Introduction

Citizenship, State, and Globalization

This book presents a critical study of citizenship, state, and globalization in societies historically influenced by Islamic traditions and institutions. An analysis of citizenship and state as ideas and practices must investigate the democratic aspirations of contemporary Islamic societies. This entails theoretical elucidation of the manifold relationships between the individual and the state, and religion and the political community. Citizenship and state-building, moreover, also concern placing one's self and community within the larger globalizing contexts where the cosmopolitan ideal and democratic aspirations necessarily become interconnected.

How can Muslim societies fulfill their aspirations to democracy and progress as desired by their citizens, while enjoying a productive and mutually peaceful presence at the global level? There are key contexts and preconditions for the realization of our desire to live as active agents and free citizens. The first is respect for the core Enlightenment values of human equality and the dignity of all members of a given society, regardless of ethnicity, religious affiliation, or other beliefs (i.e., atheism). The second is a vision of democracy providing a serious space for community as well as the individual, where the cognitive-imaginative resources of a multidimensional Islamic heritage become crucial. It follows that any essentialist framework opposing Islam and the Enlightenment as dichotomous opposites is ethically and practically untenable. Fortunately, both Islam and the Enlightenment as discursive traditions – despite heavily essentialist regions of intellectual density – harbor the resources for a nondualist and multicentered imagining of political and cultural modernity. We propose a new theoretical template to highlight these features and provide a coherent explanation of contemporary political changes in

Islamic societies. The analysis will lay bare the tacit ontological hierarchies structuring the major discursive options and their implications for citizenship, the state, and cosmopolitanism.

The Jasmine Revolutions shook the world in gripping video-Internet prime time, destroying old prejudices about cultural "stasis" and the invulnerability of long-standing authoritarian police states. In their wake, it is no longer possible to ignore that Muslim majority societies are involved in a moral and material struggle to achieve self-determination and dignity, to belong to a community, and to live in mutual respect and open exchange with all other world communities. These dramatic eruptions of a popular will, however, also raise troubling theoretical issues going back to the Enlightenment-Romanticism problematic. The Jasmine revolutionary aftermath reawakens questions about two alternative modern ideals: the secular ideal and the modern state as the expression of mass cultural identity (i.e., the popular *Shari'a* ideal). The recent assassination of Chrokri Belaid, the secular opposition leader in Tunisia, and the 40,000 protesters who gathered to condemn the "moderate" Islamist Ennahda regime on the day of his burial, testify to the polarizing power of this issue in the wake of the Jasmine Revolutions.[1] The related and underlying neocolonial issue concerns whether the Jasmine Revolutions can achieve their aims without violent self-transformation into an imagined "Western" model. This is typified in the "nationalist" pattern established by Ataturk's Kemalist Revolution and reproduced by the Shah of Iran. These regimes were endured by populations, but neither imagined nor created through their own practical energies. This problem is raised acutely by Foucauldian genealogical critiques in the Nietzschean tradition of localizing the universal claims of modernity. We argue the need – on a more fundamental level – for a philosophical analysis of violence as embedded "invisibly" in the material and discursive order of things.

An analysis of the political rationality of the Jasmine Revolutions indicates a possible road of tolerance and reorganization based on the desire of ordinary people for nonviolent and peaceful lives. It shows their desire to be treated as intelligent beings by authority. This extends equally to the potential for successful revolution in countries such as Iran and Syria, which are undergoing similar cultural-political uprisings. The unexpected speed, organization, and effectiveness of popular revolutions across the Muslim world suggest a massive and semi-anonymous network or collaboration of people consciously undermining established authoritarian

[1] *Libération*, February 9–10, 2013.

patterns and preconceptions. Such networks suggest permutations on "prerecorded" behavior-expectation patterns. They expose alterations in the structures underlying them and a process of public learning in how to analyze, choose, and construct more positive political-cultural formations through a collective reeducation of attitudes. Tiny everyday particles turn into waves.

We can identify an unthought conjuncture between the Jasmine Revolutions and an expanding current in Western thought we call the Pragmatic Revolution. Its first node, or connection point, is embodiment. The Jasmine Revolutions concerned training and performance, the question of "how" in action, the body, a moment in the upbringing of the new generation – rather than "what" in a framed atemporal picture of the world. The second node is embeddedness in mutating collective traditions. Meanings and values – systems of communication as such – are part of a practical context: this includes the language in the Holy Qur'an or other sacred texts as much as the evolving language of Internet communication or popular music to move people. The third node is a shift in the unthought or tacit premises of thought and action. The main significance of the Pragmatic Revolution in Western thought is the shift of primacy from defined intellectual figures to the space-time of the everyday. Here, bounded or final meaning (i.e., molar ontology) ceases to be possible and yields to a field of singularities (i.e., molecular). It is a shift from a uniform ontological plane (intellectual virtue) to temporal horizons (moral virtue). That is, the notion of God or the soul corresponding to substantive beings (the tradition of metaphysical abstraction) yields to a grammar of ethical terms embedded in the moral and religious practices of everyday life. In this we have Gandhi's or Tolstoy's views in attributing value to different religious practices while remaining skeptical toward religious theories. The ethical life of the everyday is the limit of what can be personally witnessed, making traditional conflicts between world religions over absolute truth – often reaching excesses of remorseless violence – a spiritually illegitimate and unfounded practice. In the pragmatic ethic, we can only see how religious belief works and shapes our lives. We can make no claims concerning religious phenomena beyond this point. It is thus logical that Gandhi's and Tolstoy's distrust of religious dogma was linked to a philosophy of nonviolent practice and activism rooted in religious everydayness.

The 2011 Jasmine Revolutions seem to teach us: the practical emergence of a global ethic of reconciliation in recent world events and experiences requires a theoretical counterpart in philosophical reflection

upon the problem of thinking a nondualist and nonessentialist pluralism.[2] Inspired by the ethic of reconciliation, this book aims to sociologically interconnect three domains: (1) the space-time of specific contexts of Islam as contemporary practices in everyday life; (2) the ethical framework of modern democratic practices or the social virtue of nonviolence; (3) certain universal or shared human experiences that ground cosmopolitanism (i.e., a universal vulnerability that provides the underlying logic for nonviolence). The interlinking of the three domains requires a multisided model that combines the key theoretical lessons in the social sciences from the latter half of the twentieth century. It should avoid both "totalization" which links "authentic" mass movements to sublimated violence, and the "fragment/universal dualism" that denies that mass movements are possible except as disguised coercion. The successful Jasmine mass movements did not forge a homogeneous ideological subjectivity (class, national, or religious), but demonstrated everyday practice in unifying diverse class fractions or autonomous levels upon a complex field of interconnected political and economic structures. They suggested that ordinary spaces of the mundane harbor a power to reach and alter the political heights. They achieved their function comprised of multiple ideational-imaginative elements mediated by broadly shared values that were neither purely Western nor local.

The cosmopolitan ideal must reject a homogeneous and tacitly Eurocentric world historical temporality. Eric Hobsbawm's *Long Nineteenth Century*, far from an unbroken period of material, intellectual, and moral progress, was a catastrophic experience for India, China, Iran, and others as viewed through a non-Eurocentric lens.[3] Historical periodization for the South does not necessarily correspond to that of the developed world, and thus a heterogeneous or multisided conception of universality is required. Although European domination represented a mere flicker of several centuries, tacit Eurocentric intellectual structures persist in the social sciences even as India and China undergo unprecedented economic growth levels. The methodological challenge is therefore to "recover and forefront alternative voices (and) notions of what constitutes modernity, development, progress, scientific achievement, secular, nation, justice,

[2] See, for example, Ari Sitas, "Beyond the Mandela Decade: The Ethic of Reconciliation?" *Current Sociology* 59 (September 2011). Sage.

[3] Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995).

ethics (and) aesthetics (in order to) incorporate the much wider human experience."[4]

Our analysis therefore integrates three paradigmatic interventions in twentieth-century thought on modernity and the practice of democratic nation-making: John Dewey's attempt to think beyond metaphysical dualism in terms of "conceptual pluralism," Edmund Husserl's suggestion of the "lifeworld" and "temporal horizons," and Amartya Sen's conception of culture as variable "components" entailing freedom as "capabilities." Together, these three critiques of the dominant discourse of modernity – belonging to the Pragmatic Revolution or "emergent" paradigm – suggest that modernization is not a single objective process to be implemented from above but a multicentered and mass-participatory interaction of imagination, belief, and value. It requires the temporal creation of conditions for building a modern democratic society. This conception of modernization at the grassroots level depends upon the ethic of reconciliation. It cannot posit a prior condition of mind as the prerequisite for building democratic modernity (i.e., any particular belief) and then impose that belief upon the population from above in order to ground the point of departure.

The methodological hierarchy, therefore, shifts from the closed conceptual absolute – or an elite ideological program imposed upon the population from above – to the everyday social world of multiple democratically mobilized spaces. Citizenship is, from this perspective, not ontological, sacred, or natural – i.e., "autonomy" as conformity to "pure reason" of the Rousseau-Kantian social contract. It is a heritage of cumulative struggle for freedom requiring unceasing protection; the nation-state is the potential channel through which vulnerable populations can voice themselves and the instrument for self-protection in relation to economically and politically more powerful countries. This "lesson" in a decentered world was confirmed by developmental, revolutionary, and other nation-making experiences of the twentieth century. Historian Bipan Chandra expanded the comparative empirical space with his insight that the Indian national movement provides lessons in social transformation comparable to the British, French, Russian, or Chinese revolutions, introducing

[4] Aditya Mukherjee, "What Human and Social Sciences for the 21st Century: Some Perspectives from the South." Paper read at National Congress on "What Human and Social Sciences for the 21st Century?" December 7, 2012. University of Caen, France. The insight on periodization was part of Mukherjee's lecture.

a uniquely nonviolent paradigm of mass mobilization.[5] In mapping the theoretical problematic of a multicentered modernity upon the practical terrain of democratic nation-making in contemporary Middle Eastern and Muslim societies, the methodology must be dialogic and interdisciplinary. It must lay bare the systematic intellectual and material linkages of the global space which – veiled under essentialist propositional constructions on "Islam," the "West," and so on – remain occluded.

We comparatively juxtapose three prevailing theoretical discourses in Islamic studies that have profoundly affected contemporary concepts of tradition, cosmopolitanism, and democracy in Islamic countries today. The first two discourses are conjoined as dichotomous ideological end points between "universal modernity" (exemplified in Kemalist Turkey and Zia Gokalp) and "religious authenticity" (exemplified in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its intellectual founders such as Ali Shari'ati). Violence, as a means, is justified in order to attain an Absolute End invested with either "scientific" or "sacred" inevitability. Both ideological end points embody a totalizing ideology and – not coincidentally – an authoritarian politics where a fundamental inside-out dichotomy defines the meaning of political modernity (i.e., dualism). The first turns secularism into a substantive discursive construct basing its political program upon a determinist historicist schema (i.e., modernity must supersede tradition as totalized ontological figures). The second, in an effort to negate the secular character of the modern world, endows a particular discursive construct (inevitably varying among regimes) with the mission of restoring a lost ontological absolute (i.e., the Malian Ansar Dine regime in its "purifying" battle against local Sufi shrines). Both involve a violent curtailment of human rights and capabilities on the level of citizenship and the state. Violent practice, beyond a mere instrumental means, is grounded in an ontological source of meaning.

We point, third, to newer democratic alternatives in intellectual discourse and popular practice aspiring to openness, nonviolence, and multicentered pluralism – as in the beleaguered Iranian Green Movement today. These embody an emerging "politics of reconciliation" produced in response to experiences of totalizing ideology and their violent authoritarian patterns of political modernization. Many formative thinkers of the Green Movement are veterans of the intellectual and political disaster of 1979 and have drawn the appropriate lessons for today. Modernity is,

[5] See Bipan Chandra, *Indian National Movement. The Long Term Dynamics* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1989).

if anything, a learning process that requires ongoing reflection upon the complex and varying empirical interrelation of means and ends, in other words, a temporal phenomenon rather than an antecedent fixed existence that requires merely reproductive transmission.

We articulate the theoretical template – to highlight the Pragmatic and Jasmine revolutionary overlap – through the tripartite problematic of "embeddedness," "embodiment," and the "unthought." The historical problematic of embeddedness was a significant multidisciplinary intervention in twentieth-century social science and philosophy, visible in structuralism (Durkheim's "substratum of collective life"), phenomenology (Husserl's "lifeworld"), Wittgenstein ("forms of life"), Foucault's "mode of subjectivation," or Michael Polanyi's "post-critical philosophy" ("conviviality").[6] The related philosophical problematic of "embodiment" – concerning scientific epistemology and social science methodology – encompasses themes of the lifeworld and the body, challenging the Cartesian model of the self (the "subject") isolated within its own bubble-like consciousness (i.e., Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Deweyan pragmatism, Michael Polanyi's "indwelling," and Foucault). Together, the problematics of embeddedness and embodiment posed the sometimes obscure but ubiquitous methodological dilemma of the "unthought" (in Bachelardian or Husserlian phenomenology, Saussurian structuralism, Foucauldian "episteme," Deweyan pragmatism, Weberian "elective affinities," Polanyi's "tacit dimension," and Nietzschean "genealogy"). We highlight and evaluate the implications of these three overlapping and internally conflicting theoretical problematics for questions of citizenship, the state, and cosmopolitanism. The tripartite problematic, in itself, suggests a new if as yet inadequately theorized cosmopolitan horizon upon the everyday terrain of ongoing contradictions, compromises, and struggles in contemporary "globalized" societies.

Embeddedness in the social sciences was linked to the impact of global modernity on everyday life. Hannah Arendt defined it as "the new social insecurity caused by the industrial revolution," involving the "loss of the entire social texture into which (people) were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world." She evoked an existential malaise: "What is unprecedented is not the loss

[6] See Emile Durkheim, *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique* (Paris: Flammarion, 2009), 53. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 7–10. Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–84, Volume I* (London: Penguin, 2000), 264–65. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 203–43.

of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one."[7] Embeddedness originated terminologically in Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1944): the Industrial Revolution was "accompanied by a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people." The "cultural catastrophe" now "revolutionizing the colonial world" was "analogous to that of a large part of white society in the early days of capitalism," that is, the violently disrupted human, economic, and moral fabric of societies.[8] This "uprooting," Polanyi argued, creates proliferating movements of self-protection urging democratic negotiation of the modern economy through its (re)embeddedness in new social and cultural relations. Arendt's and Polanyi's penetrating analyses of embeddedness highlight the human rights, protection, and violence linkage in modern everyday life under developing regimes. Their intervention – seeking to establish justice within the modern economy and state-law complex – represents a shift in the methodological hierarchy away from the absolute and toward everyday life.

A comparable methodological shift was implied in the philosophical framework of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), but not for the democratic ends of justice. We must carefully distinguish the two. Heidegger's intervention shifts the methodological hierarchy in favor of a fabricated conception of pure roots, or the discourse of authenticity. Moderns live an "inauthentic historical existence (which is) burdened with the legacy of a 'past' that has become unrecognizable."[9] This methodological confusion – linked to the problematic of embeddedness – did the traditional Left a serious disservice. We must, it follows, avoid the dualistic essentialism that identifies the Enlightenment one-dimensionally as the "implantation into new cultures of an alien framework," or the "premises of modernity" as the "last bastion of (European) global supremacy."[10] The "fragment" argument – fantasizing a utopia beyond all hierarchy – does not constitute a viable political project on the everyday practical level. The realization of our desire to live as active agents and free citizens requires nation-making hierarchally privileging an open secular and democratic ideal at the public level. The alternative is the imposition upon the public sphere

[7] Hannah Arendt, *The Portable Hannah Arendt* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 33–34.
[8] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 166.
[9] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 358.
[10] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 17/27/31.

of a particular mono-vocal fantasy (traditional, modern, or combining the two) claiming sacred, objective, or some other ontological basis to legitimize the rule of violence. In India, for example, a right-wing sectarian Hindu party came to power from 1999 to 2004 that banned scientific and secular textbooks and replaced them with works affirming their sectarian political agenda in defiance of accepted standards of the social science disciplines.[11] The suppression of modern social theory constitutes a setback in the creation of democratic secular politics in non-Western societies.

Embeddedness, then, is a key conceptual category for understanding the Jasmine Revolutions as new popular mobilizations responding to a specific pattern of modern experience: the colonial legacy of economic-political global integration along metropolitan lines and the neocolonial experience of authoritarian modernization. At the core of the Jasmine Revolutions is a proactive and self-protecting response by populations of modern nation-states subordinated within the unequal regime of global capitalist organization. In this light, Bangladeshi public anger over the April 24, 2013 mass deaths and injuries (about half women and many children) in the Rana Plaza Building collapse – in which clothing was produced for Western retailers (Benetton and, controversially, Walmart) – bears comparison as a moment in self-protection against the ordering of everyday life by a subordinating global capitalist production process (i.e., the deadly garment industry accounts for 80% of national exports). This single mesmerizing moment of horror belongs within the vaster "invisible" ensemble of specific levels of capital-labor coercion that are the condition for today's "global market society." Rather than history's largest "accident" in the garment industry, it was a moment of structural violence. By analyzing the implications of embeddedness as a historical experience producing a range of practical-discursive formations for political mobilization, we can trace their varying significance for citizenship, the state, and cosmopolitanism. We hope thereby to avoid the repetition of authoritarian patterns and foster democratically empowering options in the interaction of social structures and practices of struggle for justice.

That the related philosophical problematic of embodiment is relevant to the Jasmine Revolutions is made clear by the central emphasis on

[11] See Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee, and Sucheta Mahajan, *RSS, School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi: the Hindu Communal Project* (New Delhi: Sage, 2008).

training and performance and the question of "how" in action. Accumulated discursive materials on embodiment have shaped and consolidated over time in tandem with transformations in world space produced by expanding capitalism. At least since the French revolutionary aftermath, embodiment has opposed the "universal concept" to the "authentic particular." The body was, unsurprisingly, the locus of discourses sometimes framing salvation in terms of rupture from the contaminating whole, with definite implications for citizenship, the state, and globalization. The body is the site of the "dark background of mere givenness" and "natural and present differences" (everyday physical and temporal reality). It contrasts with "equality (produced politically) through organization" (the artifice grounding justice).[12] Hence, the body for Schopenhauer circumvents the illusory surface of intellectual "representation" (i.e., science) and attains the unknowable "thing in itself" (the "will") through lived life. The uniquely singular existence of the body is a privileged access to being that enshrines the category of "authenticity" at the summit of metaphysical truth: "the body (is) not a representation at all, but (. . .) will. I should therefore like to distinguish this truth from every other, and call it *philosophical truth par excellence*."[13] Schopenhauer forged a defining modern sensibility. To be is to access authentic truth, to know is merely to embrace a shallow reflection. Individuals may have read every study written by the experts on hip-hop, but it does not mean that they can hold their own in the underground music scene battles of Detroit or its Swahili variant in Tanzania.

Nietzsche, in this tradition of embodiment, viewed the self as primarily the lived body. He correspondingly introduced the "unthought" problematic via a methodological revolution in investigating origins, that is, genealogy. Every scar on the flesh of Saint Margarita of Cascia (1381–1457) represented another step closer to God, in a history of the body superseding mere histories of the mind. Nietzsche unmasked Absolute origins as mere mental supplements to a subordinated body. The unthought origins of Platonic-Christian idealizations (the universal) were the consolatory fantasies of enslaved bodies (the local), dominated by the master's authentic Achilles-like self-confidence. The Enlightenment's new ideal figures of Progress, Rights, and Science, and its bid for a "new world," merely reproduced superficially hidden Platonic-Christian

[12] Arendt, *Portable Hannah Arendt*, 43.
[13] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation I* (New York: Dover, 1969), 102.