Introduction

Pemba Island is a small place. Only ten miles wide and forty miles long, it seems an unlikely place to be a crossroads of multiple continents. Yet people on the island trace their heritage to African, Arab, and Indian sailors and merchants, Baluchi mercenaries, and slaves who were drawn, whether by force or by choice, to the fecundity of the “Green Isle” – where mangrove trees reached out into the tidal creeks to greet new arrivals. The island had been the granary of the Kenyan coast in eastern Africa through the eighteenth century but gradually shifted to a cash-crop economy when the Sultan of Oman, who quickly realized the potential wealth of the Zanzibar Islands, moved his capital to Unguja Island in the 1830s.1

1 The Zanzibar Islands are made of two larger islands, Unguja (which is often referred to in the West as Zanzibar) and Pemba, in addition to numerous other smaller islands. I will use Zanzibar to refer to all the islands and Unguja to refer to the larger island where the capital, Zanzibar Town, is located.

While the Omani sultanate claimed control over Pemba starting in 1698, a garrison was not stationed on the island until 1820. The Sultan of Oman from 1814–1856, Seyyid Said, was so impressed with Zanzibar that he moved the capital of his sultanate to the islands in the 1840s. At Seyyid Said’s death, the Omani sultanate was divided between two of his sons – one became Sultan of Oman and the other Sultan of Zanzibar. For further details on the pre-twentieth-century history of the Swahili coast, see John Gray, History of Zanzibar: From the Middle Ages to 1856 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Norman Bennett, A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar (London: Methuen, 1978); Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riots: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1858–1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995); Bethwell Ogot and J. A. Kieran, eds., Zamani: A Survey of East African History (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); Randall Pouwels, Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 1800–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Abdul Sheriff, Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration
By the late 1870s, the majority of the agricultural produce exported from the islands came from the second-largest island, Pemba. Oral traditions about the land and labor arrangements between the Sultan and local Africans differed between the two main islands. On Pemba, locals agreed to clear land and plant clove trees only in exchange for ownership of half the land and trees, a system known as *nusu-bin-nusu* (“half and half”), whereas on Unguja, locals planted trees but did not get ownership of any they planted. The Pemban system kept a large class of small landholders on the island of Pemba because they received half the clove trees they planted. Nonetheless, by the late nineteenth century, slavery was the main form of labor on both islands. The slaves were brought from the mainland, primarily the regions of present-day Tanzania and Malawi. While the majority of slave owners were Arab, many indigenous Pemban and Indian traders also owned slaves on Pemba. These slaves kept the areas around the clove trees weeded, helped to pick cloves during the harvests, and grew their own food plots in the areas around the clove trees. The social and economic systems put in place by the Omani colonization of Pemba would begin to unravel when the British declared a protectorate over the Zanzibari Islands in 1890.

In 1895, a former slave woman named Bahati successfully won her court case against an elite man, who claimed her as his slave, by demonstrating her position as a respectable member of her community. While

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1. Frederick Cooper, while acknowledging the small landholding class on Pemba, suggested that plantations were still the main form of economy on Pemba. However, in his 1980 book, he noted that 70 percent of planted acreage on Pemba was in food crops, not cash crops, indicating that plantations were not the driver of the economy on Pemba. Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 150. See also Fitzgerald’s comments from 1892 that much of the land was broken up in small landholdings with few large plantations or large groups of slaves. William Walter Augustine Fitzgerald, *Travels in the Coastlands of British East Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba: Their Agricultural Resources and General Characteristics* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1898), pp. 593–4, 597–8, 604.

2. While the British government abolished slavery in its colonies in 1838, it still had a limited scope in the Indian Ocean because parts of India were still under company rule rather than government control. According the Abdul Sheriff, beginning with Consul Hamerton in the 1850s, several British consuls to Zanzibar tried to break the Indian community of slave owning. Sheriff questions the legality of the consuls; nonetheless, starting in the late 1850s, Indians living in Zanzibar were subject to seizure of their slaves and property and open to flogging, jail time, and deportation. Sheriff, 1987, pp. 102–8; Also see Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) AA12/4 for a “secret” report from 1875 on Indian slaveholdings on Pemba.

she did not contest that she was an ex-slave, she did argue that she had rights in her community because she was a free person who adhered to the social norms set out by elites. She used her reputation among her neighbors as evidence to gain the support of the British colonial official posted to the island. Bahati’s case illustrated the ways in which marginalized members of coastal societies transformed meanings of status and reputation in the colonial courts. British colonization and emancipation as a reaction to the previous Omani colonization offered enslaved people new avenues to achieve a life independent from the control of elites and slave owners, who were often one and the same.

While British enforcement of emancipation laws on Pemba created an opportunity for slaves and ex-slaves to attain new social powers, colonial officials across the continent were less than enthusiastic about enforcing abolition laws. The historical literature of Africa excoriates colonial officials for being obstructionist and obdurate antiabolitionists, as they were in Zanzibar. Missionaries in Pemba, as elsewhere in Africa, sought to force the colonial office in the metropole to hand down abolition orders. Yet, as soon as these orders were made law, colonial officials wiped their hands off slavery and simply ignored its existence. Sean Hanretta raises an important critique that some scholars discuss emancipation as an artifact of colonialism. He argues that the “triumphalist” narrative of colonial emancipation where Westerners brought “freedom,” and, as such, Christianity and capitalism, to Africa reifies the perception that abolition is “alien” to African societies and thus removes the agency of Africans and Islam as sources of abolitionist ideology. However, the scholarship on slavery in Africa has shown that in parts of Africa an indigenous practice of manumission existed long before colonizers imposed a discourse of abolition. Manumission meant the voluntary release of enslaved people

* Margaret Strobel also noted this change. However, she found that women were the only ones who sought the help of British officials, indicating a gendered element to the use of courts in Mombasa. Strobel, *Muslim Women in Mombasa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 59–60.
by their owners, whereas abolition required a state power to impose the release of slaves. Along the East African coast, state power was weak in the nineteenth century; thus abolition was virtually impossible to impose, as the British colonizers quickly discovered. Enslaved people on Pemba understood and valued the practice of manumission, which goes far in explaining the response of slaves to the British Abolition Decree.

Emancipation on Pemba did not come immediately with the announcement of the abolition decree of 1897, nor did slaves rush to receive their “freedom.” A widespread exodus of slaves from the region of their enslavement to their home areas, as discussed in West Africa, does not appear to have occurred on Pemba. The British began the emancipation process in 1897, when slaves, except for concubines, could apply for their freedom from colonial officials. Twelve years later, the government abolished the status of slavery; no longer could anyone legally claim a person as a slave, nor could ex-slaves claim patronage from their former owners. But what did freedom mean? Much as Patricia Romero showed for Lamu, many Pembans did not seek to leave their owners as “free” either in 1897 or in 1909. Numerous individuals chose to remain living with their owners, calling themselves slaves and maintaining the patron-client systems of enslavement. These “slaves” accommodated themselves to the life offered them through the patronage of their “owners,” to whom they were “mutually bound through dependency.”

Why were many slaves along the Swahili coast willing to remain enslaved after abolition? As found across the continent of Africa, a continuum of enslavement to freedom existed within a broad range of communities. From the powerful military slaves of western Africa to the watumwa wa mtumwa (“slaves of a slave”) of eastern Africa, enslavement and freedom had multiple meanings depending on the social structures of the community, the status of owners, and the gender, age, and skill set of the enslaved. Numerous scholars have shown that many slaves

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11 Paraphrase of Romero, p. 129.

had incredible freedom of movement and often lived away from their owners, indicating that the meaning of slavery in eastern Africa goes far beyond the chattel slavery so often conjured up in American minds. Yet forms of chattel slavery existed on Pemba side by side with more mobile forms of enslavement, such as day laborers, traders, and long-distance porters who left on expeditions into the interior of eastern Africa that often took years. The ambiguities of enslavement offer an explanation for the ambivalence toward emancipation found among some groups of slaves on Pemba.

However, this does not mean that enslaved people on Pemba all embraced their enslavement either. It is impossible to identify exactly how many slaves lived on the island before emancipation because no census was done until 1910—and even then it was limited because it did not distinguish whether the Africans counted were born on the island or elsewhere, indicative of a slave past. The 1910 census does indicate that approximately 50,000 adults living on Pemba identified or were identified by the census takers as being of African descent. However, this included the indigenous WaPemba population, as well as the pre-Omani coastal elites, who were called waungwana. Estimates for the slave population ranged from 10,000 to 60,000, with probably the best estimate given by the British Vice Consul as 40,000. The numbers vary dramatically, but we do know that over 6,000 people applied on Pemba for their freedom from the government between 1897 and 1909. During this period, an additional 700 slaves were voluntarily manumitted by their owners.

13 Strobel, 1979, p. 30; Sheriff, 1987, pp. 149–50; Deutsch, 2006, pp. 176–8; Glassman, 1995, chaps. 2 and 3 discuss this in extensive detail.
14 ZNA BA34/2, Report of the Native Census, 1924. The 1910 census results are included in the 1924 census for comparative purpose. There were 20,000 children in this category as well. However, because an 1890 decree declared all children of slaves born after that date were free regardless of whether their parents were enslaved, this meant that any child in 1910 was most certainly free.
15 The pre-Omani term for “civilization” was uungwana. The coast elite described themselves as the civilized people and thus were known as waungwana; the wa- prefix indicates “people” in Swahili. For an excellent discussion of the transformation in terminology from uungwana to ustaarabu in the nineteenth century, see Pouwels, 1987, pp. 72–4.
16 Dr. O’Sullivan-Beare gave an estimate in 1896 of 63,000 slaves but later noted that during the smallpox epidemic of 1898, approximately 40,000 slaves lived on the island. See Report by Vice-Consul O’Sullivan on the Island of Pemba, 1896–7; Report by Vice-Consul O’Sullivan on the Island of Pemba, 1898; Timothy Welliver, “The Clove Factor in Colonial Zanzibar 1890–1950,” PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, 1990, pp. 63–4, quoting Farler from an 1899 letter to General Mathews, states that he thinks that the slave population was only 10,000 at emancipation.
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owners as well.\textsuperscript{17} This means that at least 15 percent of slaves on Pemba chose government emancipation.\textsuperscript{18} But more than that, the differences in the responses of those who were enslaved to the emancipation order tells us that there was no one strategy for dealing with the process of emancipation.

Seemingly, the moment of emancipation should have been one of empowerment for individuals who could now choose where to live and who to work for, among other choices.\textsuperscript{19} Yet the ambivalence of many slaves on Pemba to the abolition decree demonstrates that they saw emancipation not as empowering but as an act that could expose them to the economic vulnerabilities of life as a patronless person. Moreover, examining the weaknesses in ex-slaves’ social positions illustrates the ways in which definitions of status changed over time. With emancipation, the hierarchies of society changed, and slaves’ positions within communities also altered. Ex-slaves had the possibility for social mobility, but their ability to attain respectability likewise left them vulnerable in unprecedented ways because before emancipation, slaves’ reputations had a limited impact economically or socially on their livelihoods. Vying for respectability exposed ex-slaves to the vagaries of community interpretations of their reputations, yet the action of being socially vulnerable created new opportunities for ex-slaves and marginalized people to expand their social capital on Pemba. Exposing themselves to the social vulnerability of respectability allowed marginalized groups to gain social capital in a way they could not when they had the security of social position in enslavement. Enslaved and marginalized groups certainly faced economic vulnerability, yet emancipation created the space for a positive element of vulnerability, the vulnerability associated with other people’s interpretations of their reputations, as found in the case mentioned earlier of the ex-slave Bahati, who used her neighbors as witnesses to her respectability and positive reputation.

The experience of emancipation on Pemba is not the same as in other parts of eastern Africa. While some ex-slaves on Pemba mimicked slaves

\textsuperscript{17} Cooper, 1977, cites 754 voluntary manumissions on Pemba after the abolition order and 5,468 voluntary manumissions on Unguja. Likewise, he notes that 5,930 people were emancipated by the government on Pemba, p. 244, fn. 107.

\textsuperscript{18} In Chapter 2 I point to the potential of a number closer to 21 percent if children are included in the numbers.

\textsuperscript{19} Emancipation was equal to vulnerability because slaves had security in their position as slaves; as free people, they lacked security of food and shelter. See Strobel, 1979, pp. 43–100.
on the mainland of Tanzania, who simply walked away from their owners and emancipated themselves with their feet, the majority did not.\textsuperscript{20} Frederick Cooper has argued for the Swahili coast that emancipation did not significantly change the lives of many enslaved because essentially they went “from slaves to squatters.”\textsuperscript{21} Cooper is correct that many ex-slaves were not able to purchase their own land and ended up arranging share-cropping relationships with former owners on Pemba, but many others became independent land or house owners. Yet focusing on economics overlooks the very important social and cultural transformations experienced independently of economic circumstances. Ex-slaves enjoyed the new freedoms allowed to them in regard to dress, religious faith, and education. Nonetheless, as the story of Bahati illustrates, ex-slaves did not want to replicate the position of the elites but rather wanted to coexist. Slaves on Pemba did not seek to recreate their identities; rather, those who remained on the island accommodated themselves to the social hierarchy of the island.\textsuperscript{22} Even the slaves who appeared to actively resist ex–slave owners’ hegemony in economic and social aspects of Pemban society still demonstrated their accommodation on some levels through their continued residence on the island.

As ex-slaves sought to accommodate their lives to the new realities of society, elites also had to face their diminished social status. Linguistic changes in Swahili words on Pemba illustrate the shifting social dynamics of society as terms associated with the elite, such as \textit{heshima}, had newer meanings grafted onto them. \textit{Heshima} in the nineteenth century meant “honor” and the power and fear associated with holding honor.\textsuperscript{23} Yet, with the emancipation of slaves, the basis for the power of slave owners was undermined, expanding the meaning of \textit{heshima} to the much weaker notion of “respectability.” Thus, when Bahati asserted her \textit{heshima}, she was not arguing that she had power but rather that she was vulnerable to the interpretation of her reputation by her neighbors who chose to support her case. But more important, when she won her case, it reinforced the limited power of the Arab elite, demonstrating their lost ability to assert their honor through the control of lower-status people such as Bahati.

\textsuperscript{20} Deutsch, 2006, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{21} Cooper, 1980, pp. 4–6.
\textsuperscript{22} For ex-slaves trying to remake their identities, see Fair, 2001, pp. 64–109.
\textsuperscript{23} Edward Steere, \textit{A Handbook of the Swahili Language as Spoken at Zanzibar} (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1884), p. 286; Orlando Patterson explicated this link in his book, \textit{Slavery and Social Death}. See in particular chap. 3, pp. 77–101.
The history of the Swahili coast often focuses on resistance of marginalized populations against social elites. This literature includes vibrant book titles that epitomize the contested relationships of people along the coast, such as *Feasts and Riots* and *Pastimes and Politics*. These books depict the Swahili coast as a place of tensions, contestation, and revelry among people of varying social statuses and ethnic identities, including Africans, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans. This book breaks from the historiography of the Swahili coast by examining an island that while not isolated from the rest of the coast, certainly never experienced the widespread resistance against elites or the colonial state as found in the urban centers of East Africa.

This is not a story of resistance or of collaboration, as Patricia Romero found in Lamu, but rather acculturation and accommodation among a population that was able to create networks within its communities that helped to tie individuals together even in times of great political and social flux.

Without reifying the teleology that rural communities cling to “tradition,” my work shows how marginalized people, regardless of their lines of ethnic descent or income, formed a community of people who based their daily interactions with one another on an understanding of acceptable social behavior that was religiously conservative but also pragmatic. While these groups—former slaves, indigenous Pembans, migrant laborers from the mainland, and poor Arabs and Indians—worked together, lived next to each other, at times intermarried, celebrated together, and buried one another, they did not necessarily form a unified community identity. They did not imagine themselves as one group, one community, at least not yet. They had not yet identified their island and, as such, themselves as the “Cinderella” of the east coast.

I have suggested elsewhere that by the 1950s, Pembans began to coalesce around an identity of “Pemban-ness,” but in the early years after emancipation, a notion of a distinctly “Pemban” identity had not yet developed.

17 WaPemba were considered an ethnic group and referred to as a particular subset of the population living on Pemba. Elisabeth McMahon, “Becoming Pemban: Identity, Social Welfare and Community During the Protectorate Period” (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 2005).
of Pemba offered outsiders a means to lump together people on the island as old-fashioned (or without fashion in some cases), conservative, and often “stupid to an inconceivable degree.” Through the processes of building social networks, kinship bonds, and respectability, they sought to avoid the economic vulnerability associated with life for marginalized groups along the Swahili coast. Jonathon Glassman suggested that the consciousness of the crowd enabled lower-status groups to mobilize resistance against elites, but on Pemba, this did not happen in such an active, widespread manner. Rather, resistance was individually based, through court actions, slanderous gossip, or using *uchawi* ("witchcraft") to cause misfortune, among other everyday tactics.

Contrary to much of the work on urbanized coastal communities, rural communities on Pemba had limited social stratification between the elite and ex-slaves. Social hierarchy definitely existed on Pemba, but not at the level studied in places such as Pangani, Mombasa, Zanzibar Town, Bagamoyo, or Lamu. Pembans with wealth often moved to other locations, such as Zanzibar Town and Mombasa, rather than remaining on the island. Ex-slaves who sought to change their social status (and even ethnic identity) also left for the more cosmopolitan Zanzibar Town or Mombasa. Because the social gap between the poor and well-off on Pemba was so small, the elite on Pemba had restricted powers to create social change, which significantly limited the desire of the vast majority to contest elite status. In many respects, both elite and marginalized populations lived an economically vulnerable existence, susceptible to the vagaries of the biannual clove crops. Fundamentally, this is a story about mediating economic and social vulnerabilities in a transitional society. Ex-slaves and other marginalized people negotiated their social vulnerability by carefully preserving their reputations, which gave them respectability and, at times, economic credit in their communities.

Ethnicity is almost always a focus of discussions of ex-slave communities along the Swahili coast as scholars show how people shifted their

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28 A Sultan’s official told O’Sullivan-Beare that “the Zanzibar slaves are a very cunning lot; the Pemba slaves are absolute fools.” The Vice Consul agreed, stating that “his description of the latter is certainly correct. The Pemba slaves, as a body, are ignorant and stupid to an almost inconceivable degree.” *Report by Vice-Consul O’Sullivan on the Island of Pemba, 1896–97* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1898).


30 Abdul Sheriff reiterates the point in the nineteenth century that Pemba was much less socially stratified than Unguja. Sheriff, 1987, p. 129.

identities to incorporate into local communities. This phenomenon rarely happened on Pemba because on such a small island, neighborhood networks were in place for generations, which made identity less mutable. Ex-slaves may have counted themselves in the censuses as “Swahili,” “Shirazi,” or “WaPemba,” but that had more to do with their interpretation of themselves as “native” to the island. In the probate court records, ex-slaves continued to use their mainland ethnicities into the 1940s, even while they were listed as “native” or born on the island in the census. The ex-slaves recorded in the probate records were landowners, which in the literature on the coast has often been treated as a first step in a person’s ability to shift his or her identity away from a mainland ethnic group.34 Ethnicity could be obscured in rare cases, but this was not the norm on Pemba. Ex-slaves certainly did embed themselves into local Pemban communities – the probate records also show this phenomenon – but they generally did not assimilate with freeborn. Most ex-slaves, especially men, did not marry into WaPemban or elite households, but they did intermarry across mainland ethnicities. Family and personal histories, especially of past enslavement, were embedded in local identities, and past enslavement would arise in conversations from the 1950s into the 1990s.35 This indicates that few people were able to fully erase their past identities. Even when Africans of free descent tried to claim socially elite or Arab identity, they would be called out by others for trying to go above themselves.36 While most scholarship on the Swahili coast discusses the flexibility and mutability of ethnic identity in the early twentieth century, in rural Pemba, “recreating” identity was difficult to do.37