The Civic Culture Transformed

*From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*

This book reevaluates Almond, Verba, and Pye’s original ideas about the shape of a civic culture that supports democracy. Marshaling a massive amount of cross-national, longitudinal public opinion data from the World Values Survey, the authors demonstrate multiple manifestations of a deep shift in the mass attitudes and behaviors that undergird democracy. The chapters in this book show that in dozens of countries around the world, citizens have turned away from allegiance toward a decidedly “assertive” posture to politics: they have become more distrustful of electoral politics, institutions, and representatives and are more ready to confront elites with demands from below. Most importantly, societies that have advanced the most in the transition from an allegiant to an assertive model of citizenship are better-performing democracies – in terms of both accountable and effective governance.

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Other World Values Survey Books from Cambridge University Press


The Civic Culture Transformed

From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens

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Leuphana University, Lüneburg
To Ronald Inglehart,
for a career of giving voice to citizens and developing
the research infrastructure so others could follow his lead
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In a sense, this book began when Ronald Inglehart went to Paris in May 1968 to investigate the causes of a student uprising that had just paralyzed France. He mounted a representative national survey of the French public that probed into the motivations underlying the greatest mass uprising since World War II and why the Gaullist government that had opposed it was returned to power by a majority of French voters in subsequent national elections.

When he began to analyze the results, Inglehart was surprised: the data contradicted his expectations. Like most observers – including the strikers and demonstrators themselves – he assumed that the May 1968 uprising was a manifestation of class conflict. Paris was covered with posters attacking capitalist exploitation; French intellectuals interpreted the events in Marxist terms, and the participants used standard Marxist slogans about class struggle. Accordingly, Inglehart initially struggled to make the findings fit Marxist expectations. New elections were held a month after the strikes and demonstrations. His data showed that instead of heightened class polarization, with the proletariat supporting the parties of the Left and the bourgeoisie rallying behind General de Gaulle, a large share of the working-class voters had shifted to support the Gaullist ruling party, contributing to its victory. It was mainly middle-class voters who moved in the opposite direction.

Seeking to understand why this happened, Inglehart analyzed the responses to an open-ended question that asked about the goals of those who had taken part in the strikes and demonstrations. The motivations varied sharply by age and social class. Working-class respondents, especially the older ones, overwhelmingly mentioned higher salaries. Middle-class respondents, especially the younger ones, said they wanted a freer, less impersonal society. Inglehart hypothesized that these age and class differences reflected a process of inter-generational value change linked with the economic miracles of the postwar era.
He reasoned that, throughout history, most people have grown up experiencing economic and physical insecurity. Germany was a particularly striking example that quickly caught Inglehart’s attention right after his visits to France. In Germany, the older generations had experienced deprivation and loss of life during World War I, followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s, and then defeat, occupation, and liberation during World War II. The postwar era, by contrast, brought historically unprecedented levels of economic and physical security. During the two decades before 1968, Germany experienced the highest economic growth rates in its history. This economic development, combined with the emergence of the modern welfare state, meant that for the first time in history, a large part of the population had grown up in a society where starvation was virtually unknown. A large part of the postwar generation no longer gave top priority to economic security, instead placing growing emphasis on autonomy and freedom of expression.

A society’s basic values, of course, do not change overnight, and older generations continued to emphasize the materialistic goals that had shaped them during their formative years. But the more secure strata of the postwar generation gave higher priority to “postmaterialist” goals, as Inglehart called them.

The student protesters in France, Germany, and elsewhere in the Western world indicated the political emergence of the postwar generation. Although their formative conditions had been present for years, this generation did not become old enough to have an impact on politics until the 1960s, when they were university students. Eventually they would occupy the leading positions in society, but initially they saw themselves as having values that were sharply different from those of their elders. “Don’t trust anyone over thirty!” was a widespread slogan. When postmaterialists first emerged as a political force, they tended to express themselves in Marxist slogans, which were then the standard rhetoric of protest in Western Europe. To a large extent, the term “Left” meant the Marxist parties, and it was natural for the postmaterialists to assume that they were Marxists. But in fact there were profound differences between the goals of the postmaterialists and those of the Marxist Left, as the postmaterialists gradually discovered.

In 1970, Inglehart tested his postmaterialist value change theory in a six-nation survey of European attitudes with a battery of questions he had explicitly designed to measure materialist versus postmaterialist values. In all six countries (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), there were massive differences between the values of young and old respondents. Among those older than sixty-five, materialists outnumbered postmaterialists by a margin of fourteen to one; but among the postwar generation, postmaterialists were more numerous than materialists. Moreover, within each birth cohort, postmaterialists were much more heavily represented among the economically secure strata than among the less-educated and lower-income groups. The article reporting these findings was published in 1971 in the
Foreword  

American Political Science Review, and the concept of postmaterialism entered the vocabulary of modern political science.¹

Several critics argued that the dramatic value differences between age groups reflected life-cycle effects rather than generational change. Data from a long time series would be needed to answer this question. The four-item materialist-postmaterialist values battery was included in the Eurobarometer surveys beginning in 1973 and was continued for decades. This made it possible to carry out cohort analyses based on data covering a long time series. The results confirmed that a process of intergenerational value change was taking place: given birth cohorts did not become more materialist as they grew older, and as younger cohorts gradually replaced older ones in the adult population, the society as a whole became increasingly postmaterialist. In addition, the wealth of the data in the Eurobarometer studies enabled survey researchers to examine the range of attitudes and behaviors linked to postmaterialist value change, stimulating a growing body of research on this topic.

The research agenda on value change in contemporary societies continued to expand. In 1973, Inglehart developed a broader-based twelve-item battery. With Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, Warren Miller, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Alan Marsh, he helped design the Political Action study, which demonstrated the link between value change and new forms of political action such as protests, petitions, sit-ins, and various other manifestations of contentious action.²

The concept of postmaterialist values has become a standard term in social science (in 2014, a Google Scholar search on “postmaterialist values” produced more than 15,000 citations). But in subsequent research, Inglehart found that the value shift he first measured in 1970 was part of a much broader process of intergenerational cultural change linked with modernization.³ Materialist-postmaterialist values were just one component of a broader dimension of cross-cultural variation, which he called survival–self-expression values. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of out-groups, gender equality, and emphasis on participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values reflect mass polarization over gender equality and individual freedoms, which are part of a broader syndrome of tolerance of out-groups, including foreigners and gays and lesbians. The shift

from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from an emphasis on hard work and conformity to social norms toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. Plus it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to tolerance, trust, political moderation, and expressive political action – all of which are conducive to democracy.

Building on this revised view of modernization, Inglehart, in collaboration with various colleagues, particularly Christian Welzel and Pippa Norris, developed the evolutionary modernization theory. Departing from earlier versions of modernization theory, it abandons simplistic assumptions of linearity. Instead, it emphasizes that modernization is reversible and can change direction. Thus, the transition from agrarian to industrial society was linked with a cultural shift from “traditional” to “secular-rational values,” which made the emergence of “electoral democracy” possible, although by no means inevitable. Then, the transition from industrial to postindustrial society brought a shift in a very different direction: from “survival” to “self-expression values,” which makes “liberal democracy” increasingly likely. This theory also moves from a narrow focus on changes in objective socioeconomic conditions to examine changes in people’s subjective beliefs and the impact of these beliefs on regime institutions and public policies. Finally, this theory recognizes the enduring impact of a society’s historic heritage, as is manifest in the robust global cultural zones based on religious and colonial experiences: economic development tends to change a society’s culture in roughly predictable ways. But the process is path dependent: the fact that a society was historically Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, or Confucian continues to shape its people’s values today.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that rising economic and physical security tends to erode the rigid cultural norms that characterized agrarian societies, leading to norms that allow greater individual autonomy and free choice. Strikingly similar findings have been reported by researchers in other disciplines from anthropology to biology. Thus, Gelfand and colleagues find that nations that encountered severe ecological and historical threats have stronger norms and lower tolerance of deviant behavior than do other nations, arguing that existential pressures determine whether a culture is tolerant of deviance. Similarly, Thornhill and colleagues find that historic vulnerability to infectious disease is linked with collectivist attitudes, xenophobia, and low support for gender equality – all of which hinder the emergence of democracy.
Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism and the revised theory of modernization that developed from it continue to be the basis of evolving theories. Recent extensions include Welzel’s *general theory of emancipation* as well as Dalton and Welzel’s *allegiance-assertion theory*, pursued in this volume, which postulates a shift from allegiance to assertive types of citizens. The underlying logic connecting this lineage of theories is that increasing existential security, cognitive mobilization, and other opportunity-widening aspects of modernization tend to make people more self-directed and to shift their emphasis on freedom of choice and equality of opportunities. These values fuel various social movement activities that advocate gender equality, tolerance of gays and lesbians, and participatory democracy throughout societal life.

In 1973, Jacques-René Rabier launched the Eurobarometer surveys and had the foresight to include the materialist-postmaterialist values in a long-term program of monitoring the attitudinal component of social change. This made it possible to test these ideas empirically and to modify and build on them to improve our understanding of how people’s beliefs and goals are changing. Rabier is one of the unsung heroes of cross-national survey research. He not only launched the Eurobarometer surveys but also inspired and supported other cross-national survey research programs such as the Latino Barometer, the Afro Barometer, and the East Asia Barometer. He also helped design the European Values Study, launched in 1981 by Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moore, which was carried out by the same survey institutes that did the Eurobarometer and included many of its key indicators, such as materialist-postmaterialist values and unconventional political action measures from the Political Action Surveys. Later, de Moor and Kerkhofs invited Inglehart to help expand the European Values Study (EVS) into a global survey project that in 1990 became the World Values Survey (WVS). In 1995, Inglehart launched a new wave of the WVS on his own, and in 1999, the EVS and WVS were established as two separate groups, which continue to cooperate, sharing key batteries of items to build up an unprecedented time series for the analysis of value change. Kerkhof’s and de Moor’s work has been carried on with great success by Paul de Graaf, Loek Halman, Jaak Billiet, Jacques Hagenaars, and their colleagues, covering virtually every country in Europe.

The WVS is the most important research project of Inglehart’s career. In discussing the WVS, he is clearly expressing his appreciation and gratitude for having been able to work with such colleagues as Miguel Basanez, Russell Dalton, Jaime Diez-Nicolás, Juan Diez-Nicolás, Yilmaz Esmer, Christian Haerpfer, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Marta Lagos, Shen Mingming, Alejandro Moreno Alvarez, Neil Nevitte, Pippa Norris, Thorleif Pettersson, Bi Puranen, Catalina Romero, Sandeep Shastri, Christian Welzel, Seiko Yamazaki, and many other colleagues in the WVS network. These people, from countries

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around the world, have played key roles in carrying out the WVS, analyzing the data, and presenting the findings in publications and conferences around the world. A project of this scope requires people with diverse talents to design, organize, fund, analyze, archive, interpret, and publish findings from this study of social change in more than 100 countries, extending over 30 years. The WVS is diverse not only in talented people but also geographically. The WVS secretariat is based in Stockholm, the archiving is carried out in Madrid, and analysis and interpretation of the data are pursued by thousands of researchers in scores of countries around the world.

In codesigning the WVS, Inglehart emphasized a strategy of diversity, trying to cover the widest possible range of societies. This was a deliberate strategic choice. He was aware that a more cautious approach would have been to limit the data collection to countries with well-developed survey infrastructures, ensuring that fieldwork was carried out by experienced survey institutions. But this would have meant limiting the survey’s coverage mainly to prosperous democracies. He was convinced that it was a better overall strategy to push the envelope, maximizing the economic, political, and cultural diversity of the countries covered. This approach greatly increases the analytic leverage that is available for analyzing the role of culture, economic development, and democratic versus authoritarian institutions. But it also tends to increase the possible error in measurement. This is a difficult balancing act, and it is an empirical question whether the gains offset the potential costs.

Extending survey research into developing countries means doing it in places where the infrastructure is less developed and the margin of error is likely to be higher. This raises the question: Is it possible to obtain accurate measures of mass beliefs and values in low-income countries and authoritarian states where survey research is rare? Or is the error margin so large as to render the data useless for comparative analysis? There is no a priori answer to this question; it requires empirical testing. Inglehart and Welzel conducted some relevant tests. They theorized that self-expression values should be strongly correlated with indicators of economic development. Thus, they compared the strength of the correlations obtained from high-income societies with the strength of those obtained from all available societies. Here two effects work against each other: (1) the presumed loss of data quality that comes from including lower-income societies, which would tend to weaken the correlations; and (2) the increased analytical leverage that comes from including the full range of societies, which should strengthen the correlations. Which effect is stronger? They found that among high-income societies, the average correlation between self-expression values and ten widely used economic development indicators was 0.57, whereas across all available societies, the average correlation is 0.77. The data from all

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available societies explain almost twice as much variance as the data from high-income societies alone.

Their theory also implies that one should find strong linkages between self-expression values, the emergence of civil society, and the flourishing of democratic institutions. As data from scores of countries demonstrate, societal-level self-expression values are indeed closely correlated with a wide range of such indicators, including the “global civil society index” and World Bank indices of “government effectiveness,” “rule of law,” and “corruption control.” They are also strongly correlated with the United Nations Development Programme’s “gender empowerment measure” and an “index of effective democracy.” Again, the gains obtained by increasing the range of variation more than compensate for any loss of data quality.

Another important reason for covering the whole spectrum of economic and democratic development is that bringing survey research into these societies helps them develop their research capabilities. Survey research can provide valuable feedback for policy makers, and the WVS network is based on the belief that it is the responsibility of social scientists in developed societies to help disseminate survey research techniques. Accordingly, the WVS has produced many publications based on collaboration between social scientists in developing countries and colleagues from countries with a long experience in using survey research. Inglehart was convinced that, over time, the quality of fieldwork in developing countries would be improved, and he considered the effort to do so worth a substantial investment.

For academics, life regenerates itself through students and colleagues. Inglehart takes tremendous pride in the students and colleagues with whom he has worked – some of whom have contributed to this volume. This volume is a tribute to Inglehart’s achievements as a modernization theorist and an analyst of sociocultural change and also as a visionary who persistently worked to develop a key data resource, the WVS. I express my deep gratitude to all the authors for producing this volume. It is a testament both to Ronald Inglehart’s scholarship and to the continuing importance of studying how changing values are reshaping the societies and political systems in which we live.
Sometime in the 1960–70s, the paradigm of comparative politics began to change in the established democracies. Until this point, one of the field’s major concerns was to explain the collapse of democracy in interwar Europe and the rise of fascist governments in their place. The landmark study, *The Civic Culture*, thus looked at postwar Europe and before to assess what type of political culture sustained democracy. Political culture research argued that people’s deference and allegiance to democratic institutions, combined with limited, elite-mandating mass involvement, were the foundation of stable democracy.

But societies and their people change. Mass prosperity, education, information, and other forces of social modernization were transforming citizens and the democratic process. New issue demands entered the political agenda, new citizen groups challenged the status quo, and a “participatory revolution” extended popular demands on governments. Usually, scholars and pundits depicted these developments as threats to democracy, often hearkening back to the model of citizenry proposed in the political culture studies of the early postwar era.

One of the first scholars to recognize the erosion of the allegiant model of democratic citizenship was Ronald Inglehart. He has been one of the strongest voices in the political culture field to object to the stereotypical interpretation of “elite-challenging mass action” as antidemocratic. In his landmark work, *The Silent Revolution*, Ronald Inglehart theorized and demonstrated the motivation driving the rise of elite-challenging action—a growing emancipatory spirit visible in increasing postmaterialist values. He further identified the generational increase of existential security and cognitive mobilization as the social forces fueling the rise of these new values. In his revised theory of modernization, Inglehart extended the notion of postmaterialist values into the broader concept of “self-expression values.” While a first phase of
modernization – the transition from agrarian to industrial society – tends to strengthen “secular-rational values,” self-expression values emerge in the second phase of modernization: the transition from industrial to postindustrial society. With this theory, Inglehart enriched the political culture field with a set of ideas and concepts that greatly enhanced our understanding of cultural change.

In addition to his intellectual impact, Inglehart’s second crucial contribution was to provide an evidence base for the study of cultural differences and cultural change. At the beginning of his career, the field of comparative political culture research had systematic data for no more than a handful of countries. Inspired by the ambition to improve this situation, Inglehart helped develop the Eurobarometer surveys, contributed to the European Values Study, and founded the World Values Survey – the most encompassing, most widely cited and used, and most widely recognized database for studying political culture and cultural change. Hence Inglehart invented not only some of the most influential concepts but he also created the infrastructure for a major field of comparative politics. The development of these surveys has enabled a generation of scholars to do research in areas where no one had gone before. Both his intellectual and data collection contributions are so exceptional and outstanding that we dedicate this book as a tribute to the lifetime achievements of Ronald Inglehart.

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Along the way, many people have assisted in developing this book. Bjoern Buss produced the index. Lewis Bateman, the chief social science editor at Cambridge University Press, and his assistant, Shaun Vigil, provided helpful guidance in getting this book ready for publication. We also appreciate the assistance of Amy Alexander, Natalie Cook, Yilmaz Esmer, Yuliya Tverdova, and Carole Uhlaner in developing this project and the final manuscript. The seed for this project was probably sown in previous collaborations with Almond and Verba that shaped our thinking about political culture, culture change, and the value of individual citizens. We stand on their shoulders, and we hope they would view this positively.

Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* gave voice to citizens in five nations and their views of politics and their political role. It created the foundation for political culture research on which we build. One of the major accomplishments of the World Values Survey used in this book is to give voice to people around the world, with surveys spanning nearly half of the nations on the globe,
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representing roughly 90 percent of the world population. Our argument is that the tenor of this voice has changed in the past half-century, with significant consequences for contemporary politics. We owe a debt to Almond and Verba for launching a research program with the enduring importance that led to the themes we study here.

Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel