

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04491-3 - Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC

Mehmet Döşemeci

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## Introduction

The European Economic Community (EEC) officially came into being on 1 January 1958. Founded by the Treaty of Rome, the EEC envisioned the creation of a European common market with a single external customs regime and free movement of services, goods, and labor among its member states. A year and a half later, in the summer of 1959, Turkey applied to join this nascent European organization, thus beginning a journey that has carried on for more than a half-century to the present day.

From the outset, Turks perceived their integration into the EEC in more than economic terms. In fact, the most salient feature of Turkey's long-standing membership bid has been the striking incongruity between the subject matter – the integration of the Turkish economy into the European common market – and the language used to speak about this integration. Over the course of the last fifty years, integration into the EEC has sparked the imaginations of a broad range of Turks, made zealots out of technocrats and statesmen, and led to best sellers, theater productions, and arson. It has been alternately embraced as the crowning symbol of Turkey's accomplishments and disavowed as the recolonization of the country. Rarely has it been grasped without passion, neutrally, as something in between.

This book examines how Turks spoke about their integration into the predecessor of the European Union (EU) during the twenty-one years between their initial application in 1959 and the 1980 military coup. During this period, I argue, the horizon on which Turkish elites understood themselves, their people, their state, and their culture was to a large degree framed by and through a vast multifaceted conversation about joining the EEC. How the prospect and process of membership in a relatively minor organization of western European states could come to have such a defining, if not existential, grip on Turkey's imagination is one of the central questions this book seeks to answer.

But first, some details. The Turkish application to the European Common Market on 31 July 1959 presented the EEC with a problem. Although the EEC welcomed the Turkish application as adding legitimacy to the fledgling organization, it was apparent that the Turkish economy was by no measure ready to withstand the competition that immediate accession would bring. This was a dilemma the drafters of the Treaty of Rome had not foreseen. To solve this dilemma, negotiators on both sides settled on a gradual process of integration with the goal of full Turkish membership at some future date. The process was laid out four years later, in a treaty that established an *Association* between Turkey and EEC. The treaty, known as the Ankara Agreement, formed the fundamental framework on which Turkish integration into the EEC has been, and currently is, based.

The Ankara Agreement laid out a three-phase plan at the conclusion of which Turkey was to accede fully to the EEC.<sup>1</sup> The *preparatory stage*, to last five to ten years, was designed to allow Turkey's relatively underdeveloped economy to prepare for integration. In this first phase, Turkey remained free of any obligations while the EEC agreed to annul tariffs on certain Turkish exports and to provide financial assistance to the Turkish economy. The *transitional stage*, to last a minimum of twelve years, would be entered into only when both sides agreed to an Additional Protocol; this stage entailed a gradual and mutual reduction of tariffs as well as the easing of restrictions on the movement of peoples and capital. It was in this last aspect that the Ankara Agreement planned beyond a simple customs union and hinted at the possibility of full membership in a future European Common Market. The third and final phase, to begin sometime between 1981 and 1986, called for the elimination of all tariffs and the gradual harmonization of economic policies between Turkey and the European Community.

#### THE CIVILIZATIONAL AND NATIONALIST LOGICS

The Ankara Agreement implied that, structurally, Turkish integration would be protracted and, as it stands today, incomplete. These two qualities have fertilized the rich gray zone between inclusion and exclusion in which republican Turkey has dwelt for almost two-thirds of its existence. The framework of this relationship, Turkish perceptions of the EEC, and, through these, the ways Turkey has come to understand itself have undergone dramatic shifts since Turkey's initial application in 1959. To account for and understand the effects of these shifts, we need first to identify who in Turkey was concerned about Turkish involvement in the project for European unification, whether they perceived it in a favorable or critical light, and why.

<sup>1</sup> For a full text of the Ankara Agreement, see Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) No. C113/2.24.12/1973.

*Introduction*

3

At the birth of Turkish-EEC relations, there was near unanimous support for Turkish membership. Led by state elites in the Turkish Foreign Service and Armed Forces, members of both political parties and the media jostled with business associations and trade unions to proclaim their enthusiasm. Over the next twenty years, some of these groups would retract or dilute their positions, to be replaced by others. The reasons why various Turks supported integration were as variable as the groups themselves. Fear of the Soviet Union, the need to secure western financial aid, and the strategic rationale to not be left out of any organization solicited by Greece were motivations that, to varying degrees, informed Turkish support among different groups. To a lesser extent, economic calculation galvanized the few sectors of the Turkish economy (such as export/import, textiles, dried fruits, and later tourism) that stood to profit from a European common market.

Yet, remarkably, few of these considerations factored into the way Turks vocalized their support. Instead, Turkish advocates of the EEC, with few exceptions, spoke of it in *civilizational* terms, as the consummation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision to "raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization."<sup>2</sup> For the Turkish elite, joining the European Common Market was seamlessly incorporated into, and quickly became the benchmark and beacon for, this civilizational project. This book is in a sense framed by the question of why this occurred as well as the consequences of this marriage.

The broad consensus that lent an almost festival-like quality to the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 was challenged soon after by the rise of a radically new way of speaking about the EEC, one that viewed integration into the European Common Market as fundamentally at odds with Turkey's national interests. The analysis of Turkish anti-EEC groups between 1959 and 1980 presents a series of problems. First, these groups have generally been lumped together as radical, anti-western, and oppositional.<sup>3</sup> Yet, critics of Turkish integration neither politically nor rhetorically constituted a unified front, for the

<sup>2</sup> "To reach the standards of contemporary civilization" was an oft-quoted line that came to serve as the unofficial mantra of the Turkish revolution. It was used to justify many of the radical reforms that transformed Turkish society in the initial years of the Republic, and it has come to represent Atatürk's vision of the Turkish project. The term "contemporary civilization" was generally taken to refer to Europe and has been extended to the "West" following World War II. Yet as Nilüfer Göle has pointed out, the Kemalist notion of Civilization implied more than a particular sociohistorical and thus concrete civilization. In fact, it was diametrically opposed to the German notion of Kultur. "For the Kemalist elite, civilization was intimately tied up with modernity, and as such was both universal (exportable) but more importantly, was constantly changing, moving forward, encapsulating the idea of progress. It went beyond describing an extant level of development to symbolizing an ideal that must be reached." Nilüfer Göle, "Modernleşme Bağlamında İslami Kimlik Arayışı," in *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, eds. Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 75.

<sup>3</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1985* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1986); Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2005); İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* (Ankara: Ümit

most part being – outside of their opposition to the EEC – bitterly opposed to one another. Anti-EEC groups also elude the category “radical” because they included institutions and political parties central to the Turkish Republic. The term “anti-western” is similarly ill-suited, as most anti-EEC elements within party politics, the bureaucracy, or civil society did not reject the west, either ideologically or strategically. A second difficulty in conceptualizing Turkish opposition to the EEC during this period lies in the internal inconsistency of the groups themselves. The history of Turkish-EEC relations between 1959 and 1980 is rife with examples of political parties switching position on the Common Market either because of external developments or simply to draw political capital within the capricious economy of Turkish politics. Finally, the sheer variety of Turkish opposition resists attempts to derive a common political-ideological basis. Political Islam’s characterization of the EEC as an invidious Christian-Zionist enterprise out to eradicate Muslim culture had little apparent overlap with, say, leftist concerns over the penetration of western imperialism.

How then, if at all, should we talk about them? The more we ask who supported or opposed the Common Market and why, the more incoherent our picture becomes – as if we were forcing labels onto a motley crew of shifting interests and people, yet always leaving a remainder. Rather than focusing in on the *who* or *why*, this book asks the question *how*. How did various Turks speak about integration with the EEC? How did they construct their arguments? How did they understand the EEC, Turkey, and their integration? To address these questions, I introduce two historically defined categories to differentiate two distinct postures or worldviews that Turks adopted toward Turko-European relations during this period.

From factual statistical observations to the hyperboles of ideological politics, Turkish statements regarding integration into the EEC fell into and were conditioned by two historical-conceptual categories I term the *Civilizational* and *Nationalist* logics. In using the term “logic” I refer to a certain mode of being that underlay a way Turks imagined themselves and their country. It describes a peculiar subjectivity, a particular way of thinking about Turkey – of giving meaning to and ordering how Turks understood and experienced themselves and the world. Each logic, I claim, is based on a distinct self/other relation that framed the terrain through which Turkish-EEC relations were signified. The logics structured the statements Turks made about the EEC during this period; more precisely, they were what made these statements possible in the first place.

The Civilizational logic predominantly, but not exclusively, ordered Turkish voices sympathetic to integration. Its structuring principle was one of invitation, predicated on an initial gesture of hospitality or welcoming of the other

Yayıncılık, 1993); Şaban Çaliş, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri* (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2001); and Yıldırım Keskin, *Avrupa Yollarında Türkiye* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2001).

*Introduction*

5

(European civilization) into the self (Turkey). The Civilizational logic shares a close affinity with what the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas referred to as an *ethical* relation, whereby the European other (hypostasized through the EEC) was invited in to preside over the Turkish project. An asymmetrical relation, not unlike that of the master and pupil, the Civilizational logic ordained Turkey's European other to stand in judgment: positioned to assess, endorse, or censure the Turkish project.<sup>4</sup>

By contrast, the various currents and movements opposing Turkey's integration with the EEC all shared a common worldview that I call the logic of "national interest" or the Nationalist logic. The term "national interest" was first introduced into Turkey's political lexicon by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the mid-1950s to refer to his democratically given mandate against a state bureaucracy that Menderes felt was undermining his reform policies. From this specific tradition onward, with the exception of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the term "national interest" has been utilized much more effectively as an oppositional or critical concept rather than a unifying rallying point for those in power. In Turkish politics, the accusation of ignoring, opposing, and, in the last instance, betraying the national interest has had far greater political currency than protecting or guarding it.

I mention this because I wish to focus neither on the content nor meaning of the term "national interest" (which has varied depending on the speaker and his/her time), but rather on its formal structure – that is, one based on antagonism. In this manner the logic of national interest, or what from this point on will be referred to as the Nationalist logic, can be taken as an instance of what Ernesto Laclau called antagonistic (or *populist*) politics.<sup>5</sup> For Laclau, antagonistic politics referred to a particular type of terrain through which social identification occurred. The self of antagonism is based on an ontological relation wherein the being of the other is defined as what prevents me from being totally myself. It erects a discursive frontier (in this instance, between Turkey and the EEC) simultaneously positing an enemy (EEC) and a threatened self-identity (Turkey), which, though allegedly present beforehand, only takes shape retroactively through the encounter. In this way, the Nationalist logic refers to a particular way of constituting the self and makes possible a specific discourse of nationalism based on an antagonistic self/other ontology.

The Civilizational and Nationalist logics are historical-conceptual categories in that they have their origin and provenance in Turkey's past. In this sense they are immanent to Turkish history.<sup>6</sup> This book is an intellectual and political

<sup>4</sup> Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity* (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

<sup>5</sup> Ernesto Laclau, "Populism, What's in a Name?" University of Essex Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences: Online Paper Collection. <http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/theostud/onlinepapers.asp> (last accessed 17 May 2013).

<sup>6</sup> To the extent that their theoretical basis comes through the western philosophical tradition, the logics stand as interventions into this history that mandate justification, which the final section of this introduction attempts to provide.

history of these logics as they came to inform Turkish stances toward the EEC. It is a historical work in two respects. First, it details the history of Turkish responses to the Common Market as the interplay of these logics by examining how various groups within Turkey spoke about the EEC and how these voices were structured. It is my claim that because these logics oriented and made possible the specific political content that was expressed through them, the history of their interplay provides a more telling analysis of the Turkish social-imaginary than the study of the particular ideologies of individuals or groups that came to weigh in on Turkish-EEC relations. Second, the book examines the historical roots of these logics within the broader histories of Turkish-European relations and the internal dynamics of the Turkish Republic. The Civilizational and Nationalist logics, while most clearly and explicitly manifest through Turkish-EEC relations, did not originate within them. To understand the emergence of these logics, it becomes necessary to step beyond the immediate history of these relations. In doing so, the book dips quite often into the history of Turkey's interwar period. Its aim is not to trace out an objective history of the emergence of these logics (which could not help but be teleological), but rather to carry out a hermeneutic project. To do so, it looks back at this history as it was resurrected by various actors engaging in Turkish debates over the EEC between 1959 and 1980. More than any other association, the EEC occasioned in Turks a profound reengagement with their own past. How various strains of this history were appropriated by Turkish interlocutors is of central concern to this book. Its most significant consequence is to tie the history of Turkish-EEC relations to the broader themes and registers of Turkish history.<sup>7</sup>

In the most general terms, the book traces how the Civilizational logic, near-ubiquitous in the initial period of Turkish integration, soon came into question by the emergence of a radically different way of speaking about and understanding the EEC. The middle years, in the decade between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, witnessed an intense struggle between the two logics over how integration was proclaimed. The final period traces the circumstances and avenues through which the Nationalist logic moved from the periphery to the core of Turkish political culture, becoming, by the late 1970s, the predominant way through which Turkish-EEC relations were signified within Turkey.

In this context, the history of Turkish-EEC relations from 1959 to 1980 can be understood as a revolutionary period for Turkey, not in the sense of political power (or even the potential for its transition) but in the more fundamental sense of how Turks imagined themselves. This period marked a time when one reigning logic had been or was in the process of being discredited and a new

<sup>7</sup> Here I am explicitly rejecting the view that Turkish postures toward membership in the EEC were in some way a direct product of, or can be wholly explained by, an analysis of Turkish intellectual/political traditions. Rather I claim that Turkish-EEC relations became the site through which these traditions were resurrected and redeployed.

*Introduction*

7

one (albeit internally divided) had not achieved dominance over its rival. This struggle did not occur at the level of actual politics (either between Turkey and the EEC or as a struggle between various domestic groups); it was, rather, a struggle over the terrain on which politics took place.

It is important to note, however, that the Civilizational and Nationalist logics, while conceptually delineated from one another, did not remain unchanged by their interaction. The task is to trace, in their mutually conditioned historicities, the specific forms they have taken throughout their hegemonic struggle to signify Turkish-EEC integration and, through this, Turkey itself.

## MATTERS OF TIME AND SPACE: WHY 1959–1980? WHY THE EEC?

This book narrates a history of Turkey's integration into the European Economic Community from Turkey's initial application in 1959 through the 12 September coup. Turkish-EEC relations did not, of course, end in 1980 but rather remain open-ended to this day. Why then 1980? The most obvious answer would be that the 1980 coup stands as a point of radical rupture within Turkish history, a date, much like 1789 for France or 1933 for Germany, that forms a nodal point of periodization for cultural, economic, political, and social analysis of modern Turkey. Regarding Turkish-EEC relations, however, this answer could not be more wrong. The principle aim of this book is to investigate the role of Turkish-EEC relations on the Turkish social-imaginary. To this end, it traces the evolution of Turkish responses to integration and highlights how these responses were central in forming the ways Turks conceived of themselves and the world around them. Our story ends in 1980 for the simple reason that 1980 marks the end of ideological innovation in Turkish responses to the Common Market. Though Turkish-EU relations took many dramatic twists and turns following the coup, the ways Turks approached, understood, and articulated their integration remained the same – rehashing, albeit in very different contexts, arguments that were developed between 1959 and 1980. Rather than demarcate a point of radical difference, 1980, as far as Turkish interpretations of the EU are concerned, marked the end of an evolutionary era.

**Domestic Context**

Domestically, this period coincides with the birth and death of ideological multiparty politics.<sup>8</sup> These two decades were, in a very real sense, bounded by

<sup>8</sup> Outside of a few controlled and short-lived experiments, Turkey's engagement in multiparty politics dates to the immediate postwar years, consummated by the ruling Republican Peoples Party's peaceful transfer of power to the Democrat Party following the 1950 elections. Yet, owing to the extreme similarities of the political platforms between the two parties during the 1950s, one could equally argue that only in the aftermath of the 1960 liberalization did a true multiparty political system that expressed ideological differences come into existence.

two military coups: the first in 1960, which created the sociopolitical framework for Turkey's first experiment as a truly open society, and the second, in 1980, which brought this experiment to an abrupt end. As a consequence of these ideological politics, Turkish society became less insular, increasingly aware, throughout the period, of the history and current state of the world around it. From 1945 until the early 1960s, few Turks beyond those in the Foreign Service were knowledgeable or concerned themselves with developments in Asia, Africa, or the Middle East. Even the west, which they interacted with and aspired to, was, by and large, perceived in monolithic terms. Yet, by the late 1950s, the Turkish elite had clearly begun to distinguish the United States from Western Europe, and by the 1970s, differentiated the latter into distinct regions, if not individual countries. Through the increasing popularity of socialist and Islamic ideas, Turkey also became aware of, and began to think of itself in relation to, the decolonization and nonaligned movements taking shape in the non-western world.<sup>9</sup>

Beginning in 1964, this heightened awareness of the outside world came to impact domestic politics, which, until that point, had consisted mainly of vying policies of development toward a shared goal. Once the barrier of questioning Turkey's foreign policy and direction was broken, the more fundamental question of where Turkey was, or should be, headed replaced the earlier and largely instrumental debates over how best to achieve an agreed-on outcome. As this trend accelerated in the 1970s, more and more issues – including the development of the Turkish economy, debates over Turkish culture, international alignments, and even the meaning and continuation of the Atatürkist revolution – were discussed through the prism of Turkey's integration into the EEC. In this way, the EEC served as a concrete platform anchoring the often abstract and ideological debates over the future of the Turkish nation to Turkey's integration into the Common Market.<sup>10</sup>

The increasing importance of the EEC within the Turkish social-imaginary is confirmed by the rising number of participants or interlocutors in Turkish integration. Down to the signing ceremony of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963, few outside of the technocratic and diplomatic elites and a handful of businessmen were concerned with Turkish involvement in the project for European unification. By contrast, after the Cyprus crisis of 1974, Turkish-EEC relations developed into an obsession, the cause of institutional and street battles, parliamentary interpellations, and angry youth campaigns, becoming, as Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit remarked in 1975, a “National Problem.”

<sup>9</sup> See Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F, 1972) and Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 139.

<sup>10</sup> Tellingly, among the first actions of the leftist the WPT and the Islamic Milli Selamet Partisi after winning seats in the National Assembly was adamant criticism of the government's pro-EEC stance.



**International Context: The EEC, Greece, and NATO**

Further west, the beginning of this period saw the postwar project of European unification in its infancy. When Turkey first applied to the Common Market in July 1959, the EEC itself was less than two years old. It was the end result of a broad agreement among European statesmen that the twin problematic of reviving the German economy while allaying (mostly French) fears of a third catastrophe could only be resolved through the integration of France and Germany under some larger European structure. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, was in effect a compromise between various groups over what precisely this structure would be.<sup>11</sup> The Treaty established the European Economic Community with the aim of creating a common market between the signatory states. The six original members (France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux Countries) agreed to gradually remove internal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and people and to erect a unified supranational customs regime with respect to other, “third” countries.

Within Turkey’s wider international context, the EEC was just one of Turkey’s many postwar engagements, sharing attention with Turkish-American relations, NATO, and conflicts with Greece. Yet, despite the Cold War and regional disputes, the EEC remained the central symbolic nexus of the Turkish social-imaginary, resonating with and amplified by the Atatürkist project and Turkey’s Ottoman past. This is not to imply that Turkey’s relations with Greece or the United States should be ignored, just that their influence on the Turkish social-imaginary paled in comparison to the EEC.

Greece, in particular, has figured large in scholarly studies of Turkish-EEC relations. These studies assert that Turkish motives behind, or perceptions of, Turkey’s integration cannot be understood outside of the Greek context. The Treaty of Rome extended an offer of membership to any European nation with a market economy. Greece was the first to take up this offer, and its application, in the summer of 1959, was a major catalyst and factor in Turkey’s decision to apply several weeks later.<sup>12</sup> This initial impetus has led many scholars to overstate the importance of the Greek role in Turkish-EEC relations and in Turkey’s understandings of itself through Europe more generally. Yet, as others have argued, Turkey had independently and closely followed the EEC since the Treaty of Rome, and the Greek application at most affected the timing of the Turkish decision to apply to the Common Market.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The essential fault line was drawn between the federalists, who favored a more supranational framework, and those who foresaw the European Community as a forum where leaders of nation-states could gather to discuss and enact mutually beneficial policies.

<sup>12</sup> See Umut Karabulut, “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinin Başlangıcı: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu’na (AET) Üyelik Başvurusu,” *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8/16 (2012): 19–32.

<sup>13</sup> Çalış, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, 41.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04491-3 - Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC

Mehmet Döşemeci

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Over the years, an implicit understanding was reached within the EEC that the Turkish and Greek associations should progress in parallel, and Turkish fears of unilateral Greek accession (and with it a Greek veto) propelled Turkish integration on more than one occasion. On the cultural level, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 produced a European backlash against Turkey, reintroducing old stereotypes of the “Barbaric Turk” out to ravage the “cradle of European civilization.”<sup>14</sup> Yet, aside from questions of timing and Europe’s Lord Byronesque reaction to Cyprus, which went all but unnoticed within Turkey, Greece figured little into Turkish-EEC relations during this period.

Turkish relations with the United States, especially its membership in NATO, were a different matter. Although Turkey solicited and joined a number of post-war Western organizations, including the Council of Europe and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Atlantic Alliance was the only one that rivaled the EEC in strategic and symbolic terms. During World War II, Turkey had successfully managed to remain on the sidelines. Even before the war’s conclusion, however, it became clear that the prospects for Turkish neutrality in the upcoming global struggle were dim and quickly diminishing. Stalin’s aggressive and often boorish attempts to block western vessels from entering the Black Sea through the Dardanelles set a threatening tone in Turko-Soviet relations, pushing Turkey and the United States (who had recently replaced British interests in the region) into a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. When it became clear that the Western security framework against the Soviet Union would take the form of a mutual assistance pact headed by the United States, Turkey immediately and actively solicited the alliance, effectively buying membership in NATO by committing its armed forces in Korea.<sup>15</sup>

Undoubtedly, Turko-American relations, especially Turkish membership in the Atlantic Alliance, occupied a privileged place in Turkey’s postwar project. In the immediate postwar period, the Truman doctrine, U.S. military power against the perceived Soviet threat, and the simple fascination with a novel and thriving culture all served to propel the United States as the new symbol of the west. Compared to the Europeans, the United States also had a much greater physical presence within Turkey in the first two decades after the war. American bazaars, American military bases, American nuclear missiles, American technicians and American style highway construction funded by American

<sup>14</sup> See Faruk Logoğlu, “Turkey’s Image Abroad,” *Journal of the Foreign Affairs Academy* (May 1973): 104–13; Bernard Burrows, “Turkey in Europe?” *The World Today* (June 1980), 266–71, and Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet: Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar, 1974–1980* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1987), 24–54.

<sup>15</sup> Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey, Anglo-American Security Interests 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Routledge, 1999); and George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–71* (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1972).