International Relations Theory

Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this is the first textbook on international relations theory to take a specifically game-theoretic approach to the subject, and provide the material needed for students to understand the subject thoroughly, from its basic foundations to more complex models. International relations theory is presented and analysed using simple games, which allow students to grasp the concepts and mechanisms involved with the rationalist approach without the distraction of complicated mathematics. Chapter exercises reinforce key concepts and guide students to extend the models discussed. Drawing examples from international security, international political economy, and environmental negotiations, this introductory textbook examines a broad array of topics in international relations courses, including state preferences, normal form games, bargaining, uncertainty and communication, multilateral cooperation, and the impact of domestic politics.

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International Relations Theory
The Game-Theoretic Approach

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To Yoi, Amelia, and Tommy
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Acknowledgements

Authors of textbooks owe their greatest debts to their teachers and their students. I had my first brush with international relations theory in Kenneth Oye’s Introduction to World Politics class at Princeton in the mid 1980s. The class was held in the biggest classroom on campus and there were over 400 students. His lectures were so good we applauded after every one, not just the one at the end of the semester. After a few years I went to the University of Chicago where I learned international relations theory and game theory from James Fearon, Charles Glaser, Charles Lipson, John Mearsheimer, Duncan Snidal, Daniel Verdier, Stephen Walt, and In-Koo Cho. Retracing my steps, I presented the first three chapters at the PIPES workshop at the University of Chicago in May 2012. I thank the participants there for their many helpful comments. It is always a treat to come home.

I first started teaching a course such as the one this book is based on at the University of California at Riverside. However, I only started working on the textbook a few years ago at the University of Wisconsin. I would especially like to thank the graduate students in my classes who read draft chapters in the early stages. In the first year they were: Roseanne McManus, Mark Toukan, Steven Wilson, Mason DeLang, Jason Ardanowsky, and Mert Kartal. The second generation were: Budak Bugrahan, Patrick Kearney, Richard Loeza, Susanne Mueller, Ryan Powers, and Anna Weisfeiler. The next year I taught it through the iTV consortium to students at Ohio State and Illinois; the roster was Caitlin Clary, Gina Martinez, William Massengill, William McCracken, Yoshiki Nakajima, Marzia Oceno, Jason Duu Renn, Ashlea Rundlett, Daniel Silverman, Daniel Wolrich, Joshua Wu, Iku Yoshimoto, and Nikolaj Zemesarajs. The last year’s cohort was Anne Anderson, Sarah Bouchat, Clarence Moore, and Nathaniel Olin.

I would also like to thank a number of anonymous referees at Cambridge for their comments on the proposal and early drafts of some chapters, and John Haslam for taking a flier on the project.