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Introduction

NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

Nationalism is a powerful force in the modern world. It produces the boundaries of contemporary political communities that differentiate citizens from foreigners, animates violent political struggles over claims to sovereignty, and generates identities of belonging that inspire millions. In sub-Saharan Africa, the territorial discourse of nationalism has been deeply informed by a history of foreign oppression and racial domination. African nationalist leaders embraced territorial boundaries that had been drawn by colonial powers even after independence. Their claim that national political communities should possess independent states whose sovereignty extends across the entire territory encountered fierce resistance from colonial authorities who regarded African "Natives" as racially inferior and incapable of self-rule. Nationalist efforts to create a collective identity of belonging for the people of a given territory confronted colonial legacies of indirect rule that privileged ethnic (or "tribal") solidarities and empowered those local chiefs who had been willing to collaborate with colonial authorities. Race, ethnicity, and nationality have marked African postcolonial efforts, such as those in Tanzania, to establish national political communities. Colonial legacies have deeply colored postcolonial struggles over who should belong to the nation and who should be excluded.

Nationalism generates strong sentiments of love for one's country, providing an emotionally powerful language of patriotism that fosters feelings of civic obligation to help fellow citizens, promote the common good, participate in self-government, and place public responsibilities above private interests. It also fosters bloodshed, violence, and genocide targeting ethnic minorities and foreigners who are identified as threats to the nation. In their effort to understand these contrasting features of political communities of belonging, scholars have often distinguished between civic and ethnic nationalism. This dichotomy was initially developed by Hans Kohn on the basis of his study of Eastern and

Western European history. His analysis contrasted an *exclusionary* ethnic nationalism based on a shared ancestry and inherited culture with an *inclusive* civic nationalism based on the will of a people and expressed in a voluntary political union of equal, rights-bearing citizens. In Kohn's analysis, the contrast between an ethnic and a civic idea of the nation was "based on history and particularism" for Germany, "as opposed to reason and equality in France."[1] His dichotomy was subsequently adopted by other historians and incorporated into political theory as well as political activism, with nationalist leaders adopting the notion of civic nationalism as a claims-making device to legitimate demands for self-determination.[2] A number of scholars of nationalism have since revised and criticized the civic/ethnic dichotomy, arguing that this typology provides a useful theoretical tool, but only when stripped of its normative and spatial assumptions. Further, Anthony Smith insists on the value of the civic/ethnic conceptual distinction, but rejects the notion that these different understandings of nationhood are mutually exclusive. He applies the concepts not to make geopolitical distinctions between types of nation-states or to identify different trajectories of nation-state formation, but to identify different elements of nationalist thought. Smith acknowledges that these elements coexist to varying degrees in concrete cases, because national identity always involves both cultural and political elements.[3]

My research on the history of Tanzanian nationalism supports Smith's idea that real-world forms of nationalism are internally contradictory with respect to inclusiveness and exclusiveness. My work explores the operation of exclusionary politics based on nationality and race in this East African country,[4] which some scholars have categorized as an example of inclusive civic nationalism. Tanzanian nationalism deserves our attention because it demonstrates the operation of exclusionary processes even in a relatively inclusionary nation-state. Tanzania alerts us to the need to differentiate among the varying consequences of and justifications for exclusion. While some exclusionary policies may lead to

[1] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948). For a thoughtful and balanced assessment of Kohn's contribution to the scholarship on nationalism, see Craig Calhoun, "Inventing the Opposition of Ethnic and Civic Nationalism," in *Nations Matter* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 117–146.

[2] For a review of the pervasiveness of this dichotomy in the literature, see Michel Seymour, Jocelyne Couture, and Kai Nielsen, "Introduction: Questioning the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy," in *Rethinking Nationalism*, ed. Michel Seymour, Jocelyne Couture, and Kai Nielsen (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary, 1996), 1–61.

[3] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 81–83. Leah Greenfield argues that "the most common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures vary significantly enough to justify their classification in these terms and render it a useful analytical tool" (*Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992]: 12). Bernard Yack also notes that all forms of nationalism rely on symbols, stories, and cultural memories that emphasize both ethnic origins and politics to varying degrees ("The Myth of the Civic Nation," *Critical Review* 10 [1996]: 197).

[4] Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar in April 1964 to create the United Republic of Tanzania.

massive human rights violations and genocide, others are protective and defensive, based on appeals to egalitarian redistributive principles, racial justice, and anti-imperialism, and do not produce violence. This suggests the need for a context-dependent historical approach that explores the motivations, justifications, and consequences of exclusionary measures rather than assuming that all such policies deserve moral condemnation.

The ideology of African socialism that informed the Tanzanian nationalist project for decades was simultaneously inclusive, universalistic, and state-centered, as well as exclusive, particularistic, and culture-centered. It insisted on the equal rights of all citizens of the nation-state at the same time that it emphasized distinctive African cultural values, such as communalism and collectivism, as the basis for appropriate civic behavior. For example, the 1961 citizenship law and the Tanzanian National Ethic, developed by a presidential commission in 1964, delineated the rights and obligations of national citizenship in a highly inclusive and universalistic manner. Nevertheless, nationalist leaders denounced those who did not share the cultural values propagated during this socialist era as enemies of the nation and targeted them for exclusion as "paper citizens." Their loyalty to the nation was questionable. So it was that socialist-era nationalism celebrated cultural values of equality while also denouncing Asian citizens who accumulated private capital as bloodsucking exploiters unworthy of citizenship.

Public policies regarding land ownership, education, and language also reveal the contradictory combination of inclusionary civic and exclusionary racial ideas and practices in Tanzania. Cultural values concerning land and its meanings have been central to the African nationalist imaginary.[5] Prominent nationalist leaders such as Julius Nyerere, who advocated an inclusive, liberal vision of the nation that treated all citizens equally (regardless of race), supported exclusionary, race-based land policies. In fact, in 1970, his government enacted Land Laws drawing a legal distinction between indigenous and nonindigenous citizens and restricting control over land in communal areas to "Natives" – a colonial category that had been used to designate black Africans.

Educational policies of preferential treatment based on race were also implemented by nationalist leaders who otherwise advocated for the equality of all citizens regardless of race. For example, the Nyerere government granted preferential treatment to black African students applying for secondary schools in 1963–1964, after they did less well than their Asian counterparts on entrance exams.[6] The contradictory character of Tanzanian nationalism was also evident in

[5] For an analysis of the cultural significance of land as the basis for sovereignty and political authority in East Africa, see Paul Bjerk, "Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanganyika" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008).

[6] Ned Bertz, "Educating the Nation: Race and Nationalism in Tanzanian Schools," in *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*, ed. Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett, and Paul Nugent (Boston: Brill, 2007), 168.

language policies, which gave citizens speaking more than 100 ethnic languages the ability to communicate with one another in Swahili and become included in the nation-building project. At the same time, these policies excluded Gujarati-speaking Asian citizens and unschooled African villagers who spoke only their local language. In short, Tanzanian nationalists created an inclusive political community based on the equal rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or racial descent, but they engaged in a variety of exclusionary practices in doing so. Nationalist leaders justified such acts in terms of the need to prevent exploitation, address the consequences of prior racist colonial policies, and foster cultural pride among a black African population that had been oppressed by colonial rule.[7]

Following Kohn's dichotomy, historical writings on nation-building have typically emphasized either the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the process without exploring them simultaneously. Historical accounts of citizenship in Europe, for example, often tout the progressive inclusion of growing numbers of people into the political community and the democratic extension of political, civic, and social rights. These works characterize national identities as a force for community-building and for the creation of bonds of mutual trust across class, racial, ethnic, gender, and religious divisions. Historians find that nationalism, in many cases, emerged in tandem with struggles for democracy and popular sovereignty and closely connect it to popular struggles for political participation and rights, with the boundaries of the nation defining "the people" claiming the right to self-government.[8] Indeed, during the era of Africa's anticolonial liberation struggles, the community-building, democratic, and inclusive features of nationalism received much attention. However, postcolonial scholarly work has turned to emphasize exclusion and intolerance as key features of African nation-building. Ethnic, racial, and religious antagonisms were expressed in bloody civil wars and genocides following the establishment of nation-states across the continent, and scholars have responded by lamenting the "curse of the nation-

[7] Colonial administrators justified the refusal to allow non-Natives the right to purchase land as a paternalistic measure designed to protect vulnerable Natives from the challenges of the modern world. Postcolonial policies invoked a very different justification. President Nyerere cited the socialist value of equality to legitimize the exclusion, warning that the commercialization of land not only posed the threat of foreign control over land, but that it would also lead to exploitation and class inequality. "[E]ven if there were no rich foreigners in this country," he wrote, "there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing the land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants . . . there will be another group of idle people who will not be doing any work but will simply be waiting to exploit the energies and suck the blood of the poor workers" ("National Property," in *Freedom and Unity* [London: Oxford University Press, 1967], 56).

[8] Nationalism provides what Charles Taylor identifies as the necessary ingredients for democratic self-governance, including "a relatively high level of cohesion, strong collective identity, and common allegiance to the political community in order to engage in joint deliberation" ("Democracy, Inclusive and Exclusive" in *Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity, and Self*, ed. Richard Madsen [Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2002], 184).

state" in Africa as "the black man's burden" and turning their attention to nationalism's violent and exclusionary features.[9]

Again, it is clear that the process of developing rules governing membership in a national community (i.e., the terms of citizenship) always involves exclusive as well as inclusive dimensions. As Charles Tilly observed, nations are necessarily exclusive in that they are communities of individuals who claim to be united by certain characteristics that differentiate them from others. Nation-building, he writes, is a process based on "the drawing and politicization of us-them boundaries, the exclusion of visible others, [and] the foundation of membership on not being something else."[10] The building of a nation, in other words, requires the creation of "others" who are outside the boundaries of the political community.[11] Love of one's country is typically accompanied by fear or hostility toward those perceived to pose internal or external threats, and that hostility may be expressed in practices and policies that range from collective violence to territorial expulsion to public policies restricting access to land, property, jobs, education, legal protection, political participation, or social welfare.

Tanzania provides an important case for studying exclusionary processes in the construction of the nation given that observers frequently cite it as one of the few cases of *inclusive* civic nationalism in Africa. "Few countries in the world can match Tanzania's record of inclusion," writes Godfrey Mwakikagile. "And it is not uncommon to hear people from other countries who have lived in Tanzania say, 'There is no racism and tribalism in Tanzania.'"[12] Whereas many other African nations have experienced violent ethnic conflicts, Tanzania witnessed a successful nation-building project in an ethnically diverse society. (Neighboring Kenya has been repeatedly plagued by politicized ethnic violence, including a 2007 general election in which an estimated 1,000 people were killed and 600,000 displaced.) Tanzania has also been relatively immune from racial and xenophobic violence. Although Tanzania had a colonial history of racial formation similar to that of Kenya and Uganda, unlike its East African neighbors, Tanzania did not experience any anti-Asian race riots from 1965 to 1991. Some Asian-Tanzanians attained high-ranking ministerial positions within the postcolonial government, which repeatedly issued appeals for racial harmony. After attaining independence, Tanganyika, as the territory was known both as a British colony and before its union with Zanzibar, welcomed foreigners from still-colonial African countries as heroes of the liberation struggle and allowed Western expatriates to play a prominent role in the nation's new public university.

[9] Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden* (New York: Random House, 1993).
[10] Charles Tilly, "Boundaries, Citizenship, and Exclusion," in *Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties* [AU: editors?](Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 181.
[11] Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Kathryn A. Manzo, *Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
[12] Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era* (Atlanta, GA: Protea Publishing, 2002), 335.

While this sketch suggests a portrait of harmony, inclusiveness, and civic nationalism, an in-depth historical analysis offers a much more complex picture. Despite a nationalist master narrative that denies their presence, exclusionary policies based on race and nationality have been persistent features of political contention among Tanzanian nationalist leaders. A close look suggests ongoing conflicts over race and nationality expressed in public policy debates in which Asians and foreigners have actually been targeted for exclusion.[13] Those who portray Tanzania as a model of civic inclusion typically focus on outcomes, such as the inclusive 1961 citizenship legislation, rather than on the process that produced such outcomes. Nation-building entailed intense divisions among nationalist leaders over exclusionary policies. Exclusionary public policies targeting purported internal and external enemies played as central a role in fostering a strong national identity among the territory's culturally diverse population as did inclusionary measures, such as state efforts to provide schools, clinics, and clean water for all citizens. The successful creation of a pan-ethnic Tanzanian nation-state and a strong national identity that transcended ethnic loyalties was predicated in large part on the political construction of internal and external enemies of the nation, defined in terms of race and nationality.

Most theorizing about nationalism and nation-building has been based on studies of the European experience; Africa has been absent or marginalized in these academic discussions. In contrast to the European cases that inform sociological theories of nationalism, African nationalism was the product of a dependent colonial form of capitalist economic development based on racist thought and practice as well as a modern political ideology of development adopted and spread by Western-educated political elites. Given the arbitrarily imposed territorial boundaries of colonial rule, the claims of African nationalists were often not rooted in the existence of a common culture, language, or tradition, but in a common history of oppression by foreigners of a different race. The historical study of African nationalism can thus make one more attentive to the assumptions, problems, and silences of a Eurocentric literature, including assumptions about ethnicity as the necessary core of nationality,[14]

[13] I use the term *foreigners* to refer to the nonindigenous inhabitants of the territory prior to independence and to noncitizens of the nation-state after independence. The term *Asians* is used in the same way that it was popularly used after the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, to refer to descendents of those who migrated to East Africa from India and Pakistan. Prior to that time, this population was referred to as Indians, and the term *Asians* was popularized by anti-partition Indians in the 1940s and by colonial administrators. The term *Asians*, similar to the other terms used to designate this population, including South Asians, Indians, and non-Africans, is problematic given the shifting historical salience of these categories.

[14] Theories of nationalism often assert a strong connection between national identity and ethnicity and often treat national communities as politicized ethnic groups with a shared language, religion, or culture. For an analysis that emphasizes a strong connection between nations, nationalism, and ethnicity, see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986).

conflations of race and ethnicity,[15] and silences concerning the central role of colonialism and imperialism in the creation of modern nation-states. It can help move us beyond Eurocentric understandings of nationalism as a relatively unitary phenomenon characterized primarily by violence and destruction.[16] The prominent European historian Eric Hobsbawn depicts nationalism in negative terms, contending that "no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist."[17] His denunciation of all nationalisms fails to acknowledge the emancipatory dimensions of anticolonial and anti-imperialist variants of nationalism that continue to inform African politics.

IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

Just as the history of the formation of national states in Western Europe has been written with a focus on victors,[18] historians of nation-building and citizenship in Africa have typically ignored or downplayed the voices of those who offered alternative visions of the nation. In doing so, they have relied heavily on the master narratives of nationalist movements, which provide histories that ignore conflicts among nationalist leaders and silence the voices of those who imagined different communities.[19] Ernest Renan emphasized the importance of forgetting as well as remembering in the creation of national identities, arguing: "Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation."[20] This forgetting extends beyond the "deeds of violence" highlighted by Renan to include historical amnesia concerning

[15] Although scholars often conflate race and ethnicity, Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann offer a clear discussion of the distinction. They suggest that racial claims are typically made by outsiders rather than insiders and that the moral implications of the claims and the role of power in the construction process are more significant for race than for ethnicity ("Conceptual Confusions and Divides: Race, Ethnicity, and the Study of Immigration," in *Not Just White and Black*, ed. Nancy Foner and George M. Fredrichson [New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004], 29).

[16] Crawford Young notes the diversity of African nationalism, which he attributes to variations in the survival of precolonial polities, the presence of significant immigrant communities, colonial ideologies of rule, the timing of decolonization, and the mode of achieving independence ("Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Africa: A Retrospective," *Cahiers d' Etudes Africaines* 26 [1986], 433).

[17] Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12.

[18] Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 38–39.

[19] Benedict Anderson defines the nation as a socially constructed imagined political community in which people are connected to fellow members whom they do not know and with whom they do not share face-to-face relations. It is a community imagined as limited (by boundaries that demarcate it from other nations) and as sovereign (*Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition* [London: Verso, 1991], 6–7).

[20] Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1990 [originally published 1882]), 11.

conflicts and divisions among nationalist leaders who imagined different political communities. Silence with respect to advocates of alternative visions is not surprising, given that a central focus of nationalist mobilizations is the creation of national unity among populations divided by race, ethnicity, gender, class, religion, generation, and ideology. Paying attention to defeated actors, however, does not necessarily mean that we sympathize with their goals or tactics. It means that we come to fully appreciate historical outcomes as a product of conflict and cooperation rather than the inevitable unfolding of grand historical laws.

Anthony Smith defines a nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."[21] In Tanzania, these territorial, cultural, economic, and legal-political components were all subject to intense political contestation among nationalist leaders before and after independence. Leaders debated pan-Africanism and British Commonwealth membership, the appropriate elements of a national culture, economic development policies, and the rights that should be accorded to citizens and noncitizens. Throughout the colonial, state socialist, and neoliberal eras, Tanzanian nationalist leaders disagreed about which foreigners should be welcomed as allies (or as fellow citizens in the case of Zanzibar) and which should be treated as enemies. They fought over alternative strategies for dealing with foreign governments, who should be allowed access to national citizenship via naturalization and how difficult the process should be, and which rights should be granted to foreigners and which reserved exclusively for citizens. Appealing to notions of national sovereignty and self-reliance, many nationalist leaders contended that noncitizens should be denied the rights to take jobs in the civil service, manage state-owned industries, teach at institutions of higher learning, own small businesses, or even reside as refugees on the national territory.

This book is an analysis of nationalism through the lens of such contentious politics, documenting conflicts among nationalist leaders over the meaning and boundaries of belonging to a nation. These conflicts involved struggles not only over who merited membership in the imagined community of the nation and what rights should be granted to nonmembers, but also over which political, economic, and cultural rights should be granted to those certified as citizens. Tanzania's nationalist leaders disagreed about whether restrictions on civic rights (for example, on freedom of the press and speech) were necessitated by the threat posed by imperialist enemies of the nation, and they disputed the need to restrict political rights by implementing a single-party system in order to preserve national unity. In fact, these disagreements, as well as fights over whether a leadership code restricting the right of government and party officials to own private property and acquire personal wealth, led to the treason trial of

[21] Smith, *National Identity*, 14.

prominent nationalist leaders in 1968. In addition to disputing what form of the state was necessary to preserve the nation and ensure non-corrupt leadership, nationalists fought over whether members of the Asian racial minority who had acquired citizenship after independence should be granted the same rights as black Africans, citing the failure of Asian-Tanzanian citizens to actively participate in the state socialist mass rallies and public rituals of nation-building as evidence of Asians' lack of patriotism. Conflict was also evident in socialist efforts to create a national culture, which generated heated debates over which elements of foreign culture, from business suits to miniskirts and bell-bottomed trousers, should be emulated and borrowed as symbols of a modern nation and which should be rejected as alien imports incompatible with the national culture.

My approach to the study of citizenship and exclusion is based on three distinct claims. First, the "us" of a national community is constituted in large part by actions targeting the "them" of nonmembers. Such a relational rather than categorical approach to citizenship suggests the need to study the shifting civic, political, and social rights of citizens as well as the extension or denial of rights to noncitizens. In postcolonial settings, foreign states typically continue to exercise considerable power over their former colonial territories, most of which occupy subordinate positions in the global economy as exporters of raw materials. Citizenship issues are therefore likely to include contentious debates over the rights of others (framed in terms of anti-imperialism, national sovereignty, and development imperatives) rather than focusing exclusively on the rights of citizens. Tanzanian citizenship debates were, in this way, not only about citizens, but also about whether foreign investors, expatriates, and refugees should exercise the rights to own property, to hold jobs in nationalized industries, and to reside on the national territory. Second, studies of citizenship need to be attentive to internal as well as external others – that is, to the creation of internal "us-them" boundaries involving "second-class" citizens or internal others, who, based on race, ethnicity, class, religion, gender, or sexuality, are excluded in *practice* from the rights guaranteed in *theory* to all citizens.[22] (A central issue in citizenship debates in Tanzania has been whether members of the country's Asian racial minority who have acquired citizenship should have the same rights as "indigenous" black African citizens.) Third, although citizenship involves national politics and the creation of national political communities of belonging, global economic and political forces decisively shape domestic political debates over citizenship and exclusion. Conflicts over Tanzanian citizenship, then,

[22] Asians were the central, but not the only, internal other of Tanzania's nation-building project. Nationalists also targeted pastoralist groups, such as the Wamaasai, whose "backward" cultures were denounced as inimical to modernity and whose migratory behavior challenged the borders of the nation-state. Although subject to widespread prejudice, discrimination, and forced removals, these ethnic groups did not generate the same level of conflict among nationalist leaders as the Asian racial minority, nor did they become the prime targets of nationalist collective political violence.

cannot be understood outside of the context of a global capitalist economy and an international political system of nation-states.

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL CONTENTION: A DIALECTICAL APPROACH

Dialectical analysis, or the exploration of the contradictions embedded in social life, provides a powerful tool for exploring the dynamics of political change. Although the nature and consequences of contradictions vary across time and space, the assumption of contradictions acknowledges the simultaneous presence of opposing forces that reproduce and undermine political systems. My research highlights a contradiction between economic and political processes – between capital accumulation in a global economy and political legitimation in a nation-state – that generated the intense political conflicts that decisively shaped the trajectory of nation-building in Tanzania. In this context, the term "capital accumulation" refers to the creation of wealth via the investment of domestic income, savings, and profits, or foreign aid and investments. Given that the expansion of government tax revenues depends on economic growth, which itself depends on the accumulation of capital, government officials have a vested interest in promoting capital accumulation. They do so by encouraging domestic or foreign investments and securing development aid from abroad. Scholarly works that have explored the accumulation/legitimation contradiction have focused on European and U.S. welfare states and advanced industrial societies rather than on postcolonial states on the periphery of the global economy.[23] Although providing important insights into changing forms of the state in advanced capitalist societies and the fiscal crises faced by twentieth-century Western welfare states, past work has not explored the distinctive character and political manifestations of this contradiction in an alternate postcolonial context such as that of Tanzania. In a context of low incomes, limited savings, and relatively few highly profitable domestic enterprises, postcolonial governments are likely to look beyond as well as within the boundaries of the nation-state in their efforts to promote capital formation and to seek foreign aid as well as investments. This means that questions of political legitimacy may come to

[23] See James O'Connor's analysis of the U.S. welfare state and its fiscal dilemmas in *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), as well as Claus Offe's *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (London: Hutchinson, 1984). Alan Wolfe's study of advanced industrial societies suggests that the contradiction characterizes capitalist liberal democracies in which "liberalism becomes the ideology of and justification for accumulation while democracy upholds the importance of legitimation, or some kind of popular participation and some equality of results" (*The Limits of Legitimacy* [New York: The Free Press, 1977], 6–7). My analysis suggests that the contradiction is also present in postcolonial state socialist societies in which the ideology of development, rather than liberalism, justifies state engagement in the accumulation process and authoritarian populism, rather than liberal democracy, necessitates popular participation and a degree of equality.