Introduction

From Revolutionary Theory to Revolutionary Historiography: England, France, and Russia

In the ivied towers of history, political science, and sociology, recent decades have witnessed an explosion of literature on the comparative analysis of sociopolitical revolutions. There can be no doubt that, however broadly or narrowly the term “revolution” be construed, theorists in the field will always acknowledge a lasting debt to Crane Brinton. In 1938, this distinguished student of French history first published *The Anatomy of Revolution*.¹ This path-blazing comparison of the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions has long served (in this and subsequent editions) as a standard reference work on the subject of revolutionary change, even as historians, political scientists, and political sociologists have inevitably offered new typologies of and explanations for major upheavals in politics and society.² In light of subsequent scholarship, however, and particularly in the wake of recent earthshaking events in the erstwhile Soviet Union, a follow-up to Brinton’s pioneering analysis would seem to be indicated. Such a study, unlike *The Anatomy of Revolution*, could focus exclusively on European revolutions as such, thereby leaving developments in eighteenth-century “British” America to authorities in that field. Before speculating on the organization and interpretative thrust of such a study, however, we should first recapitulate what Brinton actually had to say, and then discuss the extensive theoretical literature on the Brintonian schema and on some of the questions it inescapably raises. After doing so, and after summarily relating the successive schools of thought on the English, French,

and Russian Revolutions to evolving revolutionary theory, we can then introduce our own (updated) comparative explanation of the causes, process, and results of Brinton’s three classic European upheavals.

Crane Brinton, it is true, was only the most celebrated of those numerous scholars who over the years have sought through the use of metaphors or conceptual schemes appropriated from the natural sciences to illuminate the “life cycles” or “natural” sequences of stages of carefully defined subgroups of sociopolitical revolutions. Yet, given the unique resonance of his work in the field, it seems proper at this point to concentrate in particular on the Brintonian construct. Borrowing from the imagery and vocabulary of medical pathology, Brinton likened each of the three European revolutions to “a kind of fever” invading and sorely testing a host (political) organism. First, Brinton presented the “causes” of revolution as a cluster of mutually dependent variables (the so-called “prodromal symptoms” of the impending disease). Then, there followed the successive stages of the “disease” or revolution: that is, the onset of the upheaval, which in its earliest phase briefly featured new forces coalescing against the antediluvian and discredited ancien régime; a subsequent headlong plunge into deeper “delirium,” with “moderates” being out-maneuvered by “extremists;” a veritable crisis or “reign of Terror and Virtue;” and, finally, a restoration of relative stability (“Thermidor” and beyond) revealing a patient—or, in this case, a postrevolutionary society—in convalescence, sadder, perhaps, but wiser. Much as an individual who is able to survive a pathogenic assault emerges from the trauma temporarily weakened yet in a fundamental sense strengthened, so (affirmed Brinton) the government-and-society undergoing the disruptive experience of revolution emerges from it more “functional,” more of a going concern, than it was previously. This is true despite the postrevolutionary regime’s prolonged susceptibility to “pathological” sequelae, that is, to “a series of lesser revolutions in which the forces present in the initial one are worked out.”

Such, in brief, is the schema developed by Crane Brinton to anatomize the “natural” life-cycle of revolution as it ran its course in the countries under consideration. It is a way of conceptualizing revolutionary change that has provided stimulating fare for social scientists in the field whether they have confined themselves to examining meticulously defined subgroups of revolutions or aspired to characterize and account for revolutions of all types in all possible temporal and spatial settings. At the same time, however, such theorists, even if intrigued by Brinton’s ideas on the subject, have naturally enough hastened to criticize what they have seen as their problematic aspects.


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Most of them have granted a qualified pass to Brinton’s overall schema, at least where England, France, and Russia are concerned. Chalmers Johnson, for instance, long associated with what some call “systems/value consensus” sociology, once said that while there might be “room to argue over Brinton’s descriptions of particular stages and over whether these actually occurred in all . . . of the revolutions he compares,” his formulation in general “remains our richest and most elegantly written elaboration of stage theory.” For Johnson, the chief problem with Brinton was not so much his choice of conceptual metaphor or his postulating of specific, sequential phases of revolution as it was his failure to account convincingly “for the movement from one phase of revolution to another” – in other words, to furnish for the reader “a model of the revolutionary process that encompasses all the aspects of revolution, incorporates both actor-oriented and structural variables, and is sensitive to the contingencies that may arise when all the different variables are combined.”

Still, however much Johnson accentuated the need for “a theory . . . that can account for all the major contingencies that arise during an actual revolutionary situation,” he remained persuaded that “the most famous and still the most powerful stage or life-cycle theory is Crane Brinton’s.”

Brinton’s application of “stage” or “life-cycle” theory to what Johnson in the 1960s had termed the classic “Jacobin” revolutions in Europe has still found some specialist favor in these early years of the twenty-first century. The recently deceased Martin Malia, for example, although complaining at one point that Brinton’s conceptual schema lacked substantive “ideological” content and was extended too easily from France to England and Russia, nonetheless admitted at another point that The Anatomy of Revolution remained “the work closest to being a classic” and allowed that its organizational scenario “is indeed a commonsense description of what goes on during a major European upheaval.” Some of the specific parallels unearthed among these revolutions by Brinton were, said Malia grudgingly, “genuinely illuminating.”

Even more recently, sociologist Jack Goldstone has averred that “the best-developed theory of revolutionary processes remains the classic ‘natural history’ approach;” Brinton, he concedes, “laid out a process of revolution that has become the standard view of revolutionary sequences.” True, The Anatomy of Revolution provides no explanatory key to the Chinese and other “Third World” revolutions of the twentieth century, and does not, for that matter, even account satisfactorily for all of the complexities encountered in the European revolutions themselves. Nevertheless, Goldstone finds Brinton’s analysis to be “fairly accurate in describing the course of those revolutions;” as such, it still merits the attention of those engaged in this field of studies.

7 Jack A. Goldstone, “Rethinking Revolutions: Integrating Origins, Processes, and Outcomes,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29 (2009), pp. 18–32. I thank
However reassuring the generally positive tenor of such learned commentary over the years, it offers a cautionary note for any historian wishing to follow in Brinton’s footsteps. He or she may hesitate before venturing (in sociologist Michael Kimmel’s words) “to overemphasize the French case as the template for all revolutionary events.”8 Even if the stages sequence theory laid out in The Anatomy of Revolution be retained in one form or another, the historian must not allow revolutionary experiences in seventeenth-century England, eighteenth-century France, and twentieth-century Russia to be subordinated too tightly to the temporal requirements of such a theory. Sociologist Kimmel reminds us in this connection that Lyford P. Edwards, a full-fledged member of the “natural history school of revolution” even before Brinton joined the club, warned early on that “it is the easiest thing imaginable to draw up an arbitrary series of stages and then twist and torture the data to fit this Procrustean bed.”9

It is well to sound Edwards’ cautionary note, and indeed the comparative analysis to follow will do so repeatedly. Yet, it is also only fair to note that Brinton, himself, was at all times sensitive to this issue, and was quick to acknowledge the limits as well as the descriptive and explanatory power of the “uniformities” he traced through the English, French, and Russian Revolutions. To argue (as this study will) that in each of these upheavals there was something of a progression from an early “honeymoon” phase of change to a period of radicalization to a “high” season of “virtue and terror” to a “Thermidorian Reaction” of sorts is not by any means to sacrifice a critical perception of differences among as well as similarities between these tumultuous sequences of events.

Yet if something of a consensus has emerged and (however tenuously) held among specialists in revolutionary studies regarding Brintonian “life-cycle” theory as applied to the process or course of revolution in these European settings, there is general scholarly discord when it comes to issues of causation and consequences of revolution. This is especially the case in connection with the former issue. Indeed, as far back as the 1960s, historian Lawrence Stone, expatiating on and essentially agreeing with the strictures of political scientist Harry Eckstein on this subject, was unsparingly critical of Brinton (and assorted others) who had plunged into the perilous explanatory waters of revolutionary causation. Such authors, Stone complained, had produced conflicting laundry lists of hypothetical intellectual, economic, social, and political “causes” of revolutions. “None of these explanations,” he conceded, “are invalid in themselves, but they are often difficult or impossible to reconcile one with another, and are so diverse in their range and variety as to be virtually impossible to fit

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8 Kimmel, Revolution, p. 52.
9 Ibid., p. 53.
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into an ordered, analytical frame-work.” Yet, however “cruelly” Eckstein, Stone and others have exposed the “subjectivity, ambiguity, and partial self-contradiction” of causal analyses adduced by Brinton and others, they have at least underscored the importance of the issue of causation and encouraged other theorists to confront it in their work.

The aforementioned Chalmers Johnson, for example, even while eulogizing Brinton as “unique among modern theorists of revolution” for the attention he devoted to ruling classes and to potentially destabilizing divisions in old regime ruling circles, in the same breath found fault with Brinton for his less than “exhaustive” treatment of these and other “prodromal symptoms” of revolution in the cases of Stuart England, Bourbon France, and Romanov Russia. For Johnson, one of the most prominent and prolific “systems/value consensus” or “structural/functionalist” sociologists in the arena of theorized revolutionary change, a vexing question remained in the wake of Brintonian and all other “stages” or “life-cycle” analyses: “Why do some social systems with all these symptoms of disynchronization still manage to avoid revolution, whereas others succumb?”

Social scientists of one persuasion or another have repeatedly attempted to deal with this generally perceived shortcoming of Brintonian-style explications of revolutionary causation. Many of them have devised ambitious schemata purporting to apply to sociopolitical upheavals in all (or most) “early modern” and “modern” historical situations. Chalmers Johnson, for instance, argued that revolutions have occurred when what he termed “disequilibrated social systems,” weighed down by accumulating “multiple dysfunctions,” and weakened further by their intransigent and incompetent ruling elites, have been propelled toward fatal breakdowns by “accelerators” of various types – factors such as defeats in war, the appearance of truly revolutionary parties, the emergence of charismatic leaders, and so forth. Johnson proceeded on from this position to develop a typology of six forms of insurrection characterized by their targets to be overthrown, their social composition, their motivating ideology and objectives, and their levels of organization, and covering a vast range of societies in several continents over recent (and, in some cases, not-so-recent) centuries.

Other theorists over the years have developed explanations of revolutionary causation focusing primarily on the theme of state modernization. Notable


11 Ibid., p. 8.

12 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 184.

13 Refer in this connection to Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Studies, 1964), and to Autopsy on People’s War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
among them have been S. N. Eisenstadt and Samuel Huntington. Eisenstadt’s most significant work, entitled *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, maintained that revolutions stem from fateful conjunctures of “structural” features involving the inability of social systems, and especially their ruling classes, to accommodate and master the tensions induced by the onset of modernization. In such an explanatory model, the great European revolutions make up only one of many categories of possible sociopolitical cataclysms. In his somewhat earlier tome, Samuel Huntington had said very much the same thing, arguing that social and economic changes such as “urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion,” and so on, undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional statist institutions and “enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness.” As a result, “political instability and disorder” arise in such societies; truly revolutionary situations are potentially created as the process of modernization gives rise to a perilous gap between social mobilization and the capacity of traditional political institutions to absorb the increasingly insistent demands of those so mobilized. New expectations and demands are not met; potential challengers to the old regimes are not adequately accommodated; and so revolutions (in this generalized schema) are the result.

Yet other specialists endeavoring to account for revolutionary change in inclusive theoretical terms have come up with so-called “aggregate social psychological models” that proceed from observations about the personal motivations of leaders and followers in revolutionary movements rather than from commentary on the processes of state modernization and their impact on selected groups in society. During the 1970s, for example, both James Davies and Ted Robert Gurr resorted to the kind of “relative deprivation theory,” with its famous J-curve of frustrated “rising expectations,” that obviously harkened back to Tocquevillian insights into the origins of the French Revolution. Davies applied such a theory to a dizzying variety of disparate historical cases ranging from the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century to the American Civil War in the mid-nineteenth century to the Nazi movement, the Egyptian Nasser “revolution,” and the American civil rights struggle in the twentieth century. Ted R. Gurr, appropriating these notions for his own purposes, tried to develop “relative deprivation” (i.e., RD) theory into a model that could be used to predict more or less when, and under what kinds of historical circumstances, revolutionary states of mind could reasonably be expected to trigger outbursts of truly revolutionary behavior. At the very least, both scholars managed to

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venture beyond facile concentrations on individual psychological states, and moreover avoided falling into the trap of equating revolutionary initiatives with non-normative, even “pathological” behavior. Yet, as time has passed, an ever-growing number of specialists in the field, dissatisfied with analysts stressing aggregate psychological theories of revolutionary causation as well as with most of their predecessors in revolutionary studies, have (in Michael Kimmel’s words) endeavored to “account for revolutions by reference to long-term structural shifts in the relationships among classes, between classes and the state, and between the state and the international arenas (geopolitical and economic) in which it is institutionally located.”18

The need for what is now usually referred to as a “structuralist” explication of the gestation and onset of revolutions gave rise to work in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s by a host of scholars ranging from Barrington Moore, Jr. to Ellen Kay Trimberger to Randall Collins to Perry Anderson.19 Other theorists have since added their own insights to a field that, even today, remains more than ever (as John Foran has aptly put it) “a collective enterprise, more so than most, given the complexities of the debates and the diversity of the historical material.”20 Still, given our primary preoccupation with European revolutions as such, and with Brinton-style, comparative “stage-sequence” approaches to those upheavals, it might pay special dividends at this point to reassess one particular “structuralist” whose comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China remains uniquely pertinent for anyone desiring to “update” the Brintonian argument for England, France, and Russia.

This political sociologist, whose work has surely affected all aspects of the post-1970s scholarly debate over revolutionary causation, is Theda Skocpol. In her landmark States and Social Revolutions, published in 1979, this one-time student of Barrington Moore, Jr., sharing something of her illustrious mentor’s preoccupation with peasant fortunes and state development in a comparative global context of state-imposed “modernization,” argued for a temporal shift forward from Brinton’s predominantly European-focused England/France/Russia comparison to what we could term a more Eurasian-focused French/Russian/Chinese “comparative historical analysis.”21 In doing
this, Skocpol, even as she relegated the seventeenth-century “Puritan Revolution” in England to something of a second-class status (likening it, in some respects, to the failed or “incomplete” European revolutions of 1848), took considerable pains to distinguish between Brintonian and other “natural-historical” views on revolutionary causation and her own views on the subject. Although she readily noted that “natural historians” such as Lyford Edwards, Crane Brinton, and George Pettee had advanced, “at least implicitly, some theoretical hypotheses about the causes of revolution,” they had not (according to Skocpol) made much of an attempt to validate these “primarily social-psychological” hypotheses through comparisons of specific historical cases:

Instead, the theoretical hypotheses were simply applied to the analysis as a whole, and the historical materials used primarily to illustrate the metaphorical stage sequence. The resulting natural-history analyses were certainly not without value – indeed, they offer many insights into revolutionary processes and can still be read with profit today – but they were very different from a comparative historical analysis. Such an analysis uses comparisons among positive cases, and between positive and negative cases, to identify and validate causes, rather than descriptions, of revolutions.\(^2^{2}\)

Quite forthrightly, then, Skocpol disavowed any particular interest in the unfolding processual stages of her chosen revolutions, opting instead to focus on their causation (and, as it turned out, their consequences in some measure as well).

Given the likely implications of Theda Skocpol’s argument for our treatment of (among other issues) the origins of revolutionary change in England, France, and Russia, a succinct synopsis of that argument seems in order.

States and Social Revolutions assumes from the start a cardinal distinction between “voluntarist” and “structuralist” exegeses of revolutionary causation. Most “voluntarist” approaches, according to Skocpol, explain causation in broadly similar terms:

First, changes in social systems or societies give rise to grievances, social disorientation, or new class or group interests and potentials for collective mobilization. Then there develops a purposive, mass-based movement – coalescing with the aid of ideology and organization – that consciously undertakes to overthrow the existing government and perhaps the entire social order. Finally, the revolutionary movement fights it out with the authorities or dominant class and, if it wins, undertakes to establish its own... program.\(^2^{3}\)

In the eyes of the “structuralist,” on the other hand, it is the prerevolutionary state, in its relations with competing states (and, to some extent, with their more advanced economies) as well as with powerful socioeconomic interests at home, that is the critical initiator of revolution. In this latter connection,

22 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 37–38.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
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Skocpol defines the “state” in Weberian terms that have (predictably) proven to be controversial:

The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations.\(^{24}\)

Consequently, the prerevolutionary state for Skocpol is at least potentially “autonomous from (though, of course, conditioned by) socioeconomic interests and structures.” Rather than being a passive instrument of “economically-dominant groups to pursue world market oriented development at home and international economic interests abroad,” the archetypical ancien régime state is at bottom “geared to maintain control of home territories and populations and to undertake actual or potential military competition with other states in the international system.”\(^{25}\)

Granted this methodically developed differentiation between “voluntarist” and “structuralist” exegeses of revolutionary causation, and her privileging of the latter over the former, Theda Skocpol’s application of what she calls “comparative historical analysis” to France, Russia, and China then follows logically enough. Essentially, she contends, full-fledged “social-revolutionary transformations” of all three countries occurred when – and only when – catastrophic failures in statist foreign and domestic policies dynamically interacted and converged. The inability of Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and Manchu China to compete militarily (and, secondarily, economically) with Britain, Germany, and Japan, respectively, not only undermined the prestige and security of these ancien régime states but also weakened their control over domestic society by compromising the status of “dominant class” feudal/landholding interests vis-à-vis increasingly restive peasant elements in the countryside. Loss of coercive control over the agriculturally oriented class structure within these monarchies, reinforcing as it did a failure of diplomatic/military outreach abroad, allowed “societal political crises” in all three cases to blossom uncontrollably and unexpectedly into full-scale sociopolitical revolutions, as the Bourbon, Romanov, and Manchu states lost control over the levers of administrative and physical coercion.\(^{26}\) In all three situations, finally, postrevolutionary states eventually emerged that proved to be markedly more capable than their

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp. 14, 22.

\(^{26}\) For a more succinct statement of this argument, refer to Skocpol, “France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 18 (1976): 175–210. Refer also, along these lines, to: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Theda Skocpol, ed., *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
predecessor-states had been of implementing successful foreign and domestic policies on the bases of administrative/bureaucratic and, to some extent, economic reforms.27

*States and Social Revolutions*, unsurprisingly, has elicited widespread praise and equally widespread criticism in scholarly quarters.28 For those specifically concerned with updating Brintonian ideas on the English, French, and Russian Revolutions, however, two of Skocpol’s cardinal assumptions, as discussed previously, stand out: (1) that issues of *causation* and (to some extent) of *consequences*, rather than issues of *process*, should rightly claim paramount attention; and (2) that a “structuralist” explanatory perspective, entailing a “state-centered” analysis, works best for many modern “social-revolutionary transformations.”

It is telling that some sociologists and political scientists as well as historians of specific revolutions should have found the former assumption troubling. Certainly, we would expect that historians stressing the importance of how revolutions actually *unfold* (such as, in the case of France, Lynn Hunt) would divine tautological, lockstep characteristics in Skocpol’s explanatory model, which by conflating the causes, process, and results of revolution makes it difficult (so some of them claim) to appraise the contingencies and personalities of revolutions in their own right.29 But of greater moment, perhaps, is the fact that some of Skocpol’s fellow sociologists have seized on the same issue. Chalmers Johnson did so in his revised 1982 edition of *Revolutionary Change*,30 and so did Michael Kimmel in his 1990 conspectus on sociological interpretations of revolution. “There is,” Kimmel observed, “one striking gap in her approach….although she has a great deal to say about the causes and consequences of revolution (and the correlations between them), she devotes scant space to the *process* of revolution, to how human beings actually make a revolution.”31 As Kimmel noted, this de-emphasizing of the *processual* aspects of revolution derives naturally enough from Skocpol’s absolute privileging of structuralism over voluntarism – an interpretative issue to which we will have to return later.32

Most immediately, however, we need to underscore the implications of this criticism of *States and Social Revolutions* for our decision whether to

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27 Refer again to Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, esp. Chapters 5–7.
32 Still, Skocpol has had her defenders on this issue. See, in particular, the essays by John Foran and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley in Foran, ed., *Theorizing Revolutions*, pp. 11–72.