1 Introduction
The spiritual atom bomb and its global fallout

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Lin Biao, foreword to the second edition

This introduction is not so much about Mao’s quotations themselves, but rather the effusive foreword that introduced Chinese and foreign readers to Quotations from Chairman Mao at the height of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Credited to Lin Biao, Mao’s top military man and tireless promoter of the Little Red Book, it described how the written word could transform ideas into a material force for revolution. According to the foreword, the Little Red Book was a weapon of mass instruction – the intercontinental delivery system for a potentially world-shattering ideological payload: “Once Mao Tse-tung’s thought is grasped by the broad masses, it becomes a source of strength and a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power.”

Lin Biao’s metaphor was an adulatory exaggeration, of course, but it should not be dismissed as only that. I will show, through an extended exegesis, that the spiritual atom bomb was in fact a coherent concept within its own Maoist intellectual context. More broadly, I will argue that the spiritual atom bomb was also a telling symptom of anxieties about the Cultural Revolution in China, about the Sino-Soviet split within the socialist world, about the larger Cold War between capitalism and socialism, and about the global confrontation with the real prospect of nuclear Armageddon. Lin Biao’s foreword to the Little Red Book arose from historical conditions specific to China in the 1960s, yet it was also a product of the global Atomic Age. In that moment of global existential crisis, when faceless

technology threatened to destroy all mankind, the spiritual atom bomb was an alternate vision of the atomic that affirmed the primacy of the spiritual over the material.

The era of the spiritual atom bomb was brief but explosive, roughly corresponding to the height of the Cultural Revolution in China and including the global movements of 1968. The Little Red Book originated in the Chinese military under the leadership of Lin Biao, who helped to build the cult of Mao. Lin Biao incorporated the study of Maoist texts into daily drill and encouraged the emulation of moral exemplars such as the model soldier Lei Feng; these practices culminated in May 1964 in the internal-use publication by the General Political Department of the PLA of *Quotations from Chairman Mao*. According to the foreword added to the reprint of August 1965, and “in conformity with Comrade Lin Biao’s instructions,” the Little Red Book was to be issued “to every soldier in the whole army, just as we issue weapons.” Amidst the nationwide campaign to “Learn from the People’s Liberation Army,” this handy piece of standard-issue equipment also became a prized trophy for ardent youth activists. In late August 1966, in the push that gave the Cultural Revolution its chaotic momentum, Mao approvingly reviewed throngs of young Guards waving Little Red Books in Tiananmen Square. The book was soon made available to the general public in order to, as Lin Biao’s new foreword said, “arm the minds of the people throughout the country” with Mao Zedong Thought. Mastery of Mao Zedong Thought could split the atom of the mind and unleash the power of human consciousness to destroy the old world—and create a better one in its place.

The rise and fall of the spiritual atom bomb was tied to the personal fortunes of Lin Biao, with whom the book is so closely associated. Although Lin Biao did not take an active role in creating the Little Red Book—it was not his style to take an active role in much of anything—and it is doubtful that he even wrote the foreword credited to him, nevertheless his name was the recognizable corporate mark for a particular

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2 The previous foreword addressed to the army had said “to arm the minds of all our commanders”: General Political Department, Foreword to the Reprint of the First Edition (August 1, 1965). For a word-by-word comparison of the forewords to the first and second editions, see Stuart R. Schram, ed., *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. xxxii–xxiii. Schram, the foremost Western interpreter of Mao in the postwar era, was a polymath and polyglot who had assisted the Manhattan Project before turning to the study of politics. “Having worked on the bomb,” his widow explained in his obituary, “he wanted to study more of human beings.” See William Yardley, “Stuart R. Schram, Nuclear Physicist and Mao Scholar, Dies at 88,” *New York Times* (July 21, 2012).
reading of Maoist ideology. The appearance of the phrase “spiritual atom bomb” in PLA publications beginning in 1960 typified Lin Biao’s signature brand of “politics in command” and his calls to structure all aspects of military affairs around Mao Zedong Thought. Lin Biao had ascended to power in the late 1950s on the strength of his unquestioned loyalty to Mao in the Chairman’s darkest moment, the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Ever passive and deferential by disposition, Lin’s reliable hold on “the barrel of the gun” proved indispensable in Mao’s subsequent return to political power. For while the Cultural Revolution had the appearance of a popular movement – and it is true that much of its violence unfolded in decentralized and unpredictable ways – it was Lin Biao’s access to military power that secured Mao’s mobilization of the masses to “bombard the headquarters” in August 1966. At key moments in Mao’s attack on rivals in the power structure, which developed over the next three years, Lin Biao’s loyal units protected the radical insurgents, presided over the purge of the bureaucracy, held disgruntled military commanders in check, and stepped in when internecine struggles ceased to be useful to Mao. For his contributions, Lin Biao was a prime beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution, explicitly designated Mao’s successor in the constitution passed by the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. In truly dialectical fashion, however, the pinnacle of Lin Biao’s rise also marked the precipice from which he fell.


Chairman’s trust in his “best student” and “closest comrade-in-arms” was less than complete.\(^7\) Even so, no one expected the revelation in September 1971, just two-and-a-half years later, that Lin Biao had died in a plane crash – allegedly fleeing the country after an aborted assassination attempt on Mao! Naturally, Lin Biao’s foreword to the Little Red Book was expunged, and the era of the spiritual atom bomb was over. Nevertheless, from the mid 1960s to the early 1970s in China, and somewhat later elsewhere, Lin Biao’s doctrine of the spiritual atom bomb was the orthodox interpretation that introduced Mao’s Little Red Book to the world.

The Foolish Old Man

Lin Biao’s elevation of Mao Zedong Thought to the power of an atom bomb sounds like a foolish boast, emblematic of the belligerent irrationality of the Mao cult at the height of the Cultural Revolution. It would seem to vastly overestimate the power of ideology, on the one hand, and to vastly underestimate the power of the actual atom bomb, on the other. Be that as it may, Lin Biao’s spiritual atom bomb metaphor is so bizarre, and yet so symptomatic of its times, that it merits serious consideration on its own terms. Mao’s own defense of such “foolishness” is found in “The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains” (1945), a story canonized by Lin Biao as one of the Three Constantly Read Articles. “The Foolish Old Man” is one of the longest continuous passages in the Little Red Book, and the only text to appear there in its entirety:

There is an ancient Chinese fable called “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains.” It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long, long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood two great peaks obstructing the way. He called his sons, and hoe in hand they began to dig up these mountains with great determination. Another graybeard, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, “How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up those two huge mountains.” The Foolish Old Man replied, “When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can’t we clear them away?” Having refuted the Wise Old Man’s wrongheaded view, he went on digging every day, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs. Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 285–336.
long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God’s heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can’t these two mountains be cleared away?

This passage has been interpreted primarily as a story of perseverance, determination, and strength of will, as it concludes the chapter of the Little Red Book on “Self-Reliance and Arduous Struggle.” But there are deeper meanings that surface when we answer possible objections to the application of this traditional fable to the socialist revolution in China: Isn’t it contrary to the logic of self-reliance to invoke external forces: the literal *dei ex machina* of gods and angels? Aren’t such manifestations of the spiritual alien to the materialist viewpoint of Marxism–Leninism? And isn’t their sudden intervention contrary to the lesson of persistence and accumulated effort? To answer, we must reinterpret “The Foolish Old Man” as Mao’s followers would, from the viewpoint of Mao’s interpretation of dialectical materialism and with special attention to the *mass* character of revolutionary change.

First, the agency referred to by the fable is not external. The demystified God, as Mao explains somewhat clumsily, “is none other than the masses,” and the angels are their agents, the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese Communist Party. The party cannot succeed on its own; it needs to touch the hearts of the people and enlist their support in removing the mountains. The same idea is expressed more clearly in a metaphor from the guerrilla days: the party and its army must be like fish in the water. The masses are not external, but rather are the medium in which the party operates. The revolutionary force is drawn from the masses, and the masses will become the revolutionary force; without the masses the party will flounder and die. Thus in his introductory remarks to the story of “The Foolish Old Man,” Mao says, “We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory.” The revolution is necessarily a mass movement.

Second, Mao’s invocation of the spiritual is not necessarily contrary to the materialist outlook. The Chinese term “spiritual” (*jingshen*) here refers to phenomena with subjective existence in the human mind, as opposed to the material, which exists objectively outside of human consciousness. However, the material and the spiritual are not mutually
exclusive in Maoist doctrine, but instead are dialectically intertwined by the unity of opposites. Spiritual phenomena may be ultimately reducible to manifestations of the material. As such, subjective thought can motivate human beings to know and change their objective conditions.9 Mao proposed this relationship between the material and the spiritual, in his seminal essay on dialectical ontology, “On Contradiction” (1937), which is more fully explored in Julian Bourg’s chapter on French Maoism. Mao’s essay introduces two concepts: first, the notion of the “principal contradiction,” the one whose resolution is decisive for unraveling the complex knot of secondary contradictions; and second, the notion of the “principal aspect of the contradiction,” the side of the contradiction whose positive development will be decisive in its resolution. Mao points out that these relationships are dialectical and dynamic: the secondary acts upon the principal, and at times may even become dominant. Therefore, concludes Mao, in the contradiction between the material and the spiritual, the material is only generally the principal aspect:

When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental, and social being determines social consciousness, we also – and indeed must – recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.10

At the crucial moment of revolution, the spiritual can become decisive in the transformation of the material.

Third, sudden transformation is not contrary to accumulation, perseverance, and protracted struggle – it results from accumulation. Of the three basic laws of dialectics identified by Engels, one is transformation of quantity into quality. (Mao, following Stalin, saw this not as a separate law, but as a special case of the unity and struggle of opposites.11)

9 Mao’s philosophical position of ontological monism with epistemological dualism was developed through an active but nevertheless fairly orthodox reading of the basic texts of the Soviet New Philosophy of the 1930s. See Nick Knight, Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923–1945 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), esp. pp. 171–95.


The classic example is the phase change of liquid water into steam: the incremental quantitative change in temperature leads to a sudden qualitative change in form. If the masses are the water, the medium of change, then it is the agitation of myriad individual molecules that will lead to a fundamental transformation in the collective whole—in other words, a revolution.

**Spiritual fission and the weaponization of ideology**

Lin Biao’s spiritual atom bomb refers to an exceptionally powerful kind of agitation, however, and not merely to the external application of heat or kinetic energy. Fission seeks to release vast amounts of internal energy, by splitting from the inside, and this process is fundamental to the Maoist worldview. For Mao, the fundamental law of dialectical materialism is the unity and struggle of opposites, sometimes manifested as “two combine into one” but more often as “one divides into two.” The universe is characterized by struggle: “In any given thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is universal.” Moreover, struggle that is sufficiently violent to break nuclear bonds can release vast amounts of energy; the key to such fission is to strike at the apparently indivisible core.

As a “universal” phenomenon in Mao’s worldview, fission has spiritual manifestations. A mass change of consciousness can initiate spiritual fission, releasing tremendous material force. In this example from 1958, Mao spoke of the Chinese nation as an atom to be split:

Now our enthusiasm has been aroused. Ours is an ardent nation, now swept by a burning tide. There is a good metaphor for this: our nation is like an atom . . . When this atom’s nucleus is smashed the thermal energy released will have really tremendous power. We shall be able to do things which we could not do before.

Mao was talking here about a fundamental split: the struggle of self against self. For Mao, the real object of revolutionary struggle was the revolutionary’s own consciousness. The Chinese communists’ preferred technique for spiritual revolution was a dialectical process of “struggle–criticism–transformation,” which they employed extensively for ideological indoctrination, party discipline, and social control. Ban

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Wang in his chapter also considers the liberating potential of such a quasi-religious transformation. At the heart of struggle–criticism–transformation was intensive self-criticism, which came to be practiced constantly during the Cultural Revolution. This is why Lin Biao described the Cultural Revolution as a self-revolution, “a revolution against those of us who have been engaged in the former revolutions.”

Here in this excerpt from People’s Daily, Lin Biao explicitly reiterates that each person is to wage a continuing revolution against oneself:

To look at oneself according to the law of “one divides into two” means that one must make revolution against one’s own subjective world as well as the objective world. Comrade Lin Biao instructs us: “We must regard ourselves as an integral part of the revolutionary force and, at the same time, constantly regard ourselves as a target of the revolution. In making revolution, we must also revolutionize ourselves. Without revolutionizing ourselves, we cannot make this revolution.”

So, the most basic fissile material of the revolution is the subjective consciousness of the apparently atomistic individual, though as the story of “The Foolish Old Man” says, the process of transformation cannot be limited to the cadres. For fission to become self-sustaining, it must be concentrated on and applied to a critical mass. Thus, Lin Biao says, Mao Zedong Thought becomes a spiritual atom bomb only “once it is grasped by the masses.”

It is the “grasping” of Mao Zedong Thought that allows it to be used as a weapon, says Lin Biao, and his meaning is fairly literal. Here Lin’s argument invokes Engels’ remarkable thesis that humans became differentiated from other animals by the dialectical co-evolution of the brain and the hand through labor. According to Engels, all tools and technologies – the flint axe, the iron hoe, the spinning wheel, the steam engine, the paintbrush – are extensions of this hand–brain dyad, designed to carry out human purposes. The same principle applies to that class of tools we call weapons, from the most primitive stone to the atom bomb. Without a human being to use it, the tool (which is after all merely an extension of the person) is useless. Therefore, the power of the weapon as

a material object is inseparable from the subjective spiritual or ideological power of the person who wields it. In Mao’s own words, “Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. People necessarily wield military and economic power.”

This supposition is the basis for Mao’s doctrine of “people’s war,” which became influential among Third World revolutionaries, including the Naxalites of India (see Sreemati Chakrabarti’s chapter) and the Shining Path of Peru (see David Scott Palmer’s chapter). Mao’s faith in the people derived in part from his belief in the historical teleology of Marxism, but it was also grounded in practical experience. In his conflicts against the vastly superior material forces of the Chinese Nationalist regime and Imperial Japan, Mao knew his rag-tag armies could not succeed, at least initially, by using standard positional warfare. Victory required the mobile tactics of guerrilla warfare, but also a long-term strategy of protracted conflict in which the enemy could be weakened through attrition and his own forces strengthened through accumulation. But the rebels could survive long enough for this to happen only at the sufferance of the local populace. Therefore, the military doctrine of people’s war rests on a social proposition: the “people’s army” must provide benefits that outweigh the costs of provisioning them. More than that, even, the army must be embraced by the people as a necessary part of the people. In the present-day parlance of insurgency and counter-insurgency, you win the war by winning hearts and minds. In the language of Mao, if the soldiers are at home like fish in the water, then the people are the sustaining medium that will eventually overwhelm and drown the enemy. People’s war proved successful in the war of resistance against Japan and in the subsequent civil war against the Nationalists, so it is no surprise that Mao should return to it in his confrontation with the nuclear superpowers.

By the outset of the Cold War, Mao had established his view that people’s war could overcome the atomic threat. Consider, for example, his comments to the American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946, just a year after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the

people, not by one or two new types of weapon.\textsuperscript{18} Here we have one half of the “foolish” boast, the apparent underestimation of the atomic bomb. The second half, the apparent overestimation of ideology, was introduced by Lin Biao in his famous paean to Mao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” (1965):

Even if US imperialism brazenly uses nuclear weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable. However highly developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of modern warfare, in the final analysis the outcome of a war will be decided by the sustained fighting of the ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields, by the political consciousness of the men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice. Here the weak points of US imperialism will be completely laid bare, while the superiority of the revolutionary people will be brought into full play. The reactionary troops of US imperialism cannot possibly be endowed with the courage and the spirit of sacrifice possessed by the revolutionary people. The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.\textsuperscript{19}

Mao had already stated that people matter more than weapons, and implied that ideological weapons could overcome physical weapons, but he left it to Lin Biao to state explicitly that the people were best armed with Mao Zedong Thought.

“Military affairs are a constituent part of politics, while politics includes more things, encompasses a wider scope. What is the best weapon? It’s not the airplane, not artillery, not the tank, not the atom bomb. The best weapon is Mao Zedong Thought. What is the greatest military force? The greatest military force is people, armed with Mao Zedong Thought; it’s courage and fearlessness of death.”\textsuperscript{20}

The Little Red Book was a weapon to be grasped by the hands of the people, so that Mao Zedong Thought could be grasped by their minds. But how could a sheaf of paper bound in vinyl be elevated to the status of an atom bomb, while the actual atom bomb was dismissed as a flimsy “paper tiger”?

