CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts, and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally.

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Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

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Contents

List of Contributors ix

1. Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes 1
   Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser

   PART I. THE CATEGORY

2. Ruling against Rules 21
   Adam Przeworski

   Mark Tushnet

   PART II. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

4. The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions 53
   Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo

5. Authoritarian Constitution Making: The Role of the Military in Latin America 83
   Gabriel L. Negretto

   Kristen Stilt
PART III. CONTENTS OF AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS

7. The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions 141
   Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton

8. Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism 165
   David S. Law and Mila Versteeg

PART IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS

9. The Role of Presidential Power in Authoritarian Elections 199
   Jennifer Gandhi

10. The Informal Politics of Formal Constitutions: Rethinking the Effects of “Presidentialism” and “Parliamentarism” in the Cases of Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine 218
    Henry E. Hale

11. The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China 245
    Xin He

Index 265
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