The Politics of Representation in the Global Age

Identification, Mobilization, and Adjudication

How has the process of political representation changed in the era of globalization? The representation of interests is at the heart of democracy, but how is it that some interests secure a strong voice, while others do not? Although each person has multiple interests linked to different dimensions of his or her identity, much of the existing academic literature assumes that interests are given prior to politics by a person's socioeconomic, institutional, or cultural situation. This book mounts a radical challenge to this view, arguing that interests are actively forged through processes of politics. The book develops an analytic framework for understanding how representation takes place – based on processes of *identification*, *mobilization*, and *adjudication* – and explores how these processes have evolved over time. Through a wide variety of case studies, the chapters explore how actors identify their interests, mobilize them into action, and resolve conflicts among them.

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To Suzanne Berger

Mentor, Colleague, Friend

Contents

Abbreviations

ABC	major apparel brand discussed in Chapter 9 (corporate name changed for confidentiality)
ACOVI	Asociación de Cooperativas Vitivinícolas
AFEI	Association française de l'étiquetage informatif
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization
AFNOR	Association française de normalisation
AFOC	Association force ouvrière consommateurs
AIP	Apparel Industry Partnership
APEF	Association professionnelle des établissements financiers
Asseco-CFDT	Association études et consommation-CFDT
ATJ	Andean Tribunal of Justice
CAST	Conference and Association of Steel Territories
CATI	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview
CAWI	Computer Assisted Web Interviewing
CCC	Coalfields Community Campaign
CCN	*Comité confédéral national*
CCT	conditional cash transfer
CERES	Centre d'études, de recherche et d'éducation socialistes
CFDT	Confédération française démocratique du travail
CFTC	Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT	Confédération générale du travail
CICC	Commission interministérielle de coordination des contrôles
CISL	Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori
CNP	Conseil national de la publicité
CNPF	Conseil national du patronat français

CoR	Committee of the Regions
CTW	Change to Win
EAP	Environment Action Programme
ECCJ	Economic Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOWAS	Economic Court for the Community of West African States
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIRA	European Industrial Regional Association
ERDP	European Regional Development Policy
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
FDA	Federal Drug Administration
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLA	Fair Labor Association
FOB	Free On Board
FREPASO	Frente por un País Solidario
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GSI	Government Support Institution
HACUITEX-CFDT	Fédération des industries de l'habillement du cuir et du textile
IACHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights
IC	International Court
IDR	Instituto de Desarrollo Rural
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Institut national de la consommation
INDECOSA-CGT	L'Association pour l'information et la défense des consommateurs salariés
INTA	Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
MFA	Multi-fiber Arrangement
MLG	Multilevel Governance
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MSI	Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
OHADA	Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
PAN	*Partido Acción Nacional*
PCF	Parti communiste français
PELA	*Proyecto Élites Latinoamericanas*
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal
PJ	*Partido Justicialista*
PPIs	Public-Private Institutions

PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática
PRI	Partido revolucionario institucional
PROGRESA	Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación
PRONASOL	Programa Nacional de Solidaridad
PS	Parti socialiste
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
R&D	Research and Development
Rechar	Reconversion des bassins charbonniers
RETI	Regions of Europe for Technological Innovation
RSPB	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
SEM	Single European Market
SFs	Structural Funds
SNAs	Subnational authorities
SNIP	Syndicat national de l'industrie pharmaceutique
SVPC	Société versaillaise de produits chimiques
THC-CGT	Fédération textile habillement cuir
UCR	Unión Cívica Radical
UFC	Union fédérale des consommateurs
UIL	Unione Italiana del Lavoro
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Peter A. Hall
Wade Jacoby
Jonah Levy
Sophie Meunier

Foreword

Peter Gourevitch

By exploring the theme of interest representation, this volume goes to the heart of the study of politics. Important current debates in the academy and the world of practical politics revolve around the issues taken up here. The U.S. election of 2012 saw vigorous debate over why people do not vote their "interests," on the presumption that low-income people favor progressive tax rates or universal access to medical care. A recent example of such questioning, Robert Frank's well-known book, *What's the Matter with Kansas?*, picked up on scholarly themes about working-class conservatism stretching back several decades, most notably Robert McKenzie and Alain Silver's *Angels in Marble* and the "embourgeoisement" thesis discussed by John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, and others in *The Affluent Worker*. The rise of racism on the European right and the fragmentation of party competition in Europe reflect people struggling to figure out what they want and who can provide it. Increasingly, our understanding of human behavior has moved away from an emphasis on external determination from the environment toward awareness of how internal human processes shape political behavior. Major debates of our day revolve around the role of rationality, emotion, genetics, institutions, propaganda, and economics in the processes whereby interests are developed.

This volume makes an important contribution to understanding these processes. It focuses on those that shape our understanding of what we want out of politics, what we project into politics, and what we get from politics. The editors construct a set of analytical categories – which they label *identification, mobilization*, and *adjudication* – that help us understand the forces driving representation and their evolution and transformation over time. The contributors encourage us to think about how we identify our interests and goals, mobilize

Thanks to Celia Falicov for suggestions after reading a draft.

them into action, and resolve the conflicts that are raised. Each person has multiple possible sources of identity, rooted in work situation, gender, ethnicity, institutional affiliation, ideological commitments, religion, and the like. In the course of political action, some of those concerns have to take precedence: thus adjudication is not only between groups with competing goals and multiple modes of mobilization, but within ourselves as some of these identities come to prevail over others. Using this analytic framework, the reader can navigate through the chapters of this book in ways that carry insight both into the cases and into broader issues about the nature of politics.

This book is inspired by the pioneering work of Suzanne Berger, and the chapters written by her students cover a wide range of issues in representation. Over the four decades of her career, Suzanne Berger has played a leading role in developing the study of comparative capitalism. Market economies differ, Berger argues, because there is more than one way of being efficient, more than one way of setting up the regulations that underlie all "natural" markets, and more than one way of responding to the incentives defined by markets and regulations. Economies express values about matters such as the degree of desirable risk, the speed of growth, the extent of equality, the importance of innovation, the meaning of civic participation, and the significance of leadership. Those values are defined by politics, which shapes not only the political expression of interests but, as Berger has vigorously argued, the very definition of interests themselves. Thus, choices among values emerge from a political process, and varieties of capitalism express varieties of politics.

Berger's ideas about the role of interests, their origins, their meaning, and their forms of expression lie at the core of her significant contributions to the social sciences and are the central inspiration for this book. Accordingly, in this essay, I seek to locate Berger's work in the historical trajectory of debates about politics, particularly with respect to markets and capitalism, over the four decades in which I have known her. In so doing, I note the qualities of mind and person that have inspired not only the chapters in this book, but many other works as well.

Berger and I met each other at the height of the Cold War when I arrived in graduate school in 1963, the year of John F. Kennedy's assassination, not long after the Soviet repression of Hungary in 1956 and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. All were vivid encounters with the world, and this was a time when the catastrophes of the world wars, the Great Depression, Communism, and fascism were defining the agendas of social science. Political economy was a marginal field in those days. Comparative politics focused on party systems, institutions, the comparison of constitutionalist with totalitarian systems, and cultural explanations of democratic collapse or survival. To the extent that political economy existed, it focused on the dichotomy between markets and planning.

Some European specialists did care about differences in the organization of economic life and their connections to politics. We read and debated

Polanyi, Schumpeter, Marxism and liberalism, Hoffmann, Moore, Shonfield, Gerschenkron, Landes, Beer, Lipset and Rokkan, and Huntington. But as comparative political economy began to emerge, Berger was interested in issues that did not fit the standard narrative. Most researchers saw the conflict between labor and capital as the fundamental social and political cleavage of modern society, producing political party systems and the major policy issues of the day. Many of our contemporaries and students studied labor, because a good deal of work in economics and business schools stressed issues of management and labor relations. The big outcomes to be explained were unemployment rates, macroeconomic policy, and income distribution.

Instead, Berger turned to peasants. Marginal to most theories of modern society, peasants were nonetheless in her view important players in political life, whom we could not only observe, but from whom we could learn something. Peasants had to interact with a world they did not define. Berger wanted to examine their choices about how to connect their concerns to the cleavages that dominated national life: in France, the labor versus capital cleavage was important, but so, too, were controversies about religion, regions, democratization, and the organization of the state. By talking to peasant leaders, Berger observed the concepts they had evolved to make sense of the world around them: "Voir, choisir, agir" – look, choose, act. These phrases echo Berger's view of politics, mirrored in the introduction to this volume: people have choices about how to understand their situation. They construct an interpretation that then guides their action.

Berger's intellectual engagements and considerable talents were evident the first time I met her. This was in a Harvard seminar on Europe offered in 1965 by Stanley Hoffmann, Henry Kissinger, and Lawrence Wylie, sustained by a Ford grant, the beginnings of what became the Center for European Studies and the emergence of Europe in "area studies." She had just returned from the field research in Brittany that led to her dissertation. I had just finished my comprehensive exams. We discovered many interests in common. Not surprising, given our careers, was that we were both interested in France. Quite surprising was the discovery that our fathers had known each other for years and were friends. Each had held the same title, "Director of Micro Biological Research," at rival pharmaceutical companies, mine at Bristol Myers, Berger's at Hoffmann La Roche. Indeed they had both invented the same drug – a penicillin substitute – and their parent companies were suing each other over patent rights. Our fathers sat next to each other in court chatting while the lawyers argued: the core values of research and intellectual collaboration were more important to them than the profit margins of the companies. This was well before the molecular revolution and the days when individual researchers could privatize their university-based achievements. Berger and I were both influenced perhaps by the pragmatism with which our fathers married theory to strongly inferential research to solve problems, with a view to making a better world. Recalling them in court chatting away may have alerted us to the

importance of the firms and governance issues that shape the incentives facing highly skilled labor in a high-technology economy.

As graduate students, we talked a lot about teaching. I came quickly to see the outstanding Berger characteristics: dedication to her students, a vigorously strong mind with a tremendous capacity to focus, and most notably her attentiveness to argumentation. Berger hated lists, declaring that if a purported argument had four or seven points, it in fact had no theory, no idea under development. "No laundry lists" she would say to students, ranging from freshmen to those doing doctorates, as well as to her colleagues. Berger thought that each session of each class should be built around a single core idea: the professor's task was to identify that idea and then build a lecture that developed it. In a seminar, the instructor constructed a series of questions that would lead the class to the core point. She was a master of the Socratic method. When we met, I thought her the most distinctively trained and best graduate student in our group. At first, I attributed this to her undergraduate training at Chicago and then decided it owed more to her own qualities.

A particularly fine opportunity to see these qualities of mind and person came when we cowrote (with Patrice Higonnet and Karl Kaiser) a paper on "les événements" of the French spring of 1968. We did field research together in Grenoble: I noted how warmly Berger connected with people so that they would want to tell her things, and how perceptively she interpreted their remarks, personalities, and positions to extract meaning from what they told us. When writing the paper, I saw how thoroughly she thought through the logic of what we were saying, how the sentences connected to build a case, how theory informed what we did, and how our findings contributed to the development of that theory.

When Berger joined the Harvard Government Department as a faculty member, she designed her course on European politics around the integration of feudal fragments into a modern polity – the church, the land, the regions, industrialization all came together to construct a form of mass democracy distinctive to each country. The famous book by Lipset and Rokkan had set out the cleavages generated in these processes as the drivers of modern party systems and variation in them across countries. Berger explored how different countries sought to integrate preindustrial identities and interests into contemporary politics and economics. When she moved to MIT in 1969, I was the beneficiary, as I got her slot at Harvard and taught that course on European politics (subsequently taught by Peter Lange and in recent decades by Peter A. Hall) along similar lines. While she was at MIT and I at Harvard, we were able to coteach a seminar on research strategies for comparative politics focusing on Europe. Watching her skills at work was as rewarding an experience for me as it was for our students.

At MIT, the course she devised with Michael Piore articulated their restlessness about the dominant paradigms of the day. Berger saw that the standard "liberal-market" view and its supposed antipode, Marxism, were actually

founded on similar lines of reasoning – a kind of economic determinism, in which market capitalism propelled societies implacably toward specific outcomes. In normative terms, the liberal and Marxist paradigms viewed those outcomes very differently; but the causal mechanisms they posited, which emphasized the determinism in market forces, were rather alike. By contrast, beginning with her peasants, Berger saw that people had choices.

Not long after she finished *Peasants Against Politics*, Berger turned her attention to small business, another group whose disappearance was predicted by both dominant narratives. Liberal economics and Marxism both assumed a relentless, grinding logic to modernity through which small enterprises would be exposed as inefficient and inevitably demolished by the logic of the market. Instead small and medium enterprises were flourishing. Economists tended to search for an explanation grounded in the rationality of production: something in the logic of the division of labor produced dualism. Instead, in her volume with Michael Piore, *Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies*, Berger looked to politics: like peasants, small enterprises had enough political power to secure regulations and rules protecting them, and bigger firms found political and economic uses for them.

One sign of Berger's growing prominence was an invitation to chair the Western Europe committee of the Social Science Research Council. The important volume she edited for it, *Organizing Interests in Western Europe*, explored the challenges of rethinking European politics amidst the growing economic problems of the 1970s. The emphasis of this book on the variety of ways in which interests can be expressed seems such a natural statement of the world – could we have ever thought otherwise? Yet I remember the struggles Berger faced in producing that volume and the challenges of leading such a heterogeneous group of bright people. The skills she showed there were manifest again in the projects she led at MIT on globalization and competitiveness.

As the global economy evolved during the 1980s (with the decline of American manufacturing, the rise of Japan and the East Asian NICS, as well as the dominance of Germany in Europe), MIT sought to bring its capacities in engineering, science, technology, and the social sciences to bear on an inquiry into these changes, and Berger was invited to participate in a group charged with doing so. The resulting book, *Made in America*, and a related *Scientific American* article were pioneering treatments of "competitiveness" and the "decline" of manufacturing in America. Among Berger's many influences on that project was her insistence on looking at sectors, at types of industries, rather than only at the macroeconomy. This perspective reflected Berger's reading of European economic history – from Gerschenkron to Landes, Moore, and Shonfield – as well as her own work on peasants and shopkeepers; Berger thought of the economy in terms of component pieces, each of which had choices to make.

The *Made in America* project and related work at MIT's Industrial Performance Center influenced Berger's approach to comparative political economy. She was one of the codirectors and a major influence on the project that yielded

the Hall-Soskice volume on *Varieties of Capitalism*, which became the most prominent statement of how market economies differ. Berger produced her own statement on these themes, with Ronald Dore, famous for his factory-centered comparison of Japan, in an outstanding volume, *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*. Her attention had been drawn to Japan and Asia by her work on American competitiveness, and she embarked on a series of studies of Hong Kong and Taiwan, based on interviews with factory owners and managers. Indeed, Berger must have conducted more interviews with real-world managers around the world than any other political scientist of her generation, and she emerged impressed with the range of their choices: the options they have in the world economy about where to send jobs and which combinations of skills and technology to deploy. Her book, *How We Compete* vigorously argues these points.

As she became engaged in defining the choices facing America today, Berger became interested in key moments of choice in the past. She began to explore the key economic choices made in late nineteenth-century France, wondering why various groups took divergent positions in debates about importing capital, and why important segments of labor supported free trade. This research has yielded one of the most interesting evolutions in our intellectual interactions: way back when we first met, I recall Suzanne wondering why I was so interested in international relations, as she was not. She gave me a lot of positive feedback on *Politics in Hard Times*, but in recent years our interests have converged, as Berger has become an active leader in discussions about international competitiveness.

In these debates, Berger takes an important stance that challenges how many people understand the policy positions taken by interest groups. Those positions cannot be inferred from the groups' "objective" situations in the economy – as posited by what we now call "open economy macro" well represented in the writings of Frieden, Rogowski, and Hiscox. One critique of that view, which I presented in *Politics in Hard Times*, stresses the importance of how coalitions are formed and how institutions, such as parties and political structures, shape the relevant interactions. I have also argued that the definition of interests is influenced by the probability of winning, and hence is interactive. Berger pushes the critique even farther: indeterminacy is a feature, not just of how groups interact, but of their starting positions. For Berger the initial adoption of a particular position needs explanation because an objective economic situation can be interpreted in various ways. For example, she suggests the early French Socialists could have favored free trade on the grounds that it would lower food prices and consumer goods, or opposed it in order to protect French jobs from foreign competitors. Faced with ambiguity about their interests, such groups need "information cues" about what would be best, and for these cues, they look to positions taken by their political allies and enemies. The Socialists picked free trade because groups in French society with whom they allied on other issues did so at the time, while their political enemies were in the

protectionist camp. This is a brilliant argument, to me quite persuasive, and one that forces me to modify my own views. We had learned from our fathers that close colleagues could disagree and learn from the resulting discussion.

Berger has become an important expositor of the processes of globalization in our world today. She is a pioneer and leader for many people who challenge "objectivist" depictions of trade policy positions and draw attention to other relevant variables, rooted in community, gender, and economic knowledge. Her work on factories and industries has been path breaking for our understanding of how businesspeople make decisions and firms devise strategy. It forces us to think more deeply about why businesses locate overseas or bring plants back home and to consider the extent to which these choices depend on people and their values – in short, on the internal and external processes that identify, mobilize, and adjudicate among competing options.

Berger has been a pioneer in getting political science to reflect on comparative capitalism. She reminded us to be cautious about asserting what was marginal and what was central to modern capitalism: peasants and small businesses retained forms of power that could shape policy and the actions of giant firms. She persuaded analysts of American economic performance that much could be understood via an examination of sectors and firms. She demonstrated that talking to people, such as factory owners and managers around the world, could allow you to see their strategic options and how they make choices. She persuaded Europeanists to think about Asia and Japan. She learned and taught through interviews and case studies, when method was marching down the path of massive data sets and survey research that stripped away situation. She led group projects and wrote her own important papers and books. She has taught students at all levels and her colleagues. The results are manifest in the contributions to this volume, which display the depth and range of her inspiration. This book has much to say about the central analytic issues in the social sciences, on the subjective as well as objective elements that shape our definitions of interest and how they are expressed politically.

Ultimately, however, Berger's influence in our field rests on her personal intelligence, on her remarkable creativity and skills, and on the commitment she has always had to her students and colleagues. She has the capacity to believe in you and your work. She has inspired scores of students by affirming the value of what they were doing. Everyone needs a Suzanne Berger in their life. I have had the privilege of knowing the original.