INDEX

accession partnerships
Central and Eastern Europe negotiations and, 44–5
deepening integration in EU and, 91–2
feasibility analysis of, 63–4
accountability deficit of, 192–6
performance evaluations of EU and, 78–83
in post-monetary union era, 313–16
statutory regulation and, 166–7
acquis communautaire, 39–41
closer cooperation paradigm and, 227
de facto opt-outs from, 41–2
functional vs. territorial integration and, 112–13
implications of, 42–7
integration through judiciary and, 97–101
as irreversible investment, 123
monetary union and, 289–94
‘Pact for Competitiveness’ and, 232
adverse selection
acquis communautaire negotiations and risk of, 44–5
collective responsibility and, 204–7
euro zone debt crisis, 139–41
monetary union rules and, 129–34
transaction costs and, 119–21
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) conventions, WTO jurisprudence and, 107–10
African countries
impact of precautionary standards in, 158

regional integration schemes in, 280–1
age discrimination, negative integration and, 95–7
agency costs, delegation of powers and, 129–34
Alesina, A., 129–34
Alter, Karen, 104
American Confederation of 1781, 278–9
Amsterdam Treaty, 95–7, 104–5
absence of trust and, 243–5
closer cooperation paradigm and, 226–32
Schengen Agreement and, 125–6
Andean Pact, 280–1
anti-competitive behaviour
policy harmonization and control of, 36–7
unintended consequences of ‘more Europe’ policy and, 232–5
anti-majoritarian institutions, accountability deficit in, 194–6
Articles of Confederation (United States), 185–7
Asia
European historical hegemony over, 177–8
regional integration schemes in, 280–1
asset specificity, transaction costs of, 122
Attali, Jacques, 139–41
Attlee, Clement, 161–2

INDEX


budgetary discipline
ECB focus on, 54
EU imposition of, 307–8
surveillance in euro zone of, 197–8
Bulgaria, SGP requirements and, 44
Bundesbank
ECB comparisons with, 48
euro zone scepticism in, 48
independence of, 166–7
monetary union negotiations and role of, 26–8
regulatory powers of, 166–7
bureaucracy
accountability deficit in, 192–6
multiple principles and, 101–7
BVG. See German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (BVG)
Calhoun, John, 185–7
Cameron, David, 196–7
Canada
Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
bilateral US trade agreements with, 283
Canada–United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA), 283, 286–7
institutional provisions in, 7
limits on forced integration in, 8
monetary union and economic integration and, 289
Canada–United States Trade Commission, 286–7
CAP. See Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
capital flow, exchange-rate fluctuations and, 25–6
Carr, Edward, 87, 317–18
cartels, neoliberal bias in EU and role of, 156–7
Casella, Alessandra, 17–18, 112–17, 320
Casss de Dijon judgment of 1979, 37, 270–1, 305–6
catastrophism, total optimism culture and, 70–2
Cecchini report, 219–20
Central American Common Market, 280–1
Central Europe
accession negotiations, feasibility analysis of, 63–4
acquis communautaire imposition in, 44–5
German constitutional influence in, 144–8
importance of national sovereignty in, 110–12
monetary union in, 249–52
opposition to political integration in, 39–41
centralized institutions
EU structure as, 106–7
opposition to, 38–9
regional integration and resistance to, 1–3, 7
’social Europe’ model and, 211–16
CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Chalmers, Damian, 308
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 125–6, 245–7
Chirac, Jacques, 245–7
EMU opposition and, 33–4
Choper, Jesse, 194–6
GIU (Catalan party), 31–2
classical liberalism, decoupling of economics and politics in, 149–50
closer cooperation, in ‘more Europe’ paradigm, 226–32
club good
economic integration and, 17–18, 316–22
functionalist integration and, 112–17
monetary union as, 262–4
‘club of clubs’ European model, 17–18, 320–1
competitive stability and, 279–80
cartels, economic theory of, 17–18
functional integration and, 112–17
integration and, 318–20
Coase, Ronald, 118, 151–4
Coase theorem, Rome Treaty and, 151–4
Cockfield (Lord), 249–52
Cohesion and Structural Funds, influence costs of, 137–9
Cold War, communitarian European foreign policy and, 254–5
collective decision making costs of, 238–40
fait accompli ideology and, 59
leadership and trust in, 243–7
collective good economic integration and, 17–18, 316–22
economic theory of clubs and, 112–17
exploitation of great by small in financing of, 72
collective leadership ideology equality principle and, 236–7
European Union and, 14–15
in regional integration, 289–94
collective responsibility legitimacy crisis and, 202–7
public goods provision and, 118–19
Commission White Book, Open Method of Coordination and, 68–70
Committee of Independent Experts, 252–3
EC investigation by, 196
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)
CAP financial regulation and, 248–9
personal relations among, 128–9
powers of, 129–34
common agency, multiple principles and, 101–7
‘common agency’, ECJ and member states, 101–7
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 11–12
elitism and, 15–16
executive authority for, 247–8
financial regulation for, 248–9
influence costs of, 137–9
interventionism in, 159–60
limitations of, 59
monetary policies of, 22–3
policy failures of, 222–4
positive integration and, 92–5
‘social Europe’ model and, 215–16
total harmonization and, 253–4
common currency. See also euro zone; exchange rates
British scepticism concerning, 47–8
EU proposals for, 26–8
external value of, 28–9
fragility of, 47–52
limitations of, 8
monetary union and role of, 20–1
negative economic impact of, 133–4
proposals for, 29
public opinion concerning, 9–12
risks of, 76–7
scepticism concerning, 213–14
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
consensus vs. national interests in, 253–7
constitutional reforms proposals of, 252–3
EJC exclusion from, 104–5
Iraq war and, 255–6
monetary union and, 249–52
common market formation economic integration and, 92–5
harmonization policies and, 36–7
Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC), 89–90
Community method
CAP and failure of, 222–4
debate over legacy of, 226
monopolistic power of, 129–34
obsolescence of, 216–26
Open Method of Coordination as alternative to, 232–5
relational contracting and, 124–5
weakness of European Commission and, 224–5
‘community of destiny’, Merkel’s characterization of EMU as, 70, 72–4
‘Community preferences’, CAP failures and, 222–4
compensating fiscal transfers, monetary union and, 49–50
competitiveness cooperative competition, 269–73
costs of euro zone withdrawal and, 84–5
| ‘European miracle’ and, 266–9 | EU policymaking and absence of, 20–1 |
| exit and voice and, 274–6 | total optimism culture and failure to develop it, 58–62 |
| Germany’s improvement in, 259–60 | contract enforcement |
| of nation states, 299–303 | acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7 |
| neoliberalism in EU and, 159–60 | asset specificity and, 122 |
| peripheral euro members’ loss of, 41–2 | competition through exit and voice and, 274–6 |
| competitive stability | cost analysis of, 118–24 |
| of confederations, 278–9 | opportunism and, 121–2 |
| supranational monitoring of, 276–80 | in regional organizations, 5–8 |
| Completing the Internal Market (White Paper), 219–20, 249–52 | transaction costs of politics and, 119–21 |
| confederations | control, common agency and loss of, 101–7 |
| competitive advantage of nations vs., 300–1 | Convention on the Future of Europe, 112–13 |
| competitive stability in, 278–9 | EC marginalization and, 252–3 |
| Congress (US), Federal Reserve and, 167–8 | convergence criteria |
| conservative preferences, monetary integration and, 129–34 | acquis communautaire and, 39–41, 123 |
| Constitutional Convention of the United States, 185–7 | EMU and disregard of, 24, 60–1 |
| ‘constitutionalization’ of European law, direct effect and supremacy principles and, 99–100 | euro zone impact on borrowing and inflation and, 46–7 |
| constitutional principles | intra-jurisdictional competition and, 280 |
| deeper integration and limits of, 144–8 | monetary stability and, 175–6 |
| ECB quasi-constitutional status and, 173–4 | myth of European prosperity and, 78–83 |
| in Rome Treaty, 151 | cooperative competition, economic integration and, 269–73 |
| WTO jurisprudence and, 107–10 | corporate charters, competition for, 274–6 |
| Constitutional Treaty | Costa v. ENEL case, 100–1 |
| absence of trust and failure of ratification, 245–7 | Council of Economic Advisers of the US President, 76–7 |
| enhanced cooperation in, 227–8 | Council of Europe |
| expansion of EU powers and, 191–2 | absence of government–opposition dialectic in, 236–7 |
| French and Dutch rejection of, 61–2, 109–10, 134–9, 147–8, 154, 160–1, 177–8, 186–7, 212 | EMS discussions by, 26–8 |
| rejection of, 64–5, 70–2 | equality principle and policies of, 236–7 |
| ‘Constructivist’ theory, absence of trust and, 245–7 | expansion of powers for, 191–2 |
| contingency plans | Greek financial crisis and, 139–41 |
| absence in euro zone of, 74–8 | national interest motives and, 134–9 |
| absence of trust and, 245–7 | Presidency Conclusions of, 109–10 |
INDEX

Council of Ministers
German Bundesrat compared with, 66
information, bargaining and
influence of, 134–9
national interest motives and, 134–9
Rome Treaty provisions concerning, 124–5
unanimous voting by, 248–9
Court of First Instance (EU), 9
courts of law
accountability deficit in, 192–6
eyear transregional networks in, 268–9
economic integration through, 97–101
as independent non-majoritarian
institutions, 168–70
Cowen, Brian, 31–2
Creative Destruction principle, 273
creative public finance, opportunism
and, 139–41
credible commitments
delegation of powers and, 129–34
ECB independence and barriers to, 173–4
EMU policies and, 126–7
German reunification impact on, 127
non-majoritarian institutions and
democratic government, 165–70
reputation building and, 128–9
Stability and Growth Pact and, 127–8
statutory regulation and, 166–7
technology of commitment
strategies concerning, 125–6
transaction costs and, 124–9
Cuba missile crisis, 73
cultural actions, promotion of EU
statehood using, 66–7
culture audit, EU political culture and, 61–2
currency-basket mechanism,
monetary union negotiations and, 26–8
currency fluctuations
economic conditions as trigger for, 76–7
monetary union discussions and, 23
CUSTA. See Canada–United States
Trade Agreement
customs union
economic integration and, 92–5
effect on trade of, 156–7
EMU as replacement for, 23
international trade effects of, 157–8
Czech Republic
common currency issue and, 41–2
differentiated integration and, 228–30
public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
Dahl, Robert, 168–70
Dahrendorf, Ralph, 16–17, 112–13,
116–17, 229–30
economic theory of clubs and, 112–17, 318–20
Dashwood, Alan, 38–9, 244
Dayton Agreement, 82–3
decision-making cost function,
collective decision making and, 238–40
deep integration
costitutional and political limits of,
144–8
deepening economic integration,
evolution of, 91–2
Hayek on distributive effects of, 141–4
non-European regional integration
as response to, 281–2
race to, 303–8
regionalism and, 282–3
regionalism and goals of, 1–3
scepticism concerning, 160–1
shallow integration vs., 88–90
de facto monetary union
acquis communautaire policies and, 43–4
confederation limitations and, 208–11
exit strategies and, 83–7
gold standard and, 149–50
opt-outs in, 41–2
unintended consequences of, 232–5
defence union proposal, EU foreign
policy divisions and, 255–6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deficit reduction</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective responsibility paradigm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>euro zone requirements for</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Gauze, Charles</td>
<td>236–7, 245–7, 247–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Gruwe, Paul</td>
<td>80, 148, 232–5, 248–9, 259–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Haan, J.</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de jure monetary union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gold standard and</td>
<td>149–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opt-outs in</td>
<td>83–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unintended consequences of</td>
<td>232–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delegation of powers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic integration and</td>
<td>129–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in European Central Bank</td>
<td>173–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-majoritarian institutions and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic government</td>
<td>165–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delors, Jacques</td>
<td>18–19, 24–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on EC leadership</td>
<td>247–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as EC president</td>
<td>248–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMC and</td>
<td>28–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS project and</td>
<td>26–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on federation of Europe</td>
<td>66–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal market initiative</td>
<td>249–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monnet method and</td>
<td>49–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy in America (Tocqueville)</td>
<td>278–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic deficit, economic integration</td>
<td>196–202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic deficit problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountability deficit in</td>
<td>192–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB independence and</td>
<td>173–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elitist views of integration and</td>
<td>182–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU expansion of powers and</td>
<td>190–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament as solution to</td>
<td>179–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in European Union institutions</td>
<td>52–7, 119–21, 129–34, 141–4, 154–60, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration policies linked to</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission monopoly and</td>
<td>129–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitations for EU of</td>
<td>52–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-majoritarian institutions and</td>
<td>165–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transaction costs of politics and</td>
<td>119–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acquis communautaire policies and</td>
<td>43–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>euro zone scepticism in</td>
<td>110–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opt-outs by</td>
<td>81–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejection of integration by</td>
<td>147–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>depoliticization principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monetary union and centrality of</td>
<td>149–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national sovereignty and</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deregulation, negative integration and</td>
<td>92–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Spiegel</td>
<td>84, 196–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developing countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precautionary Principle impact</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regional integration in</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Welt am Sonntag</td>
<td>46–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Zeit</td>
<td>187–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differentiated integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessity for</td>
<td>228–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theories of</td>
<td>16–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diffuse accountability, policy issues</td>
<td>67–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct effect doctrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judiciary impact on economic integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and, 97–101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preliminary-ruling judgments and</td>
<td>101–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO jurisprudence and</td>
<td>107–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single market initiatives and</td>
<td>220–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), 280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution Panel (WTO), Beef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hormones dispute and</td>
<td>89–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispute settlement mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in CUSTA, 286–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flexible and decentralized models</td>
<td>106–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in NAFTA, 287–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in regional trade organizations, 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO jurisprudence and</td>
<td>88–90, 107–10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distributive effects of deep integration, 141–4
microeconomic theory concerning, 151–4
Precautionary Principle (PP) example of, 158
Dixit, Avinash
on delegation of powers, 133–4
on transaction cost analysis, 118–19
on transaction costs of politics, 119–21
D-Mark (Deutsche Mark)
European Monetary System and, 77–8
impact on monetary union of, 86–7
sacrifice of, in single currency system, 39–41
'tyranny of', 25–32, 60–1
dollar
euro levels against, 174–5
as global monetary standard, 22–3
import volume and fluctuations in, 76–7
Dougan, M., 61–2
Downs, Anthony, 121, 123–4, 188
DSB (dispute settlement bodies). See dispute settlement mechanisms
DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding). See dispute settlement mechanisms
Duisenberg, Wim, 58, 127–8
Eastern Europe
accession negotiations, feasibility analysis of, 63–4
acquis communautaire imposition in, 44–5
anti-EU demonstrations in, 201
German constitutional influence in, 144–8
importance of national sovereignty in, 110–12
monetary union in, 249–52
opposition to political integration in, 39–41
ECOFIN. See European Union Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN)
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
accountability deficit and, 192–6
adverse selection and moral hazard risk and, 44–5
credible commitment strategies in formation of, 126–7
Delors’s advancement of, 249–52
embrace of, 25–6
German unification and, 127
limitations of, 3–5, 18–19
misleading ECB/Bundesbank analogies and, 52–7
neoliberalist politics and, 155–6
policy harmonization paradox and, 36–42
political divisions within, 83–7
political union initiatives and, 97–101
proposals for, 26–8
rhetoric of, 20–1
Stability and Growth Pact and, 32–6
tensions in planning of, 22–5
tenth anniversary of, 70–2
total optimism culture and decisions concerning, 60–1
two-speed Europe model and, 231–2
economic integration
accountability deficit and legitimacy of, 192–6
Balassa’s hierarchy of, 92–5
cooperative competition, 269–73
credible commitment issues and, 124–9
current European initiatives for, 12–18
decoupling of politics from, 149–78
deepening integration, 91–2
declegation of powers and, 129–34
functionalist approach to, 16–17
functional vs. territorial integration, 112–17
harmonization policies and, 37–8
institutional flexibility and, 112
judiciary and, 97–101
legal centralism and, 110–12
monetary union and, 20–1
national sovereignty and, 298–9
as neoliberal distortion of social welfare, 154
Index

new regionalism and, 1–3
popular vote on EU referendums for, 187–9
positive and negative integration, 92–5
postwar patterns of, 12–18
public opinion concerning, 9–12, 184
referendum threat and, 184–9
shallow vs. deep integration, 88–90
social Europe model and, 211–16
threat of democratic default in, 196–202
trilemma of hyperinflation and, 308–13
unintended consequences of, 232–5
economic performance, limits of regionalism’s impact on, 3–5
economic shocks, common currency and impact of, 76–7
economic stagnation, European Union and, 3–5
Economic Survey of the European Union 2007 (OECD), 220–2
economic theory of clubs, 17–18
functional integration and, 112–17
integration and, 318–20
economic union, economic integration and, 92–5
economist bloc countries, EMU discussions and role of, 23–5
The Economist, 76–7, 179–82
analysis of EU in, 11–12
effectiveness
accountability deficit concerning, 192–6
legitimacy linked to, 81–2, 189–92, 219–20
efficiency criteria
competitive stability and, 276–80
microeconomic theory concerning, 151–4
Eichengreen, J., 39–40
elections for European Parliament declining participation in, 52–7, 67–8
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82

elite-driven integration
constitutional issues in European integration and role of, 144–8
democratic deficit problem and disconnect with citizens, 179–82
effectiveness and legitimacy of integration and, 190–1
EU political integration and, 15–16
judiciary impact on economic integration and, 100–1
neofunctionalist ideology of, 160, 202
positive integration benefits for, 92–5
referendum threat and ‘federalist deficit’ and, 185–7
thesmos and nomos concepts and, 182–4
El País, 66–7
employment, weak EU performance in, 78–83
Empty Chair Crisis, 236–7, 247–8
‘enhanced’ cooperation. See closer cooperation, in ‘more Europe’ paradigm
Enlightenment ideology, role of legislation in, 182–4
entrepreneurial competition model, economic integration and, 273
entry mechanisms, inter-jurisdictional competition, 274–6
environmental regulation positive integration and, 94–5
transboundary externalities and, 318–20
equality principle
collective decision-making costs and, 238–40
in European Union, 236–7
EU transformation and, 264–5
equal pay principle
negative integration and, 95–7
welfare state ascendancy and, 150–1
Erhard, Ludwig, 156–7
Esping-Andersen, G., 214
Estonia, acquis communautaire negotiations and, 44–5
EULEX mission, 196
common foreign policy limits and, 254–5
Eurobonds proposal, 265
Euro-Group
European Central Bank and, 32–6
European Stability Mechanism established by, 73–4
limited powers of, 52–7
‘Europe ’92’ campaign, 191–2, 249–52
Europe 1992 programme, 9
Europe 2020 project, 4–5
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 100–1, 155–6
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 139–41
European Central Bank (ECB)
accountability deficit of, 314
Bundesbank comparisons with, 164
delegation of powers to, 129–34
economic governance framework for, 175
European Monetary System and, 77–8
euro zone crisis, lack of preparation by, 74–8
Greek financial crisis and, 30–2, 139–41
Growth and Stability Pact, 32–6
independence of, 155–6, 173–4
inflation and independence of, 175–6
interest rates set by, 46–7
‘no-bail-out’ clause of EMC concerning, 28–9
as non-majoritarian institution, 173–4
performance evaluations of, 81
political independence of, 52–7
public opinion concerning, 9–12
Stability and Growth Policy and, 32–6
surveillance duties of, 199–200
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 27–8, 100–1, 155–6
European Commission (EC)
absence of government-opposition dialectic in, 236–7
accountability deficit in, 192–6
acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7
agenda-setting monopoly of, 129–34, 217–19
Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
bias towards integration in, 129–34
direct elections proposal for, 252–3
euro zone crisis and policies of, 74–8
expansion of powers for, 191–2
feasibility analysis of CEEC enlargement and, 63–4
as federal symbol, 66
federation as goal of, 66–7
Greek financial crisis and, 139–41
growing weakness of, 224–5
incomplete contracts policies of, 105–6
independence from national governments in, 176–7
influence costs in, 137–9
information, bargaining and influence of, 134–9
leadership potential of, 247–53
legislative monopoly of, 52–7
liberalization of port services by, 289–94
mass resignations from, 196, 252–3
monetary union and, 249–52
multiplicity of roles for, 121–2
multi-speed Europe model and, 230–1
Open Method of Coordination critiqued by, 68–70
opposition to EMS by, 26–8
policy harmonization and, 36–7
Single Market Project and, 29
size of, 224–5
structure of, 14–15
surveillance duties of, 197–8, 199–200
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 13
European Council. See Council of Europe
European Court of Auditors, 196, 254–5
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), creation of, 13
INDEX

European Court of Justice (ECJ)
absence of self-restraint in, 170–8
acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7
Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979, 37, 305–6
collective responsibility paradigm and rulings by, 203
Common Agricultural Policy rulings of, 159–60
compulsory jurisdiction over default in, 285–6
constitutional disenchantment and, 109–10
economic integration through, 97–101
EU member states and, 101–7
as federation court, 66
harmonization policies and, 36–7
incomplete contracts rulings by, 105–6
jurisdictional limits of, 124–5
legal centralism and, 110–12
national courts’ relationship with, 101–7
national sovereignty and impact of, 151–4
negative integration in rulings of, 95–7
political insularity of, 164
Stability and Growth Pact and, 35
Tobacco Advertising judgment, 38–9
WTO jurisprudence and, 107–10
European Courts, EU dispute settlement and, 7
European Currency Unit (ECU), monetary union negotiations and, 26–8
European Directive 81/602, 89–90
European Directive 85/358, 89–90
European Economic Community (EEC) acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7
Coase theorem implications in, 151–4
decoupling of economics and politics by, 149–50
establishment of, 9, 100–1, 280–1
exchange rate alterations by, 23–5
exit scenarios from, 83–7
expansion of, 1–3
as first regionalism example, 1–3
German Federal Republic as model for, 66
limited economic performance of, 3–5
limited impact on economic development of, 182–4
monetary union planning following establishment of, 22
neofunctionalism ideology and, 160
neoliberal bias in, 154–60
peace and stability aspirations of, 82–3
policy harmonization and, 92–5
relational contracting in provisions of, 124–5
Snake arrangement, 25–6
unanimity principle in, 236–7
European Governance (White Paper), 9–10, 21
obsolescence of Community method and, 216–17
process vs. outcomes in, 78–83
total optimism culture expressed in, 67–8
European integration from collective good to club good, 316–22
decoupling of politics and economics and, 149–78
economic costs of, 78–83
German brinkmanship concerning, 72–4
integration á la carte theory and, 16–17
integration by law principle, 8
integration by stealth principle, 12
peace and stability linked to, 82–3
process vs. outcomes analysis of, 78–83
European law, thesmos and nomos and, 182–4
European Law Journal, 210–11
European Monetary System (EMS)
    Bundesbank opposition to, 166–7
    early success of, 77–8
    German executive decisions concerning, 146–7
    monetarist opposition to, 26–8
    price convergence and credible commitments of, 126–7
    ‘tyranny of the Mark’ and, 25–6

European Parliament (EP)
    absence of government–opposition dialectic in, 164–5
    democratic deficit of, 164
    direct election of, 15–16
    EU legitimacy problems and role of, 179–82
    information, bargaining and influence of, 134–9
    multi-speed Europe model and, 230–1
    pressures on European Commission by, 224–5
    ‘European Parliamentary Organ’ model, 230–1

European Political Cooperation, Trevi Group and, 125–6

European Political Union (EPU)
    proposals for, 49–50
    revival of, 249–52

European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
    Euro-Group establishment of, 73–4
    German constitutional influence on, 144–8

European states system, economic integration and, 13–14

European Statistical Office, economic growth statistics from, 4–5

European Summit of 2006, 245–7

European System of Central Banks, 155–6

European Union (EU)
    accountability deficit in, 192–6
    Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
    ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2003, 18–19
    centralized authority structure in, 106–7

CJEU, WTO and constitutional narrative of, 107–10
    common foreign policy and, 253–7
    competition rules in, 159–60
    current reassessment of, 12–18
    deepening integration in, 91–2
    ECJ and, 101–7
    economic integration goals of, 3–5
    effectiveness linked to legitimacy in, 189–92
    equality principle in, 67–8
    exit scenarios from, 83–7
    feasibility analysis of CEEC enlargement, 63–4
    ‘Governance Turn’ in, 67–8
    Greek financial crisis and, 30–2
    influence costs in, 137–9
    inter-jurisdictional competition in, 232–5
    leadership tensions with, 14–15
    limits of political integration in, 8–12
    Lisbon Strategy and, 4–5
    mediocre economic growth in, 78–83
    modes of unity within, 13–14
    neoliberal bias in, 154–60
    non-majoritarian institutions in, 170–8
    ‘occupation regime’ characterization of, 200–1
    opposition to expansion of, 46–7
    powers expanded by, 15, 190–1
    public opinion concerning, 9–12
    referendum threat and ‘federalist deficit’ for, 185–7
    rejection of, by other regions, 8–12
    singularity of, 3–5
    social and political diversity in, 112–13
    sovereign debt crisis and, 9–12
European Union Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), 32, 34, 35, 197–8
collective responsibility paradigm and, 203
surveillance duties of, 197–8, 199
European Unity on the Rocks. Greeks and Germans at Polar Opposites (Pew), 9–12
euro zone. See also common currency absence of contingency planning in, 74–8
adverse selection and moral hazard in debt crisis, 121–2, 139–41
brinkmanship over debt crisis in, 72–4
budgetary surveillance in, 197–8
collective responsibility in, 202–7
creditor and debt countries in, 85–6
crisis as opportunity for, 208–11
Economic and Monetary Union and crisis of, 20–1
economic crisis of, 50–1
equality challenges in crisis of, 264–5
EU leadership confusion over crisis in, 74–8
European Central Bank and crisis in, 52–7
European integration linked to, 70–2
European unification as crisis solution, 161–2
fragility and incompleteness of, 47–52
German constitutional influence in, 144–8
German hegemony in, 260
introduction of, 29–30
Monti’s discussion of, 29–30
national governments’ concerns over, 174–5
‘no-bail-out’ clause of EMC concerning, 28–9
opt-out predictions concerning, 83–7
‘Pact for Competitiveness’ and, 196–7
public opinion concerning, 9–12, 184
reluctant hegemon problem and crisis in, 257–64
Stability Pact and, 8, 33–4
total optimism culture concerning, 58–62
two-speed Europe model and, 231–2
unintended consequences of, 232–5
withdrawal from, 83–7
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
Bulgarian national currency and, 44
distortions in, 25–6
French resistance to, 26–8
exchange rates. See also common currency; fixed exchange rates
collective responsibility for, 204
distortions in, 25–6
EMU policy discussions and, 23–5
European Economic Community discussion of, 22–3
expansion of EU and, 39–41
Maastricht Treaty policy gaps concerning, 34
volatility impact on trade, debate concerning, 76–7
executive powers, in German constitutional law, 146–7
exit mechanisms, inter-jurisdictional competition, 274–6
exit option, medieval competition and, 268–9
external benchmark mechanism, inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6
external costs of collective decisions, 238–40
external monetary policy, absence of structures for, 28–9
fait accompli strategy collective responsibility and, 204
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82
EC agenda-setting monopoly and, 217–19
fait accompli strategy (cont.)
European integration and, 49–50
euro zone crisis and, 49–50
–
50
Germany government’s adoption of,
146–7
total optimism culture and, 58–62
Faymann, Werner, 65–6, 187, 196–7
feasibility analysis, total optimism
culture and disregard of, 59, 62–6
federalist ideology
competition through exit and voice
and, 274–6
competitive stability and, 278–9
cooperative competition and, 272–3
distributive effects of deep integration
and, 141–4
impact of fiscal crisis on, 139–41
inadmissibility of secession in, 83–7
integration through judiciary and,
97–101
judiciary impact on economic
integration and, 97–101
legal centralism and, 110–12
neoliberal bias in, 154–60
referendum threat and ‘federalist
deficit’, 185–7
supranational institutions and,
66–70, 295–9
total optimism culture and, 60
Federal Reserve Act, 167–8
Federal Reserve System (US), 167–8
accountability of, 314
ECB/Bundesbank comparisons with,
52–7
European view of, 175
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
165–6
Feldstein, Martin, 76–7, 213–14
on European Monetary System, 77–8
Financial Times, 39–41, 50–1, 54, 202,
232–5
Finland, Viking case in, 171–3
Finnish Seamen’s Union, 171–3
First Regionalism, 280–1
history of, 1–3
fiscal austerity, public opposition to, 184
Fiscal Compact, German approval of,
144–8
fiscal policies
austerity policies, public opposition
to, 9–12
decentralization in Europe of, 74–8
Fischer, Joschka, 112–13
Fisheries Policy, influence costs of,
137–9
Fitch rating agency, 30–2
fixed exchange rate, EMU ‘snake’
policy and, 25–6, 126–7
food safety regulations, EU
protectionism in use of, 158
foreign policy, EU ‘common policy’
proposals and, 253–7
France
Constitutional Treaty rejected by,
61–2, 64–5
equal pay principle advocacy by,
95–7, 150–1
German monetary disagreements
with, 27–8, 32–6
hegemonic stability theory and role
of, 257–9
monetary union negotiations and,
26–9, 155–6
public opinion on EU in, 9–12
resistance to EMU in, 33
‘tyranny of the Mark’ claims by,
25–6, 77–8
Franco-German war of 1870–71, 50–1
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 60–1,
145–6, 208–11
free trade
barriers to, 248–9
common currency impact on, 76–7
EU protectionism in food safety
regulations and, 158
mercantilism vs. liberalism
concerning, 149–50
neoliberal bias in EU and role of,
156–7
in Rome Treaty, 305–6
shallow vs. deep integration and,
88–90
Free Trade Area of regional
integration, 92–5
Free Trade Area of the Americas,
proposal for, 6
Free Trade Areas and Custom Unions, 281
French Revolution, 267–8
Frieden, J. A., 39–40
Friedman, Alan, 185
Friedman, Milton, 78, 213–14
Friedrich the Great of Prussia, 182–4
Fritz-Vannahme, J., 18–19
functionalist economic integration
economic theory of clubs and, 112–17
principles of, 16–17
territorial integration vs., 112–17
Furubotn and Richter, 118–19
Gabriel, Sigmar, 208
gender issues, negative integration and, 95–7
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
CAP reforms and, 223
dispute settlement system in, 106–7
most-favoured-nation principle and, 156–7
multilateralism and, 304–5
Rome Treaty compatibility with, 157–8
rules and enforcement mechanisms, 91–2
shallow integration and, 88–90
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 88–90
General Court (EU), 9
general population in European states
anti-EU demonstrations by, 201
conflicting attitudes on regional integration, 9–12
constitutional issues in European integration and role of, 144–8
declining EU status in, 32–6, 39–41, 52–7, 67–8
EU democratic deficit problem and lack of support from, 179–82
fait accompli strategy and role of, 139–41
on monetary union, 86–7
popular vote on EU referendums and, 187–9
‘gentleman-politicians of law’, judiciary impact on economic integration and, 100–1
geopolitics, deepening of integration and, 127
German central bank. See Deutsche Bundesbank
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (BVG), influence in EU of, 144–8
Germany
acknowledgement of euro zone crisis by, 74–8
as benevolent hegemon, 85–6
brinkmanship of leaders in, 72–4
Bundesbankgesetz law in, 166–7
Cartel Office in, 166–7
constitutional principles and political limits in, 144–8
EMU discussions and role of, 23–5
Federal Republic as model for EU institutions, 66
France’s monetary union negotiations with, 27–8, 32–6, 155–6
hegemonic stability theory and role of, 257–9, 260–2
impact of monetary union in, 39–41
inflation aversion in, 175–6
national sovereignty in, 145–6
negative integration and laws of, 95–7
opposition to EMU in, 32–6
opposition to Greek rescue plan from, 30–2
opposition to Lisbon Strategy by, 29–30
‘ordo-liberal’ school in, 151
public opinion on EU in, 9–12
referendum on treaty ratification in, 187
as reluctant hegemon, 259–60
reunification of, 127
sovereign debt crisis and, 70–2
surveillance of debtor nations’ MOUs by, 200–1
unification of, 25–6
Geyer, Christian, 146–7

globalization
  impact on nation states of, 295–9
  nation state resiliency and, 301–3
  trilemma of hyperinflation and, 308–13
goal independence, of ECB, 173–4
gold standard
  ascendancy of welfare state and, 150
  as de facto monetary system, 149–50
euro zone as reverse of, 155–6
Gormley L., 174

governance
  agency relationships and opportunism in, 121–2
  bargaining costs of, 134–9
  economic theory of clubs and, 116–17
  EU concepts of, 67–8
  judiciary independence and, 168–70
  leadership categories and, 240–3
  model of, for ECB, 173–4
  neofunctionalist view of, 162
  non-majoritarian institutions and democratic government and, 165–70
  political transaction costs reduction and, 123–4
  government, management vs., 240–1
  government by discussion model, 256–7
  government–opposition dialectic absence in EP of, 164–5
  equality principle and, 236–7
Grant, Ruth, 192–6

Greater Columbia Economic and Customs Union, 280–1

Greece
  anti-EU demonstrations in, 201
  collective responsibility paradigm and fiscal crisis in, 203
  costs of EU withdrawal for, 84–5
  EU aid to, 74–8
  euro adoption by, 58
  financial crisis in, 30–2, 50–1, 70–2
  German BVG rulings on aid for, 144–8

Memorandum of Understanding for, 199–200
  opportunism in financial crisis of, 121–2, 139–41
  pre-contractual opportunism and EMU membership, 44–5
  public opinion on EU in, 9–12
Grilli, V., 129–34
gross domestic product (GDP)
  common currency impact on, 133–4
  EU lack of growth in 1990s, 78–83
  Growth and Stability Pact (GSP). See Stability Pact and Growth Pact (EU)
The Guardian, 208–9

Haas, Ernst, 15–16, 147–8, 160, 163, 202, 297

Habermas, Jürgen, 154, 155–6, 162, 187–9, 193–4, 208–16, 299–300

Hague summit of 1969
  economic and monetary policy goals of, 126–7
  EMU discussions at, 23–5
Hallstein, Walter, 160, 247–8
Hansa, 320–1

harmonization of policy
  absence of trust and, 243–5
  Coase theorem and, 151–4
  cooperative competition and, 269–73
  criticism of, 37–8
  economic theory of clubs and, 114–15
  EMU and paradox of, 36–42
  expansion of EU and, 39–41
  free trade and, 92–5
  multiple principles and, 104–5
  in NAFTA, 287–9
  positive integration and, 92–5
  services sector expansion and, 249–52
  ‘social Europe’ model and, 213
  unintended consequences of reduction in, 232–5
  welfare state ascendency and, 150–1
Hartz, Louis, 272–3

Hayek Friedrich, 272
distributive effects of deep integration, 141–4
on government and monetary policy, 150
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, 128–9
health regulations, positive integration and, 94–5
hegemonic stability theory
euro zone crisis and, 260–3
historical and cultural aspects of, 262–4
‘Hegemon wider Willen’ (‘Unwilling Hegemon’) (Schoenberger), 260–2
Henning, C. R., 58, 204
Hirschman, Albert, 82–3
home-country approach, single market initiatives and, 220–2
Howse, R., 287–9
Hungary
anti-EU demonstrations in, 201
common currency issue and, 41–2
hyperinflation, trilemma of, 308–13
illegal immigration, lack of consensus concerning, 147–8
‘impossible trinity’, deepening integration in EU and, 91–2
incentives, common currency policy and generation of, 45–6
income level disparities
centralized harmonization and impact of, 38–9
competitive stability and, 277–8
myth of European prosperity and, 78–83
services sector expansion and, 249–52
incomplete contracts
acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7
contingencies and, 105–6
opportunistic behaviour in, 121–2
private ordering and, 111–12
in regional organizations, 5–8
relational contracting and, 124–5
incorporation debate, competition in US and, 274–6
independent regulatory agencies, powers of, 165–70
independent states, economic theory of clubs and, 115
inflation
ECB independence and, 175–6
euro-induced growth of, 46–7
European Monetary System and, 77–8
influence costs
diffusion of regionalism and, 283–5
impact on economic integration of, 137–9
information access
bargaining and influence costs and, 134–9
reputation building and, 128–9
Information and Consultation Directive, acquis communautaire negotiations and, 44–5
information asymmetries, transaction costs of politics and, 119–21
institutionalization
Coase theorem and levels of, 151–4
regionalization and absence of, 1–3, 7
instrumental rationality, transaction cost analysis and, 118–19
instrument independence, of ECB, 173–4
integration à la carte
differentiated integration as, 228–30
functional vs. territorial integration and, 112–13
theory of, 16–17
integration by stealth principle
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82
euro zone crisis and, 12
integration through law principle
EU regional model and, 8
private ordering vs. legal centralism and, 285–6
thesmos and nomos concepts and, 182–4
intellectual property protections, shallow vs. deep integration and, 88–90
interest groups, influence costs of, 137–9
intergovernmentalism
  European Commission weakness and, 224–5
  obsolescence of, 225–6
inter-jurisdictional competition
  in EU, 232–5
  medieval models of, 268–9
  supranational monitoring of, 280
  Tiebout hypothesis of, 274–6
internal security, Lisbon Treaty provisions concerning, 125–6
international competitiveness, ECB focus on, 54
International Herald Tribune, 208
International Labour Organization, 89
international law, judiciary impact on economic integration and, 99–100
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
  euro overvaluation and, 174–5
  Greek financial crisis and, 30–2, 139–41
  multilateralism and, 304–5
  role in euro zone crisis, 74–8
  shallow integration and, 88–90
Stability and Growth Policy and, 33–4
  surveillance duties of, 199–200
international monetary system, currency crises of 1960s and, 23
international rating agencies, Greek financial crisis and, 139–41
international trade, neoliberal bias in, 157–8
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 171–3
interstate bargaining, transaction costs of, 134–9
Interstate Commerce Act (US), 165–6
Interstate Commerce Commission (US), 165–6
interventionism
  gold standard and rise of, 150
  mercantilist ideology and, 149–50
  in Rome Treaty, 159–60
Ipsen, Hans Peter, 66
Ipsos–Publicis survey, public opinion on EU and, 11
Iraq war, EU foreign policy divisions over, 255–6
Ireland
  EU and IMF aid for, 31–2
  financial crisis in, 50–1, 70–2
  German BVG rulings on aid for, 144–8
  inflation growth and common currency in, 46–7
  Lisbon Treaty rejected by, 65–6, 160–1, 177–8, 185–7
  Memorandum of Understanding for, 199–200
irreversible investments
  asset specificity and, 122
  EC/EU membership as, 123
Issing, Otmar, 51–2, 80
Italy
  public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
  referendum on treaty ratification in, 187
  technocratic regime in, 202
  withdrawal from Exchange Rate Mechanism by, 25–6
Joerges, C., 151, 171–3
Johnson, Harry, 37–8
joint-supply property of collective goods, 112–17
Jones, Eric, 13–14, 141–4, 321–2
  on ‘European Miracle’, 267–8
Joseph II of Austria, 182–4
judiciary
  accountability deficit in, 192–6
  early transregional networks in, 268–9
  economic integration through, 97–101
  as independent non-majoritarian institution, 168–70
Judt, Tony, 27–8
Juncker, Jean-Claude, 134–9, 196–7
Juppé, Alain, 33–4
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
  EJC exclusion from, 104–5
  lack of credible commitment in, 125–6
  monetary union and, 249–52
INDEX

Kagan, Robert, 256
Kahler, Miles, 88–90, 112, 129–30, 286–7
Keiser, Max, 200–1
Kennedy, John F., 73
Keohane, Robert, 192–6, 308–13
Keynes, John Maynard, 85–6
Kiesinger, Kurt, 248–9
Kindleberger, Charles, 257–9
knowledge-based competition, national uniqueness and, 302
Kohl, Helmut, 49–50, 63–4, 127
‘checkbook diplomacy’ and, 134–9
Kojève, Alexandre, 296
Kompetenz-Kompetenz question, judiciary impact on economic integration and, 99
Kosovo
common foreign policy limits and crisis in, 254–5
EU ineffectiveness regarding, 82–3, 196
Krstew, Iwan, 201
Krugman, Paul, 213–14
labour mobility. See also employment common currency and impact of, 76–7
ECJ judgments’ impact on, 171–3
EU Services Directive and, 289–94
monetary union and, 49–50
single market initiatives and, 220–2
labour rights, ECJ ruling on limits of, 171–3
Lamfalussy, Alexandre, 249–52
Lammer, Norbert, 46–7
Lamy, Pascal, 49–50, 217–19, 242–3
Landes, David, 266–7, 295
Langyel, Làzlò, 201
Laterme, Yves, 196–7
Latin America
proposed expansion of NAFTA in, 5–8
regional trade expansion and, 1
Latin American Free Trade Association, 280–1
Latin Monetary Union, 50–1
Laval case, ECJ ruling in, 171–3
Lawson, Nigel, 47–8
leadership
European Commission potential for, 247–53
failures of, 241–2
governance and, 240–3
hegemonic stability theory and, 257–9
trust and, 243–7
Leadership in Administration (Selznick), 240–1
legal centralism
primacy of European law over national law and, 171–3
private ordering vs., 285–9
regional integration and limits of, 110–12
relational contracting alternative to, 124–5
legal norms, judiciary impact on economic integration and, 97–101
Legal Service of the European Commission, 100–1
legitimacy issues
accountability deficit and, 192–6
collective responsibility and, 202–7
of courts of law, 168–70
distributive effects of integration and, 141–4
economic integration, 310–11
effectiveness linked to, 81–2, 189–92, 219–20
European Parliament role in, 179–82
in integration policies, 168–70
statutory regulation and, 166–7
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, impact in Europe of, 35–6
 Lenaerts, K., 177–8
Lewis, Jeffrey, 128–9
liberal economics
policy harmonization and, 36–7
in postwar Europe, 155
’social Europe’ model and, 213–14
Libyan crisis of 2011, EU foreign policy divisions and, 255–6
Lindberg, Leon, 222–4
Lipset, Martin, 81–2, 190, 313
Lisbon European Council, Open Method of Coordination and, 271
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs failure of, 4–5, 29–30 feasibility analysis of, 62–6
Open Method of Coordination and, 68–70
Lisbon Summit of 2000, lack of credible commitment in, 125–6
INDEX

membership size
regional integration and, 283–5
of regional organizations, 5–8
Members of European Parliament (MEPs)
national vs. common interest conflict for, 52–7
neutralarity embraced by, 164–5
Memorandum of Understanding, political transaction costs of provisions in, 199–200
MEPs. See Members of European Parliament (MEPs)
mercantilism, state power and international trade under, 149–50
MERCOSUR (Mercado Comùn del Sur) commitments and resources in, 289–94
executive structure in, 282–3
influence costs of, 137–9
limitations of, 2–3
limits on supranational institutions in, 105–6
member countries in, 5–8, 283–5
organizational structure of, 2
Merkel, Angela, 9–10, 70–2
allegations of constitutional violations against, 146–7
brinkmanship practices of, 72–4
‘checkbook diplomacy’ and, 134–9
on common foreign policy, 254–5
‘Pact for Competitiveness’ and, 196–7
microeconomic theory, efficiency and distributive criteria and, 151–4
Microsoft case, 95–7
Middle Ages, inter-jurisdictional competition in, 268–9
Middle East, EU foreign policy divisions and, 256
Milgrom, J., 134–9, 151–4, 283–5
Milward A. S., 297
minimal harmonization, 36–7
Mishler, W., 168–70
misleading analogies of ECB and Bundesbank, 52–7
of EU to statehood institutions, 66
Mitrany, David, 16–17, 225–6, 318–20
economic theory of clubs and, 116–17
monetarist bloc countries EMU discussions and, 23–5
judiciary impact on economic integration and, 99–100
opposition to EMU from, 26–8
monetary policies
democratic deficit in, 174
Federal Reserve/ECB comparisons, 52–7
national governments’ role in, 174–5
monetary union. See also Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
absence of, in CUSTA/NAFTA agreements, 289
accountability deficit concerning, 192–6, 313–16
acquis communautaire policies and, 42–7
adverse selection and moral hazard risk and, 44–5
collective responsibility principle and, 202–7
deepening integration and, 91–2
differentiated integration and, 228–30
ECB/Bundesbank analogies and, 52–7
European federal government promotion with, 66–7
expansion of EU and, 39–41
fragility and incompleteness of, 47–52
German unification and, 127
impact on borrowing rates of, 46–7
income and employment instability and, 76–7
as irreversible investment, 123
limitations of, 18–19
mediocre economic results of, 78–83
as metaphor, 20–1
national governments’ role in, 174–5
neofunctionalist theory and, 164
as neoliberal project, allegations of, 155–6
monetary union (cont.)
opportunist behaviour and, 129–34
paradox of policy harmonization and, 36–42
political union link to, 47–52, 74–8, 97–101
process vs. outcomes orientation and, 78–83
Single Market Project and, 29
'social Europe' model and, 211–16
total optimism culture and decisions concerning, 60–1, 74–8
'tyranny of the mark' and, 25–32
unintended consequences of, 232–5
withdrawal from, 83–7
monistic theory, neofunctionalist ideology and, 162
Monnet, Jean, 160, 161–2, 163
on leadership, 242–3
Monnet method
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82
EC agenda-setting monopoly and, 217–19
effectiveness and legitimacy of integration and, 190–1
European integration and, 49–50
total optimism culture and, 58
monopoly power
negative integration and, 95–7
neoliberal bias in EU and role of, 156–7
Monti, Mario, 29–30, 116–17, 202, 220–2
moral hazard
acquis communautaire negotiations and risk of, 44–5
collective responsibility and, 204–7
euro zone debt crisis, 139–41
monetary union rules and, 129–34
transaction costs of, 121–2
Moravcsik, Andrew, 160
'more Europe' paradigm
closer cooperation as goal of, 226–32
competitive advantage of nations and, 300–1
euro zone crisis and embrace of, 208–11
obsolescence of Community method and, 216–17
unintended consequences of, 232–5
most-favoured-nation principle
free trade and, 156–7
WTO jurisprudence and, 107–10
Muenchau, Wolfgang, 39–41, 54
multilateralism
GATT institutions and, 304–5
liberal economists' preference for, 156–7
monetary stability and, 23
regionalism and, 1–3
trillemma of hyperinflation and, 308–13
multiple principles
EJC decisions' impact on, 101–7
opportunism and, 121–2
multiple tasks, of European Commission, 104–5
multi-speed Europe model
deep integration and, 230–1
differentiated integration and, 228–30
euro zone and, 231–2
Mundell–Fleming theorem, trillemma of hyperinflation and, 309
Mussler, Werner, 60–1
mutual recognition principle
harmonization policies and, 37
Single Market Project, 270–1
NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement
Nalebuff, B., 72–4
narrow-sense leadership, 240–1
national budgets, EU oversight of, 9–12
National Bureau of Economic Research, 76–7
national economic interests, conflict with European 'common interest', 52–7
National Industrial Recovery Act, 165–6
national interests, bargaining costs and, 134–9
nationalization of industry, postwar liberalism and, 155
national laws and courts  
ECJ rulings limiting decisions by, 171–3 
suspension of proceedings for EU judgments, 101–7
national sovereignty  
absence of trust and return to, 245–7 
collective decision-making costs and, 238–40 
common EU foreign policy and, 256–7 
competitive stability and, 279 
ecoconomic integration and, 298–9 
gold standard and, 149–50 
limits on deep integration of, 144–8, 187–9 
Stability Treaty restrictions on, 144–8, 199 
supranational institutions and, 124–9 
trilemma of hyperinflation and, 308–13
nation states. See also statehood model  
competitive advantage of, 299–303 
cooperative competition and authority of, 272–3 
credible commitments by, 129–34 
distributive effects of deep integration and limits of, 141–4 
European Union vs., 52–7, 66–7 
globalization as threat to, 295–9 
hostility to public opinion in, 179–82 
inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6 
markets as complement to, 302–3 
resiliency of, 163–4 
rise of welfare state and, 150–1 
Stability Treaty surveillance of, 199
negative integration  
negative law and, 184 
positive side of, 95–7 
principles of, 92–5 
Single Market Project and revival of, 249–52
neoclassical economics  
cooperative competition and, 273 
neofunctionalism and, 162
neofunctionalist theory  
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82 
effectiveness and legitimacy of integration and, 190–1 
elitism and, 15–16 
falacy of, 160–5 
trail integration theories and, 141–4, 147–8 
nation state resiliency and, 163–4, 295–9 
neoclassical economics and, 162 
technocratic decision making and, 164, 202
neoliberal bias  
evidence in EC/EU for, 154–60 
limits in EU of, 159–60
Netherlands  
Constitutional Treaty rejected by, 61–2, 64–5 
EMU discussions and role of, 23–5 
Pact for Competitiveness opposition in, 70–2
New Commonwealth Quarterly, 141–4
Nice Treaty, 104–5 
absence of trust and, 243–5 
Article 43 of, 227 
EC marginalization and, 252–3 
Nicolaidis, K., 220–2
Nida-Ruemelin, J., 187–9, 193–4, 208–11, 299–300
Nixon, Richard, 25
‘no-bail-out’ clause  
adoption of, 28–9 
legitimacy problems for, 174
nomos (Greek law of the people), 109 
European law and, 182–4 
non-delegation doctrine, non-majoritarian institutions and democratic government and, 165–6 
non-majoritarian institutions  
accountability deficit in, 192–6 
democratic government and, 165–70 
EU examples of, 170–8 
political embeddedness of, 177–8
non-observability of agent action, transaction costs of politics and, 119–21
non-verifiability of information, transaction costs of politics and, 119–21

Noonan, Michael, 200–1
North, Douglass, 118–19
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) commitments and resources in, 289–94
CUSTA compared with, 7
deispute resolution mechanisms in, 112
EC/EU expansion as impetus for, 1–3
flexible, decentralized rule enforcement in, 106–7
influence costs of, 137–9
legal centralism vs. private ordering in, 287–9
limits on forced integration in, 8
member countries in, 5–8, 283–5
monetary union and economic integration and, 289
regional integration and, 281–2
supranational institutions limited by, 105–6
trade relations and, 76–7
trilateral commission in, 283
North American Free Trade Commission, 283

The Observer, 208
Olson, Mancur, 72, 243, 264–5, 316–17
O’Neill, Larthlaith, 188
One Market, One Money (European Commission), 29

Open Method of Coordination (OMC) cooperative competition and, 271
governance paradigms and, 68–70
inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6
unintended consequences of, 232–5
‘Open Method of Coordination’, launching of, 224–5
opportunism barging costs and, 134–9
collective responsibility and, 204–7
transaction costs and, 121–2
option harmonization, 36–7
opt-out provisions
abuse of trust and, 245–7
de jure and de facto divisions, 83–7
differentiated integration and, 228–30
in Lisbon Treaty, 65–6
permissive consensus and, 81–2
Orbán, Victor, 201
ordo-liberal school (Germany), 151
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 320
Ortega y Gasset, José, 60, 296–7, 299–300
outcomes criteria
monetary union and, 78–83
regionalism, 3–5
output vagueness, opportunism and, 121–2
‘Overseas Territories’, Rome Treaty provisions concerning, 157–8

‘Pact for Competitiveness’ Merkel’s proposal for, 70–2
negative reactions to, 196–7, 232
unintended consequences of, 232–5
Panama Refining Co. vs. Ryan, 165–6
Papademos, Lucas, 202
parallelism, of political and monetary union, scepticism concerning, 48
Paris Treaty of 1951, 100–1, 155–6
Parker, Geoffrey, 59–60
parliamentary systems, referendum threat and ‘federalist deficit’ and, 185–7
Parvulescu, Cristian, 201
Pax Americana, hegemony of, 262–4
Pax Britannica, hegemony of, 262–4
peace, myth of European integration linked to, 82–3
Peace of Westphalia of 1648, 264–5, 267–8
pension restructuring, negative integration and, 95–7
INDEX

permissive consensus
common EU foreign policy and, 253–7
disregard of popular support and, 147–8
EU formation and principle of, 8–12
EU performance evaluation and, 81–2
total optimism culture and, 59
Peterson, P. E., 167–8
Pew Research Center, public opinion surveys on European Union by, 9–12
Philip II (King of Spain), 59–60
piecemeal integration, technology of commitment and, 125–6
Pinzer, P., 18–19
Piris, Jean-Claude, 20–1, 56
on closer cooperation objectives, 230
‘European Parliamentary Organ’ model and, 230–1
on EU socioeconomic diversity, 112–13
on influence costs, 137–9
on single markets, 116–17
two-speed Europe model and, 231–2, 289–94
Plamenatz, John, 240–1, 243, 247–8
plurilateral agreements, shallow vs. deep integration and, 88–90
Poland
acquis communautaire negotiations and, 44–5
EU membership and, 18–19
political equality in 16th and 17th centuries in, 236–7
public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
resistance to monetary union in, 39–41
single market initiatives and, 220–2
support for EU in, 201
Polanyi, Michael, 62
deploying of policy
policy harmonization. See harmonization of policy
policy making
courts’ impact on, 168–70
feasibility studies and, 62–6
governance structures and, 67–8
Open Method of Coordination and, 68–70
process vs. outcomes in, 78–83
statutory regulation and, 166–7
political embeddedness
European Commission embrace of, 176–7
‘social Europe’ model and, 213
political integration
decoupling of economics from, 149–78
deep integration and limits of, 144–8
economic integration and, 141–4
economic theory of clubs and, 116–17, 318–20
elitism and, 15–16
euro zone crisis as catalyst for, 208–11
functionalist approach to, 16–17
fundamental fallacy concerning, 161–2
monetary union dependence on, 23–5, 47–52, 74–8, 97–101
neofunctionalist ideology and, 147–8
regional integration and limits of, 8–12
‘social Europe’ model and, 212–14
total optimism culture concerning, 60
transaction costs of, 118–24
political transaction costs
absence in European Parliament of, 164–5
asset specificity and, 122
common agency and, 101–7
diffusion of regionalism and, 283–5
economic theory of clubs and, 114–15
hegemony and, 262–4
irreversible investment and, 123
legal centralism and, 111–12
of Stability Treaty restrictions, 199–200
technologies of commitment and, 124–9
transaction cost economies and, 118–24
Poos, Jacques, 82–3
INDEX

Popper, Karl, 141–2
Porter, Michael, 295, 300–1
Portugal
  anti-EU demonstrations in, 201
deficit in, 35
financial crisis in, 50–1, 70–2
German BVG rulings on aid for, 144–8
Posen, A. S., 175–6
positive economic integration
  positive law and, 184
  principles of, 92–5
post hoc, ergo property hoc fallacy, myth of European prosperity and, 78–83,
  182–4
power. See also scope of competences
delegation of, 129–34, 165–70,
  173–4
EU expansion of, 15, 190–1
leadership scarcity and scope of, 240–3
Precautionary Principle (PP), 158
criticism of, 274–6
preferences, private information about, bargaining costs and, 134–9
preferential trade agreements
  in Common Agricultural Policy,
  159–60
neoliberal economics and, 156–7
Rome Treaty provisions concerning, 157–8
price stability
  ECB focus on, 54
  ECB autonomy and, 175–6
primacy of process over outcome, European integration and, 49–50
principal–agent problem
  common agency and, 101–7
delegation of powers and, 129–34
multiple principles and, 101–7
  opportunism and, 121–2
principle of precaution (PP), Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
private law, competition through exit and voice and, 274–6
private ordering
  efficiency of, 111–12
  legal centralism vs., 285–9
private preferences information, bargaining costs and, 134–9
private sector, economic theory of clubs and, 115
‘problem of many hands’
accountability deficit and, 192–6
policy responsibilities and, 67–8
process criteria
  absence of trust and primacy of, 247
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82
effectiveness linked to legitimacy and, 189–92
monetary union and, 78–83
regionalism and, 3–5
Prodi, Romano, 66–7, 176–7
  constitutional reforms proposals of, 252–3
  on treaty ratification through referendum, 185
A Project for the European Union, 227–8
prosperity, integration and myth of, 78–83
protectionism
  CAP preferences and, 222–4
  EU food safety regulations and, 158
public-choice economic theory, political transaction costs and, 123–4
public goods
  collective action for supplying, 118–19
economic theory of clubs and, 112–17
  Tiebout hypothesis and, 274–6
public opinion
  absence of trust and, 245–7
  conflicting attitudes on regional integration, 9–12
  constitutional issues in European integration and role of, 144–8
  declining EU status in, 32–6, 39–41,
  52–7, 67–8
  on European integration, 184, 214–15
fait accompli strategy and role of, 139–41
INDEX 363

on monetary union, 86–7
treaty ratification through referendum and, 184–9
public sector, expansion, postwar liberalism and, 155
public space, common EU foreign policy and absence of, 256–7
public utilities, as irreversible investments, 122
Qaddafi, Moammar, 255–6
race to the bottom theory competition and, 274–6
competitive stability, supranational monitoring of, 276–80
environmental policy and, 259–60
positive integration and, 94–5
Rademacher, Walter, 203
Ranke, Leopold, 256–7
The Rebellion of the Masses (Ortega y Gasset), 296–7
redistributive objectives. See also distributive effects of deep integration
CAP failures and, 222–4
in Common Agricultural Policy, 159–60
of positive integration, 92–5
referendums
absence of trust and, 245–7
treaty ratification through, threat of, 184–9
regional integration commitments and resources in, 289–94
competing models of, 280–5
European model for, 1–3
five stages of, 92–5
history of, 1–3
nation state resiliency and, 163–4
political economy of, 112
private ordering vs. legal centralism in, 285–9
process vs. outcome regionalism, 3–5
‘social Europe’ model and, 215–16
regional organizations flexible, decentralized rule enforcement in, 106–7
size, scope and transaction costs, 5–8
regulatory legislation accountability deficit concerning, 192–6
competitiveness and, 266–9
independent agencies’ development of, 166–7
inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6
non-delegation doctrine and, 165–6
positive integration and, 94–5
protectionism in food safety regulations, 158
relational contracting, economic integration and, 124–5
reluctant hegemon, euro zone crisis and, 257–64
reputation building, commitment credibility and, 128–9
Rey, Jean, 248–9
Rhodes, Rod, 67–8
risk brinkmanship and creation of, 72–4
principle of precaution and regulation of, 89–90
Roberts, P., 134–9, 151–4, 283–5
Rodrik, Dani, 91–2, 105, 302–3, 304–5, 311–12, 332
on trilemma of hyperinflation, 309
Roedl, E., 151, 171–3
Roepke, Wilhelm, 149–50, 155–6, 156–7, 211–12, 298–9
Roessler, F., 310
Rogoff, Kenneth, 84, 129–34, 213–14
on unintended consequences of integration, 232–5
Rom, M., 167–8
Rome European Council, 125–6
absence of binding commitments in, 126–7
Article 100, 38–9
Article 119, 95–7, 150–1
Article 169, 285–6

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Rome Treaty (cont.)

Article 177, 101–7
Article 235, 124–5, 191–2
Coase theorem and, 151–4
commitments and resources in, 289–94
Community method instituted by, 216–17
customs duties in, 100–1
deepening integration principle and, 91–2
economic liberalism in principles of, 155
free trade and provisions of, 304–5
GATT compatibility with, 157–8
harmonization of laws and policies under, 36–7
incomplete contracts omissions in, 105–6
impossible investment in EC/EU and, 123
leadership provisions in, 242–3
limits on neoliberalism in, 159–60
monetary union planning in wake of, 22–3
obliteration of nationalism in, 298–9
ordo-liberal school view of, 151
positive and negative integration in, 92–5
relational contracting in, 124–5
silence on secession in, 83–7
Schaeuble, Wolfgang, 70–2, 161–2, 208–11, 252–3, 311–12
Scharpf, Fritz, 199–200, 203, 307–8, 315
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 165–6
Schengen Agreement, 125–6
differentiated integration and, 228–30
Schiller, Karl, 24
Schioappa, Kostoris Padoa, 220–2
Schmidt, Helmut, 166–7
Schmidt, S. K., 220–2
Schneider, G., 134–9
Schoenberger, Christoph, 260–4
Schroeder, Gerhard, 35
Schuman, Robert, 27–8, 217–19
Schuman Plan, 27–8, 217–19
Schumpeter, Joseph, 273
Scicluna, Nicole, 209
scope of competences
abuse of trust and, 243–5
accountability deficit and, 192–6
Coase theorem and, 151–4
constitutional limits on, 151
deepening integration and, 91–2
democratic deficit problem and, 179–82
diffuse accountability and, 67–8
EU concepts of, 67–8
EU expansion and limits of, 18–19
leadership scarcity and, 240–3
Maastricht Treaty limits on, 104–5
political embeddedness and, 177–8
in regional organizations, 5–8
Single European Act and expansion of, 191–2
search and information costs, 118–24
second-best theorem of welfare economics, feasibility analysis and, 62–6
Second Regionalism, 280–1
history of, 1–3
Seehofer, Horst 187
self-interest, bargaining costs and, 134–9
Selznick, Philip, 240–1

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INDEX

separation-of-powers systems, common agency and, 101–7
Serbia, common foreign policy limits and crisis in, 254–5
Services Directive (EU), 289–94
services sector economic integration and, 249–52
growth of, in EU, 78–83
internal market for, 220–2
Single European Market and independence of, 51–2
single market initiatives for, 220–2
Shackleton, Michael, 179–82, 190
shallow integration deep integration vs., 88–90
globalization and, 303–8
regionalism revival as response to, 282–3
Sharry, Mac, 223
Sheehan, R. S., 168–70
single currency. See common currency
Single European Act, 9, 38–9
EC agenda-setting monopoly and, 217–19
expansion of competences under, 147–8, 191–2
permissive consensus and, 81–2
Single European Market, proposal for, 51–2
single market model, failed promise of, 11–12
Single Market Project centralization of monetary policy and, 126–7
Delors and, 249–52
economic theory of clubs and, 320–1
goods and services mobility in, 220–2
initiation of, 29
legitimacy-effectiveness link in, 219–20
limitations of, 3–5
mutual recognition and, 270–1
territorial integration and, 116–17
size of regional organizations, impact of, 5–8
Krzysztof, Slawomir, 39–42
Slovakia, acquis communautaire negotiations and, 44–5
small steps strategy
EMU commitments and, 126–7
technology of commitment and, 125–6
snake fixed exchange rate strategy
monetary policy and, 25–6
piecemeal integration, 126–7
social Europe model, euro zone crisis and, 211–16
social policy, neoliberal bias in harmonization of, 154
social policy harmonization, positive integration and, 92–5
social rights, ECJ ruling on limits of, 171–3
socioeconomic heterogeneity
acquis communautaire policies and, 43–4
centralized harmonization and impact of, 38–9
Coase theorem and, 151–4
distributive effects of deep integration and, 141–4
economic theory of clubs and, 112–17
EU enlargement and heterogeneity of, 51–2
feasibility analysis and awareness of, 62–6
functional vs. territorial integration and, 112–13
single market initiatives and, 220–2
social Europe’ model and, 215–16
Soerensen, V., 297
’soft law’ methods, Open Method of Coordination and, 68–70
soft power, common foreign policy and limits of, 254–5
Sole-24 Ore newspaper, 29
Solidarność, single market initiatives and, 220–2
Soros, George, 85–6, 260, 265
sovereign debt crisis adverse selection and moral hazard in, 121–2, 139–41 brinkmanship in, 72–4

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sovereign debt crisis (cont.)
  collective responsibility paradigm and, 202–7
  crisis of public confidence following, 184
  ECB role in, 52–7
  EMU impact on, 74–8
  euro zone establishment and, 50–1
  EU status and, 9–12
  German brinkmanship in, 73
  German constitutional influence in, 144–8
  judiciary impact on economic integration and, 97–101
  opportunity in, 208–11
  'Pact for Competitiveness' and, 196–7, 232
  reluctant hegemon problem and, 257–64
  scepticism concerning integration and, 160–1
  as unification opportunity, 161–2, 311–12
  unintended consequences of, 232–5
Soviet Union
  collapse of, 127
  common foreign policy goals and collapse of, 254–5
  Spaak, Paul-Henri, 15–16, 49–50
  Spaak Report (1956), 94
Spain
  anti-EU demonstrations in, 201
  deficit reductions in 2010 by, 31–2
  history of total optimism culture in, 59–60
  national interest ideology in, 134–9
  public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
  real-estate boom in, 46–7
  special interests, positive integration benefits for, 92–5
  Spiegel On Line, 39–41, 54
  Spinelli, Altiero, 295–6, 297
  spot contracts, transaction costs of politics and, 119–21
  stability
  competitive stability, supranational monitoring of, 276–80
  economic crisis and importance of, 257–9
  myth of European integration linked to, 82–3
  Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 8
  absence of credibility for, 127–8
  acquis communautaire policies and, 44
  collective responsibility paradigm and, 203
  convergence criteria in, 175–6
  European Central Bank and, 32–6
  failure of, 29–30, 97–101
  monetary union and rules of, 129–34
  political consequences of, 49–50
  Stability Treaty. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
  standardization
  current theories on, 17–18
  EU-mandated standards, 274–6
  Standard & Poor, 30–2
  statehood model. See also nation states
  distributive effects of deep integration and limits of, 141–4
  European historical hegemony and, 177–8
  of European supranational institutions, 66
  inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6
  legal centralism and, 110–12
  Steinbrueck, Peer, 74–8
  Stephan, Paul, 266
  Strauss-Kahn, Dominique, 34, 174–5
  suboptimal solutions
  collective vs. club good and, 316–17
  economic integration and, 69–70
  feasibility analysis and, 62–6
  subsidiarity principle
  absence of trust and, 243–5
  EU expansion of powers and, 190–1
  political embeddedness and, 177–8
  Suddeutsche Zeitung, 154, 203
  supranational institutions
  absence of trust in, 243–5
 accountability deficit in, 192–6
 co-management of national economies and, 66–70
 competitive stability monitoring by, 276–80
 cooperative competition and authority of, 272–3
 delegation of powers to, 129–34
 distributive effects of deep integration and, 141–4
 European Court of Human Rights and, 13
 European Parliament as, 52–7
 hostility to public opinion in, 179–82
 leadership in, 240–3
 limitations of, 16, 141–4, 311–12
 national sovereignty issues and, 124–9
 as nation state alternative, 163–4
 neofunctionalist view of, 160–1, 162
 positive integration and, 92–5
 powers of, 15, 190–1
 ‘social Europe’ model and, 213
 supranationalism, economic integration and, 97–101
 supremacy doctrine
 judiciary impact on economic integration and, 97–101
 legal centralism and, 110–12
 preliminary-ruling judgments and, 101–7
 WTO jurisprudence and, 107–10
 Supreme Court of the United States
 accountability deficit in, 192–6
 legitimacy problems of, 168–70
 non-delegation doctrine and, 165–6
 Sweden
 derogation from EMU, 41–2
 differentiated integration and, 228–30
 Swiss Confederation, 278–9
 Switzerland, global competitiveness of, 301–2
 symbols of statehood, EU adoption of, 66–7, 279
 Szyszczak, Open Method of Coordination critiqued by, 68–70
 Tampere European Council, 125–6
 Target payment system, euro zone creditor and debtor countries and, 85–6
 technocratic decision making
 limitations of, 59
 neofunctionalist faith in, 164, 202
 technology of commitment, credibility strategies and, 125–6
 territorial integration
 economic theory of clubs and, 116–17
 functionalist economic integration vs., 112–17
 Thatcher, Margaret, 245–7
 thesmos (Greek law of the law-giver), 109
 European law and, 182–4
 Tiebout hypothesis, inter-jurisdictional competition and, 274–6
 Tietmeyer, Hans, 26–8, 48
 time horizons, ECJ preliminary rulings, 101–7
 Tindemans, Leo, 229–30
 Tobacco Advertising judgment, 38–9
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 278–9, 300–1
 top-down harmonization
 constraints on competitiveness of, 303
 mutual recognition principle and, 37
 total economic integration, characterization of, 92–5
 total harmonization, 36–7
 absence of trust and, 243–5
 judiciary impact on economic integration and, 97–101
 legal centralism and, 110–12
 total optimism, political culture of catastrophe and, 70–2
 consequences of, 139–41
 disregard of feasibility in, 62–6
 EU leadership confusion over debt crisis linked to, 74–8
 EU statehood symbols as expression of, 66–7
 fait accompli strategy and, 58–62
 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Trade-Related Investment Measures, 88–90
 trading interests, negative integration and, 92–5
transaction costs, 5–8
adverse selection and moral hazard
in euro zone crisis and, 139–41
asset specificity and, 122
Coase theorem concerning, 151–4
common agency and, 101–7
diffusion of regionalism and, 283–5
economic theory of clubs and,
114–15
information, bargaining and influence,
134–9
legal centralism and, 111–12
neofunctionalist disregard of, 162
opportunism and, 121–2
technologies of commitment and,
124–9
transboundary externalities, economic
theory of clubs and, 318–20
transfers of governing authority, ECJ
rulings and, 101–7
transmission-belt model of regulation,
non-delegation doctrine and, 165–6
transnational organizations, economic
theory of clubs and, 115
Treaty of Amsterdam. See Amsterdam
Treaty
EC agenda-setting monopoly and,
217–19
Treaty of Lisbon. See Lisbon Treaty
Treaty of Rome. See Rome Treaty
Treaty on European Union (TEU),
49. See Maastricht Treaty
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union, 65–6
balanced budget rule in, 307
deficit reduction requirements in, 198
equality principles and, 289–94
establishment of, 197–8
euro zone crisis and, 86–7
legally binding obligations in,
179–82
macroeconomic imbalance
correction provisions in, 199
Open Method of Coordination and,
68–70
political transaction costs of
provisions in, 199–200
regulatory regime of, 307
Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU)
Article 10(1), 179–82
Article 56, 171–3
Article 218(3), 83–7
closer cooperation objectives in, 230
ECB status in, 175
treaty ratification. See also specific
treaties
absence of trust and, 243–5
EC power expansion and absence of,
124–5
multiple principals and, 104
referendum threat and, 184–9
Trebilcock, M. J., 287–9
Trevi Group, 125–6
Trichet, Jean-Claude, 52–7, 74–8
Trichet, M., 30–2
Triffin, Robert, 22–3
trilateral arbitration mechanisms, legal
centralism and, 111–12
triplea
deepening integration in EU and,
91–2
of hyperinflation, 308–13
Troesken, Werner, 122
trust
leadership and, 243–7
legal centralism of ECJ and deficit of,
110–12
Tsoukalis, L., 24–5, 74–8, 126–7
Tullock Gordon, 238–40
two-speed Europe model. See multi-
speed Europe model
deep integration and, 230–1
differentiated integration and, 228–30
euro zone and, 231–2
hegemonic aspects of, 262–4
revival of, 289–94
ultra vires principle, judiciary impact
on economic integration and, 99
unanimity rule
costs of, 238–40
hegemony in EU of, 236–7
unification process, euro zone crisis and limitations of, 208–11
uniformity, supranational institutions imposition of, 92–5
United Kingdom
acquis communautaire policies and, 43–4
Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
CAP subsidies for aristocratic families in, 92–5
euro zone scepticism in, 47–8, 110–12, 155–6
federation ideology in, 141–4
judicial independence in, 168–70
opt-outs by, 81–2
postponement of Constitutional Treaty referendum in, 64–5
public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
rejection of integration by, 147–8
withdrawal from Exchange Rate Mechanism by, 25–6
United States
accountability deficit in non-majoritarian institutions in, 192–6
Beef Hormones dispute and, 89–90
bilateral Canadian trade agreements with, 283
concern over euro zone in, 54
conversion to regionalism by, 1–3
delegation of powers in, 165
federalism in, 185–7
incorporation debate in, 274–6
independent regulatory agencies in, 167–8
judicial independence in, 168–70
Middle East hegemony of, 256
monetary union discussions and, 22–3
myth of European prosperity compared with, 78–83
non-delegation doctrine in, 165–6
public opinion concerning EU in, 9–12
reluctance concerning regionalism in, 5–8
Rome Treaty and role of, 157–8
statutory regulation in, 166–7
welfare assistance in, 215–16
WTO jurisprudence disregarded by, 108–9
Uri, Pierre, 22–3
Uruguay Round, 88–90, 306
Value Added Tax, 305–6
van Gend en Loos case, 100–1
van Parys judgment, 107–10
variable geometry, differentiated integration and, 228–30
Vauchez, A., 100–1, 108–9
Verheugen, Guenther, 185
Verhofstadt, Guy, 154, 212
vertical competition, unitary states and, 278–9
Viking case, ECJ ruling in, 171–3
Vilnius ten, 255–6
Volkswagen, hostile takeover attempt involving, 95–7
Vosskuhle, Andreas, 145–6
Voter turnout in EP elections, decline in, 52–7, 67–8, 179–82
wage growth, euro-induced, 46–7
Wallace, William, 256
weak-currency countries, costs of euro zone withdrawal for, 84–5
wealth effects, Coase theorem concerning, 151–4
Weatherill, Stephen, 36–7, 39–41, 272, 274–6, 303
Wefing, Heinrich, 187–9
Weigel, Theo, 32–6
Weingast, Barry, 234–5, 272–3, 298–9
welfare state
CAP characterization as, 222–4
common foreign policy goals and, 254–5
competitive advantage of nations and, 299–300
gold standard and rise of, 150
harmonization of policy and loss of, 37–8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state (cont.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation state resiliency and formation</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal economic integration as distortion of</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular demand for</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive integration benefits for elites in</td>
<td>92–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Europe model and</td>
<td>211–16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Social Europe’ model compared with</td>
<td>215–16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner, Pierre</td>
<td>23–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delors’s advancement of</td>
<td>249–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed exchange rate under</td>
<td>126–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of</td>
<td>23–5, 29–30, 59, 155–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson, Oliver</td>
<td>111–12, 118–19, 162, 283–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittman, D.</td>
<td>123–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf, Martin</td>
<td>50–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of precautionary standards by</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism and</td>
<td>304–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization (WHO), criticism of precautionary standards by</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization, 88–90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization (WTO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef Hormones dispute and</td>
<td>89–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJEU and EU constitutional narrative and</td>
<td>107–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization of enforcement systems in</td>
<td>106–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep integration as goal of</td>
<td>303–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU competition rules and</td>
<td>159–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperinflation threat and</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-favoured-nation principle and</td>
<td>156–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules and enforcement mechanisms</td>
<td>91–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow vs. deep integration and</td>
<td>88–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyplosz, Charles</td>
<td>28–9, 58, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yen fluctuations, Japanese trading abilities and</td>
<td>76–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav crisis of 1991, common foreign policy limits and</td>
<td>254–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU ineffectiveness during</td>
<td>82–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez</td>
<td>31–2, 134–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero transaction costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coase theorem and principle of</td>
<td>151–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective decision making and</td>
<td>238–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neofunctionalist ideology and</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>