

# Introduction

I believe that this war will have no secondary importance in the progress of world culture.  
 Yoshino Sakuzō, July 1918<sup>1</sup>

For historians of the modern world, few issues rival the question of causes and consequences of the First World War. The war’s import lies less in the 14 million lives lost.<sup>2</sup> By conservative estimates, the Spanish flu, after all, claimed 20 million in 1918.<sup>3</sup> The Second World War dwarfed both at 60 million dead. But long after historians have uttered the final word on World War II, discussion will continue on the meaning of the July Crisis. There can be no “end of history” in interpreting the Great War. For the debacle and its aftermath remain the principal benchmark for the world in which we presently live. Despite countless lesser watersheds since (for Americans, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, for example), we remain fundamentally the product of the enormous global transformation sparked by shots fired in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

## World War I in global history

The most powerful affirmation of this is the growing body of literature on the impact of the war far from the Western Front. From Portugal to Syria to Japan to China, we have a sense today of a war whose transformative effects were, for the first time in recorded history, truly global in nature.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, champions of global history have found in the Great War an ideal

<sup>1</sup> Yoshino Sakuzō, “Gurei kyō no ‘kokusai dōmeiron’ o yomu,” *Chūō kōron*, 33, no. 7 (July, 1918), 62.  
<sup>2</sup> This figure includes 9 million soldiers killed in battle and 5 million civilians lost to occupation, bombardment, hunger and disease. See Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History*, 2nd edition (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2004), xv.  
<sup>3</sup> John Barry places the figure at 50 million. John M. Barry, *The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History* (New York: Viking, 2004).  
<sup>4</sup> See, for example, James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999); Guoqi Xu, *China and the*

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vantage point from which to describe significant global “moments,” or processes.<sup>5</sup> The sheer volume of this new literature accentuates the centrality of the First World War in the history of the twentieth century. And it forcefully challenges the Euro-centrism of orthodox coverage of the war.

The view from the periphery, however, has its limits. Most conspicuous is the tendency to echo earlier assumptions about the relationship between the First and Second World Wars. The dramatic rekindling of scholarly interest after 1945 in World War I and its aftermath focused, understandably, on locating the origins of World War II. Fritz Fischer’s 1961 formulation shook the academy precisely for suggesting that the ambitious German territorial aims he considered central to the cataclysm of 1914 continued to operate in 1939.<sup>6</sup> And early analyses of the interwar era stressed the weaknesses of the post-1919 peace. It suffered, we learned, from an assortment of bad policies, persistent national rivalries and/or fundamental contradictions in the international system.<sup>7</sup>

Since the mid 1970s, however, a growing body of scholarship on Europe has challenged this tale of woe. Rather than describe the 1920s as a prelude to disaster, it locates in the decade the foundations for peace and prosperity after 1945. In their construction of peace after 1919, European statesmen, these studies argue, created new models of political organization and economic integration critical to long-term stability after the war.<sup>8</sup> As Zara Steiner has recently urged, “the 1920s must be seen within the context of the aftermath of the Great War and not as the prologue to the 1930s and the outbreak of a new European conflict.” It was a time when “the management of international affairs developed a

*Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization* (Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Filipe Ribeiro de Menezes, *Portugal 1914–1926: From the First World War to Military Dictatorship* (University of Bristol, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> See, in particular, Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2007) and Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjunction,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 2, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 111–64.

<sup>6</sup> Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961). For a brief survey of the early scholarship on the First World War, see James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (London and New York: Longman, 1984), ch. 1.

<sup>7</sup> For a useful summary of these three strands of scholarship, see Jon Jacobson, “Is There a New International History of the 1920s?,” *American Historical Review*, 88 (1983), 619–21.

<sup>8</sup> Among important early titles in this wave of revisionist scholarship were Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton University Press, 1975), Walter A. McDougall, *France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1978) and Marc Trachtenberg, *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). For a survey of this literature, see Jacobson, “Is There a New International History of the 1920s?”

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character of its own distinct from that of both its peacetime predecessor and the one that followed.”<sup>9</sup>

### Interwar “crisis” in global history

Although historians of modern Europe have given us an increasingly compelling vision of a decade of accomplishment, those who have redirected our attention away from London, Berlin and Paris have reinforced earlier notions of misfortune. As in Charles Maier’s classic work on bourgeois values in interwar Europe,<sup>10</sup> Stephen Kotkin offers, through the specific prism of the Soviet Union, a compelling vision of 1920s to post-1945 ties in global political economy. But his emphasis upon a universal “ballooning of the state” and “predilection for social engineering and a vocabulary of scientific management” following the First World War suggests an irrevocable trajectory toward war in the 1930s.<sup>11</sup> Erez Manela nicely confirms the power of Wilsonian pronouncements in such colonial territories as India and China from the beginning of 1918. His “Wilsonian moment,” however, ends in the spring of 1919, when the postwar settlement appears certain to betray promises of “self-determination.”<sup>12</sup>

It is no surprise that historians continue to portray the impact of the First World War in Russia, India and China in predominantly negative terms. Each of these territories, after all, becomes fully integrated into the global political economy only in the twilight years of the twentieth

<sup>9</sup> Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 602. Akira Iriye made a similar point much earlier in the context of American history and diplomacy: “It would be wrong to judge the 1920s solely in the framework of what was to happen in the 1930s.” Referring specifically to disarmament agreements of the 1920s, Iriye argues, “one needs to see these arrangements for what they signified at that time, as a symbol of the new peace.” Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 3, *The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 79.

<sup>10</sup> Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.

<sup>11</sup> See Kotkin, “Modern Times,” 157. This determinism is ironic, given Kotkin’s appropriate appeal not to view the triumph of the welfare state among democracies after the war or the victory of liberal democracy itself as inevitable. Kotkin’s vision of the interwar era reflects a growing body of scholarship that locates aspects of 1930s Soviet mobilization in developments in the 1920s. See, for example, Peter Holquist, “‘Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context,” *Journal of Modern History*, 69 (1997), 415–50 and David L. Hoffman, “Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in its Pan-European Context,” *Journal of Social History*, 34, no. 1 (2000), 35–54.

<sup>12</sup> Erez Manela, “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East–West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” *American Historical Review*, 111, no. 5 (Dec. 2006), 1327–51.

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century. Less understandable is the persistent association of interwar Japan with the troublesome tale of these extra-European states. Despite a disastrous national trajectory in the 1930s, Japan became fully integrated in the new America-led global order after 1952.

Cold War attempts to stress the positive in modern Japanese history are, of course, well known. Inspired by a new vogue among political scientists, American specialists in the early 1960s began applying modernization theory to the recent history of Japan. In their hands, modern Japanese history became less the story of a succession of wars than a tale of the rise of a modern nation.<sup>13</sup> The late nineteenth century, in particular, shed its association with the institutionalization of militarism and became widely accepted as a striking era of nation building.<sup>14</sup> It was, scholars now argue, an era of “modern revolution,” whereby Japan became the first non-Western realm to transform from a feudal society into a modern state and economic “powerhouse.”<sup>15</sup>

Although tales of such success may include the brief interlude following Versailles,<sup>16</sup> in English-language scholarship, the closer one comes to the 1930s, the more one is apt to detect signs of trouble. “The bright dream of progress,” noted Marius Jansen in the first modernization series volume about the first decade of Japan’s twentieth century, “was fading.”<sup>17</sup> And the more historians have described the nineteenth century as an era of accomplishment, the greater the burden that has fallen on the interwar era to explain the turn to war in the 1930s. While we have an impressive new chronology to highlight the triumphs of nineteenth-century nation building, in their discussion of the early twentieth century American scholars continue to stress the same series of “crises” underscored by Japanese Marxist intellectuals, against whom “modernization” scholarship was

<sup>13</sup> The agenda was most clearly articulated in the five-volume Princeton University Press series chaired by John W. Hall. See John Whitney Hall, “Changing Conceptions of the Modernization of Japan,” in Marius B. Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization* (Princeton University Press, 1965), 7–41. For an intriguing analysis of this agenda, see John W. Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan, and the Uses of History,” in John W. Dower, ed., *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 3–108.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Roger F. Hackett, “The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo,” in Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization*, 243–81; John Whitney Hall, “A Monarch for Modern Japan,” in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1968), 11–64; and Marius B. Jansen, “Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan,” in Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan*, 149–88.

<sup>15</sup> See Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2009), 93.

<sup>16</sup> Most conspicuous in this regard is the work of Mitani Taichiro, particularly Mitani, *Taishō demokurashii ron: Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai to sono go* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1974).

<sup>17</sup> Jansen, “Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization,” 78.

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originally aimed.<sup>18</sup> More recently, the interwar years have become a time in which Japan, historians ominously suggest, exemplified increasing state penetration of civil society across the globe.<sup>19</sup>

### Rewriting interwar Japan

How might we escape the determinism that continues to define analyses of early twentieth-century Japan? We could start by reorienting our focus in the same way that has enriched our study of the latter nineteenth century. Like our present vision of the interwar years (most commonly referred to as “Taishō,” after the reign of the Taishō emperor, 1912–26), historians used to view latter nineteenth-century Japan (most commonly labeled “Meiji,” after the reign of the Meiji emperor, 1868–1912) as a succession of crises. From the arrival of American Commodore Perry (1853) to signs of popular passion for change (the “ee ja nai ka” frenzy of 1867), samurai and peasant rebellion (1870s–80s), economic retrenchment (the “Matsukata deflation” of 1882), an uneven campaign for representative government (the Freedom and People’s Rights movement of the 1880s), etc., “Meiji” used to be defined by a series of rebellions summarily crushed by the state. Today, rather than privilege voices of opposition in a narrative of subjugation, we

<sup>18</sup> For example, violent demonstrations against perceived injustices of the Portsmouth Peace following the Russo-Japanese War (the Hibiya Riots, 1905), an attempted assassination of the emperor (the High Treason Incident, 1910), nation-wide protests against inflationary rice prices (Rice Riots, 1918), post-World War I depression (1920), the Great Kantō Earthquake (1923), the Peace Preservation Law (1925), exclusion of Japanese immigrants to American shores (1924 Immigration Act), the Japanese banking crisis (1927), Chinese nationalism with the rise of Jiang Jieshi (1928), the Wall Street Crash (1929), the Japanese farming crisis (1930), etc. See, for example, Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 1974), Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), Michael Lawrence Lewis, *Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), Izumi Hirobe, *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act* (Stanford University Press, 2001), Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton University Press, 1989), Kerry Smith, *A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great Depression, and Rural Revitalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003) and Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton University Press, 2000). By contrast, Richard Smethurst, *Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870–1940* (Princeton University Press, 1986) stands out for its bold challenge of a principal pillar of Marxist historiography, the tale of agricultural distress.

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, Sheldon Garon’s discussion of increasing state–society interdependence in the interwar era over social welfare reform. Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997). Interestingly, Soviet scholars frequently cite Garon’s work in their own discussion of increasing state penetration in the 1920s. See Kotkin, “Modern Times,” 148.

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describe them as one part of a complex debate over national construction.<sup>20</sup> Why not, similarly, remove the spotlight from voices of dissent and the tale of decline that is currently “Taishō”? Why not look at interwar protest as one part of a complex dialogue over reconstructing the nation?

We might do so because that is the way many contemporaries viewed developments. “When the Emperor Meiji died in 1912,” wrote British journalist and long-time resident of Japan A. Morgan Young in 1928, “it seemed as though Japan’s transformation was as complete as it could ever be; yet the developments of the next comparatively short reign could as little have been foreseen, and are almost as surprising as those of the long period of Meiji.” Untainted by the subsequent history of war and national disaster, Young, in what must be one of the first comprehensive evaluations of Taishō, did not dwell upon “crisis.” Rather, he offered quite a contrary vision of extraordinary accomplishment.<sup>21</sup>

We might take a cue from Young not only to moderate our image of “Taishō crisis.” We might, in fact, view the interwar years as an era of remarkable opportunity. Just as historians transformed our vision of the latter nineteenth century from a tale of inexorable disaster to one of unprecedented prospects, there are ample grounds to dramatically alter the received wisdom on interwar Japan. Like the latter nineteenth century, the interwar years were an extraordinary era of change kindled by a singular global event. Just as Perry’s introduction of modern imperialism to Japan invited the creation of a modern nation-state, the First World War spurred the construction of what contemporaries referred to as the “New Japan.”<sup>22</sup>

The excitement to build anew was not confined to one segment of society. Rather, as in the latter nineteenth century, debate raged high and low. And it focused upon matters as lofty as the scope of the Japanese empire to as seemingly trivial as fashion and daily diet. It is impossible for one volume to capture the full scope of the excitement of interwar Japan. This study, however, attempts an overview through a combination of chronological and thematic coverage. Chapter 1 establishes the preliminary case for the importance of the Great War, for Japan and the world. Globally, the conflict marked the transition from a Eurocentric to an American-centric world. For Japan, it was the departure point from a primarily agricultural to an industrial state and from a

<sup>20</sup> See, in particular, Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton University Press, 1985).

<sup>21</sup> A. Morgan Young, *Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912–1926* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 16.

<sup>22</sup> From Prime Minister Katō Takaaki, “Meika no sakebi,” *Kingu*, 1, no. 5 (May 1925), 1.

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regional to a world power. Most importantly, for Japan and the world, the Great War marked a decisive shift from nineteenth- to twentieth-century sensibilities. Just as the intrusion of great power imperialism had prompted the original construction of modern Japan, the wartime destruction of world civilization as fashioned in Europe and diffused globally throughout the nineteenth century spurred an enormous Japanese effort in national reconstruction after 1919.

Chapter 2 underlines the wartime structural shifts that formed the basis of dramatic change in post-Versailles Japan. Like the original nation-building effort in the nineteenth century, national reconstruction in the 1920s lay upon the bedrock of fundamental economic, social, geopolitical and political change. The decisive tilt toward liberal internationalism was spearheaded by a new middle class that sprouted from a newly industrialized and urbanized economy and mass society sustained by an explosion in transportation networks, educational institutions and the national media. Japan's unprecedented new global presence rested upon expansion, both dramatic economic and imperial.

Chapter 3 begins a series of five thematic chapters that highlight the most fundamental areas of change in 1920s Japan. First comes foreign affairs, which, as in Japan's nineteenth-century transition, most forcefully symbolized the new trends of the age. Just as the 1868 Charter Oath had pronounced a new effort to seek knowledge "throughout the world," the 1920 Imperial Rescript on the Establishment of Peace proclaimed a clean break from the imperialist diplomacy of the nineteenth century and set the stage for an unprecedented association with a new global infrastructure for peace. Japan's participation in the new ventures of "conference diplomacy" – the Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations, Washington Conference, Kellogg–Briand Pact, London Naval Conference, Gold Standard and Institute of Pacific Relations – was unequalled in any Western capital and marked a decisive shift in Japan's diplomatic posture.

Chapter 4 highlights the most critical political innovation of the interwar years, the transition to political party cabinets. Just as the nineteenth-century rise of a modern nation was marked by a dramatic shift from feudal dynasty to constitutional monarchy, the succession of political party cabinets from 1924 to 1932 represented a striking transition from the oligarchic polity of the Meiji years. The Kenseikai (Association for Constitutional Government, later, Minseitō, Constitutional Democratic Party) Party, in particular, enthusiastically donned the mantle of reform and, in so doing, ensured its own popularity and the vigor of the New Japan.

Chapter 5 focuses upon another conspicuous symbol of change in both the nineteenth century and the 1920s, armaments. Having come of age in an era of empires, the founders of modern Japan had naturally built their new



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state in the name of “rich country, strong army” (*fukoku kyōhei*). Following the devastation of a continent and military defeat of the European empires most devoted to arms, the architects of the New Japan understandably pursued the new post-Versailles gauge of civilization and national power. Enjoined by the Imperial Rescript on the Establishment of Peace “to realize, in accordance with the international situation, a League of Nations peace (*renmei heiwa*),” Japanese representatives participated actively in all the major disarmament conferences of the day and, for the first time in the history of modern Japan, dramatically pared both army and navy strength.

Chapter 6 introduces new Japanese conceptions of empire after 1919. Conscious of the international standards of the day, Japanese statesmen in the nineteenth century had followed Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru’s prescription to “establish a new, European-style empire on the edge of Asia.”<sup>23</sup> Given the particular geopolitics of the age, empire came to focus on the Asian continent, particularly on Korea and southern Manchuria. Japan’s active wartime engagement with the powers and inclusion in the exalted circle of victors at the Paris Peace Conference, however, catapulted Japan, for the first time in history, to the status of world power. In so doing, it generated an entirely new vision of Japanese might, one less dependent upon continental expansion than upon global trade and participation in the new international framework for peace.

Chapter 7 examines the profound cultural impact of the First World War in Japan. Just as the latter nineteenth-century slogan for “civilization and enlightenment (*bunmei kaika*)” inspired a sweeping transformation in Japanese hair, clothing, diet and daily life, the 1920s pursuit of a “League of Nations peace” defined an entirely new lifestyle. The so-called “modern girl” of interwar Japan was more than a mere challenge to accepted class and gender norms. Like the “close-cropped head” (*zangiri atama*) of the early Meiji years, she represented a complete transformation of national culture.

Chapter 8 returns to chronological coverage in a tale of the triumph of liberal internationalism under Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi (July 1929 to April 1931). Hamaguchi’s party, the Minseitō, had emerged to great fanfare in June 1927 as the enlarged successor to Katō Takaaki’s Kenseikai and principal champion of reform. Following what contemporaries described as the “reactionary” Seiyūkai cabinet of Tanaka Giichi (April 1927 to July 1929), Hamaguchi’s aggressive pursuit of two principal pillars of the new era, international trade and disarmament, won widespread acclaim and overwhelming victory at the polls. The greatest challenge to this liberal internationalist Japan was not global depression

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in Jansen, “Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan,” 175.



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but a concerted campaign of violence that began with the assassination of Hamaguchi in August 1931.

### Champions of the New Japan

As suggested by the above, this volume pays close attention to the focus of traditional political and diplomatic history analysis: policy-making by a core group of decision-makers over key matters of state. Echoing recent scholarly trends, however, it goes well beyond orthodox coverage of elite decision-making to offer a new integrative history of the interwar years. Borrowing from what has been described as the “new political history,” this study understands politics as a complex negotiation among a wide range of political actors.<sup>24</sup> These include not only members of a ruling inner circle around the Japanese cabinet and throne but leaders in the civilian and military bureaucracies, the armed forces, parliament, the Privy Council, business, academia, the media and religious institutions. In addition to official cabinet and parliamentary records, this study consults a wide range of official and private papers relating to a broad cross-section of Japanese public figures. I understand these men and women, moreover, not merely as policy players but as figures well anchored in and reflective of larger social, cultural and intellectual trends.<sup>25</sup> To capture these larger trends, I pay close attention to debates within a broad range of national mainstream and more specialized print media. Echoing what has been labeled the “new international history,” this study, likewise, understands interwar diplomacy as the product of much more than backroom discussions by an isolated group of decision-makers.<sup>26</sup> Rather, the same complex web of civilian, military, economic, religious, academic and opinion leaders has a hand in fashioning Japan’s external posture. That posture is, in turn, intimately related to larger political, economic, social and cultural concerns in Japan and abroad.

The enormous scope of enthusiasm for reform in Japan after the war, indeed, calls for coverage of a broad range of policy-makers and opinion

<sup>24</sup> This mirrors movement beyond exclusive coverage of the president to analyses of bureaucrats, commissions, policy experts, think tanks, lobbyists, academics, staffers, and congressional committees in recent coverage of American political history. For a useful summary of the “new political history” in the American context, see Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History* (Princeton University Press, 2003), ch. 1.

<sup>25</sup> For a model blend of social, cultural and political history in the American context, see Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>26</sup> For a brief but useful explication of the “new international history,” see Akira Iriye, “Transnational History,” *Contemporary European History*, 13, no. 2 (May 2004), 211–22.

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leaders. As others have observed, appeals for change spanned a wide spectrum in 1919, from the anarchist Ōsugi Sakae to the conservative Hiranuma Kiichirō to the reactionary Mitsukawa Kametarō.<sup>27</sup> The trajectory for reform that quickly achieved mainstream status, however, was the liberal vision of democracy and internationalism championed at Paris by the principal victor of the First World War, the United States.

As mainstream opinion, expressions of support in Japan for the new liberal world order spanned far and wide by January 1921 – within the imperial court, bureaucracy, cabinet, parliament, mainstream media, even among members of the Imperial Army and Navy. One may, however, identify a core group of men and women whose efforts had the greatest impact upon Japan's new national trajectory after the war. These include the Taishō emperor and empress; Crown Prince Hirohito (later Emperor Shōwa) and such liberal imperial advisers as elder statesman Saionji Kinmochi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki and chief aide de camp Suzuki Kantarō; the early decade Seiyūkai and its intrepid leader, Hara Takashi; Kenseikai Party MPs Wakatsuki Reijirō, Saitō Takao and Uchigasaki Sakusaburō; naval chiefs Katō Tomosaburō, Saitō Makoto and Takarabe Takeshi; champions of army retrenchment Yamanashi Hanzō and Ugaki Kazushige; Anglo-Americaphile diplomats such as Uchida Yasuya, Shidehara Kijūrō and Ishii Kikujirō; liberal university professors like Anesaki Masaharu, Fukuda Tokuzō and Minobe Tatsukichi; prominent Christians such as Yoshino Sakuzō and Tagawa Daikichirō; celebrated Quakers like Nitobe Inazō and Sawada Setsuzō; liberal journalists such as Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Ishibashi Tanzan and Maida Minoru; financiers Inoue Junnosuke, Soeda Juichi and Sakatani Yoshirō; women's rights advocates Yosano Akiko and Ayusawa Fukuko; and such influential non-governmental organizations as the Japanese League of Nations Association, with its flagship journal *International Understanding* (*Kokusai chishiki*), and sister publication, *World and US* (*Sekai to warera*).

By far, the most powerful champion of the New Japan, however, was the Kenseikai, later Minseitō, Party. While rival Seiyūkai under Hara Takashi laid the critical foundation for the new age with its steady reduction of the tax qualification to vote and unwavering commitment to disarmament, it was the Kenseikai under veteran Anglophile Katō Takaaki, then former finance ministry bureaucrat Hamaguchi Osachi, that, by the end of the

<sup>27</sup> All of these men played a pivotal role in one or more of the new reform societies that sprang up after the war. Ōsugi founded the labor-focused North Wind Society (*Kitakazekai*) in March 1919, Hiranuma created the nationalist National Foundation Society (*Kokuhonsha*) in May 1924, and Mitsukawa established the ultranationalist Resilience Society (*Yūzonsha*) in August 1919. The classic study of these immediate postwar movements for reform is Itō Takashi, *Taishōki "kakushinha" no seiritsu* (Tokyo: Hanawa shobō, 1978).