Emotive Language in Argumentation

This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic, and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion, and meaning and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches (including President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize address) and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, rhetoric, communication, political science, and public speaking.

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Emotive Language in Argumentation

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For my family, with love. – F.M.

For Karen, with love. – D.W.
Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 When Words Are Emotive
   1. Triggering Emotions by Defining Reality
   1.1. The Aristotelian Tradition
   1.2. Emotive Words and Definitions in the Latin Tradition
   2. When Words Are Masks
      2.1. Omitting and Distorting
      2.2. Hiding Reality
   3. Modifying Meaning and Emotions: Persuasive Definitions
   4. Conclusion

2 The Emotions in Our Words
   1. The Force of Ethical Words
      1.1. The Dimensions of Emotive Meaning
      1.2. The Reasons behind Value Judgments
      1.3. Reasons and Meanings
   2. The Structure of Emotive Words
      2.1. The Descriptive Meaning of Ethical Terms
      2.2. Emotive Meaning: Emotions Dependent and Independent of Reality
      2.3. Emotions Triggered by Words: Values in the Frames
   3. The Logical Dimension of Emotive Meaning: Reasoning from Values
      3.1. The Reasoning Process within Words
      3.2. The Prescriptive Meaning: Values as Principles of Action
   4. The Logic of Values
      4.1. Argument from Values
      4.2. The Logical Components of Prescriptive Meaning
# Contents

5. Hierarchies and Conflicts of Values ........................................... 57
6. The Reasonableness of Emotions ................................................. 63
7. Conclusion. ................................................................. 67

3 When Words Are Reasoning: Definitions as Strategies of Classification ................................................................. 69
1. Why Definitions Cannot Be Persuasive ..................................... 70
2. Definitions as Premises: Reasoning for Classifying ..................... 73
   2.1. The Logical Structure of Classification ................................ 74
   2.2. Reasoning from What Is Acceptable .................................... 78
   2.3. The Structure of Reasoning from Classification ..................... 80
3. Definitions and Definitional Structure ....................................... 84
4. The Nature of Definition: The Tradition and the Theory of Predicables ................................................................. 88
5. Strategies of Obscurity: The Correctness of Definitions .............. 92
6. Strategies of Circularity: The Logic of Prior Terms ................... 96
7. The Logical Force of Definition by Genus and Difference ........... 102
   7.1. The Logic of the Genus .................................................. 102
   7.2. Specifying the Genus .................................................... 103
   7.3. The Logical Force of the Genus-Difference Definition .......... 105
8. Conclusion. ................................................................. 107

4 The Acts of Defining .......................................................... 109
1. How Definitions Can Change Reality ....................................... 110
2. The Acts of Defining .......................................................... 117
   2.1. Positive Acts of Defining .............................................. 118
   2.2. Non-Negative Definitions ............................................. 123
   2.3. Implicit Definitions ..................................................... 125
3. Describing Speech Acts ....................................................... 128
   4.1. Defining for Informing .................................................. 132
   4.2. Defining for Reminding ................................................ 132
   4.3. Definitions as Standpoints .......................................... 134
   4.4. Declaring a Definition .............................................. 135
   4.5. Defining for Committing ............................................ 137
5. Acts of Non-Commitment ...................................................... 139
   5.1. Omitting Definitions ................................................... 140
   5.2. Taking Redefinitions for Granted .................................... 142
6. Strategies of Ambiguity ....................................................... 145
7. Conclusion. ................................................................. 152

5 What Our Words Hide: Presupposition and Dark-Side Commitments ................................................................. 154
1. Presuppositions .............................................................. 155
2. Presupposition Triggers ...................................................... 157
   2.1. Sentence Presuppositions: Semantic Presuppositions ........... 158
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.</td>
<td>Sentence Presuppositions: Syntactic Presuppositions</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.</td>
<td>Inter-Sentence Presuppositions</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.</td>
<td>Dialogical Presuppositions</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.</td>
<td>Summary: Levels of Presupposition</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>How to Presuppose</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.</td>
<td>Sentence Presuppositions</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.</td>
<td>Intra-Sentence Presuppositions</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.</td>
<td>Dialogical Presuppositions</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Dialectical and Rhetorical Force of Presupposition: The Act of Presupposing</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.</td>
<td>The Act of Presupposing</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.</td>
<td>The Worlds Presupposed</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Limits of Presuppositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.</td>
<td>The Conditions of Accommodation</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.</td>
<td>The Conditions of Presupposing</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Presuming Knowledge: Presupposition as Presumptive Reasoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.</td>
<td>Presumptive Reasoning</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.</td>
<td>Presumptions as Epistemic Bridges</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.</td>
<td>Assessing Presuppositions</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Presumptions</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Dialectics of Presupposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.</td>
<td>The Burdens of Presupposition</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.</td>
<td>Dialectical Uses of Presupposition</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.</td>
<td>Presupposing Redefinitions</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.</td>
<td>Redefining Values</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Rhetorical Strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Implicit Character Attacks</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Instruments to Alter the Weight of Evidence</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Instruments for Fabricating Evidence</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4.</td>
<td>Presuppositions as Instruments for Jumping to Conclusions</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.</td>
<td>The Rhetorical Power of Presuppositions</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Dialogues and Commitments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Persuasion Dialogues</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.</td>
<td>The Structure of Persuasion Dialogues</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.</td>
<td>Commitments and Persuasion Dialogues</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Models of Persuasion Dialogues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.</td>
<td>Persuasion Dialogue as a Type of Dialogue</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.</td>
<td>Persuasion Dialogue as a Critical Discussion</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Dark-Side Commitments ............................................. 217
   3.1. Dark-Side Moves ............................................. 217
   3.2. Enthymemes and Common Knowledge ......................... 219
4. Use of Defeasible Reasoning in Persuasion Dialogues ............ 220
5. Defeasible Reasoning in the Airbag Example ....................... 223
6. The Formal Dialogue System CK .................................. 226
   6.1. Limits of the Existing Models ............................... 226
   6.2. Developing Formal Dialogue Models ......................... 227
   6.3. Rules of the CKP Dialogue System ........................... 229
   6.4. Argumentation in CK ....................................... 231
7. Dialogues Containing Arguments about Definitions ............... 232
   7.1. Persuasion Dialogues and Definitions ...................... 232
   7.2. Persuasion Dialogues and Persuasive Definitions .......... 234
8. Applying Argumentation Schemes to Persuasive Definitions in CKP .................................................. 237
   8.1. Definitional Moves and Argumentation Schemes ............. 237
   8.2. Countermoves and Critical Questions ........................ 239
9. Conclusions .................................................................. 240

7 Metadialogues and Redefinitions .................................... 243
1. Types of Definitions and Dialogue Moves .......................... 243
   1.1. Genus-Difference Definition ................................. 244
   1.2. Definite Description ......................................... 245
   1.3. Definition by Etymology .................................... 246
   1.4. Definition by Essential Parts ............................... 247
   1.5. Definition by Material Parts ............................... 248
   1.6. Definition by Operation ..................................... 248
   1.7. Definition by Negation ...................................... 249
   1.8. Inductive Definition ......................................... 250
   1.9. Definition by Example ...................................... 251
   1.10. Definition by Metaphor ..................................... 252
   2.1. A. Advancing a Definition ................................... 253
   2.2. B. Defining for Informing .................................. 254
   2.3. C. Defining for Reminding ................................. 255
   2.4. D. Declaring a Definition ................................... 256
   2.5. E. Defining for Committing ............................... 257
   2.6. F. Implicit Definition ...................................... 258
3. Conclusion .................................................................. 259

Conclusion ...................................................................... 260

References ...................................................................... 265
Index .............................................................................. 281
Acknowledgments

We acknowledge support for the work in this book from the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (research grant on Argumentation, Communication and Context PTDC/FIL-FIL/110117/2009) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Insight Grant 435-2012-0104).

For discussions on topics that related to chapters of the book, we thank Floris J. Bex, J. Anthony Blair, Thomas F. Gordon, Marcello Guarini, Hans V. Hansen, Cate Hundelby, Ralph Johnson, Erik C. W. Krabbe, Steven Patterson, Robert C. Pinto, Henry Prakken, Eddo Rigotti, and Andrea Rocci. We also thank Rita Campbell for composing the index, Lynn Fraser for helping us with the task of the final proofreading, and the international law firm of Martinez & Novebaci for providing materials and consulting on legal issues.

Fabrizio Macagno thanks in particular João Saagua, who made it possible to write this book and continue to develop his research in argumentation theory, for all his trust and enthusiasm. A special thought to Eddo Rigotti, from whom he learned what he knows about linguistics and argumentation, and from whom he received his love for these disciplines.

He special thanks to his family, who has always supported, helped, and encouraged him through the years.

Douglas Walton thanks Giovanni Sartor for his work with him at the European University Institute in Florence in 2012 on legal argumentation (funded by a Fernand Braudel Research Fellowship). Special thanks also go to Christopher W. Tindale who, as Director of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR), provided research facilities and a stimulating intellectual work environment.