Introduction

Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan

Much has changed since the publication of the first edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* in 1991. While the Cold War, the focus of most of the scholarship in the field, was winding down, the field of foreign relations history seemed under attack. “We have been told again and again,” the very first sentence of the volume noted in an injured tone, that foreign relations history “is a backwater of scholarly inquiry.” Critics assailed the field for being ethnocentric, “short on synthesis, and desperately in need of new directions.” Editors Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson pushed back by bringing together essays demonstrating that foreign relations history was already pursuing new topics and methodologies. The innovations mostly had to do with integrating approaches borrowed from political science, such as bureaucratic politics and world systems analysis. Although the cultural and linguistic turns were already sweeping through other fields of history and other disciplines in the humanities, such post-modern concepts remained largely absent from the first edition, aside from Emily S. Rosenberg’s pioneering chapter “Walking the Borders.”

By the time the second edition appeared in 2004, foreign relations history had caught up with the changes transforming the larger historical profession. The bottom-up approach of social history popularized in the 1960s–1970s and the emphasis on meaning and representation stressed in the cultural history arising in the 1980s–1990s were reflected in new chapters on how gender, race, memory, culture, and post-modern theory offered useful approaches to foreign relations history. The focus on the Cold War faded somewhat as historians explored other time periods and approached even the 1945–91 era with new questions, such as how did issues develop between North and South, and what commonalities were shared by the modernization projects of Washington and Moscow? The second edition carried forward *Explaining*’s “big-tent,” inclusive tradition by featuring ever-important approaches, such as national security, ideology, and political economy.
This third edition demonstrates that the ever more diverse field of foreign relations history (now also called international history or the history of the United States in the world) has surged to the forefront of methodological innovation while retaining its solid grounding in the analysis of political, economic, cultural, and military power in world affairs. In growing more variegated and sophisticated, the field has moved further away from the kind of over-arching synthesis achieved in earlier decades by such nationalist historians as Samuel F. Bemis, by such progressive scholars as Charles A. Beard, and by such supposed realists as George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau. Still influential though not hegemonic is William A. Williams’ thesis of a persistent drive to secure an Open Door for US trade and investment.

Despite their diverse approaches, the chapters in this volume share, some more explicitly than others, some of the assumptions prevailing among humanist intellectuals in the second decade of the twenty-first century. These ideas, a legacy of the cultural and linguistic turns of previous decades, emphasize the contingency and diversity in human affairs, the subjectivity of belief, and the historicity of tradition. According to these concepts, individuals, groups, and nations tend to construct the meanings of ideas, actions, and developments in line with prevailing cultural norms and practices. Such social construction does not rule out contestations of meaning, outlying actors, and transgressions. Nor does social construction obviate the importance of the physical body, whose thoughts and actions are influenced, though not determined, by cultural milieus. To the degree that such intellectual tenets seem like “commonsense,” they are a product of the present era. No doubt a fourth edition of Explaining will take a somewhat different perspective.

While the diversity of these chapters makes them difficult to categorize, they do sort themselves, however imperfectly, according to two parameters: whether they focus more on tangible structures or on constructed meanings, and whether they focus more on the institution or on the individual. The word “more” in the preceding sentences is operative: all the chapters address both structures and meanings, though in different ways. Moreover, we cannot explore structures without also understanding the meanings of those structures. Similarly, individuals function within an institutional setting, and institutions are constituted by individuals and groups.

This categorizing becomes clearer when we come down to specifics.

While cognizant of the contingency of meaning, the chapters by Robert Jervis, Melyvn P. Leffler, and Michael J. Hogan focus primarily on traditional concerns about how and why it is that exercising political, economic, and military power in certain ways fosters specific structures of foreign policy and international relations. Although also dealing with tangible structures of power, Brad Simpson, David Allen and Matthew Connelly, Nick Cullather, Barbara Keys, Mary L. Dudziak, and Fredrik Logevall branch off to explore the political and cultural implications of, respectively, the behavior of individual firms, the digital revolution in the archive, the pursuit of modernization and technological
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advance, the devolving of power onto non governmental organizations, the reliance on legal knowledge to codify or justify foreign policies, and the influence of domestic politics. Nathan J. Citino, Emily S. Rosenberg, and Ussama Makdisi explore the implications of a variety of borders: territorial, conceptual, metaphoric, and disciplinary.

Focusing more on meanings than on structures, Michael H. Hunt and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht investigate the meanings that people attach to the state and nation. While Paul A. Kramer elucidates the structured meanings of race in foreign relations, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu does much the same with respect to gender. Focusing on how people make and are influenced by meanings, the chapters by Andrew Preston on religion, Andrew J. Rotter on the senses, Richard H. Immerman and Lori Helene Gronich on psychology, and Frank Costigliola on emotion explore how the inner lives and thoughts of individuals and groups can shape foreign relations.

Emphasizing the tangible power and interests of the state and taking a global perspective, Robert Jervis compares the three principal models or theoretical structures available to international relations scholars and historians. He details the various iterations of realism, all of which stress the formative influence of the shape of the international system. According to realism, the structure of that system – multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar – has influenced the choices available to nations. The liberal model regards as formative for foreign affairs the economic and political structure of the domestic system. The social constructivist model emphasizes how individuals and states, influenced by the ideals and ideology circulating through society, put together a meaningful conception of what they want to achieve or avoid in foreign affairs. Like Jervis, Melvyn P. Leffler is interested in the tangible power of the state operating in a worldwide system. Striving for a comprehensive synthesis, Leffler uses the concept of national security to integrate Jervis’ realist, liberal, and social constructivist models. Leffler goes beyond Jervis, however, in the degree to which he stresses internally generated determinants, particularly the “imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats.” The national security approach edges into the realm of meaning, nonstate actors, and the intangible by stressing the importance of “human agency in the construction of core values and the significance of contingency in their implementation.”

Michael J. Hogan and Brad Simpson offer complementary introductions to political economy. Hogan’s corporatist approach explores the structure of cooperation and competition within which state and nonstate actors shaped America’s political economy and interactions with other nations. Corporatism analyzes the inner workings of what Jervis labels the liberal model of national interest. This approach traces the interplay of geopolitical strategy, partisan politics, bureaucratic rivalries, and issues of political culture and identity to show how corporate and labor officials, experts, citizen groups, and public officials thrashed out their differences, especially during the period from the late
nineteenth century to the 1950s. For instance, the Truman administration worked with leaders from industry and labor to implement the Marshall Plan through agencies that bridged the public and private sectors. While sharing Hogan’s focus on political economy, Simpson’s approach emphasizes a later time period when cooperation was less in evidence. Simpson lays out four interrelated dynamics. The first is America’s role in a world economy structured along Immanuel Wallerstein’s model of a hegemonic core nation or nations, a less developed semi-periphery, and a periphery locked into dependence and poverty. Simpson then expounds on the divergent interests, and hence different foreign strategies, of corporations engaged in various manufacturing and extractive industries. Third is the role of banking and finance in lubricating – or jamming up – the rest of the economy. And fourth is the sphere of state–business–society interaction of Hogan’s focus. By addressing some combination of these components, scholars can trace the material factors that shape foreign relations.

The document repository is another kind of structure central to foreign relations historians. That structure is changing fast as the US National Archives digitizes state department documents from the 1970s on and catalogs the growing flood of born-digital documents. David Allen and Matthew Connelly explain how historians can not only cope with these changes but also utilize them to ask new and sharper questions of the past. With digital records and appropriate software, they note, “we can ‘read’ an entire archive and analyze every available document and withdrawal card at the same time.” This could enable some new research protocols, such as measuring the frequency with which policymakers discussed certain issues, tracking the timing and location of “bursts” of interest in a topic, and finding hidden thematic structures in the documents. What, for instance, was the overall shape and focus of US diplomacy in the months before the fall of the Berlin Wall? In the days before the September 11 attacks?

The largely state-oriented, comprehensive structure of foreign affairs conceptualized by Jervis, Leffler, Hogan, and (to a lesser extent) Simpson becomes more complicated when we consider the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the missionary impulse to modernize supposedly less developed nations, the structure of the law, and the impact of domestic politics. As Barbara Keys emphasizes, NGOs are important not only because they number over 40,000, but also because they underscore the increasingly de-territorialized, transnational nature of an international system in which power flows in complicated ways. NGOs and multinational corporations can influence states, ideas, and individuals. Scholars therefore should not assume that states and individuals are the only players in international relations. As Nick Cullather points out, NGOs and multinational corporations also play a role as lobbyists and as agents of governments interested in promoting development and technological change in other nations. Cullather’s approach demonstrates the importance of ideology
and constructed meaning, in particular the pervasive belief that the United States could and should act as an agent in advancing the destiny of nations with far different histories and cultures. Faith in development and technology has remained central to US foreign policy since 1949, despite changing circumstances and a record of frequent failure. The persistence of this belief suggests its strong emotional hold. Indeed, Cullather describes how officials romanticized economic development and attached to it their hopes and fears for the future.

The ostensibly rational structure of the law and the often emotional realm of domestic politics offer another approach to foreign relations, as Mary L. Dudziak and Fredrik Logevall demonstrate. Treaties, questions of citizenship, and efforts to legally justify reprehensible practices such as torture are some of the issues that have made law central to governmental, corporate, and individual interactions across national frontiers. Dudziak points out that tracking such legal events as trials and human rights conventions can illuminate underlying debates while yielding an alternate periodization of foreign relations history and a fuller view of state power. Logevall points up what every democratic leader knows: no leader can implement her or his foreign policy unless they win elections or are appointed by someone who has triumphed at the polls. Though domestic politics influences the packaging and often the substance of foreign policy, that constraint is rarely mentioned by leaders not wanting to be seen as risking the nation’s blood and treasure for their selfish political purposes. Scholars researching the impact of domestic politics should keep in mind the admission by Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser: “Nobody talks about it but it’s on everybody’s mind.”

In contrast to the approaches to foreign relations history that focus on the structure of state-to-state relations, borderlands history conceptualizes structures that straddle states, or even questions the centrality of the territorial state. Nathan J. Citino defines a borderland as “a zone of interpenetration between two previously discrete societies.” Citino, Emily S. Rosenberg, and Ussama Makdisi challenge scholars to move beyond the US-centric, American exceptionalist view that sees Washington as the primary agent in global affairs and the ‘West’ as superior to the rest of the world. Citino advises that studying the fringes of states’ political and cultural authority can yield insights regarding not just borderland areas and the formation of borders, but also regarding the heartland of a state. Rosenberg views territorial, symbolic, and disciplinary borders as sometimes messy places whose ostensible disorder can invite a creative re-conceptualization of history. She and Makdisi urge scholars to study foreign relations from a non-US perspective, to provincialize the United States while de-provincializing the rest of the world. Makdisi cautions against those who would label themselves as transnational historians while failing to gain language skills and the cultural literacy necessary to understand the history and historiography of regions such as the Middle East or East Asia.
Chapters by Michael H. Hunt and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht return the focus to the nation, although in ways that lean more toward constructed meanings and inner determinants of foreign relations. After defining ideology as a set of convictions that suggest ways for dealing with reality, Hunt goes on to explore the powerful ideology of nationalism. The constitutive elements of nationalism include notions of who is and is not a citizen, who or what appears as a foreign threat, and how the government should defend these conceptions and other core values. Although nationalist currents have always run deep in the United States, this ideology is prominent also in other countries. Nationalism, then, affords opportunity for comparative historical analysis. While nationalism mobilizes the loyalty of inhabitants, Nation Branding, Gienow-Hecht explains, aims to influence the appraisal of outsiders. The approach of Nation Branding examines how states and nonstate actors package cultural events, educational programs, and advertising campaigns to orchestrate approval and respect in influential foreign quarters. This approach offers a means to pursue long-term, comparative analysis that takes into account cultural change over time.

While Nation Branding, nationalism, transnational perspectives, NGOs, borders, borderlands, domestic politics, law, modernization, digital data mining, political economy, corporatism, national security, and international relations all refer in some way to the nation, the approaches of gender, race, religion, memory, the senses, psychology, and emotion refer to the body and mind. This distinction is, of course, relative; human activity and thought create the nation and all things related to it. Nevertheless, since the early 2000s, foreign relations history has joined other scholarly fields in paying increased attention to the physical body, the inner self, personality, thought, sexuality, and to the cultural expression and representation of these aspects of the individual. As Andrew J. Rotter puts it, “relations between people and nations are experiential, embodied.” Especially in foreign relations, people encounter each other through what can appear as strange, unpleasant, even disgusting smells, sounds, tastes, touches, and sights. Although such judgments are historically conditioned, cultural interpretations that can be learned and unlearned, they are often assumed to reflect universal values and to “prove” that foreigners are culturally and racially inferior. Much of the US “civilizing” project in the Philippines, Rotter observes, focused on changing how racialized Filipinos looked, smelled, and sounded.

Although Paul A. Kramer also focuses on Americans’ self-assumed civilizing mission, he uses a wider lens to trace racist aspects of foreign policy extending into the present. Kramer defines racialized power as combining exception, essence, and domination. He outlines how considerations of race have played key roles in US foreign policy with regard to encounters with Native Americans, diplomacy on behalf of the pre-1861 slave-holding regime, restrictions on migration, formal colonialism, regulating the labor supply, securing corporate profits, pursuing...
modernization, the “war on terror,” and organizing the military. Like race, gender is a constructed category that maps value-laden assumptions about the supposed physical essence of, say, skin color and sexual difference, onto a myriad of social and cultural practices and beliefs. Judy Tzu-Chun Wu explores the insights available to scholars examining gender in terms of both gendered human beings and gender as a signifier of power. Women have played key roles in foreign relations as leaders, migrants, producers, and consumers in the global economy, and workers in the military—sexual complex. Notions about gender are powerful because they map deep beliefs about the “natural” order of the sexes onto other aspects of life, such as relations among nations. US policymakers often dismissed French critiques of American policy as “emotional” or “hysterical” outbursts from a supposedly feminized nation. US officials regarded defeated Japan as a “geisha nation” in need of Washington’s masculine protection. An ideology of masculinity prescribed the brash toughness that helped propel the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations into the Vietnam War.

In keeping with the broader revival of interest and faith in the subjective, Andrew Preston and Penny Von Eschen examine religion and memory. Preston advises that “scholarly empathy is as important as scrutiny.” Scholars trying to understand a historical actor, whether it is a Woodrow Wilson or a Ronald Reagan, cannot simply dismiss professions of religious faith as hypocrisy. Neither can they accept such declarations at face value; evidence must be interpreted. Religion has often operated as a powerful element in how people interpret their own lives, the interests of the nation, and the world around them. Faith in God, Preston points out, can have an especially powerful impact as it embodies both emotional and rational thought. Probing another aspect of the inner self, Von Eschen explores the creation and impact of memory. Memory is a social process, she writes, especially because memory is intertwined with forgetting. Societal values and hierarchies help determine what materials are saved in archives, which historical events are celebrated, how history is taught in schools, and, not least, what aspects of the past are glorified or denigrated on television and in other media. In the digital age, scholars can perform an intertextual analysis of content on the internet, in books, television, and in other media. Memory is always selective. Scholars can examine the consensus and the contestation over what has been forgotten, memorialized, and made the object of nostalgia.

Focusing on psychology, Richard H. Immerman and Lori Helene Gronich outline how the character traits of an official can influence her or his foreign policy. They point out that many of the concepts and issues of foreign relations history boil down to matters of psychology. Deterrence, brinksmanship, credibility, risk, threat, pride, and respect entail emotionally inflected judgments. Intelligence and counter-intelligence involve high stakes and, often, high emotion. While emphasizing the importance of emotion, Immerman and Gronich see emotion and cognition as linked but separate
brain processes. They comment that “preconscious emotional arousal may guide cognitive judgments.”

Frank Costigliola, by contrast, views emotion as intrinsic to cognition. He outlines five aspects of looking at history from the inside out. Historians can analyze the impact of emotional thinking on the behavior of individuals and of groups. They can also look at how societal norms for expressing emotions have shifted over time, and how emotions, such as honor and empathy, have themselves changed across time and culture. Finally, scholars can examine how historical actors have sought to defend or attack policies on the basis of their supposed rationality or emotionality. Examining evidence of emotions – and, more generally, recovering the history of subjectivity by looking at psychology, memory, religion, race, and gender – can reveal perceptions, beliefs, motivations, decisions, and actions that might be overlooked if the foreign relations historian did not probe beyond external evidence.

This volume offers twenty-one perspectives on American foreign relations history. Read separately, they demonstrate how the various elements of the field push and pull against each other. Taken as a whole, they offer an overview of the current state of scholarship. These chapters do not systematically review recent literature, detail all topics worthy of inquiry, or summarize all methods and interpretative frameworks. They seek instead to define the state of the field, to outline new analytical models, to show how familiar topics and methods are being rethought, and to reveal the usefulness of questions raised by other disciplines and other fields of US history. These chapters illustrate many of the challenging ways of approaching the study of American foreign relations history and highlight the healthy ferment and rich diversity that mark the field.
I

Theories of International Relations

Robert Jervis

For diplomatic historians to delve into the sub-field of Political Science that studies International Politics or Relations (terms I will use interchangeably) is to enter a world that is both familiar and different. Indeed, it is the similarities that make the differences so jarring. Just as Dean Acheson expressed his bemusement at discovering that International Relations (IR) scholars treated him as an “independent variable,” so do many historians find distasteful the notion of variables, especially ones labeled as independent (causes) and dependent (effects), studying historical events as “case studies,” seeking generalizations as wide-ranging as possible, valuing “theoretical parsimony,” with its emphasis on deploying as few independent variables as possible, and comparing cases that are dissimilar in many ways. But I believe that the very differences between the two fields make interaction potentially fruitful if historians are willing to (temporarily) suspend disbelief.

Obviously, the field of IR is too large to completely cover here, and my survey will be skewed toward international security rather than political economy, international organizations, and transnational trends and flows. In the course of this, I hope to make clear why a chapter on IR theory in some ways fits awkwardly with a book on approaches to the history of American foreign policy.

I will proceed by outlining two related ways of dividing the theoretical approaches to IR: the first between the orientations of Realism, Liberalism, and Social Constructivism, and the second sorting according to whether the main independent variables are located at the level of the individual, the state, or the international system, which lends itself to a discussion of how IR uses comparisons to try to pin down causation. I will concentrate on theories about relations among the most powerful states, which leaves out many important subjects but is most relevant to arguments about American foreign relations.

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REALISM

The best known approach to IR is Realism, which comes in several flavors: classical, neoclassical, offensive, defensive, and structural. All share the common starting point that states are usually the main actors in international politics, that considerations of power and security are paramount, that states are (and should be) guided by the national interest as contrasted with sub-national or supra-national interests, and that the world is dangerous both because human nature is malign – or at least has a malign streak in it – and because this realm, unlike domestic society, lacks a higher authority that can protect states and enforce agreements. Any number of aphorisms can be adduced here, and a nice one is by George Washington: “It is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bounded by its interest.”

Part of the reason for the mistrust and conflict is circular, but the circularity exists in the world rather than in reasoning about it. One source of fear is the knowledge that because others cannot trust the actor’s own state, they may preventively move against it, and the understanding of this leads the state to act preventively itself.

Three points of clarification are essential. First, Realists often differ among themselves in the details of how they explain policy and in the prescriptions they offer. Thus, Realists were to be found on both sides of the question of whether the war in Vietnam was necessary. They were united, however, in the way they analyzed the problem, looking at the national interest, the power stakes of the various countries involved, and the likely consequences for national security of various courses of action. They paid little attention to morality, world opinion, international institutions, or economic interests. Second, there is often a tension between Realism as description and explanation and Realism as prescription: Realism has difficulty explaining why states sometimes behave in foolish or self-defeating ways. Third, contrary to what critics often allege, Realism neither urges belligerent policies nor expects them. It fully understands the risks and costs of conflict, especially war, and stresses that the national interest includes a respect for other’s interests. Morgenthau’s classic Power Among Nations stresses the value of conciliation and diplomacy, and E. H. Carr’s foundational text The Twenty Years’ Crisis urged Britain to appease Nazi Germany because it lacked the military and economic power to resist what was seen as limited German expansion. Although it does not speak well for Carr that he excised these paragraphs when the book was reprinted in 1946, his initial stance was fully consistent with Realism. So it is not surprising that the bulk of the Realist community strongly opposed the war in Iraq, arguing that the United States was strong enough to protect itself and its allies against Iraq even if that country developed nuclear weapons, that there would be no conceivable interest that would lead Iraq to provide such weapons to terrorists, and that the post-war reconstruction would be difficult.