Global poverty is, without question, the most pervasive moral problem confronting contemporary world politics. Affecting more than 2.6 billion of the world’s poorest inhabitants, grinding poverty, hunger and deprivation is the leading indirect cause of mortality in children under five, accounting for a staggering 27,000 deaths every day, or 10 million deaths per year.1 Since the early 1970s, debate about the contours of this problem has been dominated by rationalist cosmopolitan scholars of international ethics and political philosophy who have focused their efforts on defining the nature of the duties those of us living in affluence have to assist the impoverished.2 As the continuing plight of the global poor makes clear, however, the problem of world poverty lies not just with the identification of the injustice it entails, or even with the articulation of an obligation to address it, but with the transposition of that moral obligation into ethical action.3 Thus, almost three decades after Peter Singer first argued that the failure of rich nations and individuals to help alleviate extreme poverty was morally indefensible his recent


work The Life You Can Save asks, despairingly, why the wealthy do not give more and what can be done to motivate action.4

In response to Singer’s questions, this book defends a sentimentalist version of cosmopolitanism that does not simply identify injustices and prescribe how we ought to respond to them, but actually motivates action. It is driven by a fundamental commitment to practical ethics. Articulated by the most prominent sentimentalist cosmopolitan, David Hume, and shared by rationalists as diverse as Peter Singer and Onora O’Neill, this perspective maintains that ‘[m]orality requires action of some sorts’.5 That is, ‘ethics’ is not simply an abstract armchair exercise from which ideal rules or principles are derived, the practice of making and understanding judgments about what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’ is undertaken, or prescriptions about how actors ought to behave in general or particular contexts are formulated.6 Being essentially concerned with how we ought to live, it is all of these things, considered in theoretical terms and, crucially, applied to real life.

In accordance with this commitment, I demonstrate that the answer to Singer’s question is found, at least in part, in the role that emotions play in ethics. I argue that emotions are not only central to processes of ethical deliberation and moral judgment but play an indispensable role in the practical application of ethics to moral dilemmas in international politics. That is, working within the broad frame of cosmopolitan thought, I argue that, alongside reason, emotions constitute a key component of any practical cosmopolitan ethic. In presenting and elucidating this argument, I explicitly challenge the set of rationalist assumptions that have led most thinkers concerned with questions of international ethics to conclude that emotions ought to be subjugated by their master, reason, in processes of ethical deliberation. In

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6 Although ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ are technically distinct terms, in common usage they are conceived as being broadly synonymous. See Terry Nardin, ‘Ethical Traditions in International Affairs’, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 3–4.
particular, drawing on cutting-edge research in the brain sciences, I confirm and develop the argument articulated by the sentimentalist cosmopolitans of the Scottish Enlightenment that ‘reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions’.7

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to explaining and defending the approach to be taken in the rest of the book. It briefly introduces the central tenets of the contending rationalist and sentimentalist versions of cosmopolitan ethics and, in particular, the place of emotions within them. The chapter then goes on to outline the interdisciplinary approach to be pursued in adjudicating between the sets of assumptions made by rationalist and sentimentalist cosmopolitans about the relationship between reason and emotion in processes of ethical deliberation. In doing so, it defends the use of recent findings in the brain sciences to evaluate and develop a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic. The chapter concludes by outlining the argument to be pursued in the remainder of the book. It begins, however, by situating rationalist and sentimentalist versions of cosmopolitan ethics within the wider rise of scholarship concerned with the emotions in international relations. It demonstrates that although the commanding rationalist form of cosmopolitan ethics accords well with the dominant rationalist approach to international relations more generally, it does so at the expense of keeping pace with increasing acknowledgment that emotions matter in key processes and practices of world politics.

Getting emotional about international politics

In the study of international relations the cult of reason and rationality reigns supreme. With few exceptions, dominant theories of international relations, from realism and idealism8 to their ‘neo-iterations’,9 formal theories such as game theory,10 and popular explanations for the

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causes of war, rely on reason and rationality as guiding principles and explanatory tools. Despite its centrality to human existence, emotion is routinely and systematically excluded from accounts of politics, both domestic and international. ‘Being emotional about politics’, as George Marcus, Russell Neuman and Michael MacKuen note, ‘is generally associated with psychological destruction, distortion, extremity, and unreasonableness’. Emotions, it is thus generally assumed, ought to be assiduously avoided in the fundamentally rational, reason-centred pursuits that are the study and practice of international politics.

This is not to say that emotions have been wholly absent from the study of international relations. Fear, in particular, looms large in the canon of classical texts to which theorists of international relations traditionally refer and has provided, for many, the bedrock on which their theories of world politics have been built. Indeed, as Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison note, ‘just about every philosopher considered central to the tradition of IR scholarship, from Thucydides to Machiavelli and from Hobbes to Rousseau, has engaged the role of emotions’ in some capacity. It is thus more accurate to say that unlike in other fields of inquiry, such as psychology and


12 Although each of these theories is underpinned by a particular set of assumptions about precisely what rationality entails, in broad terms they all concur that rationality is ‘the need to subject one’s choices to the demands of reason’. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 4. Rationality, in this sense, is thus distinct from that referred to by Keohane in the context of international institutions or that associated with the ‘Grotian tradition’ of the English School but, nonetheless, underpins and directs these forms of rationalism. Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32 (1988), pp. 379–96; Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (London: Leicester University Press, 1991).


The emotions have, with few exceptions, been ignored or actively marginalised from the study of international relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For most scholars of international relations concerned with the emotions, blame for this state of affairs can be laid squarely at the feet of the rationalist and reason-centred approaches that dominate the field. As Neta Crawford argues, ‘the assumption of rationality is [so] ubiquitous in international relations theory’ that even those scholars, predominantly realists, ‘who highlight insecurity (fear) and nationalism (love and hate), have not systematically studied emotion’. However, it is not simply the assumption of rationality that has worked to marginalise emotions in the study of international relations. Rather, a particular set of assumptions about rationality and a series of meta-theoretical claims about the nature of rationalist theories have pushed the emotions outside the bounds of what is deemed to be acceptable scholarship. Rationality, as William J. Long and Peter Brecke note, ‘has come to mean the conscious, goal-oriented, reasoned process by which an individual, expressing and thus revealing his or her preferences, chooses a utility-maximizing action from among an array of alternative actions’. Amongst the meta-theoretical claims that follow from this understanding of rationality is the assumption that rationalist theories ought to avoid consideration of the emotions (conceived as distortions of rationality) and other aspects of human psychology. Psychology, by this reckoning, ‘explains only mistakes’ or deviations from rationality and thus has no rightful place within rationalist

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16 Bleiker and Hutchison, ‘Fear No More’, p. 117.
17 One notable exception is Harold Lasswell, whose work addressed personal insecurities including ‘emotional insecurities’. He wrote: ‘The expectation that violence will ultimately settle the clashing demands of nations and classes means that every detail of social change tends to be assessed in terms of its effect on fighting effectiveness, divides participants into two conflicting camps, segregates attitudes of friendliness and of hostility geographically, and creates profound emotional insecurities in the process of rearranging the current political alignment.’ Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 57.
theories. Though incredibly prevalent in the social sciences, especially political science, these said assumptions, about the nature of rationality and the explanatory reach of psychology, are, as we will see later, mistaken.

Again, this is not to say that rationalist international relations scholarship has been wholly blind to the existence of the emotions in world politics. Rather, the emotions have been seen as unimportant phenomena or dismissed as dangerous distortions that reside outside the legitimate bounds of scholarly concern. For example, although fear has been a persistent theme underlying many theoretical accounts of international relations, the view that ‘[f]ear is supposed to lurk beyond the reach of our rational faculties’ is incredibly common. Thus, Hans Morgenthau highlighted the ‘distorting effects’ that ‘mutual fear’ may have on already ‘antagonistic foreign policies … overlaid with world-embracing ideologies’. More broadly, Morgenthau dismissed the emotions as ‘[d]eviations from rationality’, writing that:

It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.

That said, Morgenthau did concede that ‘[t]he possibility of constructing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics is worth exploring’, though it was not a project he took up himself.25

Similarly, and more recently, James Fearon’s rationalist explanation for the causes of war suggests that consideration of leaders’ ‘emotional commitments’ might help to explain why ‘rationally led states have conflicting expectations about the likely outcome of military conflict’ when a strictly rationalist theory suggests that, with identical information, they ought to come to the same rational conclusion.26 In doing so, Fearon draws on Geoffrey Blainey’s argument that conceived ‘disagreements about relative power as a consequence of human irrationality’.27 In particular, mutual and hence irrational and unwarranted ‘optimism about victory in war’ is, Blainey suggested, a function of ‘moods which cannot be grounded in fact’.28 Yet, despite recognising that they may help to explain why states go to war, no further discussion of the emotions is included in Fearon’s work. Rather, the emotions are, again, dismissed as irrational distortions of rational thought.

Despite the strength of this view, however, recent scholarship has witnessed increasing acknowledgment of the role that the emotions play in politics and international relations. In particular, since 2000 we have seen the emergence of a growing ‘emotions and …’ literature. In political science, scholars of political psychology and political theory29 have examined the role that emotions play in democratic deliberations,30

civic engagement and understandings of citizenship. Similarly, interdisciplinary studies originating in the fields of psychology and neuroscience have analysed the impact that particular emotions, such as disgust, have on party political and ideological orientation.

In International Relations, scholars have sought to demonstrate that emotions play a significant role in ‘characteristic processes of world politics’. Thus Dominique Moisi has examined the geopolitics of fear, humiliation and hope, Stephen Peter Rosen’s work explores ‘the ways in which emotional memories may affect rational decisions’, particularly in the context of war, and Andrew A. G. Ross has examined the place of emotions in the global anti-American protest movement. In the subfield of international political economy, scholars have demonstrated the effects of emotions on a range of phenomena, from financial crises to the emergence of self-regulating markets. Perhaps most

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prominently, scholars concerned with peacebuilding, post-conflict justice and reconciliation have also begun to consider the ways in which negative emotions born of past injustices might be addressed in ways that reduce the probability of renewed violence.\textsuperscript{39} Finally, a further body of literature that recognises and explores the role that emotions play in transnational activist networks is also gathering momentum.\textsuperscript{40}

In addition to focusing attention on the place of emotions in the processes and practices of international relations, many of these works are grounded, implicitly or explicitly, in the claim that conventional rationalist approaches are at odds with the patterns of human interaction that mark the actual practice of international politics and ethics. In particular, it is becoming increasingly widely accepted that by overplaying the roles played by reason and rationality, rationalists have overlooked or dismissed the significant contributions that emotions make to the theory and practice of international relations and ethics. Of course, these types of criticisms are nothing new. Since their inception, detractors of rationalist theories of international relations have used the limitations of rationalism as a foil for the development of non-rationalist and, occasionally, affect-based theories.\textsuperscript{41}

Many prominent feminists have thus argued that the ‘rational actor model’ with its reason-centred account of interest-seeking behaviour cannot explain the full gamut of relationships and interactions that take place in international relations. As Kimberly Hutchings explains, ‘[f]rom the feminist point of view . . . the model of the individual as a rational “chooser” is highly problematic’ as it is based on the premise that the moral agent is ‘independent and instrumentally rational, with complete discretion over his or her own body and


\textsuperscript{41} Marcus et al., \textit{Affective Intelligence}, p. 5.
capabilities’.42 This, she notes, reflects only one subset of actors engaged in international politics, ‘white, able-bodied, middle class’ adult males.43 As Ann Tickner argues, conceived in this context rationality is ‘stereotypically associated with masculinity’, while emotion is considered a feminine trait.44 When coupled with the ‘separation of public and private spheres’ that has marked most conventional accounts of international politics, a further division between reason and emotion has been engendered. Thus, while reason is commonly associated with the public realm of politics, emotion is considered private and personal.45

Of course, at the centre of the feminist movement is the slogan ‘the personal is political’, ‘the central message of feminist critiques of the public/domestic dichotomy’.46 It thus comes as something of a surprise that ‘few explicitly feminist projects . . . situate emotions at the centre of research’.47 Although some elements of moral sentiment theory are present in feminist theories of the ethics of care,48 the specific roles that emotions play in international politics have not been a core focus of much feminist scholarship.49 Rather, where the emotions have been considered in recent feminist work, it has largely been in the areas of methodology and research ethics.50

43 Hutchings, Global Ethics, p. 62.
46 Susan Moller Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family (Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 124. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon’s argument: ‘For women the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political. In this sense, for women there is no private, either normatively or empirically.’ Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 191.
48 See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
50 See Brook Ackerly and Jacqui True, ‘Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research on International Relations’, International Studies Review, 10 (2008), 696 and, in particular, their discussion of the works of Maria Stern