Britain’s domestic intelligence agencies maintained secret records on many left-wing writers after the First World War. Drawing on recently declassified material from 1930 to 1960, this revealing study examines how leading figures in Britain’s literary scene fell under MI5 and Special Branch surveillance, and the surprising extent to which writers became willing participants in the world of covert intelligence and propaganda. Chapters devoted to W. H. Auden and his associates, theatre pioneers Ewan MacColl and Joan Littlewood, George Orwell, and others describe methods used by MI5 to gather information through and about the cultural world. The book also investigates how these covert agencies assessed the political influence of such writers, providing scholars and students of twentieth-century British literature an unprecedented account of clandestine operations in popular culture.

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BRITISH WRITERS AND MI5 SURVEILLANCE, 1930–1960

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On 20 June 1940, George Orwell noted in his diary a particular fear circulating amongst many writers of his acquaintance. With the evacuation of Dunkirk having just occurred and the French surrender only days away, it seemed like the German invasion of Britain was imminent. This had obvious implications for those who had public reputations as left-wing writers and anti-fascist activists, and Orwell recorded:

I notice that all the ‘left’ intellectuals I meet believe that Hitler, if he gets here, will take the trouble to shoot people like ourselves and will have very extensive lists of undesirables. Cyril Connolly says there is a move on foot to get our police records (no doubt we all have them) at Scotland Yard destroyed. Some hope! The police are the very people who would go over to Hitler once they were certain he had won.¹

Of course, the invasion did not occur, and Orwell was not shot because of records the police held, but his distrust of how Special Branch and other security agencies viewed left-wing intellectuals evidently remained. It rose to the surface again in December 1945, when he dedicated one of his Tribune columns to considering an incident that had recently occurred on the outskirts of Hyde Park in London. The park, with its famed Speakers’ Corner, had long been regarded as a haven for free speech on controversial topics, but a group of five men had just been convicted in court on the charge of ‘obstruction’, for selling leftist newspapers outside the park’s gates. For Orwell, the evidently partisan nature of these arrests and convictions came as no particular surprise. As he noted, ‘Till quite recently “red” and “illegal” were almost synonymous, and it was always the seller of, say, the Daily Worker, never the seller of, say, the Daily Telegraph, who was moved on and generally harassed’.² Instead, what more intrigued Orwell about this incident was the wider question this posed about the entrenched sympathies of governmental agencies tasked with domestic political monitoring but hidden from public (and even parliamentary)
oversight. 'When a Labour Government takes over,' Orwell asked, 'I wonder what happens to Scotland Yard Special Branch? To Military Intelligence? ... We are not told, but such symptoms as there are do not suggest that any very extensive reshuffling is going on.'

This book could be described as an attempt to finally address Orwell's fears and understand how these evolving security–intelligence forces monitored the left-wing writers and artists of his generation. For many decades since Orwell's article, such a project was an almost impossible task, for while the history of Britain's intelligence services has long been a subject of public curiosity, it has also long been difficult terrain for scholarly investigation. Unlike in the United States of America, where Freedom of Information legislation introduced in the 1960s has given researchers at least some leverage to access files held by agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation,4 for most of the twentieth century the actual existence of Britain's intelligence agencies was not officially acknowledged and their records were exempt from public release. Concurrently, the all-encompassing Official Secrets Act (1911) ensured that most memoirs or media reports on the activity of Britain's covert agencies fell under the purview of its wide definitions. The result has been a field of inquiry where credible historical information remained thin on the ground, and relatively few reputable scholarly works existed on intelligence matters.5

However, during the 1990s, with the implementation of the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government, the attitude of the British government towards opening the historical records of government agencies underwent a significant shift.6 While still officially exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, the Security Service (more commonly known as MI5, the name which I will generally use in this study), Britain's domestic intelligence agency, adopted a policy of opening a limited range of its historical records to public access (albeit with considerable internal and external resistance). The first official release of MI5 files to the National Archives occurred in 1997.7 The most recent release of Security Service files in 2012 brought the number of available files to slightly fewer than 5,000 separate folders (or 'pieces', as termed by the National Archives), covering the period from the official founding of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 through to a cut-off point in the early 1960s, the point where the enforced fifty-year barrier of retention again draws the shutters on the archival trail.

Although such disclosures are a significant development, the files released to the National Archives are still only a small fraction of MI5's records. It has been alleged that, in 1955, MI5 held two million personal
files, which puts into perspective the limit of this new, lauded openness.\(^8\) Moreover, as the Service’s website makes clear, more than 375,000 of MI5’s files have been destroyed and all material beyond the early 1960s is still retained.\(^9\) The files of Britain’s foreign intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, more commonly known as MI6), still remain for the foreseeable future firmly restricted,\(^10\) and Special Branch has released only a handful of its records and destroyed much of the rest.\(^11\) Nonetheless, even given this constrained access, the selection of MI5 files available at Kew offers a considerable bounty for researchers. They cover areas such as the founding and growth of the Service, information on broad topics such as its intelligence policy, wartime activity, the organisation and shifts of departmental structure, as well as detailed files on specific cases, operations, and individuals who attracted the attention of MI5. Consequently, the past decade has seen a rapid growth in the study of British intelligence history, resulting in media reports, scholarly articles, and weighty books, culminating in 2009 with the publication of Christopher Andrew’s official history of MI5.\(^12\)

Out of this range of material that has now appeared in the archives, it has frequently been the release of the records kept on prominent British writers and intellectuals that has sparked some of the most sensational newspaper headlines and consequently received the widest public attention. The personal files of Auden and Orwell released in 2007 were publicised by the National Archives as ‘highlight files’, resulting in widespread, if not particularly accurate, media reporting. The blurring between George Orwell’s dystopian literary work and actual historical surveillance lent itself to an obvious slant for reports: the Daily Telegraph’s headline, that “‘Big Brother’ was watching George Orwell”, was only one of many that seized upon this apparent crossover.\(^13\) The announcements were even more sensational in the case of Auden, due to the links he held with Guy Burgess of the Cambridge spy ring: ‘Revealed: How Auden may have helped Burgess to flee Britain’ (The Independent), ‘MI5 suspected Auden of aiding Cambridge spies’ escape’ (The Guardian), ‘The maddening poet who slipped from MI5’s grasp’ (The Times), and ‘Auden suspected of helping Cambridge ring’ (the Daily Telegraph) were just some of the headlines.

Such reporting served a useful function in drawing attention to MI5’s archival releases on these authors but tended only to discuss elements of the files that directly lent themselves to the conjuring of a celebrity spy affair. However, when one looks in more detail within these specific files and the broader MI5 archive, it becomes apparent that a far more
complicated interaction was taking place in this era. Auden and Orwell were just two of the many writers and intellectuals who, as a result of the political radicalisation that marked much of British culture of the 1930s, became involved with the political networks that were under surveillance by MI5 – an agency that, in 1931, had been given a unique and powerful new mandate to pursue domestic subversion, and which, over the following decades, penetrated and documented Britain’s radical networks to an unprecedented extent.

It is the project of this book, therefore, to map this intersection and present a detailed study of the files that MI5 maintained on key cultural figures of this era. After Chapter 1 describes the developments within (and intersections between) the spheres of British literary culture and intelligence during the early and middle twentieth century, this book offers case studies dedicated to three significant and distinct clusters of writers. While these clusters vary in their geographical locations, social backgrounds, and artistic modes, they share a common link through their affiliation with emerging left-wing cultural movements of the 1930s – affiliations that marked them as subjects of interest to security–intelligence forces, which then followed them through the shifting political terrain of the Second World War and the Cold War. Chapter 2 considers the files maintained on the most famous 1930s literary group, the so-called Auden circle of writers. Through close examination of the files of W. H. Auden, Cecil Day-Lewis, Stephen Spender, and Christopher Isherwood, this chapter questions how these authors, who have commonly been seen as the major current of left-wing literature in the 1930s, were actually viewed and investigated by state agencies, as well as how these links with the communist circles of the era would continue to haunt their profiles long after they renounced their views and became respected members of the Establishment. Chapter 3 examines the surveillance of working-class theatre pioneers Ewan MacColl (born James Miller) and Joan Littlewood. They reached their peaks of fame in the 1950s and 1960s (Littlewood for her work with Theatre Workshop and productions such as Oh What A Lovely War, MacColl for his award-winning and chart-topping folk-music), and recent scholarship has re-evaluated their role in the development of a British theatrical avant-garde during the 1930s and 1940s – a view that was paralleled by MI5 and police, who long maintained records on their performances, employment, and personal circumstances, and who came to suspect that the later success of Theatre Workshop was actually facilitated via silent Communist Party support. The final chapter examines the files kept on George Orwell and Arthur Koestler, two writers who came
to prominence as left-wing authors and journalists in the 1930s and who would both become leading intellectuals at the emergence of the Cold War; Animal Farm and Darkness at Noon became seminal anti-communist Cold War literary texts read by generations of school students. Both had come under repeated British governmental surveillance – Koestler for being a Hungarian-born communist fleeing to Britain from Europe, Orwell for being a known leftist undertaking suspicious travels as well as wartime work for the BBC – and both would move across their lifetimes into complicated rapprochements with the secret state. They thus provide an apt case study to link in with the conclusion of the book, marking as they do the wider changes in the political landscape from the pre-war optimism of British radical intellectuals through to the Cold War disillusionment with the Soviet Union as the ‘God that Failed’ (as the influential collection of essays organised by Richard Crossman was titled in 1949), and indeed a pattern by which many of those previously regarded by MI5 and Special Branch as subjects of political suspicion actually came to be courted by other covert branches of the British state as credible assets in the emerging struggle for hearts and minds during the cultural Cold War.

As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, this is not the only possible way that such an interaction between British artistic and intelligence spheres during the early and middle twentieth century can be analysed. For one, the 1930s was not the first decade in which authors were subject to state surveillance in Britain, and consequently this book does not address a range of MI5 files held on authors (such as the far-right–affiliated Ezra Pound) whose political affiliations and periods of activity are outside the direct frame of this present study.14 There are also the cases of other cultural forms monitored by MI5 which are beyond the scope of this work to address. The interactions of MI5 and Special Branch with film societies and prominent film enthusiasts of this era is a crucial story that is told elsewhere, as is the surveillance that MI5 maintained on radical literary magazines.15 And there are other groupings of important 1930s writers who have MI5 files but who do not feature in this book. Although we have access to the files of Ralph Fox, Randall Swingler, and John Cornford (who were amongst the Communist Party’s most important writers and critics in this decade), these did not lend themselves to a coherent section in this present study.16 There are also other files (such as those held on Nancy Cunard) which have not yet been released and have possibly been destroyed.17 However, while this study is by no means an exhaustive analysis of all the questions raised by these new archival
resources, it does illuminate issues around a coherent group of files related to one significant literary–historical moment, and thus undertakes some of the first steps towards establishing a dialogue between the fields of intelligence history and literary history.\textsuperscript{18}

Addressing this range of files, this study has pursued several overarching aims. The most direct task has been to piece together each fragmentary story that is the personal file of an individual writer, to understand elements such as what documents are actually in the file, why this individual came to security attention, the modes of surveillance deployed by security–intelligence agencies against this person, and the profile generated by intelligence officers when trying to interpret the activity of the writer. Given that detailed surveillance efforts will often have collected significant information that has otherwise been lost, the documents in an MI\textsubscript{5} file frequently present a distinct biographical resource. Equally, the investigations and assessments of intelligence officers provide a silent coda to incidents and characters which sometimes feature in an author’s published work, and thus I am interested in seeing how public literary writing and covert security assessments both entwine and conflict.

Beyond this, the book addresses several wider debates that these files raise. First, there is the question of what parallels or contrasts the archives of intelligence history have with the received literary–historical interpretations of this era. As will be seen, the focus of MI\textsubscript{5}’s accounts often diverges from what the literary historian would expect. Some authors typically regarded as central to the left-wing culture of the decade were of comparatively scant interest to MI\textsubscript{5}, whereas other lesser-known individuals were observed with far greater attention, and some prominent examples of writing and activism were almost totally ignored by police and intelligence officers while others were recorded in detail. Consequently, in considering an era when the role and impact of radical writing was subject to acute and unprecedented debate by authors, the files of MI\textsubscript{5} allow us to see where the British state security organs actually judged the potential political impact of such literary activism to be.

Second, this book examines what these files can tell us about the interactions between British authors, Communist International (Comintern) front groups, and the Soviet Union. It has long been suggested that these authors and intellectuals were one of the most important avenues by which the Soviet Union garnered support in the West. David Cuate, for instance, has characterised this period (1928–1956) as the era in which ‘some of the most distinguished writers, philosophers, critics, scientists, and publicists of the West became communists or fellow-travellers’,
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defining a fellow-traveller as an intellectual who voiced sympathy for Soviet communism but eschewed rank-and-file Party membership or orthodox Marxist beliefs. Cautue argued that, while their literary or cultural productions were often at odds with the standard Party line, these fellow-travellers were nonetheless valued by the Soviet Union due to the three main contributions they could offer: ‘political journalism, membership of communist front organizations, and, where appropriate, the loan of their prestige, their lustre, the respect in which they [were] widely held’.9 Although Cautue argued for an uneasy alliance, other prominent accounts have cast a far darker role, and suggested that it was through these ideological channels that a deep red stain seeped in. Thus Stephen Koch has alleged that the Comintern propaganda guru Willi Münzenberg manipulated these authors to spread the Soviet Union’s influence in the West via an intricate and tightly controlled campaign, which wore the sheep’s clothing of the Popular Front and anti-fascism to hide its Stalinist body. Koch asserts that this campaign to ‘Stalinize Bloomsbury taste’ operated by seducing well-meaning but naive authors into ‘directing opinion in every area from the theatre and art to sports’, conducted through myriad front organisations controlled by Münzenberg and his cast of shady lieutenants.22 These writers were cultivated not only as dependable mouthpieces (so the story goes), but also as potential spies: for this cultural world formed a path that led to a ‘point of intersection between propaganda and espionage’ – a point that, Koch alleges, some crossed.21 Koch’s account is dubious for many reasons (as others have already pointed out).23 Nonetheless, access to the MI5 archives raises the question again of to what extent these fears were shared by British security forces of the era, and whether their records provide new evidence to substantiate or finally debunk such a claim.

This leads to the third overarching question that has shaped this study, which is how this interaction with covert British governmental agencies actually affected the careers of these authors or the cultural developments of the period. Scholars of twentieth-century American literature have long pointed to the chilling effect various red scares had upon cultural developments in the United States, whether created by the public hearings of bodies such as the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) or in the clandestine crusades waged by J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI against those suspected of being dissidents or subversives. As Claire A. Culleton has argued, ‘File evidence makes it manifestly clear that the bureau [FBI] worked to discredit writers, editors, and publishers; to harass and beleaguer them; to incriminate them; and to limit their access to publication,
their nomination for awards and prizes, and their opportunities to present their work in public arenas, all at precisely the time when literary modernism was gaining strength and strengthening its morale. Access to the security–intelligence files from British agencies therefore begs the question of whether any similar dynamic was in process across the Atlantic, although it is immediately clear that MI5 showed nothing like the same anti-communist zeal that possessed its counterparts in America. Instead, as this book will show, MI5’s activity was much more circumspect and rarely resulted in direct forms of censorship. MI5 or Special Branch had almost no power to directly block literature on politically radical topics, and therefore their impact was little like that of the Home Office, which had the ability to prohibit works deemed obscene, or the Lord Chamberlain, who could vet and censor any play script before its public performance. Equally, even when an author was the subject of an active file, much of the material gathered was bureaucratic and inconclusive. Files rarely climaxed with an explosive arrest or definitive assessment of the case, but instead tended to grow over the years in fits and starts, as reports were submitted, analysed, filed, and forgotten, until an incident months later caused the case to be looked into again. Indeed, given Orwell’s fears about the secret watchers he faced, and the newspaper headlines claiming such authors were subject to an all-seeing gaze, one of the necessary tasks of this book is to give a proper sense of the banality often found in the files, in order to puncture the mystique of MI5’s methods and show the anti-climactic paperwork that typically filled an intelligence officer’s day. But even if some of the more sensational preconceptions are dismissed, it does not render these files a neutral or benign force, and the profiles generated from this surveillance will be seen to have silently affected the careers of writers in important if unpredictable instances. Crucially, however, this interaction with the secret state was not always a one-way track. While some authors noticed their mail was mysteriously delayed or inexplicably found themselves barred from work at the BBC, other authors were quite witting in their engagement with such agencies when it suited their needs, and thus one of the main lineages that this book will go on to trace is how certain radicals of the 1930s managed to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British security establishment and enter into the covert governmental networks from which they had previously been barred.

This project has incurred debts to numerous people and organisations, and here I can only try to list the main few. The majority of the research
for this book was carried out while I was a University of Queensland Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and I am grateful for this period of research funding, as well as the advice and discussions I had about this project with many of my colleagues in the School of English, Media Studies, and Art History. The final stages of the book were completed while I was a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Oxford, and again I am indebted to colleagues in the Faculty of English and New College with whom I discussed this work. At Cambridge University Press, Ray Ryan saw the potential in this project in the very early stages and encouraged it through to completion, and the anonymous readers of the manuscript provided a range of astute suggestions for revisions. I owe particular thanks to two other people: Simone Bovair, whose research assistance allowed me to chase up many files and references from the other side of the world, and Becky Williams, to whom I owe more than I could ever convey.

THE STRUCTURE OF AN MI5 FILE

The Security Service files released to the National Archives in Kew, London, can all be found in the Public Records Office under the department code of KV, further broken down into series of files that include KV 1 (historical reports, mainly concerning the First World War), KV 2 (personal files), KV 3 (subject files), KV 4 (policy files), KV 5 (organisation files), and KV 6 (list files). The case studies offered in this book are primarily based around selected KV 2 personal files. The various personal files now make up nearly three-quarters of the total files available at Kew and were originally opened by the Security Service on individuals deemed to be of sufficient interest to necessitate the dedication of a specific folder to them; individuals of minor interest might only have been noted in cross references in the registry card index.\textsuperscript{25} Those personal files that survive are usually originals, with occasional photocopied pages when material has been retained due to redaction. However, some are created from microfilm and thus are entirely reproductions. Most material is, physically, in good condition, and only the occasional leaf (often Special Branch reports) has suffered enough damage to make sections illegible.

A KV 2 file is typically contained within a buff folder, the cover of which specifies the original MI5 registry reference number, provides cross references to other directly relevant files (such as family members with a file), and a list detailing when the file had been withdrawn and returned to the MI5 registry. A personal file dedicated to an individual of
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Minor security interest would normally only occupy a single folder, but files dedicated to Party officials or suspected Soviet agents frequently run to ten or twenty folders with thousands of entries all told. Inside the covers, material is normally loosely bound with treasury tags. The first documents inside a personal file will normally be the minute sheets, which provide a chronological description of material that has been entered in the file and the date it was added, and sometimes brief comments (‘minutes’) by an officer as the case proceeded. After the minute sheets there is also often a photo of the subject and particulars from his or her passport applications, which provided a quick reference point to establish the identity, appearance, and handwriting of the subject.

The main substance of the file consists of what are termed the serials: the various letters, documents, reports, notes, and extracts gathered on the subject, which were individually numbered to correspond to the minute sheet (serial 1a, for example, corresponds to minute 1) and then entered into the file in chronological order. Serials can be almost anything; some of the most typical materials are copies of interdicted mail items, reports from Special Branch officers, letters from provincial Chief Constables, correspondence between MI5 and SIS, internal notes between MI5 officers, requests from the BBC and other government departments for vetting and transcripts of taped telephone calls, or discussions in bugged rooms. Many serials, though, do not have a covert origin, and in some files clippings from newspapers or copies of pamphlets make up a significant proportion of the content entered. Whatever the origin, serials entered in a file are often annotated by an MI5 hand, with names underlined, significant information marked out by marginal notation and cross references to other files added in. (Surnames in MI5 and Special Branch documents were typically typed out in block capitals, but I have not followed this practice when quoting from them.) Sometimes, material was entered into a file months or years after it was originally composed because it belatedly came to someone’s attention, but in my referencing in this study I generally give the document’s original date, only drawing attention to the date it was entered if this seems to have some significance.

All MI5 files were obviously highly restricted and access to their information was limited to a small cadre of intelligence officers and civil servants, but the actual security markings on individual files and documents in this era were haphazard, little resembling the standard Whitehall-wide system that is now in place. Many undoubtedly sensitive documents carry no specific security markings, while others carry the more familiar
designations of Confidential, Secret, Most Secret, or Top Secret (a level that replaced the confusing ‘Most Secret’ during the Second World War). When present, these classification levels were applied by different agencies in different ways and often seem to have little relation to the secrecy of the material contained — standard police reports (for example) were often stamped ‘Secret’ when sent to MI5 even though they contained only trivial information from routine police work, whereas foreign intelligence reports from SIS (so-called CX reports) were often also designated ‘Secret’ even though they involved intelligence liaisons of international sensitivity. There is also the occasional item classified as ‘Top Secret’ with the presence of an additional codeword designating that the material was related to a particularly sensitive source or operation and was subject to restricted dissemination even amongst those generally able to see Top Secret material. Additionally, some files indicate on their covers that they were ‘Y-Files’, which meant that they were considered to be of special sensitivity and therefore removed from the general registry and personally held by a specific officer (a process called ‘Y-Boxing’). ‘Y-Boxing’ appears to have frequently occurred to files associated with the Burgess-Maclean case, with the result that the files of the Auden circle (whose personal files often still bear Y-File markings) suddenly became amongst the more restricted held by MI5. But it should be emphasised that the security classification of a document is generally a poor guide to its actual research interest: Much of the Top Secret material derived from covert bugging is little more than garbled gossip, sensitive only because of its clandestine method of collection, whereas some of the most important material (at least from the perspective of this study) can be found in otherwise routine government forms.

A hurdle often faced is the issue of redaction, or the removal of areas of a file before it was released to the National Archives. Almost all of the KV files I consulted have some degree of redaction, the presence of which is indicated on a page by a whited-out section and a red stamp citing Section 3(4) of the Public Record Office Act. More often than not this redaction is minor, consisting only of the removal of the name of an individual involved in secret work. Occasionally the redactions are more substantial, and entries on minute sheets and corresponding serials have been removed in their entirety and replaced with blank pages bearing the red stamp. SIS telegrams seem to be particularly susceptible to such treatment, as most aspects of SIS’s history are still withheld from public release. But often the redactions themselves appear to have been done in a haphazard way: A letter in one file might, for example,
have different redactions from an otherwise identical copy of the letter found in a separate file.

Even when a file or document has not been redacted, there are still various difficulties to be faced when assessing its content. Often a serial will not be a full document but instead only a short extract, which can generate problems in understanding the context of the information. Although officers frequently signed their names on their reports, there are also many documents in which the author or the addressee is only identified by his or her section code (or the signature is illegible), which can again present the researcher problems in working out who actually wrote or read a piece. Other documents dealing with sensitive sources deliberately do not detail what this source actually is. Thus, reports based on covert human informants almost never give the source’s name; instead, they normally use a codename and the designation of the handling officer. All of these were security devices, but this also means that the later researcher is often faced with a puzzle in trying to work out a document’s origin or how pieces of the file should be put together. In compiling the endnotes in this study, I have followed the principle of providing as much specific information about each document as is available and practical, in order to give the fullest picture of sometimes obscure documents and render them easily locatable in the National Archives if anyone so desires.
Abbreviations

BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BBFC  British Board of Film Censors
BYFC  British Youth Festival Committee
CCF  Congress for Cultural Freedom
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
Comintern  Communist International
CPGB  Communist Party of Great Britain
CPHQ  Communist Party of Great Britain Headquarters (King Street, London)
CRD  Cultural Relations Department (United Kingdom)
Department EH  Electra House (propaganda department controlled by FO) (United Kingdom)
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
FO  Foreign Office (United Kingdom)
GPO  General Post Office (United Kingdom)
HOW  Home Office Warrant
HUAC  House Un-American Activities Committee (United States)
ILP  Independent Labour Party (United Kingdom)
IRD  Information Research Department (United Kingdom)
KGB  Committee for State Security (USSR)
KV  Papers of the Security Service, National Archives (United Kingdom)
MI5  Security Service (United Kingdom)
MI6  See SIS
MOI  Ministry of Information (United Kingdom)
PID  Political Intelligence Department (FO, also cover name for PWE) (United Kingdom)
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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>POUM</td>
<td>Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (Spain)</td>
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<td>PWE</td>
<td>Political Warfare Executive (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Special Branch</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Special Branch</td>
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