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Introduction

> *The difference between inbred oppression and that which is from without is essential, inasmuch as the former does not exclude from the minds of the people a feeling of being self-governed; does not imply (as the latter does, when patiently submitted to) an abandonment of the first duty imposed by the faculty of reason.*
>
> – *William Wordsworth*

In July 1808, a new constitution was presented to the Spanish people by King Joseph. For the first time in the country's history, Spain was offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of aristocratic and ecclesiastical feudal privileges. At this time, 3,148 towns and villages were owned by clerical overlords who ruled over some of Europe's most impoverished tenants. However, as Goya's iconic paintings of the turmoil in Madrid in May of that year reveal, far from welcoming greater political liberty and freedom from feudal rule, Spain's peasants instead followed their priests and rose up against the constitution and the king who proposed it. Why did they spurn the freedoms they had been offered? Why did they reject a regime that promised them greater opportunities and superior material conditions? They did so because Joseph, the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, had been installed on the Spanish throne by French troops in the previous month (Luttwak 2005). In the end, the peasants preferred poor rule by Spaniards to the promise of better rule by Frenchmen.

In this respect, not much has changed. Alien rule continues to be widely disparaged in the world today. It has no defenders because it is blamed for fostering underdevelopment, ethnic divisions, racism, genocide, and a host of other malign outcomes.[1] Indeed, some political theorists hold that alien rule

[1] This is particularly evident in the American literature on colonial history, which is frequently viewed exclusively through nationalist lenses (Wilder 2005: 127). According to Owen (2000:

is incompatible with human freedom (Abizadeh 2012: 867). What is an alien ruler? Because rulers promulgate and enforce rules, the answer largely hinges on the definition of aliens. Legally speaking, an alien is someone who has neither the privileges nor the obligations of citizenship in a state (Bosniak 2006). On this view, an alien ruler is an individual who is not a citizen of the state he or she is ruling. Colonial rulers and military occupiers are among the most common examples of such alien rulers. However, this definition is overly restrictive: alien rule can exist in organizations far less large and encompassing than the state. For the purposes of this book, alien rulers are authorities in a given collectivity, who are themselves not members of that collectivity.

Unlike rule, the meaning of which is relatively straightforward, alienness is a more slippery concept: it is defined by the ruled, and their perception of it can change over time.[2] One means alien rulers often have used to diminish their alienness in the eyes of the ruled is the adoption of some of the cultural forms and institutions of the recently subdued native society. Alexander the Great's temples along the Nile incorporated many elements of Ancient Egyptian culture – from temple architecture, to the use of hieroglyphics, to the recognition of Egyptian gods – as a means of making himself appear to be less alien. The Manchu conquerors of Ming China adopted Ming institutions wholesale in their long-lived dynasty. Following the expulsion of the Moors from Cordoba, Spanish Catholics built their cathedral over a preexisting mosque. Likewise, after conquering Tenochtitlán, the conquistadores constructed their cathedral on Aztec ruins, incorporating many Aztec elements in the church. These examples reveal alien rulers' attempts to reduce their alienness in the eyes of the ruled by acknowledging native culture, rather than wholly disparaging it.

The present volume makes the case that assertions regarding the pervasive antipathy to alien rule are overdrawn and potentially at odds with the pursuit of better governance in the modern world. It considers the possibility that good alien governance may be better than bad native governance. To do so it argues that popular resistance to alien rule emanates from two different sources. One source comes from a general, and possibly ancient, fear of aliens. The other comes from a core principle of liberal political philosophy – the right of individual self-determination – that takes issue with the idea of rulership pure and simple. Neither of these bases of opposition to alien rule is set in stone, however. The aliens in one era often become the natives in another. And even in

20), for example, the colonial state led "to the familiar dialectic by which imperial rule cannot help but generate the nationalist forces that will eventually drive it out." Lawrence (2013) offers an insightful critique of this literature.

[2] Membership can be determined either legally, as in the case of citizenship, or informally, as in social groups. The criteria involved in determining which individuals qualify as citizens of a given state or members of a social group are often contested and may change over time, but an analysis of the complex issue of boundary formation lies beyond the scope of this analysis (for one such attempt, see Shelef 2010).

the most liberal societies, individuals voluntarily surrender control over some domain of their activities to others whom they trust. They also surrender some of their control to political representatives and the state. Individuals comply with costly state policies such as conscription and taxation either out of coercion or because they grant the state legitimacy to demand these kinds of sacrifices of them. For their part, states attain compliance and social order more effectively from legitimation than from coercion. But can alien rulers manage to attain legitimacy? This chapter introduces the view that all rulers – whether domestic or foreign – ultimately rely on the same means of legitimation. They can do so to the degree that rulers effectively produce the right kinds of collective goods,[3] and allocate these goods fairly to the ruled.

It is hardly a secret that we live in an era of global communications and trade. World cities like New York, London, and Paris are well-known multicultural hotspots: the range of languages spoken on their streets and cuisines represented in their restaurants is nothing short of stunning. One often hears comments that New York is not really American, that London is not really English, and – albeit less frequently – that Paris is not really French. However, cultural diversity also figures prominently in many smaller urban areas in both developed and less-developed societies. For instance, Des Moines, Iowa, is the home of a thriving community of Nuers, who – as Evans-Pritchard (1944) would have been gratified to learn – are largely employed in the meatpacking industry. Increasingly, the composition of professional sports teams, corporate offices, and university departments is diverse, polyglot, and cosmopolitan.

One of the few exceptions to this growing approbation of cultural diversity is in the realm of government. There seems to be near-universal consensus that it is unacceptable for a country to be ruled by someone other than a native-born citizen. This consensus derives from a pervasive norm of national self-determination.[4] This norm is avowed in the United Nations' Charter, which states that the organization's goal is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Ch. 1, Article 1). This commitment is reinforced in Article 15 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which states that "everyone has the right to a nationality, and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived

[3] Throughout this book, I have generally chosen to substitute the term *collective goods* for what is usually termed *public goods* in the literatures of economics and political science (see Olson 1965). Unlike public goods, which are not excludable, collective goods, in principle, can be excluded from individuals who are not members of specific groups. For example, a range of welfare benefits can be excluded from individuals who are not citizens of a given state. The argument in this book hinges in part on consequences of the differential allocation of collective goods across groups.

[4] Political theorists, however, disagree about the reasons that ostensibly justify this norm (Buchanan 2004; Moore 1998). For a recent argument about the structural conditions that promoted the development of the norm of national self-determination, see Wimmer (2013).

of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." Article Two of the U.S. Constitution famously contains the requirement that the president must be a natural-born citizen of the United States. On this account, advocates of the birther movement sought to delegitimate Barack Obama's presidency by claiming that he fails to meet this criterion.[5] Likewise, following her party's victory over the National Democratic Alliance in India in 2004, Sonia Gandhi, a natural-born Italian, was dissuaded from becoming prime minister of India on account of her foreign origin. In what is perhaps the most revealing sign of the disreputability of alien rule, even the World Trade Organization, that militant advocate of free trade, goes out of its way to deny that it supports an international market in governance services. Opposing alien rule is as natural as upholding mom and apple pie.

By the same token, alien rulers have often encountered stiff resistance. The historical record is rife with examples of such defiance. The earliest historians of ancient Greece wrote about the resistance of Greek city-states, united in the Delian League, to defend themselves against the threatened incursion by the Persian Empire (a brief description is found in Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes 2007: 7–10). Following this, Athens built an empire and subjected other city-states to its will. The Peloponnesian War was made "inevitable [by] the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" (Thucydides 1954: I: 23). Judea erupted several times against Roman rule, most notably at Masada. Alexander Nevsky mobilized the Rus against Swedish and Teutonic invaders (Martin 2007). In the Indian subcontinent, Hindus battled against Muslim invaders from the thirteenth through the sixteenth centuries. Joan of Arc asserted that God had instructed her to recover her homeland from English domination late in the Hundred Years' War. The Mongols fought against the expansion of China during the Qing Dynasty (Perdue 2005). Similar resistance movements emerged in late-medieval Europe (Gorski 2000).

Yet we cannot read *popular* opposition to alien rulers from the mere existence of these premodern resistance movements. Nor is there much reason to believe that their opposition was motivated by a norm of national self-determination, for no such norm could be said to exist prior to the eighteenth century. If this is so, however, then what can account for this resistance to alien rule? Most premodern societies were largely rural. As such, they tended to be made up of a large majority of serfs, peasants, or tenant farmers who were lorded over by

[5] As this statement from a conservative political scientist suggests, hostility to Obama is not just a matter of his ostensibly foreign birth, but his ostensibly foreign values: "I finally realized that the Obama administration and its congressional collaborators almost resemble a foreign occupying force, a coterie of politically and culturally non-indigenous leaders whose rule contravenes local values rooted in our national tradition. It is as if the United States has been occupied by a foreign power, and this transcends policy objections. It is not about Obama's birthplace. It is not about race, either; millions of white Americans have had black mayors and black governors, and this unease about out-of-synch values never surfaced. The term I settled on is 'alien rule' – based on outsider values, regardless of policy benefits – that generates agitation" (Weissberg 2010).

a small minority of large landowners.[6] When aliens conquered these territories, they could either rule indirectly by delegating authority to the traditional rural elites, or they could attempt to strip power from these elites and replace them with alien retainers. The bulk of the rural population remained dependent on the landowners for their very survival, however. Thus it was the disposition of the *landowners*, a small elite, rather than the peasantry, the bulk of the population, that was responsible for resistance against alien rulers. To the degree that alien rulers threatened the power and privileges of the native elites, these elites had an incentive to mobilize their dependent peasants against them (Hechter 2000: 60).[7]

Genuinely popular resistance to alien rule – that which constitutes the phenomenon of nationalism, in short – is often thought to have emerged following the American and French revolutions (Kedourie 1960) and the European revolutions of 1848 (Dowe, Haupt, Langewiesche, and Sperber (2001). These dramatic events provided seeds for the development of a norm of national self-determination. Ernest Gellner (1983: 1) enunciates the content of the norm squarely:

> If the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety.

To take just one example, the American South reacted violently to Northern overlordship during the era of Reconstruction, as graphically depicted in D. W. Griffith's landmark film, *The Birth of a Nation*.[8] The norm of national self-determination gained further strength at Versailles, which claimed it as a universal ideal. In the years following World War II, a virtual cascade of anticolonial liberation movements swept across the globe (Strang 1990; Wallerstein 1961). In the wake of this massive decolonization, detailing the many warts of alien rule turned into a booming academic industry.[9] This critique of colonialism

[6] The situation was rather different in the ancient Greek city-states. Each city-state tended to be divided into two class-based parties: the oligarchs, favored by the Spartan empire, and the democrats, favored by Athens (Thucydides 1954: cf. the discussion of the civil war in Corcyra). Resistance against the threat of Athenian domination, then, was determined not by the sentiments of the citizenry writ large but by the relative power of the two local parties.

[7] See also Chapter 5.

[8] Viewers of *The Birth of a Nation* may wonder which nation Griffith was referring to: the United States, which had successfully prevented the division of its territory, or white Southern society, which bred the Ku Klux Klan. Evidently, Griffith did not believe that the Confederate States of America was a nation, despite its secession from the United States in 1860. For a discussion of the era of Reconstruction as an early exercise in nation building, see Suri (2011); for a historical account of the rise of the Klan, see Foner (1988: 424–444). Interestingly, Nevsky and Joan of Arc – each also the subject of feature films – were both granted sainthood by their respective state churches.

[9] The postcolonial branch of this industry has been justly criticized for its ahistoricity: "Postcolonial studies has brought before a large and transcontinental public the place of colonialism in world history, yet it has tended to obscure the very history whose importance it has highlighted.

profited from a great deal of empirical support.[10] Similar conclusions were reached about the German occupation of Europe (Mazower 2008) and the Japanese occupation of East Asia (Duus et al. 1996) during World War II. Even Italy's high rate of tax evasion – a hindrance to its current struggle to reduce its public debt – has been ascribed to a cultural legacy emanating from opposition to pervasive alien rule.[11]

Why has alien rule in the modern era generated such popular resistance? One reason is because often it has been imposed by conquerors rather than chosen by the ruled themselves.[12] This makes it easy to perceive alien rulers as predatory rather than beneficent. And in many cases this perception was entirely accurate. More fundamentally, however, rule by imposition is totally at odds with liberal and democratic norms. As far back as the seventeenth century, John Locke could write that "a Man can never be oblig'd in Conscience to submit to any Power, unless he can be satisfied who is the Person, who has a Right to Exercise that Power over him" (Locke 1988: Section 81.25, p. 203).

There is something fundamentally misleading about this story, however. Resistance to alien rule is hardly universal. Alien rule has long been accepted in human history. Prior to the eighteenth century it was a commonplace; there was no attempt to engender cultural homogeneity within polities. Indeed quite the contrary: rulers preferred to govern culturally *heterogeneous* territories, the better to divide their subjects (Gellner 1983: 10–13). In the absolutist monarchies of premodern Europe, for instance, the national identity of the rulers was politically insignificant.[13] Royal weddings were quintessentially instrumental affairs designed to cement advantageous geopolitical alliances. Likewise, the Manchus, an alien people from the north of the heartland, ruled China for almost four centuries (Perdue 2005).

A generic colonialism – located somewhere between 1492 and the 1970s – has been given the decisive role in shaping a postcolonial moment, in which intellectuals can condemn the continuation of invidious distinctions and exploitation and celebrate the proliferation of cultural hybridities and the fracturing of cultural boundaries. … [More weight should be placed on] the specificity of colonial situations and the importance of struggles in colonies, in metropoles, and between the two" (Cooper 2005: 400). For an analysis of the variable effects of colonialism on present-day civil violence, see Lange and Dawson (2009).

[10] Indeed, my own first book (Hechter 1975) was a part of this anticolonial literature.

[11] In the United States, the first forms of taxation were in the far west for the defense of the community, and tax evaders were expelled from the community. By contrast, in Italy, the first forms of taxation were largely imposed by foreign princes to pay for their own battles, and Italians did everything they could to avoid paying taxes because they saw nothing in return (Donadio and Povoledo 2011).

[12] See, however, the discussion of the Genoese *podesteria* in Chapter 2.

[13] In this context, it is notable that the account of Spanish resistance to Napoleonic rule with which this chapter begins has been called into question. "Indeed, as one perceptive British officer noted of the Spanish peasantry, 'had they been permitted to live in peace, it would have been a matter of the greatest indifference to them whether their king was Joseph [French], Ferdinand [Spanish] or the ghost of Don Quijote'" (Esdaile 2001: 94).

Support for alien rule can also be found in the modern era. Progressive social theorists and colonial authorities alike justified the imposition of alien rule by claiming that it brought progress and civilization to the benighted peoples of Africa and Asia (Muthu 2003). At least some of the native collaborators who profited from colonialism no doubt agreed. More recently, UN peacekeepers became alien rulers (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008), and nongovernmental organizations have assumed control over many different substantive domains in the international economy (Koppell 2010).[14] Finally, at the time of this writing, the European Union is engaged in a prolonged struggle to protect its currency, the euro, by increasing its financial oversight at the expense of the fiscal sovereignty of its members.

This book is about the conditions that have made, and that might continue to make, alien rule legitimate in the eyes of the ruled. This issue matters for several reasons. First, the massive gap between the haves and have-nots in the world increases the prospect of international intervention to prop up failed or failing states. Second, vital social problems concerning climate change, the spread of infectious disease, financial stability, and terrorism are global rather than national in scale. Solutions to these problems therefore will have to be global and will increasingly challenge Westphalian notions of state sovereignty. As a result, it appears that more of the state's prerogatives will come to be assumed by alien institutions and actors in the future.

Yet the prevalence of the norm of national self-determination ensures that state sovereignty will not go gently into that good night. There are two distinct sources of discontent with alien rule. The first involves the term "alien," whereas the second involves the term "rule."

Roots of the Antipathy toward Foreigners

Consider the roots of xenophobia, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "a deep antipathy to foreigners." On one view, these roots derive from our ancestral past. Evolutionary accounts of xenophobia in humans suggest that conflicts over territory, reproduction, and status led to the development of xenophobia (Thorpe 2003).[15] An early statement holds that natural selection was responsible for xenophobia:

> Our brains do appear to be programmed to the following extent: we are inclined to partition other people into friends and aliens, in the same sense that birds are inclined to

[14] The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is conventionally thought to have established the norm of national sovereignty in the international system, but in reality it did no such thing. For a comprehensive historical survey of the multifarious violations of so-called Westphalian sovereignty since the seventeenth century, see Krasner (2001).

[15] Something akin to xenophobia – which evolutionary biologists generally explain by low genetic relatedness (Hamilton 1964) – exists in many other organisms, from social insects to mammals. Many primates, such as chimpanzees, exhibit intense hostility toward the members of alien

learn territorial songs and to navigate by the polar constellations. We tend to fear deeply the actions of strangers and to solve conflicts by aggression. These learning rules are most likely to have evolved during the past hundreds or thousands of years of human evolution. (Wilson 1978: 119)

This view, however, ignores the possibility that it is also adaptive to cooperate with neighboring groups, and all the more so when our ancestors sometimes were prey rather than predators. After all, one may be more skeptical of strangers than locals, but it is wise to keep one's options open (Cashdan 2001: 760). Where might the suspicion of strangers come from? From an evolutionary point of view, contemporary xenophobia may be derived from adaptations selected to manage the threats posed to ancestral humans by their social environments. Individuals banded together in small groups to acquire and protect critical resources and to ensure against threats (Hechter 1987), but this openness to others could not have been universal. After all, some kinds of interactions – those that expose one to the risk of physical harm, contagious disease, and free riders – are costly. To overcome the potential costs of involvement in group life, mechanisms would have evolved to enable individuals to characterize others as potential threats and to lead them to either avoid or eliminate these threats. "Just as eyelids, blink reflexes, eyelashes, and tear ducts evolved to protect the eye and its important functions, prejudice and discrimination processes may have evolved to protect ultrasociality and its important functions" (Neuberg and Cottrell 2006).

Beliefs about alien groups are likely to be unfavorable because aliens, who are necessarily strangers about whom relatively little can be known, lack a reputation for cooperative behavior. Any person who acts in a manner inconsistent with normative standards may be implicitly viewed by others as a threat to the integrity of the group (Neuberg, Smith, and Asher 2000). Unlike the members of in-groups, aliens have not participated in the repeated reciprocal exchanges of effort and goods that contribute to a favorable reputation. This suggests that aliens should be perceived as untrustworthy and potentially dangerous until their behavior suggests otherwise. Alien individuals – those who do not share some of the in-group's norms – are likely to be regarded as such a threat and thereby to inspire antipathy.

That there may be an evolutionary basis for categorizing individuals into members of in-groups and out-groups is of course plausible, but xenophobia is far from a universal outcome of intergroup contact. The concept of alien is evidently a social construction that is not set in stone. For example, following

groups. More surprising, perhaps, something akin to xenophobia is found in extremely small organisms such as microbes. The recognition of relatives is important in microbes because they engage in many behaviors that entail costs to the individual while benefiting neighbors. Microbes cooperate for nourishment, movement, virulence, iron acquisition, protection, quorum sensing, and production of multicellular biofilms or fruiting bodies. Likewise, cells benefit their own kind by poisoning alien cells (Strassmann, Gilbert, and Queller 2011).

the French Revolution, many inhabitants of the Celtic-dominated region of Brittany regarded the French as culturally alien, and the French felt likewise about the Bretons, but today the inhabitants of both territories reserve that label for the Mahgrebis, among others. One source of differential antipathy to aliens is the variable level of threat they pose. In this view, one is more likely to fear manifestly warlike neighbors than manifestly cooperative ones. So even if there is an evolved tendency to be suspicious of strangers, this belief can be modified in the face of contradictory evidence. This conclusion points to the importance of contextual and historical contingencies.

Hostility to aliens could also arise from competition over resources such as land and food. Yet there is little evidence of an association between land shortage and intergroup conflict (Thorpe 2003: 148–159). In contrast to this expectation, the archaeological record does not reveal a significant increase in conflict following the adoption of agriculture. The social psychological version of this materialist theory – realistic group conflict theory – is also undermined by much empirical research (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). Doubtless, competition for material and human resources sometimes spurs intergroup hostility, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient explanation of xenophobia. After all, intergroup contact may also yield both reproductive and political benefits to individuals and groups (Gluckman 1955; Lévi-Strauss 1969).

Another root of the antipathy to alien rule concerns the term "rule" rather than "alien." Criticism of rule goes hand in hand with the growing acceptance of the right of individual self-determination.

Roots of the Antipathy to Rule

The concept of individual self-determination – which asserts one's right to control one's own actions – emerged in the seventeenth century out of the notion that individuals have certain natural, inalienable rights. Key among these is freedom from depending on the will of others (Macpherson 1962: 263).[16] In previous eras – and in other parts of the contemporaneous world – no such right was presumed. In premodern societies, individuals, far from being wholly

[16] This formulation assumes that individuals have free will and the goals they decide to pursue are their own rather than those imposed on them by a predatory or manipulative ruler bent on pacifying and exploiting them, as in *Brave New World* (Huxley 1946). As Rawls (2005: 137) puts it, "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason." The view that legitimacy rests on a commitment to equally respect all persons is widely held by normative political theorists (Grafstein 1981; Lukes 1974; Rehfeld 2005). Much of the corpus of sociological theory discounts the realism of this view of free will; by contrast, sociologists regard social institutions as key determinants of individual preferences and values. If internal states such as preferences and values are in large part determined by such institutions, then it is naïve to assume that they are entirely sovereign.

independent agents, were largely understood as members of communities (*Gemeinschaften*) and were defined, and defined themselves, by their status within these communities (Macpherson 1962; Maine 1986; Tönnies 1988).[17] If groups are conceived as essential to human welfare and survival, then the idea that membership in them imposes obligations that limit individual sovereignty is easy to accept.

The emergence of liberalism as a political philosophy brought concern for the individual to the forefront.[18] If previous social thought conceived of the premodern community as a harmonious collective, much like the colonies of ants or bees (Hollingsworth 2001), liberalism highlighted the existence of conflict between individuals and the groups to which they belonged. The rise of liberalism invariably raised questions about governance and rule. As Hobbes (1996) had argued, some sort of governance was required to mitigate interpersonal conflict and foster civilization and social order. Such collective goods could only be provided if individuals surrendered some part of their liberty to the ruler. But by what criteria should the performance of these rulers be assessed? Their commitment to individual self-determination led liberals to argue that governments should be assessed by the degree to which they satisfied the demands of the ruled.

Not that individualists agreed on the trade-off between individual liberty and state prerogatives. Elevated to the level of a political philosophy, the untrammeled right of individual self-determination lies at the core of anarchism, which denies that the state is a prerequisite for the attainment of social order. Not only is the state unnecessary; anarchists also believe that it is malign. Consider Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's indictment of the nineteenth-century state:

> To be GOVERNED is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, checked, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom nor the virtue to do so. To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, prevented, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be place[d] under contribution, drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted from, squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, vilified, harassed, hunted down, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and

[17] Indeed, classical sociology was erected on the basis of this distinction between premodern and modern societies. Marx's feudal and capitalist social formations (Marx, Engels, and Hobsbawm 1998), Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim and Simpson 1933), Weber's (1978) patrimonial and rational-legal forms of legitimation, and Simmel's (1955) concentric and juxtaposed forms of group affiliation all attest to the centrality, if not the details, of the distinction.

[18] This is not to deny that various communitarian and other nonindividualist philosophies also continue to attract adherents today.