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Introduction: 'an unknown story'

> To All Ranks of the Third Army
>
> The operations of the last three months have forced the enemy to sue for an armistice as a prelude to peace.
>
> Your share in the consummation of this achievement is one that fills me with pride and admiration.
>
> Since August 21st you have won eighteen decisive battles, you have driven the enemy back over sixty miles of country and you have captured 67,000 prisoners and 800 guns.
>
> That is your record, gained by your ceaseless enterprise, your indomitable courage and your loyal support to your leaders.
>
> Eleven divisions in the four Corps (Guards, 2nd, 3rd and 62nd 5th 37th 42nd and New Zealand, 17th 21st and 38th) have been continuously in action since the beginning of the advance and have borne the brunt of the operations. Other divisions have joined and left, each one adding fresh lustre to its history.
>
> To all ranks, to all Corps and formations, to all administrative and transport units, I tender my thanks. May your pride in your achievements be as great as mine is in the recollection of having commanded the Army in which you have served.
>
> Signed J. Byng, General, Commanding Third Army[1]

In the late summer and autumn of 1918 five British armies, together with their American, Belgian and French allies, launched a series of offensives across France and Flanders. They advanced up to eighty miles and broke the back of the German army. In a deliberate Napoleonic reference, the British campaign fought from 8 August to 11 November was soon dubbed the 'Hundred Days'. According to Marshal Foch, 'never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack' than it did

[1] Special Order of the Day by General Sir Julian Byng, 11 November, Imperial War Museum (IWM) Misc 33/600. All dates are 1918 unless otherwise specified.

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in these battles.[2] In July few would have dared predict that this time it really would all be over by Christmas. What suddenly made this possible after nearly four years of deadlock? Why did a near-static war of position become a war of movement which defeated the German army? Was it merely the inevitable result of superior Allied weight of manpower and *matériel* after years of attrition? Or had the British army learnt the lessons of modern warfare better than their enemy? This book addresses these questions. It offers a detailed comparative case study of the campaign fought from 21 August to the end of the war by General Sir Julian Byng's Third Army and its German opponents of *Second* and *Seventeenth* armies. This campaign must be seen in context. To argue that the British army on the Western Front, let alone any single formation within that army, single-handedly defeated Germany would be to misunderstand the many dimensions in which the war was fought and the coalition effort which brought victory.[3] By examining how representative British and German armies fought, this book aims merely to assess the extent to which the application of modern warfare underpinned the British army's part in that victory.

Was the German army in fact defeated on the battlefield? Many Germans between the wars thought not. Even before the Armistice, German commanders, led by Chief of the General Staff Paul von Hindenburg and his First Quartermaster-General Erich Ludendorff, had been working to divert blame from the army. The *Frontkämpfer* who defended the *Reich*, they claimed, may have been bloodied but were unbowed. Instead, they had been stabbed in the back by socialist, pacifist and Jewish agitators on the Home Front. In fact, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were well aware that the military situation had become untenable. Their men could no longer fulfil their primary role of defending Germany against her external enemies. The two generals' prime motivation from the end of September on was to secure an armistice to prevent the collapse of the army. In their view, if the *Frontheer* broke and fled home, at worst it might provoke a Russian-style revolution in Germany; at best the army would no longer be able to carry out its secondary role of suppressing domestic disorder.[4] By early November their fears were being realised. On 5 November Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the army group facing the British and Belgians in the north, reported

[2] Introduction to J. H. Boraston (ed.), *Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915–April 1919)* (London: J. M. Dent, 1919), xiii.
[3] For a recent survey of the last year of the war which covers all its many dimensions in detail, see David Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
[4] Michael Geyer, 'Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levee en Masse in October 1918', *Journal of Modern History* 73 no. 3 (September 2001), 459–527: 464–72.

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to *Oberste Heeresleitung* (Supreme Army Command: hereafter *OHL*) that the commanders of his *Seventeenth* and *Second* armies were warning that they were no longer capable of withstanding a major attack and that rout threatened.[5] Four days later, an extraordinary meeting of front line regimental and divisional commanders was called at *OHL*. The thirty-nine officers who attended were asked whether their men were willing to fight for the Kaiser to recapture their homeland and/or were prepared to take up arms against Bolshevism. The answer on both counts was no. The men were exhausted and wanted only to go home in peace.[6]

A bystander watching the *Guards Cavalry Division*'s homecoming parade in Berlin on 10 December might nonetheless be forgiven for thinking he was watching a victory procession rather than the return of a defeated army.[7] According to the *Times* correspondent, an 'enormous crowd' gave them 'a hearty reception', cheering and throwing flowers to the soldiers as they marched down Unter den Linden, regimental bands playing 'Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles'. Processing beneath the Brandenburg Gate, the guardsmen were addressed by the Chancellor of the provisional government, Friedrich Ebert:

> No enemy has overcome you. Only when the preponderance of our opponents in men and material grew ever heavier did we give up the struggle, and just because of your heroic courage was it our duty not to demand further useless sacrifices of you.[8]

Ebert's connivance in the *Dolchstoßlegende* ('Stab-in-the-back-myth'), which was so to poison Weimar politics, was born of a desire to coopt the army to a fragile new regime whose legitimacy faced apparent threats from both monarchist reaction and Bolshevik revolution.[9] Ebert was talking politics, not writing history.

Indeed, even in this parade itself can be glimpsed the true state of the German army. First, and most obviously, if this was a triumph, where was Caesar? Secondly, the losses suffered by the German army had reduced many units to mere cadres. The *Guard Cuirassier Regiment*, for example, in theory over 700 strong, had emerged from battle with just two officers and

[5] *Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht* (*HKR*) to *OHL*, Ia Nr 10606, 5 November, Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv Abteilung IV: Kriegsarchiv, Munich (BKA), *HKR* Bund 99 Folder 101 (hereafter, for example, Bd 99/101).
[6] Scott Stephenson, *The Final Battle: Soldiers of the Western Front and the German Revolution of 1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 83–8.
[7] The names of German formations and units in the text are translated into English and italicised. Where necessary, their designations in footnotes are given in the original.
[8] 'Berlin Welcomes the Guard: "Unbeaten Troops": Oath of Fealty to the Government', *The Times*, 12 December, 7.
[9] Stephenson, *Final Battle*, 237–45.

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forty-eight other ranks.[10] For the parade, the ranks of this Potemkin regiment had to be padded out with the lightly wounded and with troopers from a regiment of hussars.[11] In the event, when called to defend the government against rebellious sailors on Christmas Eve, the division proved unable to do so. The German army could no more suppress its internal enemies than withstand its external foes, and in that sense its defeat was complete. The full extent of that defeat will become clearer in the course of this book.

The First World War was a multi-dimensional conflict fought out on many fronts, from science laboratories and factory floors to muddy trenches, and at all levels from political, through strategic and operational, down to tactical. It established a pattern for modern warfare between major industrial nations which the next generation developed to even greater destructive effect and which continues to be the model for conventional military operations today. The unprecedented scale and violence of the First World War was rooted in a range of political, economic, social and cultural developments which swept Europe in the long nineteenth century. These radically changed both the reasons for which wars were waged and the means by which they were fought. The revolution in warfare undergone between 1914 and 1918 was not merely a battlefield phenomenon, but embraced whole peoples. Here, however, our concern is with what modern warfare meant on the battlefield, with means rather than ends, for this book deals solely with the operational and tactical levels of war, and specifically with how Third Army and its German antagonists fought.

Some terms require definition. The operational level of war 'refers to the analysis, selection, and development of institutional concepts or doctrines for employing major forces to achieve strategic objectives within a theatre of war. Operational military activity involves the analysis, planning, preparation, and conduct of the various facets of a specific campaign.'[12] (This is a modern concept. Andy Simpson points out that, to a First World War soldier, the operational level of war was seen purely in terms of the chain of command and 'connoted operations involving any formation from a brigade upwards'.)[13] The tactical level, meanwhile, refers to

[10] Hermann Cron, *Imperial German Army 1914–18: Organisation, Structure, Orders of Battle* (C. F. Colton, trans.) (Solihull: Helion, 2002), 128.
[11] Stephenson, *Final Battle*, 238.
[12] Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations' in Millett and Murray (eds.), *Military Effectiveness* Volume I: *The First World War* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 1–30: 12.
[13] Andy Simpson, *Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006), xv.

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'the specific techniques used by combat units to fight engagements in order to secure operational objectives'.[14]

This book does not address grand strategic questions, such as the overall provision of *matériel* and manpower resources, although it will consider how available resources were employed. Nor will it discuss larger issues such as the strategic decision-making and inter-allied cooperation of Foch, Haig, Pershing and Pétain.[15] This is no place to consider other explanations for the defeat of Germany, such as the naval blockade, the collapse of her allies and the intervention of the United States of America. Political and strategic activity is discussed here only where it is necessary for context and in so far as it impinged on the operations carried out by Third Army and its opponents.

This narrow tactical and operational focus makes it easier to define what this book means by 'modern warfare'.[16] It combines two strands. At the tactical level, modern battles are fought in three dimensions and by combined arms: all available technology is integrated to combine and carefully calibrate the effects of firepower and manoeuvre across the breadth and depth of the enemy's space. In mass warfare, no single battle is likely alone to be decisive. Therefore, at the operational level, battles must be synchronised and sequenced across space and time to form a coherent campaign which seeks, within the context of a wider strategy, to destroy the enemy's ability to resist by destroying his assets, his will to fight or his capacity to react. The design and execution of operations on the First World War scale posed a novel managerial challenge to generals of

[14] Millett, *et al.*, 'Effectiveness', 19.

[15] See Elizabeth Greenhalgh, *Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 229–64 and William Philpott, *Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century* (London: Little, Brown, 2009), 502–37 for two perspectives on this.

[16] The literature on this subject is vast, and the definition here presented draws on many works, including: Jonathan Bailey, *The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare* (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996); Bailey, 'The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare' in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132–53; Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1990); Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); J. J. G. Mackenzie and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), *The British Army and the Operational Level of War* (London: Tri-Service, 1989); Colin J. McInnes, *Men, Machines and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1914–1945* (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1992); Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (London, Brassey's, 1985); David T. Zabecki, *The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

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all armies. Note that modern warfare as here defined includes killing the enemy. It should thus be distinguished from recent theories of 'manoeuvre warfare' which concentrate primarily on the psychological dislocation of the opponent and regard attrition as best avoided.[17] One of the contentions of this book is that attritional method remained an integral part of war in 1918, even as manoeuvre returned to the battlefield.

A helpful analogy, perhaps, is poetry. A commander must ensure that his different arms combine together in each battle just as a poet has to weave together sound and sense harmoniously in each line of verse. Then the individual battles need to be fitted together into a coherent whole, just as every line must fit the rhythm, tone and purpose of the larger poem.

Critical to success in both poetry and warfare are timing and rhythm. The technical term for this is 'tempo': 'the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another.'[18] The side with higher tempo is better able to react to changing circumstances, and so to pose a series of threats with which the enemy is increasingly unable to deal. It runs through the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act cycle faster than its opponent.[19] Tempo is determined by the combination of seven elements:

1 physical mobility
2 tactical rate of advance
3 quantity and reliability of information
4 command control and communications timings
5 time to complete moves
6 pattern of combat support
7 pattern of service (logistic) support.[20]

Analysis of the ability of Third Army to maintain operational tempo and execute combined arms tactics forms the core of this book.

Modern warfare has here been defined largely using today's jargon. First World War soldiers would not have been familiar with some of these terms. 'Combined arms', however, was a well-established concept. In Britain, it was taught at the Staff College by G. F. R. Henderson and enshrined in the

[17] For manoeuvre warfare, see: Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5: Blueprint for the AirLand Battle* (Washington: Brassey's, 1991) and Simpkin, *Race to the Swift*.
[18] *Army Doctrine Publication* Volume I: *Operations (Army Code 71565)*, Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff (1994), 3–19.
[19] Also known as the Boyd Loop: A. Behagg, 'Increasing Tempo on the Modern Battlefield' in Brian Holden Reid (ed.), *The Science of War: Back to First Principles* (London: Routledge, 1993), 110–30: 112.
[20] Simpkin, *Race to the Swift*, 106.

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very first substantial point made in the British *Field Service Regulations* of 1909.[21] 'Operations' and 'tempo', on the other hand, are terms generally agreed to derive from Soviet military theorists of the 1920s and 1930s. The extent to which soldiers before 1914 understood these concepts, even if they did not use this precise terminology, is a complex and controversial area. Antulio Echevarria, undeterred by Jay Luvaas's joke that 'to wade through the flood of technical and theoretical [military] literature that appeared after 1870 could easily consume the worst years of one's life', has argued that some did. Military thinkers such as Schlieffen, Hoenig, Colin, Grandmaison and Haig, he suggests, had understood that the nature of the next war would preclude decisive battles on the model of Austerlitz or Sedan and require the integration of a much longer and broader series of engagements into a larger *Gesamtschlacht*.[22] His case seems more convincing for some of these individuals than for others. In any case, one wonders to what extent such ideas stood out from the welter of contradictory thought in circulation and how wide an audience they found outside a tiny circle of military intellectuals. Nonetheless, any pre-war doubts about the concept of 'operations' would have been dispelled by 1918. If nothing else, the Western Front taught that individual battles could not be decisive, and that they needed to be carefully incorporated into a larger plan. Likewise, the first four years of the war had demonstrated to all that maintaining momentum was vital. This required working around the logistic constraints immense armies imposed and finding solutions to the command difficulties caused by poor battlefield communications. By the summer of 1918, commanders who had shown themselves unable to think in these terms had largely been weeded out. The question now was whether their replacements could apply these concepts in practice.

Modern historians have proposed a range of answers to this question, although in general the Hundred Days campaign has not been well covered. In 1978 John Terraine wrote that, despite the fact that 'great

[21] G. F. R. Henderson, *The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1892–1903* (Neill Malcolm, ed.) (London: Longmans, Green, 1905), 70; General Staff, War Office, *Field Service Regulations* Part I: *Operations 1909* (London: HMSO, 1909), 13. Hereafter abbreviated as *FSR I*.

[22] Jay Luvaas, 'European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870–1914' in Michael Howard (ed.), *The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart on his Seventieth Birthday* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 69–94: 69; Antulio J. Echevarria II, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 195–7, 206–7, 208–10. See also Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood, *The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 330–1 where the concept of 'operations' is traced back to Moltke the Elder. Russell M. Epstein's *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994) goes back even further, arguing that the 1809 campaign against Austria witnessed operational planning and execution.

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feats of arms were performed and great victories won as deserving of commemoration as Austerlitz or Waterloo', it remained 'virtually an unknown story', overshadowed by the 'great catastrophes of the First World War [which] have lingered in men's minds for six generations'.[23] Although in the last thirty years a new generation of professional historians, often inspired by Terraine, has explored many aspects of the institutional development of the British army during the conflict and in the process shed light on aspects of this final campaign, his central point stands. Systematic studies of the British victory remain rare and the Hundred Days continues to attract less attention than some of the earlier 'great catastrophes'. The ninetieth anniversary in 2008 saw the publication of four works of military history on the Hundred Days, compared with twenty-three books released to commemorate the anniversary of the Somme two years previously.[24] Of the four, one was a picture book and one a scholarly study of the Canadian Corps in 1917–18. The other two, Peter Hart's oral history *1918: A Very British Victory* and *The Day We Won the War: Turning Point at Amiens 8 August 1918* by Charles Messenger, wear their hearts on their sleeves although neither is quite so jingoistic as their titles suggest.[25] The fullest modern treatment remains J. P. Harris and Niall Barr's *Amiens to the Armistice*, which covers the whole British effort, and is, as Harris acknowledges, 'a fairly short book on a very big campaign', while Tim Travers's *How the War Was Won* attempts to survey the whole last year of the war. Much of his discussion of the Hundred Days centres merely on the Canadian Corps.[26]

Gary Sheffield and John Bourne note that Third Army had 'a key role in defeat of Germany, a role for which neither [Byng] nor his troops have – as yet – received sufficient recognition'.[27] Instead, it has been overshadowed by its neighbours. The spearhead of General Sir Henry Horne's First

[23] John Terraine, *To Win a War: 1918 The Year of Victory* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 13.
[24] Search of British Library online catalogue, www.bl.uk, 29 January 2010, using the search terms '1918', 'Amiens' and 'Hundred Days' for publication year 2008 and 'Somme' for 2006.
[25] Alistair McCluskey, *Amiens 1918: The Black Day of the German Army* (Oxford: Osprey, 2008); Tim Cook, *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917–1918* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008); Peter Hart, *1918: A Very British Victory* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008); Charles Messenger, *The Day We Won the War: Turning Point at Amiens 8 August 1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2008).
[26] J. P. Harris with Niall Barr, *Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign 8 August–11 November 1918* (London: Brassey's, 1998), xiii; Tim Travers, *How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918* (London: Routledge, 1992).
[27] Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds.), *Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2005), 498.

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Army, the Canadian Corps, has been the subject of extensive research by Tim Travers, Bill Rawling, Ian M. Brown, Shane B. Schreiber and, most recently, Tim Cook.[28] Fourth Army, under General Sir Henry Rawlinson, is equally well known, for four main reasons. Its role in spectacular operations such as the Battle of Amiens (8–11 August) and the seizure of the Riqueval Bridge (29 September) brought headlines at the time and continued interest thereafter. So did, secondly, the presence in Fourth Army of Australian, American and, briefly, Canadian corps. Thirdly, Rawlinson's chief of staff, Archibald Montgomery (later Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1933–6), wrote a detailed account of Fourth Army's campaign, on which Sir James Edmonds drew heavily for his official history.[29] Lastly, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson's groundbreaking *Command on the Western Front* worked a rich seam of available evidence, including Rawlinson's diaries and the collated Fourth Army papers held at the Imperial War Museum, to offer a novel and thought-provoking study of Rawlinson and his men.[30] Third Army, on the other hand, pulled off few headline-grabbing stunts. The capture of Le Quesnoy on 4 November was the exception that proves the rule: this operation was carried out by the New Zealand Division, the only one in Third Army which was not raised in the British Isles. Further, Byng had little use for publicity, to the point that all his, and his wife's, papers were destroyed on their deaths. Consequently, although historians such as Peter Simkins and Glyn Harper have studied parts of Third Army on the old Somme battlefield, and J. P. Harris and Niall Barr's study includes some valuable material on its operations, as yet no detailed study of Third – or indeed any other army – throughout the entire Hundred Days exists.[31] The historiography of the campaign, therefore, is best approached thematically.

[28] Travers, *How the War Was Won*; Bill Rawling, *Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914–1918* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Ian M. Brown, 'Not Glamorous, but Effective: The Canadian Corps and the Set-Piece Attack, 1917–1918', *Journal of Military History* 58 (July 1994), 421–44; Shane B. Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War* (Westport: Praeger, 1997); Cook, *Shock Troops*.

[29] Archibald Montgomery, *The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919).

[30] Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, *Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

[31] Peter Simkins, 'Somme Reprise: Reflections on the Fighting for Albert and Bapaume, August 1918' in British Commission for Military History, *'Look to your Front': Studies in the First World War* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), 147–62; Glyn Harper, *Dark Journey: Three Key New Zealand Battles of the Western Front* (Auckland: HarperCollins, 2007), 323–490; Harris, *Amiens to the Armistice*.

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The shadow of the British official history is inescapable.[32] Sir James Edmonds rejected the views of inter-war apostles of armour such as Basil Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller who saw 1918 as the victory of the tank. Fuller argued that 'from Hamel [4 July] onwards the war became a tank war' and that 'the battle of Amiens was the strategical end of the war, a second Waterloo; the rest was minor tactics'.[33] The tank, as Fuller put it later, broke the stalemate at the Battle of Amiens leading not only to the collapse of the German army but also to 'a tactical revolution'.[34] Liddell Hart, likewise, considered that 1918 marked the 'rebirth of cavalry' in the form of the tank, and that Amiens could thus be equated with the Battle of Adrianople in 378.[35]

For Edmonds the Hundred Days marked not the beginning of a new era in warfare, but a restatement of fundamental principles: 'in the end . . . it was not the weapons or the tactics but the superiority of the British soldier over the German on the ground, under the ground, and in the air which won the day'.[36] Although Edmonds felt the British sought the cooperation of all arms, in contrast to what he saw as French reliance on artillery, the impact of new technology, such as tanks and aeroplanes, was limited. The victory of 1918 was the fruit of the previous years of attrition, and, indeed, of the relentless grinding down of the German army in the course of the campaign by Foch's widening-front offensive. As Peter Simkins put it, 'it did not always suit old regulars like Edmonds to concede that citizen-soldiers who had enlisted merely "for the duration" could achieve high levels of tactical skill and initiative'.[37] Cyril Falls dismissed the Edmonds view as 'a myth as preposterous as it is widely believed. For the first time in the known history of war, we are told, the military art stood still in the greatest war up to date.'[38] Nonetheless, most subsequent narrative

[32] J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium 1918* Volume IV: *8th August–26th September: The Franco-British Offensive* (London: HMSO, 1947); J. E. Edmonds and R. Maxwell-Hyslop, *History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium 1918* Volume V: *26th September–11th November: The Advance to Victory* (London: HMSO, 1947). Hereafter *BOH IV* and *BOH V*, respectively.
[33] J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War: 1914–1918* (London: John Murray, 1920), 305; *Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936), 317.
[34] J. F. C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence upon History* Volume III: *From the American Civil War to the End of the Second World War* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956), 276–7.
[35] Basil Liddell Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies* (Edinburgh: John Murray, 1927), 38–60.
[36] *BOH V*, 609.
[37] Peter Simkins, 'Co-Stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the "Hundred Days", 1918' in Paddy Griffith (ed.), *British Fighting Methods in the Great War* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 50–69: 65.
[38] Cyril Falls, *The First World War* (London: Longmans, 1960), xvi.

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