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978-1-107-05695-4 - British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, 1914–1930

Donald J. Lisio

Excerpt

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Introduction

This is a study of British insistence on preserving its naval supremacy during the 1920s and the resulting resurgence of Anglo-American naval and diplomatic antagonisms leading up to, including, and following the climactic Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. Following the end of the Great War in 1918, as Germany's mighty warships lay at the bottom of the sea and France and Italy recovered from devastating invasions, three great Allied naval powers engaged in a naval arms race to ensure supremacy in the ocean regions vital to their national security and prosperity. Japan's modern navy and its Twenty-One Demands on China challenged America's Open Door policies while its occupation of the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas island chains threatened the ability of the United States to defend the Philippines. Much more immediate, however, was the renewed clash with Great Britain over America's doctrine of "freedom of the seas."

During World War I, but before Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare and the United States consequently joined the Allied Powers in 1917, the vital interests of the United States and Great Britain collided repeatedly over differing interpretations of the complex issue of neutral rights at sea. Having declared neutrality, American leaders believed that British naval blockades, interdiction of American cargoes, lengthening contraband lists, and blacklisting of American firms accused of trading with the Central Powers threatened the prosperity of the United States. British resistance to President Woodrow Wilson's interpretation of freedom of the seas eventually convinced Wilson that only a navy "second to none" could enforce America's neutral rights, and in 1916 Congress authorized the creation of the world's most powerful navy.

Not surprisingly, the British were deeply concerned with this new challenge to Great Britain's naval supremacy, especially as its diplomats failed to persuade Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference to alter his rapid naval buildup.

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At first Great Britain attempted to compete in building the most powerful battleships, but the enormous expense coupled with a faltering postwar economy soon prompted it to welcome the invitation of Wilson's successor, President Warren G. Harding, to the first international naval arms-control conference. Nonetheless, while Harding and his Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes substituted the concept of naval equality with Great Britain for Wilson's naval supremacy, the British had not forgotten that blockade and interdiction had worked well during the War and were therefore determined to preserve these strategies. Thus, at the naval arms-control conferences at Washington in 1921–1922, at Geneva in 1927, and, in the negotiations between President Herbert Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald before the 1930 London Conference, British diplomats cooperated with Admiralty strategists to forestall treaty provisions which would diminish Great Britain's power to impose blockade and interdiction during a future war.

This is the story of the continuation of the Anglo-American clash over freedom of the seas, one which would erupt once again in full fury at the second naval conference in 1927. The Washington Conference had succeeded in limiting capital ships – battleships, battle cruisers and aircraft carriers. But as skillful British diplomacy had stymied limitation on the numbers of auxiliary cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the second conference, at Geneva, sought to rein in a new naval race in these powerful warships. However, high hopes for the success of the second international effort were dashed by unexpected British demands for cruiser supremacy rather than equality in the very warships best suited for blockade and interdiction. The failure of this conference prompted a bitterly disillusioned President Calvin Coolidge to switch suddenly from being a staunch advocate of naval limitation to a champion of naval supremacy. Indeed, to punctuate his disillusionment, Coolidge canceled plans to meet with Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and the Duke of York at the 1927 opening of the "Peace Bridge" connecting Canada and the United States and instead successfully pressured Congress to build a cruiser force more powerful than Great Britain's.

This crisis in Anglo-American relations had its immediate origins in the furious reaction among naval leaders in Great Britain, the United States, and Japan to the diminution of naval power forced on them by treaties agreed to at the Washington Conference in 1921–1922. With the lessons of World War I still fresh in their minds, these naval strategists were more convinced than ever that regional naval supremacy in the ocean areas vital to national prosperity and security was being sacrificed by naïve politicians and diplomats engaged in untested, unverifiable, unenforceable, and thus totally unreliable treaties. By 1927, at the advent of the second conference, naval leaders had come to the realization that international arms-control negotiations were inherently risky and that they must therefore become more actively involved in this new experimental diplomacy.

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Naval leaders understood as well that they must also become more assertive in shaping domestic naval policy. This is illustrated by the untold story of repeated clashes between Admiral Sir David Beatty, Chief of the Admiralty's Naval Staff, and former First Lord of the Admiralty and now Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill. These clashes arose over Beatty's desire to strengthen England's postwar naval forces, most especially in the as yet unrestricted auxiliary cruisers. Alarmed by the capital ship reductions and prevented from replacing these vessels for ten years, Beatty worried over Great Britain's eroding ability to protect its Empire from future Japanese encroachments in East Asia and its equally important ability to enforce blockade and interdiction strategies against a neutral United States during a future war in Europe. Churchill agreed with Beatty on the need for naval supremacy and was enthusiastic about building the newest, most powerful 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers. But as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he wanted to avoid asking Parliament for a tax increase to build all twenty-one of these cruisers, requested a one-year delay in beginning their construction, and thereby generated increasingly acrimonious relations with Beatty.

As a former First Lord of the Admiralty during World War I, Churchill believed that military power was based on economic capability, and, as the then current Chancellor of the Exchequer, he argued that by deploying its scarce government resources to stimulate and rebuild a faltering postwar economy, Great Britain could ensure even greater military capability in the near future. He justified this economic priority and the short naval construction delay by the absence of any imminent Japanese naval threat. Beatty's rejection of a one-year delay, however, generated a series of internal Cabinet clashes during which Beatty successfully employed threats of Admiralty resignations and skillful political infighting to achieve Cabinet approval for immediate construction, but of only sixteen rather than the twenty-one cruisers that Churchill had promised to build.

Withholding vital information was an additional means that Beatty unhesitatingly employed against the British Cabinet and against the Americans both before and during the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference. He believed that his evasive tactics were essential to keep secret strong American objections to his proposed capital ship and cruiser construction savings, proposals that were instrumental in persuading a grateful yet unwitting Cabinet to allow the Admiralty to control the negotiations at the second conference. Even more important was the imperative to prevent domestic political critics and rival foreign navies from uncovering the serious combat weaknesses in the expensive new cruisers which he had rushed into production only to discover that baffling deficiencies in the newly designed 8-inch-gun had opened the way for both the Americans and the Japanese to build superior cruisers. The shocking perception of this British naval weakness convinced him that the most effective way to prevent rival naval powers from building superior 8-inch-gun cruisers was to capitalize on the overwhelmingly popular approval for ending the naval

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arms race in these auxiliary warships by engineering and controlling a second international conference. At this 1927 conference, Beatty surreptitiously planned to safeguard British cruiser supremacy by substituting the less expensive 6-inch-gun for the 8-inch-gun, by outlawing the 8-inch-gun on all future warships, by securing agreement to an unlimited number of smaller British 6-inch-gun cruisers, and by offering additional capital ship and cruiser savings so compelling to American and Japanese politicians that they would override the objections of their naval advisers, just as President Harding and Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Hara Kei had done during the Washington Naval Conference five years earlier.

The failure of Beatty's poorly planned and executed Admiralty strategy resulted in continuous disputes within the British Cabinet, punctuated by repeated threats of resignation, Churchill's skillful maneuvering, and finally, a diminution of the Admiralty's political influence. More disturbing was the serious diplomatic rift with the United States, a rift highlighted by Coolidge's success in rallying Congress to construct more 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers than authorized by Parliament, and the consequent sudden, unexpected escalation of the naval arms race.

Digging deeply into unpublished military documents and the personal papers of these military leaders should encourage historians to evaluate more fully the military strategists who influenced interwar arms-control diplomacy. Published documents seldom reveal the most important underlying military thinking, motives, and objectives at these peace conferences, or the behind-the-scenes manipulations and deceptions sometimes employed by negotiators. We need to know the degree to which military strategists at the various arms reduction conferences in the 1920s and 1930s, and perhaps since, used arms-control diplomacy as a new, more subtle, means of warfare – war at the peace table.

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I

Clashing World Interests

For a brief time during World War I, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan cooperated as part of the Allied coalition against the Central Powers. This war did more than bring them together on the battlefield. The creation of the League of Nations at the Versailles Peace Conference offered glimmers of hope for future peaceful cooperation. Nonetheless, before it entered the war in 1917 and later at the Versailles Conference, the United States voiced grave concerns over imperial policies pursued by Great Britain and Japan, policies that prompted President Woodrow Wilson to begin construction of a Navy “second to none” and which drove these three allies into a continuous postwar naval arms race. Both during and after the war, each nation sought to ensure that it maintained sufficient naval supremacy in those parts of the world vital to its national and imperial interests. The resulting postwar arms race in turn gave rise to the first international arms-control conference, a novel experiment that sought to mitigate clashing world interests.

In the almost six years between May 7, 1915, when a single torpedo from a German submarine sank the *Lusitania*, and March 4, 1921, when he left office as President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson came to the unalterable conclusion that three great naval powers – Germany, Great Britain, and Japan – had threatened, albeit in different ways and in varying degrees, the current and future vital economic interests of the United States. World War I revealed the stark vulnerability of America’s rapidly expanding world trade and convinced Wilson of the need for a navy “second to none,” one capable of defending this expanding trade and even, if necessary, of defeating, or at the very least deterring, potential adversaries in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans simultaneously. By July 16, 1916, a reluctant yet increasingly frightened Congress finally agreed with him. It authorized the building of a navy large enough to safeguard American shipping from submarine attacks, from the naval threat of

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a possibly victorious, possibly vengeful Germany, from repeated British violations of American neutral and economic rights at sea and its blacklisting of American firms engaged in neutral commerce, and from an aggressive, imperialistic Japan, whose recent occupation of the former German colonies in the central Pacific threatened America's ability to defend the Philippines, while its Twenty-One Demands made a mockery of its promises to honor the Open Door policies in China.

Wilson's naval buildup was a response to the fact that soon after the beginning of World War I both warring ententes either ignored international law governing trade by neutral nations or interpreted it to their own advantage.¹ As a neutral nation, the United States was concerned that Great Britain's evolving definitions of contraband were illegal and its use of naval blockades to enforce increasingly restrictive contraband edicts seriously infringed upon America's right to freedom of trade. German unrestricted submarine warfare was yet another unresolved flashpoint. Adding to the danger was increasing reliance on new war technologies such as the submarine, improved torpedoes, and marine minefields.² To allow Great Britain or Germany, or any other power, to restrict or cut off vital trade between the United States and its most valuable trading partners, with the almost certain result of either economic recession or depression, was unacceptable to Wilson.³

Violations of American neutrality by Germany and Great Britain were not the only causes for Wilson's frustration. Japan's actions in China and in the Western Pacific were a third worry. Just as the British, in Wilson's judgment, were openly contemptuous of neutrality laws, the Japanese were openly imperialistic. On May 7, 1915, the same day that a German submarine sank the British passenger liner *Lusitania*, with great loss of life, including 128 Americans, Wilson learned of Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China. Japan had wasted little time in taking advantage of the war. With the European imperialists tied down in a life-and-death struggle, they were in no position to challenge Japan's expansion in East Asia. The Twenty-One Demands violated Japan's repeated promises to the United States to honor America's Open-Door policies emphasizing the principles of equal trade and the political integrity of the Chinese government. Troubling, too, was Japan's military occupation of the German-held Marianas, Marshall, and Caroline Islands. These island groups were strategically important both to the United States and to Japan. They could be fortified with naval and air bases to form an outer perimeter to defend Japan against an attacking navy, but they also

¹ Arthur S. Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), pp. 3, 12–23, 35–43; Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 249–256.

² Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality 1914–1915*, 5 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947–1965), 3: 308, 589–599, 682–692.

³ *Ibid.*

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lay athwart the vital sea lanes which could enable Japan to interdict United States' defense of the Philippines.⁴

Wilson thus confronted two implacable imperial powers. Japan was as determined to expand its empire in East Asia as Great Britain was to improve the efficiency of its blockade of the Central Powers in Europe. Both of these nations viewed these strategies as matters of life and death. Like England, Japan was an island nation, and like England, she was convinced that safeguarding or expanding her empire guaranteed essential food, raw materials, world markets, and prosperity.⁵

Reluctantly recognizing the potential new threats from Japan in the Western Pacific as well as from Germany and England in the Atlantic, the United States Congress passed the 1916 Naval Act authorizing 156 new ships, including sixteen capital ships, generally understood to include battleships, battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers. This legislation not only vastly expanded the American navy but authorized the building of badly needed naval bases along the Pacific Coast and at Pearl Harbor, from which the navy could better defend the Philippines and its lesser vestiges of empire.⁶ To reiterate the importance of

⁴ Link, *The Struggle for Neutrality 1914–1915*, 3: 208–210, 270–272, 284–285, 306–308; Outten Jones Clinard, *Japan's Influence Upon American Naval Power, 1897–1917* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947), pp. 131–135; John Chambers Vinson, *The Parchment Peace* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955), pp. 22, 26–27; Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Harvest Book, 1967), pp. 132–135; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea-Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 19–20, 28–30, 35–36, 88–93. Hereafter cited as Sprout, *New Order*.

⁵ Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1935), pp. 91–182; Clinard, *Japan's Influence*, pp. 10–13, 33, 35, 41, 44, 47, 49–51, 58–65, 76, 88–90, 107, 113–118, 127–128, 146–157, 166–167; Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, pp. 24, 64–68, 86, 97–108, 115, 120–127, 132; Rolland A. Chaput, *Disarmament and British Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935), pp. 99–102; Sprout, *Toward a New Order*, pp. 19–20, 28–30, 64, 70–72, 90–93; Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 63–64; Akira Iriye, “Japan's Policies toward the United States” in James William Morley, *Japan's Foreign Policy: 1868–1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 414–416, 420–429, 444; Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 149; Stephen Howarth, *The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1895–1945* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1983), pp. 125–130; Richard Burns and Donald Urquidí, *Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the Wars, 1919–1939* (Los Angeles: California State College at Los Angeles Foundation, 1968), p. 42; Hector C. Bywater, *Sea-Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Problem* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), pp. 88–91; Hector C. Bywater, *Navies and Nations: A Review of Naval Developments since the Great War* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), pp. 7–8.

⁶ Link, *Wilson: Confusion and Crisis 1915–1916* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) 4: 337; George T. Davis, *Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), pp. 215–222, 236–237, 254; Roger Dingman, *Power*

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protecting neutral trade during war, Wilson highlighted freedom of the seas as the first of his famous Fourteen Points that he hoped would influence peace negotiations. After joining the Allies in 1917, he dramatized the importance of freedom of the seas once again in December 1918, only three weeks after the war ended, by convincing Congress to pass his 1918 naval bill calling for the completion of the 1916 Naval Act, which doubled the number of capital ships to forty-four battleships and sixteen battle cruisers, for a total of over eight hundred combat ships of modern postwar design.⁷ Any nation which sought to equal this new American navy would have to spend billions of dollars for an indefinite length of time to do so.

Wilson's challenge to British naval supremacy in the Atlantic and Japanese naval supremacy in the Western Pacific aroused considerable resentment. Fresh memories of the crucial success of the naval superiority which prevented the German fleet from interdicting Great Britain's vulnerable supply lines prompted Britain's Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, to vow to spend England's "last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power."⁸ Winston Churchill, the former First Lord of the Admiralty, reiterated this determination, proclaiming "nothing in the world, nothing that you might think, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments however specious, no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy by which the life of our country depends."⁹ Nonetheless, with its economy devastated by the war and deeply in debt to the United States, Great Britain could ill-afford to continue what had evolved into a postwar naval race against

in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation 1914–1922 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 34, 36; Clinard, *Japan's Influence*, pp. 163–164; Woodrow Wilson, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, August 7–November 19, 1916*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) 38:205; David F. Trask, "Woodrow Wilson and the Reconciliation of Force and Diplomacy: 1917–1918," *Naval War College Review* 27 (1975): 25, 28, 31; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 246–258, 270–272; Bywater, *Sea-Power*, p. 74; Hagan, *This People's Navy*, pp. 209, 254–256; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The League Fight in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 52, 115–116; Ian H. Nish, ed. *Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919–1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 3–5, 29; Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference*, pp. 146–147; Howarth, *Fighting Ships*, pp. 131–133; Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 155–156.

⁷ Sprout, *New Order*, p. 55; Arthur Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 303; Christopher Hall, *Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921–1937* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 11–12; Ambrosius, *Wilson*, p. 52; Dingman, *Power in the Pacific*, pp. 87–88; Davis, *Navy Second to None*, pp. 241–242; Sprout, *New Order*, pp. 106, 65–66, 53–55, 58; Bywater, *Navies and Nations*, pp. 104–105.

⁸ Quoted in Sprout, *New Order*, p. 62.

⁹ Quoted in Burns and Urguidi, *Disarmament*, p. 7.

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the prosperous United States.¹⁰ Neither could Japan. From 1917 to 1921, Japan had tripled its naval budget. Indeed, postwar maintenance costs alone would soon claim almost one third of the nation's annual budget, prompting the Vice Minister for Finance to warn that the nation's financial position was fast becoming "hopeless," and that unless quick action was taken to cut expenses, Japan would be financially "ruined."¹¹

Wilson's naval strategy soon ended in frustration. Unable to win Senate approval of the Versailles Peace Treaty, he embarked on an extensive speaking tour to generate public pressure on the Senate, but suffered a severe stroke that incapacitated him throughout the remainder of his term in office. Without Wilson at the helm, Congressional support for his "navy second to none" eroded.¹² Peace societies, church groups, women's organizations, business leaders, and journalists soon echoed a growing popular slogan that big navies meant big wars, and no warships meant no wars. In addition to reducing the fear that the current postwar naval arms race among the former allies could lead to still another world war, naval reductions, they hoped, meant lower taxes and a faster recovery from the brief but sharp economic maladies engulfing the American economy in 1921–1922. When Wilson left office in 1921, the United States had completed or authorized more new warships than all other nations combined, but soon after his departure, the American voters and their political leaders all too quickly ignored the reasons for his "navy second to none."¹³

¹⁰ Paul M. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), pp. 259–261; Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 151–158 and preface.

¹¹ Asada, "Japanese Admirals," pp. 145–147; Davis, *Navy Second to None*, pp. 246, 252; Dingman, *Power in the Pacific*, pp. 122–123, 174–187; Buckley, *The United States in the Washington Conference*, p. 59; Emily O. Goldman, *Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 53, 65; James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 30; Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy*, pp. 227, 229–230; Frank H. Schofield, "Incidents and Present Day Aspects of Naval Strategy," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, (May 1923), pp. 780–781; Robert A. Hoover, *Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements* (Denver: University of Denver, 1980), pp. 12–13; James B. Crowley, "Japan's Military Foreign Policies" in *Japan's Foreign Policy 1868–1941*, ed. James Williams Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 23–24, 37–38; Gerald E. Wheeler, "The United States Navy and the Japanese Enemy, 1919–1931," *Military Affairs* 21 (Summer 1957): p. 67; Raymond L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York: D. Appleton, 1922), pp. 138–139. Naval figures vary in these sources.

¹² Dingman, *Power in the Pacific*, pp. 91–92, 103–104, 155; Davis *Navy Second to None*, pp. 239–241, 266, 271–272; Vinson, *Parchment Peace*, pp. 62–68; Sprout, *New Order*, p. 119.

¹³ Cora Rubin to Roy Baker Harris, "History of Disarmament Resolution," May 13, 1933, BOR, LC; *New York Times*, January 23, 1921; Robert G. Kaufman, *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 23–32; Vinson, *Parchment Peace*, pp. 43, 45–46, 53, 56–57, 62–68, 83; Sprout, *New Order*, pp. 104–105, 111–115, 118, 120–121; Dingman, *Power in the Pacific*, pp. 90–94, 103, 143–144; Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business and Foreign*

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Warren G. Harding, the handsome party peacemaker and orator who led the Republican Party back to the White House in 1921, began dismantling Wilson's navy. While he had promised during the 1920 presidential campaign to continue building Wilson's navy, he had also promised to cut taxes and retire the national debt. He soon discovered, however, that he could not continue to build a "navy second to none" while simultaneously lowering taxes and liquidating the national debt. To cut naval construction costs, he therefore invited the world's leading military powers to meet in Washington, DC for an international naval arms-reduction conference.

Unlike Wilson, whose wartime leadership had taught him the intimate interrelationship between military power and successful international diplomacy, neither Harding nor his Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes would allow complex postwar diplomatic problems to trump domestic political priorities. Indeed, domestic political priorities dominated their thinking about arms control. They sought to garner both political and diplomatic success by achieving agreement to a new international naval balance of power, one which they believed would promote peace and enable the Republican Party to fulfill Harding's campaign promises to cut taxes and retire the national debt. With widespread American support for these objectives, arms reduction appeared to be smart politics and therefore smart diplomacy.¹⁴

While President Warren G. Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes turned away from diplomatic realism based on military strength to a diplomacy which relied on treaties, a significant shift which was much more congenial to domestic Republican politics and priorities, British and Japanese leaders continued to respect the crucial relationship between military power and imperial objectives. Fortuitously, the new American proposals, emphasizing drastic cuts in naval construction and limitations on warship numbers, were given considerable momentum by the economic weaknesses within Great

Policy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1971), pp. 35, 39–40; Sprout, *New Order*, pp. 111, 120–121; Davis, *Navy Second to None*, pp. 268–269.

¹⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, *Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1915–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 9–15; 416–419; Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 1: 269, 181–269, 315–366; Dexter Perkins, *Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), pp. 3–28, 50–70; Randolph C. Downes, *The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865–1920* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970), pp. 140–141, 272–275, 395, 562–598; Vinson, *Parchment Peace*, pp. 33–34, 69, 87, 97–98; Sprout, *New Order*, pp. 84–85, 121–124, 288–289; Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 143; Robert James Maddox, *William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 90–92; Perkins, *Charles Evans Hughes*, pp. 27, 50–70; Pusey, *Hughes*, 1:174–217, 269, 323–349; Betty Glad, *Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusion of Innocence: A Study of American Diplomacy* (Urbana and London: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 303, 324–327, 268, 280; Dingman, *Power in the Pacific*, pp. 148, 157–161.