# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of figures</th>
<th>page xiv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of cases</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of treaties, statutes and legislative instruments</td>
<td>xxvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Introduction
1
0.1 Cartels and calls for their criminalisation 1
0.2 Cartels and their effects 4
  0.2.1 Defining cartels 4
  0.2.2 The economic effect of cartels 7
0.3 An outline of this work 11

## 1 A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity
18
1.1 Liberalism and the harm to others justification of the criminal law 18
  1.1.1 Harm (generally) and criminalisation 18
  1.1.2 Mill and the harm to others principle 19
  1.1.3 Protected harms 22
  1.1.4 Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ and the choice of social institutions 26
1.2 An outline of a liberal theory of the limits to criminal law 33
1.3 Cartel harms: an analysis 37
  1.3.1 Raising the price of goods as a prohibited harm 37
  1.3.2 Creating deadweight loss as a prohibited harm 40
  1.3.3 Creation of social waste as a prohibited harm 41
  1.3.4 Stunting the development of new products and processes as a prohibited harm 42
  1.3.5 Exacerbation of X-inefficiency as a prohibited harm 43
1.4 Harm to the institution of distributive justice as the justification for criminalising cartel activity 43
## CONTENTS

1.5 Conclusion: an extension and two caveats 48

2 Corporate responsibility, agency and the advantages of vicarious liability 52
   2.1 Introduction 52
   2.2 The agency problem in corporate action and control 54
   2.3 Attribution rules: principles of corporate liability 56
   2.4 Identification, Tesco and a historical mistake 57
       2.4.1 The development of the doctrine 57
       2.4.2 Tesco’s flaw 65
   2.5 Alternative models of corporate liability 67
       2.5.1 Aggregation 67
       2.5.2 Corporate fault and/or corporate culture 69
       2.5.3 Vicarious liability 71
   2.6 The objective of corporate liability: deterrence beyond tort 75
   2.7 A model corporate criminal liability regime 79
       2.7.1 Agency, monitoring and liability: attribution rules 80
       2.7.2 Vicarious liability: with or without a due diligence defence 83
   2.8 Conclusion 87

3 Closing the deterrence gap: individual sanctions 89
   3.1 Introduction 89
   3.2 A model of deterrence 90
   3.3 Deterrence and cartel activity 92
       3.3.1 Probability of cartel detection 93
       3.3.2 Cartel overcharges 93
       3.3.3 Cartel duration 94
       3.3.4 Implications for cartel deterrence 95
   3.4 Bankruptcy and the consequences of optimally deterrent fines 95
       3.4.1 Bankruptcy considerations 95
       3.4.2 The existing fine regime as under-deterring 97
   3.5 Filling the deterrence gap with individual criminal liability 101
   3.6 Conclusion 103

4 The American experience of cartel control: values and effectiveness 106
   4.1 Introduction 106
   4.2 Natural law and morality: the nineteenth-century background 108
6.4 Post-war: the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act and Court
6.4.1 Post-war internationalisation 225
6.4.2 The post-war UK regime 227
6.5 The British reception of European reform 231
6.5.1 Reforming the regime 231
6.5.2 The attempt at criminalisation 234
6.5.3 The failure of criminalisation 240
6.6 The 2012 reforms 242
6.6.1 Calls for consultation 242
6.6.2 The Reform Bill 244
6.7 Conclusion: tolerance and ad hocery – the failure of supplementary criminalisation 247

7 Internationalisation and transplantation 253
7.1 Introduction 253
7.2 Convergence: goals and types 254
7.2.1 Types of convergence 254
7.2.2 Convergence, legal values and norms 257
7.3 Anglo-American values of antitrust 259
7.3.1 Introduction 259
7.3.2 American values 260
7.3.3 European values 261
7.3.4 British values 263
7.4 Competing values at the global level 265
7.4.1 Hofstede’s results 265
7.4.2 Difficulties with ‘top-down’ convergence 267
7.4.3 Regional agreements as an alternative 269
7.4.4 Global ‘bottom-up’ convergence 271
7.5 Resource allocation, institutional credibility and national priorities 276
7.5.1 Resource allocation as a global problem 276
7.5.2 Resource allocation and competing demands 278
7.6 Corporate governance and cartel control 280
7.6.1 The nature of the problem 280
7.6.2 Individual criminal liability 281
7.7 Collectivist values and individual responsibility 284
7.7.1 Hofstede’s insight redux 284
7.7.2 Collectivist values and legal norms 285
7.8 Global convergence of corporate governance 286
7.9 Cartel control, convergence and good practice 288
## CONTENTS

Conclusion 297  
8.1 The normative background to cartel criminalisation 297  
8.2 A pragmatic justification for cartel criminalisation 302  
8.3 Scepticism about the expansion of criminalisation: the US, EU and UK regimes examined 304  
8.4 Scepticism about internationalisation 310  

Bibliography 316  
Index 335