Negotiation has always been an important alternative to the use of force in managing international disputes. This textbook provides students with the insight and knowledge needed to evaluate how negotiation can produce effective conflict settlement, political change and international policy-making. Students are guided through the processes by which actors make decisions, communicate, develop bargaining strategies and explore compatibilities between different positions, while attempting to maximize their own interests. In examining the basic ingredients of negotiation, the book draws together major strands of negotiation theory and illustrates their relevance to particular negotiation contexts. Examples of well-known international conflicts and illustrations of everyday situations lead students to understand how theory is utilized to resolve real-world problems, and how negotiation is applied to diverse world events. The textbook is accompanied by a rich suite of online resources, including lecture notes, case studies, discussion questions and suggestions for further reading.

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For my brother Ukdon, who always puts other people’s interests, needs and feelings before his own
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Preface

In providing an introduction to international negotiation and bargaining, this book presents essential concepts and approaches. Its ultimate goal is to serve as a guide for readers to cultivate an ability to analyze negotiation problems and circumstances. Thus the book is oriented toward helping students, diplomats or other practitioners develop an overarching knowledge base with a look at pertinent social science theories relevant to examining and tackling real-world issues.

Understanding international negotiation and analysis will be an important task in considering the costs of ignoring many problems faced by humanity. There is no shortage of disputes, involving territorial claims, trade imbalance, security dilemma, pollution and so forth. It would be ideal to achieve results that are beneficial to all parties concerned. However, that may often not be the case due to competitive settings inherent in international politics. Thus it becomes more important, in a negotiation analysis, to uncover the characteristics of interdependent interests embedded in a structural relationship. This book approaches negotiation from the perspectives of strategic interaction where one actor’s situation is fully dependent on another actor’s action. Bargaining strategies can be considered in the context of cooperation and conflict embedded in negotiating relationships.

An interactive process in various settings can be succinctly illustrated by game theories that provide basic tools in understanding the structure of bargaining relationships. Reflecting on this theme, the first part of this book is devoted to game theories, laying a foundation for more complex analysis. For those who are not familiar with game theories, the core concepts are introduced in a step-by-step manner. In so doing, game theory chapters start with basic assumptions and eventually move on to illustrate the theory’s relevance to diverse settings such as global warming and North Korean denuclearization.

In the real world, we should not hold an illusion that a single theory provides all-encompassing answers, predicting the outcomes of our interactions with others. Guided by diverse research traditions in international negotiation, multidisciplinary contributions are quite evident in this book. Behavioral, psychological, political and institutional aspects of decision-making are brought to understanding a negotiation process in the remainder of the book. Thus different theories have been pulled together to provide
both sufficient depth and breadth in developing a coherent picture of a complex phe-
omenon of international negotiation.

Part of the underlying tenet of this book is represented by such questions as how we
define rationality and power in a negotiation context and how they actually translate
into specific strategies and outcomes. In addition, when, why and how do negotiators
deviate from rational behavior to their own disadvantage? This book should be able to
offer some answers to why negotiations are stalled in a failed attempt to settle many eth-
nic and territorial conflicts as well as controlling climate change and other global issues.
Could we draw lessons from past successful experiences, including but not limited to
multilateral negotiations on ozone layer protection, the preservation of Antarctica and
the law of the sea as well as peaceful settlements in Northern Ireland, South Africa,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia-Herzegovina and other intractable conflicts. These
cases are relevant in discussion about whether the course of negotiation is predeter-
dined, what shapes the ability of actors to reach agreements, and ways in which nego-
tiators can overcome impediments to narrowing differences.

This book aims to help students develop an integral picture or framework in exam-
ining the mechanics of negotiation. It regards students as critical thinkers rather than
as passive learners in advancing their own learning and knowledge-seeking process.
Sustainable solutions necessitate coordinated actions in a multifaceted world, full of
discord and contention. The capacity to properly diagnose problems is part of a core
negotiating skill. This textbook will assist students in enhancing their own thinking
about what negotiators should consider before taking any action.

We are far from living in a peaceful world. As seen in the China–Tibet case and
others, unfortunately negotiation is often not equipped to bring about justice. Norma-
tive concerns are not the main tenet of this book, and answering this kind of question
would require a different kind of analysis as illustrated in Cecilia Albin (2001), Madan
Pillutla and Keith Murnighan (2003) and Tom Tyler et al. (2004). More future research
may perhaps be required to properly assess what can and cannot be ultimately achieved
when the power differentials are externally imposed. It may also need to raise ques-
tions about whether negotiations can be left to the primary participants of a totally
asymmetric conflict.

A vast array of individual cases have been examined in developing this book, but the
number of examples mentioned had to be reduced due to limited space. In the main
text, these examples have been put in the context of explaining specific negotiation
theories and concepts. For those who are particularly interested, for instance, in more
detailed negotiation episodes on US–Soviet arms-control talks, the 1994 framework
agreement between the United States and North Korea on the latter's denuclearization,
the 1978 Camp David Peace Accord, and ozone diplomacy, there are well-written books
by former diplomat-scholars representing their firsthand observations. These include

Various aspects of conceptual thinking in this book were aided by gaining insight from much of the existing literature accumulated over the past several decades. The main task has been integrating a diverse spectrum of negotiation research traditions ranging from bargaining theory to political coalition-building to social psychology. While there are many important academic works that have formed my thoughts, below are some of the examples for chapters on strategic analysis and sociopsychological approaches to negotiation. In developing chapters on strategic analysis and bargaining theories, particularly helpful were Barry O’Neill (1999), Robert Powell (1999, 2002), Abhinay Muthoo (1999), Thomas Schelling (1960), Anatol Rapoport (1974), Rudolf Avenhaus (2008), William Poundstone (1992), Ariel Rubinstein (1982) and John Sutton (1986). In organizing sections on psychological aspects of negotiation behavior in Chapter 8, I greatly benefited from Laurie Weingart and Mara Olekalns (2004), Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale (1991), Daniel Druckman (2013) and Wendi Adair and Jeanne Brett (2005) as well as classic works such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974). In reflectively synthesizing diverse research streams, particularly helpful were John Odell (2000), Terrence Hopmann (1996), Thomas Princen (1992), Howard Raiffa (2002) and James Sebenius (2009).

In referring to two-actor negotiations or games, for consistency purposes, the first person is often referred to him; the second one is denoted as her throughout the text. In identifying a single person in a sentence, I used either “him” or “her” interchangeably. For the nonmathematical audience, ignoring math equations (necessitated as logical proof) would not really hamper the understanding of the basic bargaining theory concepts in Chapter 5. This book can be compatibly used with existing simulation exercises on competitive or collaborative decision-making and role play as well as a collection of case studies.

I would like to thank editors John Haslam and Carrie Parkinson at Cambridge University Press for patiently managing the review process and bringing this book project to a successful end. While the opinions of several reviewers on this book’s initial proposal were interesting, particularly the two anonymous reviewers provided an invaluable suggestion that this manuscript should be more tilted toward strategic aspects of negotiation informed by game and other formal theories. They have also offered very thorough point-by-point comments on the detailed features of the book’s structure that are reflected in this eventual product. I am also very grateful for kind and supportive words and comments from John Odell, Barry O’Neill, Thomas Princen, Robert Powell
and Abhinay Muthoo. However, any shortcomings or oversights are solely the fault of this author.

Much debt is owed to US Army Colonel Guy Jones who has carefully read each sentence in the majority of chapters from a practitioner’s perspective. Whereas I have profited from some of his insightful editorial comments, these represent his own personal scholarly interest and are not connected to any part of his service for the US government. I would also like to express many thanks to my research assistants Francesca Watson, Charles Davidson, Caitlin Turner, Kwaaw G. de Graft-Johnson and Caroline Saskia, who managed to organize the vast amount of bibliographic information and supported editorial work. My university librarian Philip Glidewell’s assistance was invaluable in identifying and obtaining many books needed in the completion of this project. Finally, I appreciate the support of Mary and Nimmy in my endeavor to complete this book’s typescript.