Introduction

Nation, Empire, Globe

On 6 December 1897, the new Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and royal favourite Bernhard von Bülow gave his inaugural speech to the Reichstag, in which he referred to what was subsequently termed 'world policy' (*Weltpolitik*).[1] As a forty-eight-year-old career diplomat who had never spoken in public before, he had – he later claimed in his memoirs – 'in no way prepared for his speech', since he expected to be called only on the second, third or fourth day of the debate.[2] In the preceding days, the satirical journal *Lüstige Blätter* had shown him on the front cover as a baby, presented by a mother (the government) to three old ladies (the Centre Party, Conservatives and Liberals): 'Now, look, this is the youngest little minister, a handsome boy, this Bülow, isn't he?'[3] The parties answered: 'Well, we'll have to see how he develops; we'll only know when the little one begins to speak.'[4] When he did come to speak, responding to deputies' earlier allusions to the imprisonment of a German subject in Haiti and to the dispatching of German cruisers to Kiautschou in China after the alleged 'slaughter of our missionaries', he concluded with the words: 'we want to put no one in the shade but we demand our place in the sun, too. (Bravo.) In East Asia, as in the West Indies, we shall endeavour to be true to the traditions of German policy, without unnecessary harshness, but also to maintain our rights and our interests without weakness'.[5] While he was talking, 'since one can very well speak and think about other things at the same time', he was more concerned about the 'hilarity' which broke out, 'perhaps because of my style of speaking, my discourse or my bearing'.[6] Later, he was relieved that the press labelled him 'a born public speaker' ('in the most-read Berlin paper, the *Lokal-Anzeiger*') and that Herbert von Bismarck had congratulated him on the 'content, diction, tone and imagery' of the speech.[7]

Bülow did not suspect that he would, in this fashion, gain his first entry in Büchmann (a dictionary of quotations), 'which I did not even know at the time'.[8] Württemberg's Minister in Berlin, Axel von Varnbüler, reported to Stuttgart that 'Some fortunate phrases in his short, succinct speech – like, for example, "we don't want to put anyone in the shadow but we too demand our place in the sun" and "the times when the German left the earth to one of his neighbours, the sea to the other, and reserved for himself the heavens where pure doctrine reigns – these times are over" – have already become almost proverbial and are

1

on everyone's lips.'[9] The speech has since been seen by historians and was said by Bülow himself in 1914 to have marked the transition of Germany from the status of a Great Power to that of a 'world power'.[10] It occurred during a period when 'distant continents moved increasingly into Germans' horizons of perception' and when 'descriptions of one's own situation in terms of "world" categories were spreading'.[11] Yet Germany's mass press appeared to show relatively little interest in Bülow's speech. The popular new satirical magazine *Simplicissimus*, for example, not only made no direct reference to it, but also devoted none of its glossy images to China, Haiti or the 'wider', extra-European world, preferring to concentrate on everyday scenes from the German countryside, the moral quandaries or urban life and politics of Berlin, with more occasional depictions of the French Riviera and the politics of neighbouring states.[12] The Leipzig *Illustrirte Zeitung*, which carried lithographs based on photographs, did include a short article without illustrations on the opening of the railway in German South West Africa on 6 January 1898 and an illustrated article about an expedition in Central Brazil on 21 January, but it made no mention of Bülow's speech or the new world to which it referred.[13] These two articles were outshone by a welter of images of domestic scenes and Alpine passes.[14]

This study re-evaluates such discrepancies. Over the last two decades, historians have focused on the nexus of transnational networks and interactions, imperialism and a colonial imaginary, and commercial and communicative forms of globalization in order to revise the historiography of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century politics, constructions of identity and nationalism. 'None of this is unfamiliar to historians,' write Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel in their volume on the 'transnational *Kaiserreich*': 'It has, however, had relatively little impact on the more general historical account. No other period of modern history has been understood as a temporal unity in such an endogenous fashion as the *Kaiserreich* before 1914.'[15] The formation of nation-states during the course of the nineteenth century itself created a powerful mythology and contemporary record framed in national terms. To turn-of-the-century observers, the Reich 'as a *Nationalstaat* without a forerunner had to be more insular than the polycentric German world of the preceding epoch', continue Conrad and Osterhammel: 'What belonged to Germany territorially was no longer uncertain,' with borders maintained by law and the conventions of the state. Yet it was precisely this 'concentrated build-up of power [with which] Germany began as a nation-state in 1871' that forced it to 'project its influence outwards into the world' and to play a role in the system of Great Powers.[16] The Reich's 'economic dynamism pushed it beyond nationally-circumscribed systems of circulation', and 'its cultural institutions, which were so carefully cultivated in its competition with neighbours, became magnets with extensive powers of attraction'.[17]

The paradox of nation-building in Germany, as elsewhere, was that its principal sources – the projection of power, economic growth, scientific and

cultural inquiry – were transnational: the more powerful the German nation-
state became, the more it became entangled in a web of relations beyond
national borders and beyond the control of a national government. These
entanglements 'did not lead to a dissolution of borders and the utopia of a post-
national history', but to the 'stabilization and territorialization of the nation-
state' as 'one of the fundamental effects of global linkages before the First World
War', in Conrad's view.[18] All the same, the form and content of nationalism were
affected by globalization and 'the colonial structures that permeated economic
and political exchange, migration and cultural interactions', without which 'the
global integration of the world around 1900 was inconceivable'.[19] For the Berlin
historian, 'what is at stake here is a revision of common assumptions concerning
the history of nationalism'.[20] Whereas the dynamics of nationalism have gen-
erally been located within nation-states, as 'imagined communities', 'invented
traditions' or reactions to modernization, Conrad's own case studies show that
'the shifts and changes in the discourse of nationalism . . . appear not only as
effects of internal trajectories, as the familiar picture would suggest, but just as
much of the larger process we retrospectively call globalization'.[21] By investigat-
ing de- and re-territorialization in their own right, together with the instances
of transnational interaction which produced them, Conrad aims to 'rescue his-
tory from the nation', which allegedly enjoyed a privileged and distorting status
as a category, even in the mind of an author of a 'universal history' like Karl
Lamprecht. To the Leipzig historian, the transformation of the nation around
the turn of the century was 'the most profound consequence of internal devel-
opment'.[22] To Conrad, such testimony merely proves the 'hegemonic character
of the internalistic paradigm'.[23] Although the perspective of global history 'does
not imply abandoning the category of the nation', it does alter historians' view
of nations, which cease 'to be the point of departure of historical inquiry', and
instead become 'what needs to be explained as the result of global conjunc-
tures'.[24] Perception and understanding depend on starting points and points
of view.

Here, I ask how historians should describe and explain the varying forms of
national identification, allegiance and politics after the much-heralded crea-
tion and consolidation of a German nation-state in the 1870s and 1880s. How
were colonialism and globalization connected to other, longer-standing types of
affiliation and interaction, whether local, 'patriotic' (state-centric) or 'German'?
Conrad concedes 'that the concept of the nation originated before the years of
intensified global exchange since the 1880s' and that 'German nationalism, as
elsewhere, was shaped by a longer tradition that reached back at least to the
Napoleonic wars', characterized by 'romanticism, the 1848 revolution and the
unification movement'.[25] Given that 'nationalism was by no means a new phe-
nomenon in the late nineteenth century' but, rather, 'the product of a complex set
of social conditions and political discourses *within* German society', how were
later instances of global nationalism – or nationalizing imperialism – related

to such existing horizons, habits and patterns of behaviour?[26] 'The nation func-
tioned around 1900 as a hegemonic paradigm of social and historical imagina-
tion' in the dual sense of becoming a 'ubiquitous conceptual scheme' and 'an
internal paradigm of historical knowledge', writes Conrad.[27] The parameters
of the nation-state were not 'forms of false consciousness' whose 'ideological
(or narrative) veil' could be lifted through acts of deconstruction, as Prasenjit
Duara and other post-colonial scholars have argued.[28] Instead, the 'historical
process . . . which first made these [supposedly universal, national] categories
binding', must be kept in view: 'The denial of the universalism of the national,
in other words, should not lead to the ignoring of the ubiquity of the nation as a
cognitive dimension and as a space of social practice.'[29]

The question, though, is what weight should be attached to the historical
processes – discourses and social conditions within Germany – and the cat-
egories which they produced before the global era of the 1890s, 1900s and
1910s. Drawing on the work of Alon Confino and other historians of locali-
ties and regions, who have pointed to the reciprocal and competing processes
of nationalization and local belonging (to a mythologized *Heimat*, amongst
other things), Conrad leaves open the question of how 'globalization around
1900 entailed not only a restructuring of the national, but also left traces on the
level of the local': 'This process, which is treated in the literature under the label
"glocalization", could also provide interesting insights for an interpretation of
the German *Kaiserreich*.'[30] Transnationalism as a 'pragmatic approach, behind
which stands neither a worked-out theory nor specific method of investigation',
according to Conrad and Osterhammel's definition, 'refers to relations and con-
stellations which transcend national borders', yet how can it take account of and
assess attitudes and interactions which do not transcend national borders but
which have a bearing on the scope and content of nationalism, understood in
the broad sense of individuals' desires, dispositions and practices, sometimes
within groups or institutions, which have led them to create or maintain a
nation-state?[31] Moreover, how are historians not merely to analyse the relations
between different instances, forms and levels of individual, group and institu-
tional activity, but also to evaluate the relative significance of those relations?
Conrad admits that 'relations within Europe were of greater importance in most
fields for the German Empire, even in the Wilhelmine era, than entanglements
with extra-European societies, with the exception of the United States'.[32] He has
also subsequently argued that the transformation of national discourses was
'just as much' the effect of 'internal trajectories' as it was that of a larger pro-
cess of globalization.[33] This study asks how internal and external trajectories –
and the consolidation and transcending of the boundary between internal and
external – can be analysed and explained. In doing so, it seeks to address
questions which recent transnational, imperial (or post-colonial) and global
approaches to the subject have left unresolved.

The Wilhelmine Era in Retrospect: the First Global Age?

The term 'globalization' was coined in the interwar period and came into common usage in the 1980s and 1990s.[34] For the majority of scholars, it has come to refer to what the sociologist Roland Robertson, one of the first to deploy it in its contemporary sense, calls 'the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole'.[35] At the turn of the twenty-first century, despite regular deployment in the media, meaning that the word was 'in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of our times', the term remained contested, with the political scientists David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton distinguishing between 'hyperglobalizers' for whom 'peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the marketplace', 'sceptics' for whom 'globalization is essentially a myth' concealing 'the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national governments remain very powerful', and 'transformationalists' for whom 'contemporary patterns of globalization are conceived as historically unprecedented such that states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world'.[36] Usually, globalization described a system of interconnected economies and a level of trade which appeared to be creating convergence and a degree of uniformity in the political decision-making of implicated governments and in the daily preferences and choices facing ordinary citizens. The 'new commercial reality' was 'the emergence of global markets for standardized consumer products on a previously unimagined scale of magnitude', wrote the economist Theodore Levitt in his seminal article on 'The globalization of markets' in 1983.[37] 'A powerful force drives the world toward a converging commonality, and that force is technology', which had 'proletarianized communication, transport and travel' and had 'made isolated places and impoverished peoples eager for modernity's allurements', he continued: whereas the multinational company 'operates in a number of countries, and adjusts its products and practices in each, at high relative costs', the global corporation 'operates with resolute constancy – at low relative cost – as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity; it sells the same things in the same way everywhere'.[38]

Even Levitt accepted that economic forms of globalization had been accompanied by communicative ones, with worldwide communications everywhere carrying 'the constant drumbeat of modern possibilities to lighten and enhance work, raise living standards, divert and entertain'.[39] From the thousands swarming daily in Brazil 'from preindustrial Bahian darkness . . . to install television sets in crowded corrugated huts' in coastal cities, to soldiers in 'Biafra's fratricidal war against the Ibos . . . listening to transistor radios while drinking Coca-Cola', it was evident to the Harvard economist that 'the same countries that ask the world to recognize and respect the individuality of their cultures insist on

the wholesale transfer to them of modern goods, services and technologies', not least because they were now visible on television.[40] For other observers, globalization concerned the contestation of such imperatives. 'The complexity of the current global economy has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics which we have barely begun to theorize,' wrote the Indian anthropologist Arjun Appadurai in his pioneering article on 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy' in 1990.[41] In order to make sense of such disjunctures it is necessary to look at five dimensions of 'global cultural flow' – their ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes, or ideological aspects – all of which were 'not objectively given relations which look the same from every angle of vision, but rather . . . are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of actors', including nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, sub-national religious, political or economic groupings and movements, and 'even intimate face-to-face groups such as villages, neighbourhoods and families'.[42] Whether for advocates of standardization like Levitt or opponents of it such as Appadurai, globalization here implied that citizens lived in close 'proximity' to their counterparts in the rest of the world.

For many historians, globalization has different connotations and a longer history.[43] Christopher Bayly, one of the founders of global history, distinguishes between 'archaic' and early-modern globalization.[44] In the former, the notion of universal kingship pushed monarchs and their armies across vast distances in search of personal and dynastic honour; 'cosmic religions' encouraged pilgrims to voyage – to Rome, Jerusalem and Mecca – to find signs of God; and 'the world's bio-medical systems' – Greek, Islamic, Hindu, Daoist and Confucian – pushed traders to purchase and transport spices, precious stones and animal products believed to ensure good health and increase fertility.[45] In the latter form of early-modern globalization, long-distance trade in opium, tobacco and tea combined with the Atlantic slave trade, European chartered trading companies and their partners in Asia to extend the reach of early capitalism from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century.

In many respects, the different regions which had come into contact with each other were similar in terms of production and power, with the bulk of the world's population in Asia, which had approximately 600 million inhabitants in 1800, compared to just under 200 million in Europe and Russia.[46] The Americas at that time had a population of 25–29 million, with only 6 million in North America. By 1900, North (81 million) and South America (63 million) had a population of 144 million, which could be added to 423 million in Europe and Russia to make 567 million, or a figure for 'Europe' and its offshoots closer to that of Asia as a whole (857–915 million). According to one estimate, Western Europe's GDP in 1820 was $142,399 million (1990 level) and that of Asia excluding Japan was $391,738 million. By 1913, the GDP of Western Europe was

$902,210 million, Asia excluding Japan $609,135 million, and the United States $582,941 million (compared to $12,548 million in 1820).[47]

The historian of China, Kenneth Pomeranz, has used Samuel Huntington's term of 'the great divergence' to describe these trajectories.[48] For Bayly, who cites Pomeranz repeatedly, the principal task is to counter 'Western exceptionalism' whilst avoiding 'complete relativism', accepting that 'north-western Europe was, in some significant areas, more economically, intellectually and politically dynamic than the rest of the world at the end of the eighteenth century' and that 'its "great divergence" from Asia and Africa after that date was not simply the result of the "failure of the rest", or even its access to coal and the Americas', but also the 'egotistical buoyancy of philosophy, invention, public debate and, more dismally, efficiency in killing other human beings'.[49] Crucially, this point can only be made 'by considering Europe in the context of the "rest"' through a 'global, interactive analysis of political and economic conjunctures' which alone can show 'the multiple and interconnected origins of global change'.[50]

For historians such as Bayly and Osterhammel, global history is not the only approach to the subject but it is the main one, not least because it offers the best prospect of overcoming the national biases and 'internalism' of existing scholarship.[51] 'Global history is neither its own field of research with characteristic methods nor a content-based dogma,' write Osterhammel and Niels Petersson: 'It can be understood as a type of "diagonal" question cutting across national histories and as an attempt to see the relations between peoples, countries and civilizations not solely in terms of power politics and economics.'[52] 'World' or global history on this reading is designed to 'overcome "Eurocentrism" as well as every other kind of naïve, cultural self-reference'.[53] It does not imply a 'continental macro-history' or the history of the relations between large spatial blocs, as is commonly believed: 'these relations can also exist between small units, nations and regions, and also, above all in respect of the history of migration, between local points in parts of the world which are far away from each other'.[54] Processes of globalization can be regarded as a 'sub-problem of global history, which can also certainly investigate relations that do *not* contribute directly to globalization'.[55]

In theory, such history might simply furnish grounds for the comparison of different regions of the world or civilizations, or – at least – selected aspects of them.[56] In practice, though, the concept of globalization came into use at the same time as, and was closely connected to, the development of global history, as Osterhammel points out: 'After the end of European domination of the world, in an epoch of rapidly advancing intercontinental entanglement and in view of growing doubt about the universal, normatively binding nature and practical superiority of notions of modernity of European origin, history too sees itself confronted by the irrefutable demand for a global set of questions and horizons.'[57] 'Globality', in Martin Albrow's account, rests on novel horizons, problems, assumptions and forms of orientation, distinguishing our age from all

previous ones, as we contemplate the ecological difficulties of the entire earth, global markets and systems of communication, and the possibility of destroying the planet by means of nuclear weapons.[58] Most importantly, it is reflexive, meaning that humans, once they have discovered the interconnectedness of the world, are bound to go on referring 'to the globe as the frame for their beliefs' and thinking of the problems that they face, including historical ones, in a global sense.[59] Leaders' and citizens' consciousness of worldwide frames of reference are intrinsic to 'globality' as a sociological and historical approach designed to replace those of 'modernity'.[60]

The German *Kaiserreich* has attracted the attention of global historians because it stood at the forefront of the 'great divergence', which has been treated by economists and economic historians such as Cornelius Torp as 'the first wave of globalization, indeed, [as] globalization's *belle époque*'.[61] According to Torp, it was only this economic globalization, conceived of as a 'long-lived historical process but not a teleologically determined or an irreversible one', which had taken place, rather than other 'further-reaching concepts of a *global culture*'.[62] This process had involved the 'worldwide extension of economic activities and networks, a growing intensity of goods, services and capital flows beyond state borders and the increasing international interdependency of economic transactions', which had begun in the mid-nineteenth century and has continued to the present.[63] By 1913, Germany's share of world trade was 12.2 per cent (compared to 9.5 per cent in 1874–8), and its share of the world's GDP was 8.7 per cent (compared to 3.9 per cent in 1820).[64] External trade had reached 34 per cent of German gross national product by 1914, which was comparable to the figure for the Federal Republic of Germany's 'open' economy of the 1970s, following a period of 'deglobalization' (Roland Robertson) in the interwar era.[65] Economic openness brought about or was associated with other challenges and opportunities which had the potential to alter contemporaries' outlook: mass migration, industrialization and further diversification, labour uncertainty and changes of working practices, the creation of diaspora, new conceptions of territory and citizenship, questions of identity and a racialization of nationalism.[66]

Officially, there were about 1.2 million foreign workers in Germany in 1914, although this figure understates the number of seasonal and temporary migrants. One estimate claims that approximately 5 per cent of the workforce had come from abroad.[67] In addition, 5.1 million migrants passed through Germany on their way to the United States and elsewhere, including so-called 'Ostjuden' ('eastern Jews') fleeing pogroms in Russia and those travelling illegally because of the cost of acquiring a permit.[68] They were joined by a significant proportion of the Reich's 3.7 million Poles from Prussia, moving westward to work in the industrial regions of the Ruhr, where 20 per cent of the labour force – or 500,000 inhabitants – were Polish Germans by 1914.[69] During the imperial era, 2.85 million Germans emigrated, with 1.8 million leaving between 1880 and 1893. According to Conrad, this type of mobility issued in 'three

aspects of the transformation of the national' which 'could be understood as specific products of the connection to processes of globalization': first, the reinforcement of the borders of the nation-state; second, the unleashing of a debate about the 'Germanization' of the 'eastern marches', the plight of a so-called '*Auslandsdeutschtum*', and about what it was to be German (*Deutsch-Sein*); and, third, the addition of 'elements of racial thought' to nationalism in Germany, giving it a 'colonial dimension' and leading to ethnic stereotyping of Jews and migrant groups, visible in turn-of-the-century fears of a 'yellow peril'.[70] Notwithstanding variations of class, occupation and education, nationalism in pre-war Germany was shaped by a 'global consciousness', it is held, as 'increasing global entanglements left its traces on the way the German nation was conceived'.[71] 'The globalizing trends that began in the 1880s, of which Imperial Germany was part and parcel, produced an over-determined space in which different strands of national thinking overlapped,' concludes Conrad: 'Increasingly, social actors connected their sense of community and belonging to larger contexts.'[72] In other words, the shift in consciousness associated with 'globality' had begun to occur at the end of the nineteenth century, a century before the term 'globalization' passed into common use.

The historical case about 'globality' rests on decision-makers', journalists' and subjects' perceptions, assumptions and ideas, because globalization in Levitt's meaning of a standardization of goods, services and flows of capital had not occurred to the degree necessary for the transformation of daily life or the spheres of politics and policy-making. The proximities, vistas and movement of the late nineteenth century helped to shape contemporaries' attitudes and informed their actions. Yet how far did specifically global events and horizons alter their sense of identity and allegiance, revising their conception of a German nation and state? At least two-thirds – and for most of the imperial era more than three-quarters – of Germany's rapidly expanding production was destined for domestic consumption. The early twentieth-century slogan 'Made in Germany' arguably became popular because of consumers' wonderment, faced with the machinery and inventions – automobiles, trains, telescopes and electricity – coming from large-scale factories, and with the abundant display of goods in department stores. The slogan had, in fact, been coined in Britain in an attempt to discredit the products of a competitor. It had been adopted by German publicists, standing as a reminder of Anglo-German economic rivalry and the reality of intra-European trade. Seventy-five per cent of the Reich's exports on the eve of the First World War went to Europe, with most of the rest going to the United States.[73]

The same was true of migration: the official number of immigrants had increased from 433,000 in 1890 to 1.26 million in 1910, but most came from surrounding European states (1,236,000), especially from Austria-Hungary (667,200), with the rest of the world accounting for a mere 24,000 residents. There are few indications that these German-speakers were viewed differently

from those of the *Kaiserreich*'s individual states, whose burghers – as Thomas Mann reminded his readers in *Buddenbrooks* (1901) – had in the recent past been incomprehensible to each other. Wilhelmine cities were certainly transitory places, with Berlin not only growing by 950,000 inhabitants between 1880 and 1910, but also witnessing a total of 11.3 million people arrive or leave during the same period.[74] However, the majority of those migrants – with 16–17 million settling beyond the state of their birth – were Germans moving from the countryside.[75] Twenty to forty per cent of the population of German cities were rural migrants. Such mobility contributed to the turbulence and excitement of urban centres, but it did not necessarily remind neighbours or onlookers of 'foreigners' or migration overseas. It has been estimated that there were only 207 Chinese inhabitants in Hamburg, which had the *Reich*'s largest Chinese community, by 1910. Any fears of a 'yellow peril' were almost entirely mediated. When workers in Hamburg – Germany's most global city – talked about 'foreigners', they tended, except in giving their view of Jews and Poles from Prussia, to repeat the opinions which they had read in the press.[76] Germany's international expedition to China under Alfred von Waldersee in 1900–1 was usually decried as 'ridiculous' and a waste of money.[77] 'Germany could take a hint from the decline of England and stop its policy of adventurism before it's too late,' declared one worker in a Hamburg bar, his conversation recorded by the police, in July 1900.[78] His judgement, which was close to that of the SPD and left-wing newspapers, seems to have been that of the majority of the city's working-class population.

Transnationalism

Much of the impetus for global history, especially amongst German historians, derives from attempts to test and transcend national borders against the background of debates in the 1990s about supranationalism in the post-Maastricht European Union, and about the fate of a supposedly 'post-national' state in Germany after unification.[79] Interestingly, one of the first meanings of 'globalization' described supranational interactions in the European Communities, but it fell into desuetude as competing concepts of economic standardization, multinationalism and the communicative transformation of media became dominant from the 1980s onwards, with the advent of global news and the Internet.[80] 'Transnationalism' appeared to incorporate such changes without making claims about their 'globality'.[81] 'The "transnational" concept should be used for the largest possible number of relations which cross [national] borders and it begins from the premise that the front line between domestic and foreign affairs, which structured earlier controversies, is now obsolete,' contend Conrad and Osterhammel: 'Such relations can be thought of as bilateral or multilateral, of equal weight or asymmetrical.'[82] According to this broad definition of transnationalism, the history of foreign policy and international relations, 'above all in their new form', is covered by the term.[83] Transnational relations,