INTRODUCTION

It was the time of the sacred festival in honour of Jupiter Capitolinus. Emperor Commodus (r. 177–92 AD) had just taken his seat in the imperial chair to watch the performance of a group of famous actors. An orderly crowd filled the theatre and quietly occupied their assigned seats. Suddenly a half-naked philosopher, carrying a staff in his hand and a leather bag on his shoulder, jumped onto the stage. Before anyone could say anything to stop him, he silenced the audience with a sweep of his hand and said: 'Commodus, this is no time to celebrate festivals and devote yourself to shows! The sword of Prefect Perennis is at your throat. Unless you take precautions, you shall be destroyed before you realise it.'[1] According to the Greek historian Herodian of Antioch (d. 240 AD), who recounts this story in his *History of the Empire*, the emperor was thunderstruck. Although everyone suspected the words were true, Herodian says, they pretended not to believe them. The man was dragged from the stage, and executed as a punishment for his insane lies. Although it later turned out the philosopher was right and the emperor was indeed in danger, Herodian shows no moral indignation when he described the philosopher's death. He judges the man to have 'paid the penalty for his ill-timed free speech (*parrhesia*)'.[2]

Throughout Antiquity, free speech (*parrhesia* in Greek, *libertas* in Latin) was a highly valued political and social virtue. Individuals who had the courage to speak truth to power were much admired by their contemporaries, at least in theory. Speaking freely before authorities was not without danger, as Herodian's philosopher found out to his cost. Not only did he incur the wrath of the emperor, he also suffered Herodian's criticism for speaking out at the wrong time and in the wrong place. Rhetoricians were keenly aware of the risks of speaking one's mind to

[1] Herodian, *History of the Empire* 1, 9, 4, ed. and trans. Whittaker, LCL 454, pp. 54–5.
[2] Ibid. 1, 9, 5, ed. and trans. Whittaker, LCL 454, pp. 56–7.

those in power, and showed a pragmatic approach to the ideal of free speech. From the first century BC onwards, recommendations on how to criticise the powerful in a way that was both effective *and* safe were incorporated into handbooks on rhetoric.[3] Nowadays, rhetoric, the art of persuasion, has become almost synonymous with insincerity. 'That's just rhetoric' is a proverbial expression used to dismiss a political speech as empty verbiage. In Antiquity, however, rhetoric and truth were intricately related, although their relationship was culturally strained. One strand of rhetoric was considered to have a special relation to the truth, namely, the rhetoric of free speech. Teachers of rhetoric offered practical suggestions about what to say and what not to say in conversation with someone of superior rank. Some rhetoricians advocated indirect and veiled language, while others discussed more direct strategies to deliver the truth to a ruler's face.

As rhetoricians in Antiquity recognised, free speech is an idealistic construction. It is a culturally significant rhetorical performance that adheres to a social script. The Roman rhetorician Quintilian (first century AD) devoted much attention to the rhetorical figure of free speech in his *Institutes of Oratory*.[4] He advised his students on how to offer criticism or unwelcome opinions to authorities. He strongly recommended always to heed time, place and circumstances, as well as status difference and decorum. What was appropriate for one person to say was inappropriate for another.[5] Surely there was such a thing as honourable frankness, he said, but frank words were not tolerated from everyone and were certainly not appropriate on every occasion.[6] In his opinion, free speech was only rarely free. Surely some people truly spoke freely, but as soon as persuasion came into play, he argued, 'free speech' was no longer free, but belonged to the realm of rhetoric.[7]

What we can learn from the rhetorical handbooks of Quintilian and other ancient rhetoricians is that free speech is the result of intricate negotiations within any given society concerning who is allowed to speak, for how long and under what circumstances. Rhetoricians

[3] See for example *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (first century BC) IV, 36–7 (*licentia*), ed. Caplan, LCL 403, pp. 349–55; Rutilius Lupus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* (first century AD) II, 18 (*parrhesia*) ed. Halm, *RLM* pp. 20, 21; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* (first century AD) IX, 2, 26–9 (*licentia, parrhesia*) and XI, I, 37 (*libertas*), ed. Russell, LCL 127, pp. 46–8 and LCL 494, p. 28; Julius Rufinianus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* (fourth century AD) 33 (*parresia, oratio libera, licentia*), ed. Halm, *RLM*, p. 46; *Carmen de figuris vel schematibus* (fourth or fifth century AD), vv. 130–3 (*parrhesia*), ed. Halm, *RLM*, p. 68.

[4] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* IX, 2, 26–9, ed. Russell, LCL 127, p.46–9.

[5] Ibid. III, 8, 48, ed. Russell, LCL 125, p. 138 and XI, 1, 36–8, 43–59, ed. Russell, LCL 494, pp. 26–8, 30–8.

[6] Ibid. XI, 1, 37, ed. Russell, LCL 494, p. 28.

[7] Ibid. IX, 2, 26–7, ed. Russell, LCL 127, pp. 46–8.

acknowledged that there are unspoken rules and social codes that determine what we can and cannot say – that is, if we want to get our message across to an audience. Even within cultures that we tend to regard as tolerant and liberal, as the literary theorist Stanley Fish states in his book *There's No Such Thing as Free Speech: And It's a Good Thing, Too*, there are certain taboos that cannot be broken and social boundaries that cannot be crossed. He observes that free speech is possible only against the silent background of what cannot be said.[8]

Free speech is not a natural given; it is a cultural construction, governed by social norms, legal rules, rhetorical conventions and scripted roles. This book is about the history of that cultural construction. It deals with the rhetoric of free speech from c. 200 to c. 900 AD and studies the cultural rules and rhetorical performances that shaped practices of delivering criticism from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. In this book, I explore the processes of transformation by which the classical tradition of free speech was transmitted to the Middle Ages. I examine the continuities and changes in rhetorical strategies for expressing criticism in letters and narratives of late antique and early medieval authors, who ventured to speak the truth to the powerful. The authors whose speeches and letters are discussed in this book were outspoken figures in their own day; some of them could even be called political dissidents. The martyr Perpetua (d. 202), Bishop Hilary (d. 368), the missionary monk Columban (d. 615) and Bishop Agobard (d. 840), to name but a few, employed a rhetoric of free speech to communicate what they considered to be the truth to the rulers of their day. To what extent, if at all, was their rhetoric related to the classical tradition of free speech? And can we detect in their writings the same traditional values that were once connected to the ancient practice of truth-telling?

The early Middle Ages is not a period one readily associates with free speech. Studies on the history of free speech tend to pass over the early Middle Ages and go straight from Antiquity to the early modern period.[9] Only recently, the editors of *The Art of Veiled Speech* characterised texts from fifth-century Athens and Republican Rome as 'famous for setting the benchmark for free speech', and texts from the medieval period as equally famous for setting the standard for censorship.[10] It is still widely held that free speech declined towards the end of Antiquity, disappeared completely with the beginning of the Middle Ages, and only re-emerged in the Renaissance, when people finally learned to think and speak for

[8] Fish, *There's No Such Thing as Free Speech*, p. 104.
[9] A case in point is Smit, van Urk (eds.), *Parrhesia: Ancient and Modern Perspectives*.
[10] See the blurb of Baltussen, Davis (eds.), *The Art of Veiled Speech*.

themselves again.[11] This tenacious image is based on the preconception that free expression was unthinkable in a period in which 'the Church' was dominant and religious diversity was suppressed. And yet, as we shall see in the following chapters, the ancient tradition of free speech did not so much become extinct, as take on different cultural shapes. Dissident speakers of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages often styled themselves, for example, as outcasts and as marginal speakers. Yet their message could find an audience only with the support of people who were connected to the 'centre' that they wished to criticise. Free speech rarely reaches an audience without any relation to structures of power and authority. The essence of creating a 'licence to speak' is that it is a *licence*, and a licence has to be granted by an institution. Regardless of whether this institution is a political assembly, a community, a jury or a ruler, someone who is in charge of the forum and decides its rules has to grant the speaker permission to speak. As Pierre Bourdieu argues in *Language and Symbolic Power*, no speech can be effective if the speaker holds no authority whatsoever to speak.[12] The mechanism of this relation between effective speech and authority, he suggests, can best be exemplified by the Greek ritual of the passing of the *skeptron*. In the *Iliad,* Homer describes the custom at assemblies of passing a staff, belonging to the ruler or whoever was in charge of the meeting, to a person who wished to take the floor, to indicate that he was allowed to let his opinion become known.[13] No matter how boldly or audaciously the speaker subsequently expressed his opinion, the *skeptron* showed that he could do so, because he had been granted permission. Now as much as then, free speech is the result of careful construction, negotiation and ritual setting. Its effectiveness depends on the willingness of others to listen.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN ANTIQUITY

Most scholars are of the opinion that free speech originated in the Greek world and was intrinsically connected to the rise of democracy.[14] Others, however, argue that the need for free speech is a universal phenomenon that exists in most societies and ages, at least in the form of improvised expressions of opinion, such as heckling and shouting.[15] Whatever its

[11] Hargreaves, *The First Freedom;* Davis, *The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West*, p. 1; More nuanced are Tierney, 'Freedom and the medieval church', p. 65, and Bouwsma, 'Liberty in the Renaissance', p. 203.
[12] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, pp. 107–16. [13] Homer, *Iliad* II, 275–85.
[14] For a background of (and nuance on) this idea, see the introduction of Sluiter and Rosen in *Freedom of Speech,* pp. 1–19.
[15] Momigliano, 'Freedom of speech in Antiquity'.

precise origin, the Greeks turned free speech into a political and communal value. They developed the concept and gave it a specific name.[16] The notion of *parrhesia,* to be translated as 'free speech', 'frank speech' or 'frankness in speaking the truth', emerged in Greek literature from about the fifth century BC, the time when citizens of the city-state of Athens obtained the political and civic privilege (*isegoria* or *parrhesia*) to speak freely in political forums. The privilege was, however, granted only to free male citizens and did not extend to women, foreigners, immigrants or slaves.[17] The privilege to speak freely, moreover, held no guarantees for the personal safety of the speaker.[18] As Frederick Ahl noted, Greek writers of fifth- and fourth-century Athens were keenly aware that expressing unpopular opinions about religious, moral or political issues was dangerous, even in a democracy.[19]

By the third century BC, when democracy in Athens had given way to oligarchy and eventually to autocracy, *parrhesia* had changed from an institutional privilege to speak freely in public meetings to a personal, ethical practice of speaking the truth.[20] Under the influence of Epicurean, Cynic and Stoic philosophy, *parrhesia* entered the field of moral philosophy. Ethical notions of truth-telling checked the limits of what could, or should, be said. A genuine *parrhesiast* (truth-teller) did not say anything he pleased, but only what he knew to be true. *Parrhesia* came to be seen as the virtue par excellence of a select group of philosophers, whose opinion was considered valuable on the grounds that they led a virtuous life, and therefore had access to the truth. Stoics further elaborated the ethical definition of *parrhesia* in connection to self-knowledge and self-control. They held that only those who were free from passions, such as anger and jealousy, could truly speak freely. The Epicureans appreciated *parrhesia* above all as a quality of friendship and an instrument of moral correction. For them, moral correction was a means of improving oneself, provided the admonition was offered by a well-meaning friend. Just as a physician cures a physical disease by applying the right dose of medication, so, they believed, friends should cure each other's spiritual ailments by speaking the truth frankly.[21]

In the Roman world, *parrhesia* was adopted as a Greek loanword,[22] but free speech also went by its own Latin name: *libertas*. This word was used

[16] Raaflaub, 'Aristocracy and freedom of speech', p. 42.
[17] Balot, 'Free speech, courage and democratic deliberation', p. 233.
[18] Momigliano, 'Freedom of speech in Antiquity', p. 258.
[19] Ahl, 'The art of safe criticism', p. 174.
[20] Bartelink, *Quelques observations sur παρρησία*, p. 10.
[21] Glad, 'Philodemus on friendship and frank speech'.
[22] See the Latin rhetorical treatises listed in note 3.

to denote the free status of the citizen as well as his freedom of speech. The fact that *libertas* could mean both free speech and free status shows how much the two values were linked in Roman thought, and underlines the fact that citizenship and a free status were a prerequisite for freedom of speech.[23] *Libertas* was a key concept in Roman thought. It was connected to the ideals of the Roman Republic, long after that republic was gone. When Roman historiographers praised the freedom of speech of certain individuals, who offered frank or honest counsel, or who courageously stood up to a ruler, the ideals of the Republic kept resounding in their use of the term *libertas*.[24] While in Greek literature such outspoken individuals were usually philosophers and outsiders, in Roman historiography they were members of the Roman establishment, such as senators, orators, generals or the emperor's ministers. Yet the free-speaking outsider continued to feature in Roman histories, notably as the embodiment of political opposition. Suetonius recounted in his *Lives of the Caesars* (c. 121 AD) how Emperor Vespasian (r. 69–79 AD) 'tolerated the outspokenness of his friends and the impudence of philosophers',[25] while Tacitus (d. 117) tended to attribute freedom of speech to men outside the senate, such as Cicero's friend Atticus, who shied away from politics and refused to express allegiance to one particular party, but whose opinion was valued by everyone.[26]

In Antiquity, *parrhesia* stood in an uneasy relation to rhetoric. *Parrhesia* was seen as a type of speech that was open, straightforward and sincere, without ornamentation or cover: the precise opposite of speaking with rhetorical flavour. Yet when the notion of free speech became embedded in Roman oratory, *parrhesia* was included among the rhetorical figures. Antique and late antique Latin rhetoricians incorporated the Greek notion of *parrhesia* into their system of rhetoric and translated it as *libertas*, *licentia* or *oratio libera*.[27] In Latin there was not one specific term to translate the Greek *parrhesia,* and each choice of translation implied a different interpretation or evaluation. When *parrhesia* was translated as *licentia,* an element of criticism or reservation was often implied, while the term *libertas* usually expressed a positive evaluation of freedom of speech.[28] In the Roman world, the rhetoric of free speech moved in a different social and political setting from that of the ancient Greeks. In

[23] Raaflaub, 'Aristocracy and freedom of speech', pp. 43, 46, Baltussen, Davis, 'Parrhesia, free speech and self-censorship', p. 1–2.
[24] Vielberg, *Untertanentopik*, p. 35.
[25] Suetonius, *De vita Caesarum* 8, 13: 'Amicorum libertatem, causidicorum figuras ac philosophorum contumaciam lenissime tulit.'
[26] Vielberg, *Untertanentopik,* p. 34. [27] See note 3.
[28] Wirszubski, *Libertas,* p. 7, Braund, 'Libertas or licentia?', p. 409; compare Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* XI, 1, 37, ed. Russell, LCL 494, p. 28: 'vox honestissimae libertatis'.

the Athenian democracy, *parrhesia* had been a civic privilege, in the Hellenistic period, it became a moral duty, and in Rome, frank speech became connected with the art of persuasion in law courts. The Roman rhetorician Rutilius Lupus (fl. 49 BC) explained how the rhetorical figure *parrhesia* could be used in a courtroom situation. 'With *parrhesia* it is possible to discuss matters with a judge in a vehement manner', he wrote, 'and to reproach him face to face for a fault or error in an audacious manner.'[29] Rutilius warned, however, against frequent and careless use of free speech, to avoid annoying the judge. It was better, he said, to pretend to speak out of sadness, or better still, out of necessity. A good strategy, for example, was to claim one could no longer remain silent, but had to speak out for the common good.[30]

A decade or two earlier, another rhetorician had offered advice on how to employ frank speech in a tactful manner. This was the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* a handbook written in the second decade of the first century BC. From the time of Jerome, its author was believed to be Cicero, which added to the popularity of the treatise in late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages. As James Murphy has noted, the description of rhetorical figures in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* influenced almost every medieval rhetorical theorist.[31] The anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* defines free speech, here called *licentia,* in the following manner: 'It is Frankness of Speech when, talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out, because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault.'[32] After providing this definition, the author adds advice, tips and warnings on how best to employ frank speech. He cites examples from famous political speeches to illustrate his point and suggests some helpful lines from everyday discourse to use in conversation. He recommends the addition of a few words of kindness after proffering criticism, to mitigate offence. The recipient of the admonitions will then realise that the critic only has his best interests at heart, and that he is not speaking out of malice or from a spirit of insubordination. As the author observes, such a strategy works well in friendship too.[33] Kind words

[29] Rutilius Lupus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* II, 18 (*parrhesia*), ed. Halm, *RLM*, p. 20: 'Parresia. [. . .] Nam in hoc vehementer cum iudice agendum est, et vitium aut erratum eius audacter coram eo reprehendendum.' Note that Rutilius Lupus does not provide a Latin synonym for *parrhesia*.

[30] Ibid., ed. Halm, *RLM*, p. 21, quoting a speech of Demosthenes.

[31] Murphy, *Medieval Rhetoric,* p. 11.

[32] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV, 36, ed. and trans. Caplan, LCL 403, pp. 348, 349: 'Licentia est cum apud eos quos aut vereri aut metuere debemus tamen aliquid pro iure nostro dicimus, quod eos aut quos ii diligunt aliquo in errato vere reprehendere videamur.'

[33] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV, 37, ed. Caplan, LCL 403, pp. 350, 351.

smooth ruffled feathers. The speaker should convince the person he is criticising that his words, however harsh, are spoken out of love and respect. The author recognises that criticism can disturb perfectly good relationships, and this undesirable side-effect should be avoided, especially if the person who is being criticised holds some power or authority over the critic.

Although free speech became part of a stock repertoire of rhetorical figures, its inclusion in rhetorical handbooks did not imply that unlimited and unguarded use of it was promoted. In fact, most rhetoricians warned against over-extensive and incautious use of the rhetoric of free speech.[34] Quintilian holds that sometimes it is better not to put matters too bluntly and to use figured speech instead.[35] A friendly tone of advice can be more effective than raging invective, for it involves a lesser chance of offending the addressee.[36] Quintilian knew the importance of cloaking political criticism, for he practised and taught rhetoric in a period of political upheaval.[37] He lived through the civil wars of the late 60s of the first century AD and witnessed the rule of Galba, Otho and Vitellius and the Flavian emperors, Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. Although today Domitian is no longer considered the harsh and cruel emperor that contemporary historians, notably Tacitus and Suetonius, make him out to be, the political situation was nevertheless such that one had to mind one's tongue. Quintilian recommends a resort to figurative speech in dangerous situations, and suggests that one should make sure one's words are ambiguous.[38] If a speech does not go down well with the addressee, one can always claim to have intended something different.

Rhetoricians not only gave advice on how to increase the effectiveness of free speech, they also offered ethical guidelines. As the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* argues, free speech should be informed by a concern for the well-being of the addressee, or at least create that illusion.[39] Its purpose is to offer correction for improvement, not to give free rein to annoyance with someone else's faults. Authors such as Cicero and Seneca, whose ideas were influential in the formation of Christian ethical thought, connected the Roman ideal of *oratio libera* or *libertas* to the Stoic ideal of restraining one's passions. The ideal orator and philosopher, according to Cicero, had his passions under control and spoke with *constantia* (stability of mind, or self-possession).[40] *Constantia*

[34] See for example Rutilius Lupus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* (first century AD) II, 18 (*parrhesia*), ed. Halm, *RLM*, p. 20.
[35] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* IX, 2, 67, ed. Russell, LCL 127, p. 74.
[36] Ibid. XI, 1, 67–72, ed. Russell, LCL 494, pp. 42–6. [37] Ahl, 'The art of safe criticism', p. 190.
[38] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* IX, 2, 67, and IX, 2, 75, ed. Russell, LCL 127, pp. 74, 78.
[39] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV, 37, ed. Caplan, LCL 403, pp. 350–2.
[40] Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions*, p. 169; Scarpat, *Parrhesia,* p. 8.

became an important notion in the Christian vocabulary of free speech, as we shall see below. It was one of the terms by which *parrhesia* in the Greek New Testament was translated into Latin.

The word *parrhesia* occurs frequently in the books of the Greek New Testament, in particular in the Gospel of John, the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline epistles. The New Testament meaning of *parrhesia* was influenced by Hellenic culture and Judeo-Hellenic literature.[41] The word is used, among other things, to describe Jesus' way of speaking with his disciples, the later apostles.[42] The apostles, in their turn, spoke and acted with *parrhesia* when they defended their faith in Christ being the son of God before religious and secular tribunals.[43] If one looks at the way in which the term *parrhesia* is used in the New Testament, for instance in the Acts of the Apostles, it becomes clear *parrhesia* does not exclusively denote speech acts, but also refers to a person's behaviour. To act with *parrhesia* meant to act boldly and courageously. Just as speech could be unveiled, transparent and frank, without taking recourse to the cover of figured speech, so too a person's actions could be open, bold and clear. This meaning of *parrhesia* did not emerge for the first time, or exclusively, in the New Testament, but was part of a widespread trend in *parrhesia*'s semantic development. New meanings of *parrhesia* can be found in the writings of the Judeo-Hellenic authors Flavius Josephus (d. c. 100 AD) and Philo of Alexandria (d. c. 50 AD), who used the term *parrhesia* to refer to the religious privilege of free access to God.[44] The complex of Greek texts that formed the corpus of the New Testament showed that *parrhesia*'s field of reference was differentiated, ranging from freedom to say everything to familiarity, courage, frankness and openness. When Jesus speaks openly to his disciples, he uses a different type of speech from that used by his disciples when they proclaim Christ's message to the world, although in both cases the word *parrhesia* is used. In the first example, Jesus' *parrhesia* refers to an open and clear mode of speaking, as opposed to speaking metaphorically or in parables,[45] while in the second example the disciples' *parrhesia* refers to their ability to preach with confidence and courage.[46]

When the Greek books of the Bible were first translated into Latin in the second century AD, the translators were faced with the problem of how to translate the highly charged term *parrhesia*. The word had different meanings, which sometimes overlapped and intersected, and there was not one equivalent in Latin that captured all senses of *parrhesia*. Different

[41] Peterson, 'Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte', p. 292. [42] John 16:29. [43] Acts 4:13; Acts 26:24.
[44] Momigliano, 'Freedom of speech in Antiquity', p. 262. [45] John 11:14; John 16:25
[46] For example, Acts 4:29–31; Eph. 6:1 and 1 Thess. 2:2.

Latin words and expressions were used in the Vetus Latina and later in the Vulgate translation of the Bible to transmit the term *parrhesia*. The translators chose words like *audenter*, *audere*, *palam*, *manifeste*, *libertas (libere agere)*, *constantia (constanter)* and *fiducia (fiducialiter)*, depending on the context in which *parrhesia* occurred.[47] The way in which Jesus addresses his disciples is translated as *(in) palam* or *manifeste (dicere),*[48] whereas the boldness of those who preach the gospel without fear of repercussions is most often translated as speaking with *fiducia* or *constantia,* to emphasise the courage that was needed to spread the Christian faith.[49] Likewise, the verb *audere* and the adverbs *constanter* and *audenter* brought the courageous aspects of speaking with *parrhesia* to the fore.[50] These same expressions – to speak or act with *fiducia* and *constantia* – are employed to refer to the confidence of Christ's apostles when they are defending their faith before secular or religious authorities. The terms *fiducia* and *constantia* were borrowed from the vocabulary of Cicero and Seneca, and carried Stoic meaning.[51] *Constantia* referred to stability of mind, tranquillity and self-assurance: the exemplary virtues of the Stoic philosopher.[52] Likewise, *fiducia* referred to stability and tranquillity, and, flowing on from that undisturbed state of mind, to the ability to speak with courage and self-confidence.[53]

Parrhesia thus never meant any one thing at any one time in Antiquity. Free speech took on many different shapes and forms, and over the course of the centuries it spread from the political and the judicial to the moral and the religious sphere, while retaining its importance as a tool of political criticism. From the second century AD, a Christian rhetoric of free speech came into being, which took its inspiration from this varied and multi-layered classical tradition. In this book, I investigate which aspects of the rich cultural cluster of free speech late antique Christians adopted and adapted when they made the tradition of truth-telling their own. This book offers a study of the changes and continuities in the rhetoric of free speech from late Antiquity to the early Middle Ages, with special attention to both rhetorical performances and the vocabulary of speaking truth to power.

[47] Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, pp. 117, 118; Engels, *Fiducia dans la Vulgate*, p. 101.
[48] John 11:14 and 16:25.
[49] For example, Acts 4:13 (Vetus Latina: *constantia*, 'Itala': *fiducia*); Acts 4:31 and Acts 4:29 (*cum fiducia omni loqui* (in all Vetus Latina versions); Acts 13:46 (*constanter dicere* (all Vetus Latina versions, except 'Itala'); Acts 26:26 (*parrhesia* of the apostle Paul before king Agrippa: Vetus Latina 'Itala', *constanter loqui, fiducialiter loqui*); for other instances of *constantia* and *fiducia* in translation of Greek *parrhesia* see also Acts 26:26, Eph. 6:18; 4:13; 4:29; 9:27; 13:46; 14:3; 26:26; 28:30; 1 Thess. 2:2.
[50] Engels, *Fiducia dans la Vulgate,* p. 130. [51] Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, pp. 118–34.
[52] Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, 'Il termine *constantia*', pp. 118–22.
[53] Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, 'Il termine *fiducia*', pp. 122–34; Engels, *Fiducia dans la Vulgate,* p. 106.