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The Conscience of a Nation

On an otherwise ordinary morning in the summer of 1970, a divorced and abandoned woman named Pixie went into labor in a Dallas hospital. A self-described “rough woman, born into pain and anger and raised mostly by [herself],”¹ Pixie had spent the last few years as a barker “running the freak show at the Bluegrass Carnival.”² Though she was young, Pixie had already lived a tough and troubled life, and now, at age twenty-one, she was the mother of three girls born to three different fathers. Her oldest daughter, Missy, was conceived in an abusive and failed marriage she had entered into at age sixteen. Her second daughter, the fruit of a short-lived fling with a young orderly at Baylor University Hospital, was placed for adoption before she woke from the anesthesia. And the child born that morning, she claimed, was the result of a brutal rape.

Young, scared, and alone, Pixie had initially decided after the rape and resulting pregnancy that she didn’t “want this thing growing inside [her] body” any longer, and, not knowing what the procedure for an abortion was or even what it

² Ibid., 98.
was called, asked her obstetrician simply to make her “not pregnant.”³ To Pixie’s dismay, she was told that in Texas it was illegal to perform an abortion that was unnecessary to save her life, and, admittedly, her life was not in danger.⁴ Through a series of events that began with a referral to a Dallas adoption attorney, she then ended up at Columbo’s Pizza Parlor seated across from two young, idealistic attorneys searching for a lead plaintiff for a class-action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s restrictive abortion law.

In a decision that changed her life, Pixie – whose legal name is Norma McCorvey – agreed to participate. The pregnant, twenty-one-year-old carnival worker assumed the pseudonym Jane Roe in a lawsuit filed against Dallas District Attorney Henry Wade, and nearly three years later – long after McCorvey had given her third daughter up for adoption – the case of Roe v. Wade was decided in her favor. On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States announced in a 7–2 decision that the Constitution protected the right of Jane Roe to terminate her pregnancy, and the Texas law banning elective abortions, along with similar state laws across the country, was deemed unconstitutional.⁵

Yet this landmark decision was fraught with historical ironies. The Jane Roe of Roe v. Wade never actually had an abortion, and, in fact, she later admitted to fabricating the story about being raped in an attempt to help her case. Perhaps even more confounding, McCorvey now runs a pro-life crisis pregnancy center in Dallas called “Roe No More,” and she routinely travels as an anti-abortion activist, even engaging in acts of civil disobedience that led to her recent arrests at Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination hearings in Washington, DC, as

³ Ibid., 119.
well as at President Barack Obama’s 2009 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame. Today, her opposition to abortion runs deep. When called to testify in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee about the consequences of Roe v. Wade, McCorvey condemned the Court’s decision in the strongest possible language. We must ask “Almighty God to forgive us for what we have done,” she told the assembled senators. “We must repent for our actions as a Nation for allowing this holocaust.” In a turn of phrase that has become common among anti-abortion activists, McCorvey also analogized abortion to slavery in antebellum America. “When slavery was constitutional,” she asserted in a statement submitted for the official Senate record, “we treated one class of humans as property. We are treating the humans in the mother’s womb as property and less than human when we say it is OK to kill them.”

SLAVERY AND ABORTION

Such alleged parallels between slavery and abortion have been a mainstay of American public discourse since 1973, and these analogies have often been drawn at the level of ethics or constitutional interpretation. During his own testimony at the 2005 Judiciary Committee hearings, for example, Ethics and Public Policy Center President Ed Whelan told the senators that the Supreme Court’s notorious pro-slavery decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) – which, among other things, found a Fifth Amendment constitutional right to traffic in slaves in the federal territories – was the most appropriate historical analog to Roe. The landmark


8 Ibid., 127.

9 Roe v. Wade (invalidating a criminal abortion statute in the state of Texas).
abortion rights case, Whelan insisted, was only “the second time in American history that the Supreme Court has blatantly distorted the Constitution to deny American citizens the authority to protect the basic rights of an entire class of human beings. The first time, of course, was the Court’s infamous 1857 decision in *Dred Scott*.10 In response, Professors R. Alta Charo and Karen O’Connor turned the tables on these appeals to the history of slavery. A judicial decision “overturning *Roe v. Wade* would invite states to treat women just as slaves were treated during the pre–Civil War period,” Charo submitted11 before O’Connor expressed her own “worry that the next U.S. Supreme Court case may produce a *Dred Scott*–like case denying women across America their basic constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity.”12

As William Voegeli noted less than a decade after *Roe*, the point of these various analogies “has usually been that the wrong position on abortion treats fetuses – or, conversely, pregnant women – in the same malicious and dehumanizing way as slaves.”13 On one side, advocates of abortion rights argue that the criminalization of abortion is tantamount to legal slavery. “A woman who is forced to bear a child she does not want because she cannot have an early and safe abortion,” Ronald Dworkin wrote in his ambitious 1993 book *Life’s Dominion*, “is no longer in charge of her own body: the law has imposed a kind of slavery on her.”14 According to this line of reasoning, an unwanted pregnancy is viewed as a kind of forced labor, and opponents of abortion rights are unavoidably depicted as standing on the same moral plane as those who once defended the practice of

11 Ibid., 28.
12 Ibid., 43–44.
slavery. Others, such as Northwestern University Law Professor Andrew Koppelman, have gone so far as to argue that the denial of abortion rights is a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. In the rhetoric of abortion rights supporters, Roe therefore represents the polar opposite of Dred Scott. For critics of constitutional abortion rights, however, the reverse is true. Abortion is depicted as an “evil parallel to that of slavery” – or worse. Roe, accordingly, is characterized

15 In a thought experiment, Mark Graber imagines what a society would be like if it truly viewed abortion as a “fundamental human right.” In part, Graber suggests that “the pro-life movement” would “be discussed in the same way as Dred Scott v. Sandford and the pro-slavery movement.” See Mark Graber, Rethinking Abortion: Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 135. Bruce Ackerman similarly depicts a hypothetical situation in which “extreme pro-lifers” are forced to take a loyalty oath to both the Constitution and Roe in the same way Confederates after the Civil War were required to swear fidelity to both the Constitution and “the laws and proclamations” regarding slavery. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 139. Implicit in each hypothetical is a moral comparison between pro-slavery and pro-life political movements.


18 When asked to write a judicial opinion as though he were on the Court when Roe v. Wade was decided, Michael StokesPaulsen asserted: “This [i.e., abortion] is worse than Dred Scott and slavery as fire is worse than a frying pan. Slavery is a horrible human wrong. But as bad as it is, murder is worse.” See Jack Balkin, ed. What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 212.
as the “Dred Scott of our age,” a decision that threatens the very legitimacy of the American regime because it is a “gross usurpation of the people’s authority to act through their democratic institutions to prohibit, or at least, contain” a practice that is fundamentally unjust. It is within this tense ideological climate that President George W. Bush asserted, in an unscripted moment during the 2004 presidential campaign, that one example of the “kind of person” he would not appoint to the Supreme Court “would be the Dred Scott case.” As the Washington punditry quickly scrambled to decode Bush’s seemingly cryptic remarks, several left-leaning journalists stepped in to explain: “Roe = Dred” the title of Katha Pollitt’s piece in The Nation announced, while Timothy Noah similarly declared in Slate that “‘Dred Scott’ turns out to be a code word for ‘Roe v. Wade.’” Writing a bit more diplomatically in the Los Angeles Times, Peter Wallsten reported that Bush had “a history of using language with special meaning to religious conservatives” before noting the allegation of Bush’s critics that “the Dred Scott reference was an attempt” to covertly attack abortion rights “without alienating moderates.” Of course, for those involved in the American abortion debates it was not much of a revelation that the

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pro-life movement has long drawn parallels between the issues of abortion and slavery. The New York Times, in fact, ran a column just a few days after Bush’s remarks in which the Dean of Arts and Letters at Notre Dame predicted that “[h]istory will judge our society’s support of abortion in much the same way we view earlier generations’ support of torture and slavery – it will be universally condemned.”

For the last forty years, such rhetorical invocations of slavery in the service of anti-abortion politics have been commonplace.

Writing in Human Life Review shortly after Roe’s tenth anniversary, President Ronald Reagan laid out what has now become a familiar legal and moral argument against abortion rights. Quoting then-Dean of Stanford Law School (and political liberal) John Hart Ely, Reagan asserted that the Court’s opinion overturning state abortion laws in Roe v. Wade was “not constitutional law and [gave] almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.” Reagan continued, perhaps a bit more eloquently than Bush:

Nowhere do the plain words of the Constitution even hint at a “right” so sweeping as to permit abortion up to the time the child is ready to be born. Yet that is what the Court ruled.

As an act of “raw judicial power” (to use Justice White’s biting phrase), the decision by the seven-man majority in Roe v. Wade has so far been made to stick. But the Court’s decision has by no means settled the debate. Instead, Roe v. Wade has become a continuing prod to the conscience of the nation.

The closest historical parallel to the decision, Reagan suggested, was the fight over slavery in antebellum America and the Supreme Court’s attempted resolution of that nationally divisive issue in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. Appealing to the legacy of Abraham Lincoln, and the central role of the Declaration of Independence in Lincoln’s statesmanship, Reagan asserted:


The great champion of the sanctity of all human life in that day, Abraham Lincoln, gave us his assessment of the Declaration’s purpose. Speaking of the framers of that noble document, he said:

“This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe. This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to His creatures. Yes, gentlemen, to all his creatures, to the whole great family of man. In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on. ... They grasped not only the whole race of man then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the farthest posterity. They erected a beacon to guide their children and their children’s children, and the countless myriads who should inhabit the earth in other ages.”

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The egalitarian principles in the Declaration of Independence, Reagan seemed to suggest, were as equally antithetical to the institution of slavery as they were to the practice of abortion, and the various political issues implicated in the nineteenth-century struggle against slavery found striking parallels in the modern fight over the legal status of the unborn.

Reagan’s suggestion was not idiosyncratic. The “Letters to the Editor” and op-ed sections of newspapers throughout the world during the last quarter-century attest to a widespread feeling that these two issues are somehow connected. One letter writer to Canada’s The Globe and Mail asserted in 1985 that the “issue of abortion today closely parallels that of slavery in the nineteenth-century United States,” and another, writing more recently in The Australian, predicted that “by the end of [the twenty-first] century our society will hang its head in shame at the slaughter of our unborn children from abortion. Like slavery and genocide, our children’s children will struggle to comprehend how a civilized society could have allowed such a crime against humanity.”

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At the opening of a museum commemorating the abolition of slavery in England, Charles Moore similarly wrote in London’s
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The Daily Telegraph that he “found [himself] wondering how abortion will be viewed by museum curators, teachers, historians, and moralists 200 years from now. As the slavery exhibition shows,” Moore noted, “something that one generation accepts readily enough is often seen as abhorrent by its descendents – so abhorrent, in fact, that people find it almost impossible to understand how it could have been countenanced in a supposedly civilized society.”

Writing in USA Today during a contentious legislative battle over a proposed national ban on “partial-birth” abortion, Rebecca Hagelin simply asked: “Haven’t we learned anything since the struggle to end slavery? The parallels between that battle and the current ugliness surrounding abortion are many.”

Among a small cadre of socially conservative intellectuals, comparisons between abortion and slavery have been commonplace as well. Shortly after the decision in Roe v. Wade, Amherst College political philosopher Hadley Arkes penned an op-ed piece in The Wall Street Journal analyzing the issues at play in Roe in light of the celebrated nineteenth-century political debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas.

In his 1979 book A Matter of Choice, Berkley Law Professor (and later Reagan appointee to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) John Noonan compared the legal dehumanization of slaves in the nineteenth century to the legal dehumanization of the unborn in the twentieth century, suggesting

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30 Rebecca Redd Hagelin, “Don’t Stifle Protest,” USA Today (January 24, 1995), A30.
that there has always been “a propensity of professionals in the legal process to dehumanize by legal concepts those whom the law affects harshly.” More recently, Robert George – the holder of the prestigious McCormick Chair in Jurisprudence at Princeton University – has argued that abortion resembles slavery “in its denial of the equal dignity of a particular category of human beings,” and Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, like Dred Scott before it, relied on a “language of dehumanization.” For some, abortion is indeed an issue of public morality on par with slavery, and, as a result, Roe v. Wade has been cast by at least a few serious thinkers as the Dred Scott of our time.

In addition to the copious moral comparisons between slavery and abortion, the technical legal issues at play in Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade have been the subject of a more direct analogy. In his polemical bestseller The Tempting of America, Robert Bork declared that “[w]ho says Roe must say ... Scott,” and, in a dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explicitly compared the majority’s affirmation of the central holding in Roe to Roger Taney’s Dred Scott opinion. Criticism of Chief Justice Taney’s argument in Dred Scott has, in fact, become somewhat of a proxy for conservative criticism of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. During Senate confirmation hearings for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Orrin Hatch repeatedly queried Ginsburg about her views on the Court’s century-and-a-half-old opinion. “In my view it is impossible,” the Utah senator later