Introduction

Democracy is a personal way of individual life ... it signifies the possession and continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and purpose in all the relations of life. Instead of thinking of our own dispositions and habits as accommodated to certain institutions we have to learn to think of the latter as expressions, projections and extensions of habitually dominant personal attitudes.

John Dewey, “Creative Democracy – The Task before Us”

The democratic ideal in politics straightforwardly calls for government by the governed. “Democracy” in our time certainly signifies something beyond the rule of the many or the crowd as opposed to the few, the best, or “the one”. It means that a country’s political practice is not right – the practice is not as it ought to be – unless, in the last analysis, it leaves the country’s people under their own rule.

Frank Michelman, “How Can the People Ever Make the Laws?”

Inherent in democracy is a propensity for innovation, not for preserving tradition: in this lies democracy’s affinity with openness. It goes without saying that democracy also has a tradition of its own – a canon, a constellation of forms, rituals – and a special ethos of its own. Its distinctive characteristic, however, is the capacity to undergo transformation, to open itself up to the new. Born in Athens, where a few tens of thousands of citizens would give themselves the laws that they would obey, it has become the form of government of modernized societies that count tens and hundreds of millions of citizens and has turned into representative democracy in order to remedy the obvious impossibility of physically convening the demos in one single public square.

Since a few decades ago, practically since yesterday given its bimillenary history, democracy has become a regime without antagonists, an unquestioned horizon shared by all the advanced societies of the Western world.¹

¹ On the idea of a “non-negotiability” of democracy in today’s world see Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1. On the transformation of all
Paradoxically, as we shall see, this transformation comes at a time when the social, historical, cultural conditions under which long-established democratic polities are functioning become more and more “inhospitable” and at a time when, for many peoples around the world, democracy has turned into an aspiration that cannot be renounced. Indeed, democracy might well follow the same trajectory as the nation-state: born in Europe with the rise of the absolute monarchies from the feudal fragmentation of the former Roman empire, exported through colonialism and superimposed onto local varieties of political association, after four centuries this political form has become the aspiration of every movement of anti- or postcolonial liberation from autocratic or oligarchic regimes. The last of these nation-states, now on its way to political life, is South Sudan. Democracy might well be the next political form to share this destiny. If this will be the case, democracy – even if stripped down to the minimal idea that voting is better than shooting and ballots preferable to bullets – will certainly undergo transformations along lines other than those that we are familiar with.

The historical process to which we bear witness can be interpreted in several ways. Some have equated it with the “end of history”, others with democracy turning into an “emblem” or an “empty signifier” and being enervated from a symbol of emancipation to an instrument of power. To be sure, the moment when democracy becomes a “horizon” also marks a moment when neo-oligarchic tendencies rear their head in societies that already are democratic and when populist antipolitical attitudes gain center stage. However, the extent to which it makes sense to characterize the state of democracy exclusively on the basis of these challenges will be left open in this book. Underlying this book is, rather, the intent to analyze the internal resources at democracy’s disposal for resisting these inegalitarian and oligarchic pressures and to reflect on how, in the future, democracy will be able to remain faithful to its core principle of
self-government while loosening more and more that anchoring to the nation that so much has contributed to its success in the modern age, and while facing the challenge of sinking roots in cultural contexts where the value of individual autonomy is not paramount. Democracy has a chance of becoming a truly universal political form only if democratization will not forever remain synonymous – as it has been for a long time – of Westernization and will truly open up to diversity, rather than consisting in the exportation of Western institutions and traditional forms.

From this general diagnosis – somewhat different from the often proclaimed “crisis of democracy” – a twofold task follows. On the one hand, the new challenges must be identified with which twenty-first-century democracy will be confronted in those countries where it was born and more precociously developed, and the ways must be explored in which such challenges can be met. On the other hand, it is necessary to understand the directions along which democracy can undergo transformation and yet remain faithful to itself in the new areas of its expansion.

Democracy is coeval with the philosophical conversation about politics initiated by Plato in *The Republic*. Its history is peculiar. For 24 and a half of the 25 centuries during which it has developed, and notably until 1945, democracy had remained little more than one among various kinds of legitimate rule: the rule of the many, as opposed to the rule of the few or the one. Instead, since World War II – the last of the great wars in which Western powers have fought against one another, and precisely across a divide that demarcated democracy versus dictatorship – the democratic form has never been thrown into question again in the West (with the exception of the prolongation of authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal until the 1970s and of the military junta in Greece between 1967 and 1974), in India and in Japan. Starting from the 1990s, then, three large waves of democratization have swept geographical areas where previously democracy never had had any strong foothold: Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Africa, and, recently, in the course of a still open-ended process, North Africa and the Middle East. Now also in these parts...
of the world democracy has become no longer just one, but the quintessentially legitimate form of government.

Democracy’s becoming an “emblem”, lamented by the theorists of democracy’s crisis, its turning into insignia used by the powers that be in order to self-legitimize, is among other things also a symptom of this extraordinary historical success and of the intrinsic and almost irresistible appeal of the idea of self-government – an idea that can mobilize men and women at all latitudes, though certainly this almost universal appeal inevitably brings a plurality of not always consistent meanings to be attached to the far from empty signifier “democracy”. Contested does not mean “empty”, but the opposite, an excess of signification in need of being sorted out.

For a political philosopher living in a global world where obvious advantages exist for any polity that looks like a democratic regime – easier access to international credit, staying out of the blacklists compiled by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fighting for human rights, more intense incoming touristic fluxes, greater attractiveness for foreign investment capital – a fundamental task is to define what it means for a political regime to count as a real democracy.

Some opt for a procedural strategy. Aware of the almost unlimited plasticity of cultural frames that are anchored to the great world religions and underlie the local political process, these theorists constantly refine their conceptual tools: they look at such criteria as party pluralism, the confidentiality of ballots and electoral equity, the regular frequency of elections, the formation of majorities, of coalitions, and their effectiveness on the executive terrain. Others instead, among whom I place myself, consider procedural criteria always vulnerable to the risk of a “trivializing emulation”: no parameter is immune from being formally satisfied yet substantively deprived of all meaning.

In fact, even the crucial nexus of elections and democracy has come under close and critical scrutiny. On the one hand, the possibility of elections without democracy has been investigated with reference to the situation that has led to the Arab Spring. On the other hand, in the “prosperous and secure democracies” a reflection has been under way for more than a decade on the changing significance of electoral representation, taken as the crucial juncture of democratic life, in the light of the presence of elective oligarchies, of the decisiveness of
Introduction

campaign funding and the favor of the media, and of the declining accountability of the representatives.\(^8\) In a positive vein, an exploration of “nonelectoral” forms of representation has directed our attention to the democratic potential of forms of “discursive representation” and even of “informal representation”, the latter being based on criteria, among others, of authenticity or “untaintedness” of the representatives.\(^9\) More generally, the perceived need for a thorough rethinking of representation comes from the realization that in today’s global world it makes less and less sense to assume that political representation is only real if it is democratic, that it is only democratic if it is electoral, and that it could only be electoral within the nation-state.\(^10\)

Thus an alternative strategy is followed in this book: namely, to make the definition of democracy hinge on the idea of a democratic ethos that underlies and enlivens the procedural aspects of democracy and that at the same time, being a historical product connected with singular developmental contingencies, proves difficult to reproduce at will and to be “trivially imitated”.

Democracy is then an ethos on whose basis certain procedures are adopted and followed, not simply the format of these procedures. Dewey’s fragment, quoted as exergue next to Frank Michelman’s characterization of democracy, forcefully and concisely expresses this idea. At the center of this book is the attempt, among other things, to identify the contours of this democratic ethos and to highlight one aspect of it, which thus far has remained out of the limelight: democracy’s intrinsic relation to openness as a public value. More on this point will be added later, in Chapter 2, but before addressing the normative questions

\(^8\) This debate has been opened by Jane Mansbridge’s seminal article “Rethinking Representation”, American Political Science Review, 2003, 97, 4, 515–28, where classical “promissory representation” is distinguished by the often interfering “anticipatory representation” and the more generalized “surrogate representation”. Philip Green and Drucilla Cornell have summed up their view of American democracy in a way which applies to many other Western democracies: in the alleged “rule of the many”, “elections in which the many participate do intervene between the agenda-setting (and candidate selection) of the few and the installation of a government. However, except on certain (mostly symbolic) issues, the government, though elected, governs at the approval of the few: this is representative oligarchy”; “Rethinking Democratic Theory: The American Case” (2007), in IED, http://www.iedf.org/articles/rethinking_democratic_theory.php. See also Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren, “Rethinking Democratic Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues”, Working Paper, Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia, 2006.


raised by the rethinking of democracy after it has become a horizon, we need to look at some of the trends often captured by the phrase “crisis of democracy” and certainly defining the context of that renewal.

Democracy, as a political regime, is inserted in the larger context of society. Montesquieu well understood this point, when in The Spirit of the Laws he suggested that the stability of democracy – in his framework just one of the versions of the “republic” – is connected with the diffusion of what he called vertu and could be understood as a culture of giving priority to the common good over particular goods. In the same vein, Machiavelli forcefully made the case that no “republic” can flourish and attain stabilization in a context where citizens are not used to what he called “vivere civile”. These reflections point to the misleading connotation conveyed by the genitive “of” in the expression “crisis of democracy”. Using a botanical metaphor, one could say that democracy qua political regime is like a plant that, its genetic endowment remaining the same, can flourish and grow in a fertile soil and is doomed to wither and fade in an arid soil. Our attention needs to be directed more to the qualities of the soil than to an intrinsic genetic weakness of the democratic plant.

Today, we have reasons to believe that the soil – the larger societal, historical, cultural and economic context where twenty-first-century democracies must function – has become more inhospitable.

We do not start from scratch in this analysis. A copious literature exists, which cannot be surveyed here, except for recalling the most concise account of the contemporary conditions inhospitable for democracy, with reference to the last third of the twentieth century, offered by Frank Michelman. He mentions:

a) The immense extension of the electorate, reaching tens and sometimes hundreds of millions of voters, which instills or enhances a perception of irrelevance associated with one’s participation in elections – a perception hardly thrown into question by the “electoral ties” that have punctuated the first decade of the century (Bush vs. Gore in the United States, Berlusconi vs. Prodi in Italy and Calderon vs. Obrador in Mexico) – and puts an incentive on “rational ignorance” on the part of the ordinary citizen;

b) The institutional complexity of contemporary societies – where the diverse layers of representation, from local to national, make it difficult to grasp the relation between one’s vote and its real political


12 “Rational ignorance” is the response of the citizen who finds futile to invest time in acquiring all the knowledge necessary for an autonomous and considered judgment on highly complex issues, given the neglectable influence of a single ballot in an election where tens or hundreds of millions vote. See James Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
consequences – as well as the technical complexity of the political issues, which again discourage active participation on the part of lay persons and interfere with the accountability of elected officials;\textsuperscript{13}
c) The increased cultural pluralism of constituencies, typical of societies where migratory fluxes combine with a public culture receptive to openness and the value of diversity, which renders consensus on political values and \textit{constitutional essentials} more unstable and difficult to reach relative to societies that are either more impermeable to immigration or more inclined to accept the public hegemony of the culture of the majority – a condition of \textit{hyperpluralism} with which a renewed version of political liberalism will have to come to terms in ways explored in Chapter 4;
d) The anonymous quality of the processes of political will-formation, i.e., the emerging of a political orientation and opinion less and less out of direct interaction among citizens assembled in public places and now almost exclusively via simultaneous, yet isolated, exposure to a variety of media outputs or at best through exposure to such messages within small like-minded groups.\textsuperscript{14}

Some of these conditions have generated important responses and counter-tendencies, the most important of which is the rise of a “dualist conception of democratic constitutionalism”. According to this dualistic model, formulated in the volume \textit{Foundations} (1991) of Bruce Ackerman’s multivolume work \textit{We the People}, in the inhospitable context of today’s society it makes sense to apply the classical standard of the “consent of the governed”, in order to assess the legitimacy of a political order, only to the “higher” level of law and the institutional framework – that is, to the level that coincides with the \textit{constitutional essentials}. Instead, the political justification of all the legislative, administrative and judicial acts of “ordinary” or “subconstitutional” level is best conceived of as resting simply on their consistency with the constitutional framework (needless to add, when mechanisms of \textit{judicial review} are in place).\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} See the now classical study by Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere} (1962), trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

\textsuperscript{15} See Bruce Ackerman, \textit{Foundations}, vol. 1 of \textit{We the People} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 6–7. Ackerman’s dualistic approach, adopted by Frank Michelman in his reflections on democratic constitutionalism, has then been subsequently integrated into Rawls’s \textit{Political Liberalism}, as attested by Rawls’s definition of the “principle of liberal legitimacy” in the following terms: “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principle and ideals acceptable to their common human reason”; \textit{Political Liberalism} (1993) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 137.
To these four conditions mentioned by Michelman a fifth one is worth adding, which is also rooted in the historical context of the last third of the twentieth century, namely, the same migratory fluxes that have accrued societal pluralism also have contributed to make citizenship less inclusive and more selective. Contemporary democracies are further and further removed from the canonical image of a political community of free and equals encompassing all the human beings who live within the same political space. Instead, they resemble more and more the ancient democracies, inhabited by citizens who would decide the fate of denizens of various kinds and of slaves. Within the number of all those who live within the borders of a contemporary democratic nation-state are now included many who are not citizens at all: resident aliens, immigrants awaiting legal residency, illegal aliens who have no chance of becoming residents, refugees, people enslaved by human-trafficking rackets.

This is history now. New conditions, perhaps even more inhospitable, have emerged. The list needs some updating, and this exercise helps us highlight the element of truth in the misleading thesis of the "crisis of democracy".

Among the new inhospitable conditions, which favor a de-democratization of democratic societies, we can certainly include the prevailing of finance within the capitalist economy (a factor that further increases the difficulty, on the part of government, to steer the economic cycle), the generalized acceleration of societal time, the globalization-induced tendency toward supranational integration, the transformation of the public sphere caused by the economic difficulties of traditional media and the rise of the new social media, the wide-scale and generalized use of opinion polls and their influence on the perceived legitimacy of executive action.

Democracy has always had an ambivalent relation with the capitalist economy, but it is an undeniable fact that modern representative democracy could stabilize and flourish only in combination with a capitalist economy. During the last three decades, however, capitalism has undergone a momentous transformation that has revived traits of brutality typical of earlier stages of capitalism at the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The value of labor has constantly been diminishing in the West over the last few decades, and this process, linked in turn both with technical rationalization and with the geopolitical availability of a global labor market, exerts a social impact that goes well beyond industrial relations or even the whole of the economic sphere.\(^6\) We are probably witnessing the terminal decline of employed labor qua generator of wealth and social prestige also in the tertiary sector, among white collars. It is not just that the great

\(^6\) An indicator of this general trend is the systematic decline of the labor share in favor of capital share over the last few decades in all economies, a decline that reaches beyond 10% in Finland, Austria, Germany, Sweden and New Zealand and has a peak of 15% in Ireland, as attested by the International Labor Office, *Global Wage Report* (Geneva, 2010), 37. For a similar analysis, see also International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook: Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy* (Washington, DC, 2007), 174.
manufacturing industry declines – Detroit has been most insidiously attacked by Wall Street, not by unionized opposition – but more generally the prevailing of financial capital in the economy tilts the scales in favor of capital and rent and mercilessly reduces the income, the relative wealth, the purchasing power – and consequently also the political influence – of the employed middle class. Wage labor becomes flexible, precarious, less well paid, subcontracted and outsourced and also loses its historical representation: it becomes increasingly de-unionized and loses the capacity to draw consensus on its requests. Public space becomes dominated by high-prestige managers, top professionals, stars in the arts, in show business and in sports, whose income reaches spectacular levels unrelated with the everyday reality of the rest of the working people.

Starting from the 1980s, finance appears to be more capable of generating wealth than production and manufacturing in general, and its instruments become ever more “virtual”, disjoined from all measurable and material benchmark in the “real world”. A firm is worth what the sum total of its equities are worth, but the value of its equities becomes a function of the expected capital gain that they can generate in the short run. On the Italian stock exchange in Milan, within a few months Fiat equities oscillated between 5 and 14 euros, just depending on their perceived potential for short-term growth, while obviously the aggregate value of Fiat’s liquid capital, stocked products, production plants and real estate remained more or less constant. Paraphrasing Charles Horton Cooley, the great social theorist and associate of George Herbert Mead, one could be tempted to say that the value of a share in today’s stock-exchange market is the fantasy that people make of the potential growth of its value. Not accidentally, some momentous turns in the stock market are explained through the “sentiment” turning positive or negative. Also in this respect, Wall Street, not the “real economy”, calls the shots: bubbles and their bursting are entirely its own creations, first, the bubble of the dot.coms, then the housing one, then the subprime mortgages one. It is not difficult to detect here yet another inhospitable condition for contemporary democracy, especially considering that it is only since the era of the New Deal that a democratic government had managed to curb the classical capitalist cycle of expansion and recession, and considering a crucial difference that separates that context from ours. Franklin Roosevelt faced an economic crisis that originated at home and at home could be solved, through appropriate legislation by Congress, supported by a large popular consensus on labor protection and needs. President Obama faces an economic crisis that originates from the Wall Street-generated bubbles, but whose solution no longer depends solely on congressional legislation, in support of which no large prevailing consensus is in sight anyway, and requires international cooperation, which his administration can only plead for.

Secondly, the acceleration of societal time contributes to a verticalization of social and political relations. In all walks of social life, there is always less and less time for deliberation, collegiality, consultation. A political party, a twenty-first-century global firm, but also a successful NGO that wishes to keep abreast
and be visible in a crowded public sphere, the editorial staff of a newspaper that wishes not to be left behind by the competition – all must take a stance, make a statement, sell and invest, make the most of an opportunity for visibility, publish news before the competition in a world in which time is the “real time” of the Internet. In turn, this process puts a greater emphasis on the recognizability, the discretionality and ultimately the power of the political leader, of the CEO, of the coordinator, of the editor in chief – regardless of the organizational efforts that some political, institutional, corporate cultures may make in the opposite direction. It lies beyond democracy’s powers to slow down the tempo of social life in the age of the Internet and of global connectivity in real time, but democracy will have to face the challenge of somehow neutralizing the verticalizing, perhaps even authoritarian, implications of acceleration.

Thirdly, the globalization of the finance economy and the growing inability of the “average” nation-state to meet such global challenges as migratory waves, terrorism and organized crime, climate change and international security jointly fuel a powerful trend toward supranational integration of countries of more or less similar history, culture, traditions and geopolitical location. The EU is often cited as an exemplary pacesetter in a process that has afterwards been replicated under the names of ASEAN, Mercosur, ECOWAS and so on. This process, saluted by many as a welcome beginning of a trend to overcome the political fragmentation of the “world” in 193 state entities, in fact, confronts democracy with the necessity to survive, in forms that remain to be investigated, the dissolving of that nexus of one nation, one state apparatus, one national market and common culture, language and memories that had been at the basis of its flourishing in the modern Westphalian system of the nation-states. As Habermas pointed out over a decade ago, today it is the states that are immersed in the global economy rather than national economies being delimited by state borders. This irreversible fact of world history calls for new patterns of coordination and integration among existing states, and these new patterns in turn bring to the fore of political philosophy keywords such as governance, opposed to classical government, soft-law, best practices, benchmarking and moral suasion. In this context it is yet to be clarified what form will be assumed

17 After Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics (New York: Semiotexte, 1986), Hartmut Rosa and William Scheuerman have investigated the effects of acceleration respectively on contemporary social life and more specifically on the democratic process: see Hartmut Rosa, Beschleunigung: Die Veränderung der Zeitstruktur in der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), William Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), and Hartmut Rosa and William E. Scheuerman, High-Speed Society. Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010).

18 On the political consequences of acceleration and some reflections on citizenship in times of social acceleration, see William Scheuerman, “Citizenship and Speed”, in Rosa and Scheuerman, High-Speed Society, 287–306.