Introduction

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Thomas Aquinas's *Quaestiones disputatae De malo* (*QDM*) is a lengthy, mature work consisting of 16 questions that subdivide into 101 articles.[1] It has been characterized as "one notable exception" to the tendency of later medieval thinkers to avoid writing major works dedicated to the topic of evil.[2] The third longest of Aquinas's series of disputed questions, *QDM* is valuable and best known for containing the most extensive accounts of several fundamental philosophical issues in the whole of Aquinas's written corpus. Among them are a detailed analysis of evil as *priuatio*, a lengthy exposition of human free choice, a highly original discussion of the cause of moral evil, and a thorough presentation of the so-called seven deadly sins.

Recent years have seen an increased interest in Aquinas's *QDM*. The long-standing predisposition to view the *Summa theologiae* (*ST*) as his final word on matters in philosophy and theology has given way to a more refined view that not only takes into account the relationships among Aquinas's later works but also reflects a greater sensitivity to the occasions for which Aquinas composed his major writings. *QDM* is not a comprehensive work of theological synthesis in the manner of the *ST* or the *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG*), but, rather, is a careful and detailed analysis of select problems falling under the general topic of evil. Compared with articles in the *ST*, those in *QDM* are generally more expansive, exhibit a greater number of objections and replies, offer lengthier arguments, and engage philosophical authorities with greater scrutiny. Additionally, *QDM* offers many vivid examples of moral situations and moral transgressions.

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[1] The critical edition of the work is: Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae De malo, Opera omnia*, vol. XXIII (Rome: Commissio Leonina / Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982), hereafter, *Editio Leonina*, XXIII.

[2] Bonnie Kent, "Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45 (2007): 177–205, at 182.

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Arguably, the work presents Aquinas's best and most detailed treatment of a variety of important philosophical issues.

Aquinas's *QDM* illustrates the vast range of issues that can be considered under the broad topic of evil. The work begins with a subtle analysis of the metaphysics of evil (q. 1), and afterwards turns to the nature of sin (q. 2) and its causes (q. 3). After a discussion of original sin (qq. 4–5), Aquinas's much-debated analysis of human free choice (q. 6) appears. Then Aquinas offers an extensive account of the lesser or pardonable moral failures known as venial sins (q. 7), followed by a detailed treatment of the seven capital vices, popularly known as the seven deadly sins (qq. 8–15). Completing the work is Aquinas's meticulous account of demons and their influence in the world (q. 16). There is substantive overlap, therefore, between what later medieval thinkers and what present-day philosophers would consider essential to the topic of evil: the issues of moral failure, habits, and the metaphysics of evil are certainly recognizable areas of inquiry in contemporary philosophy. Such overlap, however, should not occlude certain oppositions between medieval and contemporary outlooks. From one perspective, the medieval view may appear too broad in comparison, as contemporary philosophers are much less interested in demons and in theological doctrines such as original sin. Yet from another perspective, the medieval view can appear too narrow. Aquinas is surprisingly silent in *QDM* on what contemporary philosophers of religion designate as *the* problem of evil, namely, how a God possessing the traditional attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence could allow the great suffering that is manifest in the world.[3]

The origin of *QDM*

Identifying a precise date for the composition of *QDM* has been a matter of difficulty among commentators, despite the general agreement that the work is one of Aquinas's later compositions.[4] As a work in the genre of *quaestiones disputatae*, *QDM* had its origins in disputations, only to

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[3] Brian Davies observes, "Readers largely unfamiliar with Aquinas's writings might expect his *De Malo* (On Evil) to amount to a sustained essay on God and evil. But it does not." See *Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 135, n. 21. Davies also contends, "In a serious sense, however, Aquinas has *nothing* to say on this topic" and "what now passes as the problem of evil goes unmentioned in Aquinas's writings" (6).

[4] See Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, rev. ed. (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 201–207; Brian Davies, "Dating the *De malo*," in Thomas Aquinas, *On Evil*, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 12–14; and "Authenticité et date," in *Editio Leonina*, XXIII, 3*–5*.

be edited and published in final form sometime later.[5] Interpreters commonly distinguish three stages in the composition of *QDM*: the original disputations, a later redaction or correction, and subsequent publication. Precision in dating the first stage for *QDM* is difficult; some propose Aquinas may have held the disputations in Italy at the Dominican *studium* in Rome at Santa Sabina,[6] whereas others suggest that they originated later in Aquinas's university activity in Paris.[7] In dating the later redaction or correction of *QDM*, commentators have pointed out that Aquinas's citation of recently available sources demonstrate that q. 1 must have been edited after March 1266, and that q. 16, a. 12 must have been edited after November 1267.[8] It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the final text of *QDM* was established by Aquinas no earlier than the end of 1267. However, if one adopts the view that the edited version of q. 6 on free choice presupposed the intellectual climate of the condemnations by the Parisian bishop, Stephen Tempier, on December 6, 1270, then the date of the second stage must be moved up to around that time.[9]

Despite the unresolved issues concerning the first two stages, interpreters now generally agree about the dating of the final publication of *QDM*. All surviving manuscripts of *QDM* originate in a single university exemplar that was contemporaneous with Aquinas. This Parisian manuscript consisted of 28 *peciae*, which were rented out for copying at the university and formed the basis of all extant manuscripts of the work.[10] The consensus is that *QDM* was published around 1270–1272 during Aquinas's second regency in Paris, with qq. 1–15 (23 *peciae*) published around 1270, and q. 16 appended by Aquinas around 1272 (28 *peciae* total). This publication date of around 1270–1272 for the complete set of sixteen questions suggests, however, that Aquinas was working on *QDM* around the

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[5] Bernardo C. Bazán defines the disputed question as "a regular form of teaching, of apprenticeship, and of research, presided over by a master, characterized by a dialectical method, which consists in bringing forth and examining arguments from reason and from authority which are provided by the participants which conflict on a theoretical or practical problem, and where the master must reach a doctrinal solution by an act of determination which confirms him in his function as master" in "Les questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie," in *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, by Bernardo C. Bazán *et al.* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 15–149, at 40.

[6] For a discussion, see M. Michèle Mulchahey, *"First the Bow Is Bent in Study…" Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 294–296.

[7] Torrell favors the view that all of *QDM* was disputed during Aquinas's second teaching period in Paris; see *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 204, and more recently, "Life and Works," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–32, at 26.

[8] See "Authenticité et date," 4*; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 202.

[9] See "Authenticité et date," 4*; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 202.

[10] See Pierre-Marie Gils, "Étude critique de la tradition," in *Editio Leonina*, XXIII, 21*–68*.

same time as the *Secunda pars* of the *ST*, a work that overlaps in ways with matters treated in *QDM*. The Leonine Commission editors of the critical edition of *QDM* have proposed that "A somewhat simultaneous composition of these two works would explain rather well both the disputed question and the *Summa*, which seems to give the final position of Saint Thomas's thought."[11] In light of the general contemporaneity of both works, each should be consulted when assessing Aquinas's mature thought on themes common to both, especially since the treatments in *QDM* tend to be lengthier than their counterparts in the *ST*.

The unity and diffusion of *QDM*

To be sure, the great variety of issues falling under the general topic of evil selected for analysis by Aquinas in *QDM* might tempt some readers to question the very unity of the work. To allay such long-standing concerns, one might consider that the Leonine editors have emphasized the historical unity of the sixteen questions in the manuscript tradition. Although, as mentioned above, qq. 1–15 circulated first, it is known from the earliest extant taxation list of exemplars that q. 16 formed part of the original 28 *peciae*. This evidence has led the editors to conclude that "from the critical point of view it [q. 16] makes up an integral part of the total work, with no evidence of discontinuity."[12] The manuscript history of *QDM* is also relevant for assessing the status of the well-known q. 6 on free choice. Apart from potential concerns regarding the fittingness of its subject matter for the topic of evil, as well as potential concerns about its location in the order of the work, one might pause over its placement in *QDM* as a whole, because it alone of all of the questions does not subdivide into articles. On the basis of the manuscript tradition, however, the Leonine editors have insisted that q. 6 "occupies its logical place there from the beginning."[13] Still, not all commentators have been persuaded.[14]

While the influence of Aquinas's *QDM* is not comparable to that of the *ST*, particularly as the latter replaced Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* as the

[11] "Authenticité et date," 5*; cited in Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 202.
[12] "Summary," in *Editio Leonina*, XXIII, 71*–72*, at 71*.
[13] "Summary," in *Editio Leonina*, XXIII, 71*–72*, at 71*.
[14] An unusual hypothesis has been advanced by Kevin J. Flannery, who suggests that q. 6 was an earlier version of *QDV*, q. 24, a. 1. Flannery suggests, "Perhaps q. 6, 'found in a drawer,' was inserted into *De malo* in order to provide what was thought to be lacking in a work on evil: to wit, a treatment of the role of *voluntas*," in "The Dating of *De Malo* Q. 6," which is Appendix C of *Acts Amid Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 247–249, at 249.

standard theological textbook of the later medieval period and beyond, it would not be fair to say that *QDM* has been neglected. A total of eighty-three extant manuscripts of *QDM* have been identified,[15] and a recent catalogue identifies thirty-seven printed editions of the Latin text of *QDM* published between the 1470s and 2009, including the various *opera omnia* editions of Aquinas's works through the ages.[16] A major impetus for the renewed attention to the work was the 1982 appearance of the critical edition of *QDM* by the Leonine Commission, the institute inaugurated by Pope Leo XIII in 1880 to produce an authoritative series featuring of all of Aquinas's texts.[17] Additionally, translations of *QDM* in the major Western languages have appeared in the last twenty-five years or so,[18] including two complete English translations.[19] Recently, some translations of select questions with detailed commentary have appeared.[20] Unsurprisingly, the wider availability of the work has generated increased interest from those working from theological as well as philosophical standpoints.

The approach of this volume

This collection of essays examines the most interesting and philosophically relevant aspects of *QDM* without attempting a complete or systematic coverage of the work. The chapters exhibit how *QDM* makes a unique

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[15] "La tradition du texte," in *Editio Leonina*, XXIII, 6*–19*, at 6*–15*.

[16] Rolf Schönberger *et al.* (ed.), *Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der Philosophie und angrenzender Gebiete*, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011), III: 3732–3734. Of these editions, twenty-six are described at length in "La tradition du texte," 15*–19*.

[17] An online version of the Leonine edition of *QDM* (see note 1 above) is hosted by the Bibliothèque nationale de France: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9485j.r=.langEN.swf.

[18] See Thomas Aquinas, *Vom Übel / De malo*, ed. and trans. Stefan Schick and Christian Schäfer, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009–2010); *Quaestiones disputatae De malo / Untersuchungen über das Böse*, trans. Claudia Barthold and Peter Barthold (Mühlheim an der Mosel: Carthusianus Verlag, 2009); *Cuestiones disputadas sobre el mal*, trans. Ezequiel Téllez Maqueo (Pamplona: EUNSA / Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1997); *Il male*, trans. Fernando Fiorentino (Milan: Rusconi, 1999); *Questions disputées sur le mal / De malo*, trans. les moines de Fontgombault, 2 vols. (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1992).

[19] The first complete English translation of *QDM* to be published was *On Evil*, trans. Jean Oesterle (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). The second translation appeared in a bilingual edition containing the Latin Leonine text, minus the apparatus, as *The 'De Malo' of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). A slightly revised, English-only version of the second translation was later published as *On Evil*, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[20] A bilingual edition with commentary of *QDM*, q. 1, is Martin Kuolt, *Thomas d'Aquin: 'Du mal.' Question 1: Le mal in général. Introduction et commentaire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009). Select articles of *QDM* in German translation with commentary are found in Christian Schäfer, *Thomas von Aquins gründlichere Behandlung der Übel: eine Auswahlinterpretation der Schrift 'De malo'* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013).

contribution to the Thomistic corpus by highlighting what is distinctive about the work and by situating Aquinas's analyses in relation to discussions found in Aquinas's other writings. Additionally, these contributions summarize the relevant history of interpreting the work and enter into ongoing debates among present-day philosophical interpreters.

The first contribution to this volume, by John F. Wippel, examines the major metaphysical themes that appear in the first question of *QDM*, which sets forth the metaphysical foundations of Aquinas's account of evil that is presupposed in the questions that follow. On some interpretations, *QDM* as a whole derives its name from this first question. The chapter begins by noting that Aquinas's awareness of the problem of evil is evident from a well-known objection in the *ST* that precedes the Five Ways for the existence of God. While Aquinas does not appear to treat the problem of evil in *QDM*, in the *ST* he considers the objection that if God existed, there would be no evil. According to Wippel, Aquinas's philosophical argumentation to show that God is good is highly significant for his overall analysis of the metaphysics of evil. The first question of *QDM* contains Aquinas's most detailed defense of the view that evil is not something positive but is a privation; that is, it is the absence of what ought to be present in a particular thing. Wippel shows that for Aquinas, evil is neither a thing nor an entity, nor does it possess an essence or nature in itself; rather, it is a special kind of negation involving the absence of the being (and goodness) of what is proper to a given subject. With these precisions, Aquinas is committed to the existence of evil in a qualified way: moral and physical evils are undoubtedly real. Aquinas's philosophical account in *QDM* of the origin of these moral evils has received much attention by scholars, and Wippel examines the history and debate surrounding the assertion by Jacques Maritain that Aquinas's analysis is one of his most original philosophical discoveries. The chapter concludes with the observation that Aquinas's treatment of particularly horrendous physical evils (such as devastating earthquakes that take many human lives) rests ultimately in part on theological considerations. On this view, a fully satisfying account of the problem of evil appears beyond the limits of philosophy.

In their contribution to this volume, Bonnie Kent and Ashley Dressel consider Aquinas's presentation of sins of weakness and sins from *malitia* (or, as generally translated, sins from malice). Aquinas's analyses of moral failure in *QDM* are indebted to a variety of traditions that preceded him, and part of this inheritance is an assortment of frameworks for classifying sins. Kent and Dressel argue that commentators have tended to overstate the Aristotelian features of Aquinas's account of both kinds of sins. A close

inspection of *QDM* shows that Aquinas departs from Aristotle's positions in key respects. Aquinas holds, for instance, that virtue does not inoculate a person from temptation, so that even a virtuous person can sin from weakness. Furthermore, on Aquinas's view it is possible for someone to choose a morally bad act while recognizing it as such, as is the case in acts of willful wrongdoing that Aquinas designates as sins from *malitia*. The chapter analyzes Aquinas's psychology of sins of weakness and sins from *malitia*, noting the divergences from Aristotle's views that mark the presentation in *QDM*. The chapter also addresses an interpretive puzzle that faces readers of *QDM*. Aquinas appears to offer two conflicting and seemingly incompatible accounts of sins of *malitia*: one that is Aristotelian, and another that assumes several essentially Christian tenets.

Tobias Hoffmann and Peter Furlong contribute a chapter that considers Aquinas's account of human free choice in *QDM*. Of the sixteen questions of the work, the one on human free choice (q. 6) is arguably the best known. It has been a key text in a long-standing debate concerning Aquinas's view of the precise relationship between intellect and will in human agency. This relationship is often considered in controversies over whether Aquinas should be viewed as a proponent of intellectualism or voluntarism in his moral psychology.[21] Many scholars have asked whether according to Aquinas the intellect or the will has primacy in human free choice. In the last century, Odon Lottin had proposed a developmental account by arguing that Aquinas's earlier writings favor the view that the will follows the intellect, and that in later works (including *QDM*, q. 6) a greater emphasis is given to the will.[22] Lottin revised his evolutionary approach several times, and his works spawned much discussion.[23] In their chapter, Hoffmann and Furlong begin their analysis of q. 6 by considering what is required for moral responsibility, and they conclude that the necessary condition for freedom is possessing perfect sourcehood, that is, voluntariness in the perfect sense. In their terminology, agents enjoy perfect sourcehood if and only if they are the source of their actions, they have alternate possibilities, and they control which alternative is actualized.

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[21] For cautionary remarks on invoking these categories to assess Aquinas, see Tobias Hoffmann, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau with Christina Van Dyke, rev. ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 414–427.

[22] The first work by Lottin on this issue was "La date de la Question Disputée 'De malo' de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 24 (1928): 373–388, slightly revised in his *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 6 (Gembloux: Ducolot, 1960), 353–372.

[23] For brief overviews of the debate that followed, see Flannery, *Acts Amid Precepts*, 111–116, and P. S. Eardley, "Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003): 835–862, at 836–839.

Hoffmann and Furlong then show how Aquinas's presentation of the relationship of intellect and will in acts of free choice accounts for the fulfillment of these conditions. After arguing that Aquinas's position on free choice is incompatible with determinism, they contend that Aquinas's remarks concerning the fall of the angels in *QDM*, q. 16 validate their conclusion that Aquinas endorses an incompatibilist theory of free choice.

In his chapter, Steven J. Jensen addresses a long-standing problem that interpreters have found in Aquinas's treatment of venial sins. Question 7 of *QDM* carefully considers the status of these lesser moral failures. The distinction between venial sin (*peccatum veniale*) and mortal sin (*peccatum mortale*) was firmly anchored in earlier ethical thought, as Peter Lombard had endorsed it in his *Sententiae*, thereby making it a matter of reflection for later medieval theorists on ethics.[24] Aquinas uses the distinction to explore degrees of gravity of moral failure, and in *QDM* he is generous with examples of wrongful actions falling under the two categories. Among venial sins Aquinas counts excessive eating and drinking, speaking an idle word, lying in jest, and lying to please or help someone; among mortal sins Aquinas counts homicide, adultery, blasphemy, devil worship, and theft.[25] Corporeal analogies assist Aquinas in setting forth the degrees of gravity of moral failures: venial sins are like curable diseases or food that is not easily digestible, and mortal sins are like incurable diseases or poisonous food.[26] Jensen observes that some commentators have accused Aquinas of a significant inconsistency concerning venial sin: on the one hand Aquinas maintains that every human action is ordered to an ultimate end, yet on the other hand he maintains that venial sin neither places a creature as its end (as is the case with mortal sin) nor places God as its end (as is the case with a good action). Does a venial sin have an ultimate end? One might wonder how sinning venially is possible, given these restrictions. Appealing to several neglected distinctions in Aquinas's writings, Jensen provides a solution and indicates problems with contemporary analyses of Aquinas's division of types of moral failure. In the course of his argument, he critiques appropriations of Aquinas's thought by contemporary philosophers, including proponents of the new natural law theory.

Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung contributes a chapter that begins with a summation of the far-ranging tradition of the seven deadly sins or seven capital vices (*uitia capitalia*) that Aquinas inherited, a tradition spanning a millennium with origins in the Christian monastic communities of the

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[24] Lombard, *Sententiae*, II, d. 42, c. 3.   [25] Aquinas, *QDM*, q. 7, a. 1, c.
[26] Aquinas, *QDM*, q. 7, a. 1, c.

fourth century. By adopting this scheme as a major framework for analyz-
ing the moral life, Aquinas participates in a venerable tradition, and much
of his analysis in *QDM* is heavily indebted to his predecessors. DeYoung
provides a detailed and historically sensitive account of Aquinas's ana-
lysis of the capital vice of vainglory (*inanis* or *uana gloria*), highlighting
along the way Augustine as an important forerunner to Aquinas's reflec-
tions. Aquinas offers a surprising level of detail in his account of vain-
glory in *QDM*, as he distinguishes carefully between vainglory and pride,
argues that one can be vainglorious even when others are not present,
and develops a sophisticated taxonomy of the many ways glory can be
directed toward unfitting ends. Nevertheless, Aquinas ascribes to glory an
important and necessary social function when glory is properly under-
stood. The chapter demonstrates how Aquinas's presentation appropriates
both Aristotelian and Augustinian elements in a novel way, revealing that
Aquinas's invocation of the seven capital vices is not simply a deference to
tradition.

Thomas M. Osborne, Jr.'s contribution to this volume offers an
instructive example of how seemingly conflicting claims found else-
where in Aquinas's writings can be successfully resolved by examining the
more expansive discussions in *QDM*. Osborne considers a central issue
of Aquinas's action theory that is treated both in *QDM*, q. 2, and in *ST*
I-II, q. 18–20, texts that were written at approximately the same time.
In the *ST*, Aquinas appears to make contradictory statements concerning
whether moral goodness principally comes from an act's object or whether
the moral goodness principally comes from the act's end. Furthermore,
Aquinas contends in the *ST* that the exterior act is both an object and an
end of the interior act. It is not obviously clear from the context of the
ST how the exterior act can be both, if the object and the end are really
distinct. Interpreting these passages has been difficult for generations of
Thomistic commentators, some of whom have concluded that certain pas-
sages are irreconcilable. Osborne argues that *QDM* and *ST* offer consist-
ent accounts, but this consistency is only clear when the texts of *ST* are
read in light of *QDM*. In *QDM*, Aquinas successfully absorbs the termin-
ology and major theses of his contemporaries to provide a more consist-
ent approach than is evident in *ST* and in *In Sent*. These precisions allow
Aquinas to offer a successful analysis of complex moral acts, such as when
an agent commits adultery in order to steal, or gives alms under further
considerations such as penance or vainglory.

In their chapter, Carl N. Still and Darren E. Dahl consider how
Aquinas appropriates the Augustinian–Dionysian account of evil as a

privation within his analysis of human moral failure in *QDM*. At first glance, the notion of privation seems more applicable to physical evils, such as blindness or physical deformities, than to moral evils that originate in the will. Moral acts – even evil ones – appear to have a positive dimension, insofar as they are expressions of the will. In *QDM*, Aquinas faces the challenge of providing a description of moral evil in a way that preserves the metaphysical account of evil as privation but still does justice to the positive element of human acts. In opposition to those who would find inconsistency or incommensurability in Aquinas's presentation, Still and Dahl argue that Aquinas provides a unified account, one that is particularly dependent upon Aristotelian concepts of human agency.

In her contribution to this volume, Therese Scarpelli Cory uses Aquinas's inquiry into whether demons can cognize human thoughts as a springboard for examining what she calls "the mind-reading question," namely, whether a person who directly observed the inner workings of another's mind would be able to see what the other is thinking about. Recent years have seen a growing interest in the medieval views of angels and demons from a strictly philosophical point of view.[27] In reflecting on the existence and characteristics of immaterial creatures, medieval theorists developed and significantly expanded many philosophical doctrines in metaphysics, psychology, and cognition. In her analysis of the mind-reading question, Cory notes that the issue overlaps in significant ways with contemporary discussions in cognitive science about reading minds through neuroimaging techniques. Aquinas answers the mind-reading question in the negative, and his analysis reveals that he has a more sophisticated account of intentionality than is generally acknowledged. In particular, Aquinas's concept of intentionality is broader than static mental representation, as Aquinas is shown to be aware of the mental phenomenon of attentiveness.

In the penultimate chapter of this collection, Fran O'Rourke engages the lengthy history of reflections on evil as a privation of the good (*priuatio boni*). O'Rourke unravels the earlier Neoplatonic contributions that formed this complex tradition, one where the writings of Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius were conduits of a host of earlier, unnamed sources. A full analysis of Aquinas's appropriation of evil as *priuatio* in *QDM* requires an identification of his explicit as well as hidden sources, and

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[27] Two recent collections of new philosophical essays on the topic are *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Leiden: Brill, 2012), and *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*, ed. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).