civic integration and antidiscrimination policies in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,” 245–46.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.: 243; Becker and Strik, “Language and knowledge tests for permanent residence rights: Help or hindrance for integration?,” 166.
\textsuperscript{13} Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe,” 6.
\textsuperscript{16} Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, 150–51.
policy (that is, the relative ease or difficulty with which immigrants obtain citizenship) as a politically consequential structure for the politics that seek to alter or reify it. Not only does citizenship give formal “institutional expression to the state’s prerogative of inclusion and exclusion,” but it also leads state actors to different understandings of how to perceive and repair membership problems. In other words, new civic requirements in traditionally restrictive (exclusive) citizenship states necessarily address different challenges—and produce different effects—than new civic requirements in traditionally liberal (inclusive) citizenship states. Therefore, a mandatory civics test or language course that may be restrictive in one context could enable integration in another. This institutional setting then provides a meaningful context for a more traditional account of membership policy change that focuses on preferences of the party in power, where right parties pursue restriction and left parties pursue liberalization.

My central argument is that civic integration policies are crafted as part of different policy strategies to address different problems of membership, defined by inherited citizenship policy and extant political preferences of the party in power that seeks to change or fortify these approaches. Existing citizenship policy—interchangeably referred to here as policy legacy or inherited policy—not only reflects formal opportunities for political inclusion and exclusion but also defines the parameters of the debate in which policy actors propose and implement change. The second condition—ideological orientation of government—recognizes that likelihood for continuity or change depends not merely on the context in which policymaking plays out, but also on the preferences of the policymakers.

To examine this more closely, I explain diversity in membership strategies based on the interaction of existing restrictive or liberal citizenship policy starting points and politics, which seek to change or maintain those initial policy positions. This dynamic approach builds upon existing insights on the various means by which politics produce citizenship change, noting the agenda-setting role played by far-right parties, policy gains through campaigns, coalition partnership, opposition pressure, etc., but integrates an institutional perspective to highlight the different contexts in which these politics play out. In states with restrictive (exclusive) citizenship, where opportunities to naturalize are already limited and rightist governments in power identify no interest to break this practice, membership requirements serve to continue and retrench existing citizenship postures. In this scenario, permanent residence may become a durable alternative membership status—a type of ancillary, demi-citizenship. On the other hand, in restrictive states where leftist governments are predicted to have a

significanct interest to liberalize, civic integration policies represent more contained, or limited, change, where government views are modulated to maintain electoral competitiveness or bargains are struck to stay in power in a restrictive policy environment. In sum, this negotiated procedure may soften initial restriction but not to the extent that liberal proponents hope. In both instances, where citizenship remains closed off, a strong focus of integration and immigration occur at both the stages of permanent residence and citizenship, thereby establishing a significant chain of conditionality to full legal incorporation.

In liberal (inclusive) citizenship regimes, however, states pursue fundamentally different objectives in adopting civic integration. Where left governments are not predicted to pursue restriction – and face no political pressure to do so – changes that introduce new membership requirements reify an existing liberal orientation, enriching citizenship by encouraging more participation and incentivizing naturalization of long-term residents. In other words, where citizenship is already accessible, the challenge of membership is primarily one of achieving incorporation and defining an accessible civic identity in multicultural states. Finally, liberal citizenship states in which governments on the right seek to pursue restriction may use integration requirements to constitute that new restriction, but like restrictive regimes with liberalizing governments, the intensity of change will be contained, resulting from self-modulation or negotiation. In both of these scenarios, costly alteration to the fundamental parameters of naturalization establishes instead equivalence between permanent residence and citizenship whereby statuses are, by and large, indistinguishable from one another.

The promotion of membership through civic integration is a discrete phenomenon, limited to advanced democratic systems in Europe and traditional immigrant receiving states (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Australia). However, limiting analysis to Western Europe provides sufficient variation to test convergence claims and other endogenous pressures. In testing existing theories for citizenship policy and providing important modifications to those predictions that take into account the unique nature of membership requirements, the comparative case studies included in the book demonstrate how similar policy instruments can yield different effects where they are bound by different institutional parameters. Thus, while civic integration is largely confined to Europe, this observation is generalizable to cases of citizenship change beyond the continent, and potentially to other policy areas, in that it illustrates the importance of context for assessing convergence claims, while highlighting the value-added of detailed, comparative case study analysis.

Finally, after identifying variation in civic integration policy as well as the factors that produce those outcomes, this book’s third major contribution is in providing important confirmatory evidence for the continued relevance of national citizenship in contemporary nation-states, against faddish postnational, supranational and transnational predictions that say otherwise. If there is a common theme underlying these policies, it is that of states employing the
informal and identity-providing ties of membership to fortify citizenship in a new context of ethnic diversity and fiscal constriction. Moreover, this is achieved through the innovation of state identity, not the reinvigoration of national identity. In the end, new requirements do not change or signal a departure from national citizenship but anchor and strengthen it. Despite predictions that “distinct national models of dealing with immigrants are giving way to convergent politics of civic integration,”¹⁹ this book shows how European states are using new tools to address national membership problems, thereby perpetuating national differences in membership. If anything, new requirements show the truly adaptive and resilient nature of the nation-state in the twenty-first century. Large-scale immigration in the postwar period has disrupted the European myth of the homogenous nation-state, forcing Europeans to rethink what it means to be a member of the core group. Through the innovation of state identity, new civic requirements articulate clear definitions for belonging and lay out arbitrary steps for outsiders to become insiders in principle, if not always in practice, without fundamentally altering the parameters of what the state already possesses.

Methodologically, I approach these three objectives with a research design that uses a medium-N sample to identify patterns and variation in civic integration policy, but employ in-depth case studies and a series of paired comparisons to examine the interacting effects of citizenship policy starting points and politics. I include six case studies in total in order to provide typical, diverse, as well as influential cases of civic integration adoption.²⁰ Cases are paired in order to illustrate the importance of condition interactions, where citizenship legacy can induce differently oriented governments to pursue similar membership policy design (Chapter 4), where differences in citizenship steer similarly oriented governments to policy divergence (Chapter 5), and where process of causal change can yield differences of outcome despite similarity of conditions (Chapter 6). I use a variety of evidence in these case studies to observe causal processes and elucidate mechanisms for how institutional starting points and politics yield different membership strategies, including primary legislation, government and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, interviews, as well as the vast secondary literature on civic integration policies by area experts, which provides hefty descriptive content but little analysis. Each case study examines both policy output and outcomes (effects), in order to fully characterize civic integration policy strategy and variation across states.

¹⁹ Joppke, “Transformation of immigrant integration in Western Europe: Civic integration and antidiscrimination policies in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,” 243. Klaver and Ode also argue that “countries with very different traditions with regard to immigration and integration issues have resorted to similar policies” in Klaver and Odé, Civic Integration and Modern Citizenship: The Netherlands in perspective, 4.

²⁰ For more on techniques of case selection, see Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008), 297–98.
The remainder of this introduction looks more closely at existing work on civic integration policies, identifying some problems that require attention and discussion before analysis can proceed. Finally, I present the organization of the book by summarizing individual chapters.

CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR CIVIC INTEGRATION STUDIES AND ANALYSIS

The study of civic integration tells us much about existing membership problems in citizenship practices and concepts of belonging, and analysis of policy adoption sheds critical light on perceived deficiencies of existing citizenship approaches as well as how states adapt to new conditions to maintain control over nation-building. The importance of studying civic integration is reflected in the many articles, edited volumes, and policy reports comparing these new state practices. Yet while this burgeoning research has unearthed a bevy of important facts on policies, detailing specific nuances of each policy design from price to targeted population to test content, the singular focus on ideational convergence – and consequently, relegation of policy diversity to an afterthought or minor detail of the civic integration phenomenon – has yielded a series of problematic observations that have been concretized as prima facie claims. These biases create problems for concept validity, i.e., for defining what is a civic integration policy and what is not, which then creates problems for measurement and comparison. These problems require acknowledgment and discussion before analysis can proceed and include, but are not limited to: (1) interpretation of restriction; (2) a lack of acknowledged policy differentiation; and, (3) differences of interpretation over what civic integration requirements represent. I would argue that these problems largely proceed from the fact that existing work is almost entirely descriptive, identifying patterns and drawing conclusions without attempting comparative analysis of causes or outcomes. Or, what there is in terms of analysis is largely relegated to concerns of effects of civic integration on multiculturalism and other integration models, not citizenship and legal status.21

I. Interpretation of restriction: The first problem is that because obligations are required by definition, they should be interpreted as synonymous with a restrictive change; that is, more requirements equal more barriers.22 Viewed


22 For examples of this usage, see Howard, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*; Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe.”; Ruud Koopmans et al., *Contested Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe* (Minneapolis, MN:
from this theoretical vantage point, integration requirements have been inter-
preted as representing an “illiberal liberalism” that constitutes a “restrictive turn” or “backlash” against the vast liberalization of citizenship policies in the 1990s – policies that included the widening acceptance of dual citizenship and the lowering of residence duration. These perspectives all identify a primary role for far- and center-right parties in introducing this restriction. But these approaches are limiting because: (1) if any requirement is considered restrictive, then the bar of acceptable requirements the state can ask of a newcomer is essentially set at zero, which betrays the widely accepted notion of citizenship as an exchange of rights from the state for obligations by the citizen; (2) language proficiency and society knowledge tests can actually enable integration and produce inclusion, not exclusion; and (3) policies get introduced by a bevy of actors outside of the right. Overreliance on this blunt characterization tool diverts attention from what is happening on the ground.

II. Lack of acknowledged policy differentiation: The second problematic claim stems from taking ideational convergence as the starting point for analysis. Simply put, the belief of ideational convergence produces a type of empirical cherry picking that seeks out only similarities. The view of convergence is predicated on the idea that similar instruments produce similar outcomes, even going so far as to posit that they were adopted for similar macro-reasons. Change is seen as part of a larger, comprehensive strategy of major immigrant-receiving states for addressing the demographic shifts and diversity-related pressures of immigration. But if a mandatory membership strategy is a response to large-scale immigration, why do states make changes at the stage of citizenship if other requirements for naturalization make it so that only a tiny percentage of foreign residents will be able to obtain it? And, in countries where immigrants are more likely to obtain citizenship and have higher rates of naturalization over time, why do policy actors perceive membership problems at this time?


53 Guild, Groenendijk, and Carrera, eds., Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, citizenship, and integration in the EU; Orgad, “Illiberal liberalism: Cultural restrictions on migration and access to citizenship in Europe.”; Triadafilopoulos, “Illiberal means to liberal ends? Understanding recent immigrant integration policies in Europe.”
