Rebellion in Ireland is often viewed as something handed down through generations, part of an unbroken tradition, by both the conspirators themselves and in the histories written about them. The Proclamation of the Irish Republic, delivered by insurgents during the 1916 rising, depicted their actions as the logical extension of a history that had seen insurrection ‘six times during the past three hundred years’. Tradition kept the rifles warm, or so the manifestos claimed, and not successful precedents of insurrectionary action elsewhere. To illustrate the point, rebels had only to look to the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), more widely known as the Fenians, the nationalist movement that most readily evoked intergenerational continuity.1 Established in 1858 by a veteran of the failed 1848 rebellion, the IRB was committed to achieving an independent Irish republic through insurrectionary means. When staged in 1867, their uprising quickly collapsed and the organisation was widely suppressed. Almost fifty years later, in 1916, the IRB again organised an insurrection that indirectly led to the formation of the Irish Free State. In the War of Independence (1919–21), they played an influential role under the direction of Michael Collins, before eventually winding up in 1924. Yet outward continuities can be misleading. Between the 1867 and 1916 insurrections, Irish nationalists experimented with a variety of different strategies, the most spectacular being an urban bombing campaign in the 1880s. This break with the insurrectionary tradition is the subject of this book.

1 Fenianism was an umbrella term that referred generally to the IRB (founded 1858), the Fenian Brotherhood (1858), and the Clan-na-Gael (1867). The term Fenian itself was a variant of ‘Fianna’, the name of a mythological band of Irish warriors. The term Fenian was widely employed by both nationalist and anti-nationalist propaganda in the second half of the nineteenth century to refer to the medley of Irish organisations committed to ‘physical-force nationalism’. The term is used in this sense in the present study. See M. J. Kelly, The Fenian Ideal and Irish Nationalism, 1882–1916, Woodbridge, 2006, 108; Owen McGee, The IRB: The Irish Republican Brotherhood from the Land League to Sinn Fein, Dublin, 2005, 33–7.
Introduction

At around two o’clock on a Saturday afternoon in January 1885, three homemade bombs exploded almost simultaneously in the chamber of the House of Commons, the crypt of Westminster Hall and in the armoury of the Tower of London. The chamber was empty at the time and few injuries were caused, but the episode – labelled ‘Dynamite Saturday’ in the press – caused an international sensation. In 1884, the Special Irish Branch at Scotland Yard – established the previous year specifically to investigate the dynamiters – was itself rocked by a blast that caused extensive structural damage and destroyed a portion of the Fenian records.

These explosions were orchestrated by a faction of the Fenian movement that advocated ‘skirmishing’ from their safe haven in the United States. Skirmishing was imagined as a means of applying scientific innovation and new technologies to win the goals of revolutionary nationalism. Insurrection, they believed, caused more hardship to the Irish population than to the authorities. In contrast, dynamite bombs would spare Ireland but disrupt economic life in Britain, bringing deep-rooted colonial grievances directly to the metropole. Their homemade devices – referred to as ‘infernal machines’ in the press – targeted symbolic public buildings in Britain. Numerous bombs failed to explode, though the campaign was not without startling moments. Viewed by many as a dramatic break with the conventional strategies of nationalism, skirmishing was met with markedly more opposition than enthusiasm in the wider nationalist movement.

Unlike insurrection, the skirmishing or dynamite campaign was not vindicated by the rebels of the past, suggesting that revolutionary nationalism was not always moved by its own history. Instead, it is argued in this book that the rebels’ actions may be better grasped if placed in concurrent contexts and in connection with transnational milieux. The Fenians’ world interacted with wars, revolutionary movements, labour struggles and revolts in European, American and imperial settings, and they were not alone in believing violence to be the midwife of a new society. Contemporary movements opposed to capitalism and colonialism shared similar views of revolutionary violence. Indeed, precisely when the New York Fenians began to imagine skirmishing, subversive groups elsewhere also instigated a new departure in revolutionary action that was characterised by political murder and bomb attacks. The 1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II with homemade bombs ensured that revolutionary violence was central to discussions at the International Social Revolutionary and Anarchist Congress in London, held just a few months afterwards. During the congress, delegates overwhelmingly endorsed the use of ‘propaganda of the deed’, a proposal that had been
mooted five years earlier at the International Workingmen’s Association conference in Bern.\(^2\) Italian anarchist Carlo Cafiero described this new, ‘modern’ strategy of ‘minute bodies or groups’ armed with dynamite, in comparison to the old, ‘classic school’ of insurrection. For Cafiero, the choice was unequivocal. The classic school had ‘had its day and today is absolutely impotent’.\(^3\) Throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century, several revolutionary organisations abandoned insurrection in favour of urban guerrilla warfare and assassinations.

The emergence of urban guerrilla warfare and dynamite attacks was symptomatic of the tensions provoked by modernising and globalising forces in the nineteenth-century world. The timeframe of this book – from the year of the Fenian uprising and the patenting of dynamite in 1867, to the dynamiters’ last explosion in 1900 – witnessed remarkable change and turbulence both inside and beyond Ireland. These were years that saw the broad expansion of the franchise (Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884); disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (1869); the Irish Land Wars (1879–82 and 1886–91); the Phoenix Park assassinations (1882); and Gladstone’s conversion to Irish Home Rule (1885). Internationally, the period was one of revolution and reform that saw the German and Italian wars of unification (1860–71); the Paris Commune (1871); uprisings in the Balkans (1875–6); the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan (1881–99); the Great Upheaval in the USA (1877); and the assassinations of the leaders of Russia and the USA (1881), France (1894), Spain (1897), and Italy (1900). World historians have observed that international peace was disrupted by no less than 177 war-like confrontations in the second half of the nineteenth century.\(^4\) The period was characterised by violent upheaval and militant Irish nationalism has to be understood in these historical limits, as a political movement in a violent age rather than a violent movement in an age of peaceful politics.

Since the nineteenth century, militant nationalism in Ireland has been more commonly referred to as ‘physical-force’ nationalism, in opposition to ‘moral-force’ or ‘constitutional’ nationalism. Typically, varieties of nationalist political opinion were squared off under either of these two labels, both of which have proven to be stubborn in Irish historical writing. From 1858, physical-force nationalism in Ireland manifested


\(^3\) *Il grido del popolo* (Naples), 4 July 1881; Pernicone, *Italian Anarchism*, 189–90.

Introduction

itself through the Fenian movement. Initially hostile toward constitutional politics, the Fenians were organised hierarchically in cellular structures, or 'circles', and committed to a Blanqui-like vision of secret conspiracy that led them inevitably to action in 1867. Though their uprising failed, the Fenians displayed considerable longevity and continued to influence Irish society through entryism or the infiltration of numerous associations, from literary to sporting groups. Secular in outlook, they espoused a form of republicanism that jumbled French and American elements and mixed differing social and economic worldviews. The movement's centre of exile was often found in Paris, 'a general emporium for plots, secrets, revolutionary designs and treasonable documents', but shifted increasingly to the United States in the final third of the 1800s. Beyond Europe and the USA, Fenian organisations were found to a lesser extent in Canada, South Africa and Australasia.

The journalist Desmond Ryan (1893–1964) was arguably Fenianism's earliest historian. A student of Pádraig Pearse, one of the leaders of the 1916 rising, Ryan himself was present at the barricades in Dublin. His work, which laid down a rigorous empirical framework from which historians continue to borrow, was characterised by an affinity for his subject matter and an emphasis on the agency of key figures like John Devoy and James Stephens. Ryan's pioneering investigations were followed by studies of Fenians and Fenianism by Marcus Bourke (1967) and Leon Ó Broin (1971, 1976), but these early works neglected the skirmishing campaign, excepting only Seán Ó Lúing's biography Ó Donnabháin Rosa (1979) and Ryan’s explanatory notes in his edition of John Devoy's letters. Similarly, in the United States, historians have largely overlooked skirmishing, although an interesting analysis was made in Thomas Brown's influential study (1966), which linked Irish American nationalism to immigrants' social and economic ambitions in the host country, above their commitment to independence in Ireland. Later studies by Eric Foner (1978), Kerby Miller (1985) and Timothy Meagher (1986, 2001) challenged Brown's thesis by reorienting the focus of analysis toward the Irish American working class, revealing

---

5 Michael Davitt, Fall of Feudalism in Ireland; or, The Story of the Land League Revolution, London, 1904, 437.
significant commitments to Irish independence and also to social justice in the new home.\(^7\)

In Ireland, Desmond Ryan’s approach to the history of nationalism in some ways epitomised what the next, ‘revisionist’ generation of historians sought to counteract. In turn, their studies moved Fenian historiography in new and sometimes controversial directions. So-called ‘revisionism’ came to the fore as a challenge to an official orthodoxy that wrote histories of pious Irish heroes and little more. In time, revisionism itself became the orthodoxy, evident in the nine-volume *A New History of Ireland* (1976–2005).\(^8\) The frontlines of many revisionist clashes were found in the long nineteenth century, where historians looked for the origins of modern Irish nationalism (a tendency criticised by early modern scholars), and consequently Fenianism drew substantial attention.\(^9\) In fact, one of the more vibrant revisionist debates followed the publication of R. V. Comerford’s *Fenians in Context* (1985). Comerford viewed membership of the IRB as a release valve for young Irish men who held few opportunities for social fulfilment: ‘Fenianism found a following not because there were tens of thousands of Irishmen eager to “take up the gun” for an Irish republic, but because there were tens of thousands of young Irishmen in search of realisation through appropriate social outlets.’\(^10\) Historian John Newsinger viewed this analysis as an attempt to ‘dilute [the IRB’s] revolutionary character’, and sought to stem the tide of this new orthodoxy with his *Fenianism in Mid-Victorian Britain*.\(^11\) Yet, the debate ignored the fact that years previously, J. J. Lee, not identified as a revisionist by critics, had remarked that many volunteers

---


Introduction

found in the IRB ‘the camaraderie that helped integrate them into their new urban environment’. Though the divisions between scholarly camps were clearly marked in the Comerford–Newsinger debate, this has not always been the case.

Today, it may be argued that divisions between revisionists and their opponents, so-called ‘post-revisionists’, have been fading for some time given the paucity of scholars that openly identify themselves with either camp. Time will tell whether the decline in revisionist controversies is linked to the success of the Northern Irish peace process. During the Troubles, the topic of political violence repeatedly brought out the core divisions among historians and many debates were shaped by presentism. Historians were clearly mindful of scholarship that risked conferring legitimacy on paramilitary activity, unionist and nationalist, whilst the palpable brutality of violence in Northern Ireland, D. George Boyce argued, led to ‘distorted’ historical treatments that highlighted the proximity of past and present, instead of putting relief between them. Political violence was studied in a specifically Irish context and historians rarely looked to similar debates beyond Ireland or Britain. A narrowness was evident when ‘arch-revisionist’ Conor Cruise O’Brien recycled an old quote – ‘violence is the best way of ensuring a hearing for moderation’ – in a 1969 debate with Noam Chomsky, Susan Sontag and Hannah Arendt on the legitimacy of violent protest against the Vietnam War. O’Brien was then teaching at New York University, but when he returned to Ireland in 1969, developments in Northern Ireland led him to change his previous position and blend past and present in a moral condemnation of violence north and south of the border.

Given the centrality of political violence to scholarly debates over the past four decades, the scant attention paid to the dynamiters is all the more remarkable. Or perhaps the weight of events in Ulster best explains why the skirmishing campaign was largely forgotten, no more than a footnote in the scholarship. For some it was an unsavoury departure from a nationalist tradition that emphasised honourable insurrection and the birth of the Irish Free State, and for others its exhumation

risked gifting an historical precedent to the IRA's bombing campaigns in Britain and Ulster. While historians engaged other aspects of Irish history, the only thorough account of the skirmishing campaign was left to the New Jersey-born historian of broadcasting and Second World War propaganda, Kenneth Richard MacDonald Short.

Short’s background, both as a media historian and Anglican vicar in Oxford, made a curious pair of book and author. The Dynamite War provided a sound and stimulating account of the skirmishing campaign. Short’s use of official documents, particularly the papers of the Home Secretary William Harcourt, produced a cogent analysis of the actions of different individuals when dealing with the threat posed by dynamite bombs. Yet the sources that Short consulted also limited his analysis and resulted in a study of counter-terrorism that overlooked the dynamiters themselves. When it was published, neither Irish Historical Studies nor Éire-Ireland reviewed The Dynamite War, while elsewhere one historian unhelpfully found the study to be ‘historical froth. Short’s book contains a number of amusing stories drawn from a wide variety of sources, but serious scholarship it is not.’

The past decade has provided a rich yield of new studies on Fenianism by Owen McGee (2005), Matthew Kelly (2006), Máirtín Ó Catháin (2007) and Marta Ramón (2007), which have advanced debates considerably from previous revisionist disputes, while Seán McConville (2003) has provided a rich study of Fenian political prisoners. McGee and Kelly addressed a former gap in Irish historiography, between the years 1890 and 1916, when alliances and new programmes were remodelled and tried out. Both authors make persuasive cases for a more nuanced picture of revolutionary nationalism, degrading the ‘physical’ and ‘moral-force’ distinctions made by contemporaries and preserved by historians. They emphasise the metamorphosis of Fenianism during the period 1882–1916, but also how it remained central to Irish politics. McGee contends that physical-/moral-force distinctions were ‘verbal nonsense’ shaped by hostile propaganda, along with the term ‘Fenian’ itself. On this last point Kelly differs, arguing that ‘Fenian’

most commonly referred to as a nationalist worldview, rather than an organisation, and was readily used by IRB members.\textsuperscript{18}

The repression of the IRB, McGee concludes, did not reflect official fears about violent insurrection but elite desires, English and Irish, Protestant and Catholic, to maintain the social status quo. This threat to the social and political order derived from the Fenians’ mobilisation in terms of their democratic leanings and civic republicanism, above their commitment to insurrection. The democratic and egalitarian aspects of the IRB’s worldview are also drawn out by Ramón’s analysis of the 1850s and 1860s, when Fenians created a ‘mass democratic movement’ driven by the ‘belief that “the people” were capable of governing themselves independently from the traditional direction of their “trusted leaders”’.\textsuperscript{19} Kelly takes a more cautious view of the Fenians’ ideals and concurs with Comerford that the ‘social’ or recreational element was key to the IRB’s high levels of recruitment, as members sought ‘purpose against a background of rural and provincial tedium’.\textsuperscript{20}

Kelly understates the IRB’s republicanism in \textit{The Fenian Ideal}, though in a later essay (2009) on the 1860s, he argues that the IRB held a democratic appeal and expressed a class-based, though not Marxist, radicalism that mirrored organisations such as the Reform League in Britain.\textsuperscript{21}

Of these five publications, Máirtín Ó Catháin’s found the most room for the skirmishing campaign, exploring its appeal for Irish immigrants in Scotland. Insightfully linking skirmishing with the tradition of Ribbonism or agrarian secret societies, Ó Catháin demonstrated how working-class Fenians were alienated in the 1870s and 1880s by a staid IRB organisation that was middle class in composition, preferring the actionist policies of O’Donovan Rossa.\textsuperscript{22} Dynamite conspiracies also crop up in \textit{The IRB}, where McGee reveals how Irish American conspirators misled each other and the Dublin IRB regarding violent strategies and finances. The resulting organisational dysfunction allowed government spies to achieve prominent inside positions and incite bomb plots to discredit the movement as a whole. McGee’s empirical rigour and delicate detective work help clarify the spies and shadows of the era, adding to Christy Campbell’s \textit{Fenian Fire} (2002). Campbell examined


\textsuperscript{19} Ramón, \textit{A Provisional Dictator}, 251–2.

\textsuperscript{20} Kelly, \textit{The Fenian Ideal}, 39.


\textsuperscript{22} Ó Catháin, \textit{Irish Republicanism in Scotland}, 126–39.
Introduction 9

the roles of agents provocateurs during the alleged ‘Jubilee Plot’ to assassinate Queen Victoria in 1887, and made the disquieting conclusion that the conspiracy was manufactured by government agents and sanctioned by Conservative prime minister Lord Salisbury in order to discredit the IRB and the Irish Parliamentary Party.23

These works by McGee and Campbell greatly deepen our knowledge of the skirmishing campaign, but misgivings linger about the actual ability of agents provocateurs to manipulate Irish American nationalism as they pleased. Numerous spies infiltrated nationalist organisations but it is mistaken to overestimate their influence and understand the skirmishing campaign in these terms alone. The present study steps back from factual reconstructions of the intrigues of the dynamite campaign, as they have been adequately explored by Short, Campbell and McGee. Moreover, given the incomplete evidence available to us, it is unlikely that a definitive list of those responsible will ever emerge. There will always be doubt about the identities of the bombers and the agents provocateurs. Individuals are central to this story, such as Patrick Ford and O’Donovan Rossa, but it is also important to move away from dominant figureheads and pay attention to the diverse voices and ideas that characterised the movement. By focusing on the different groups that participated in the skirmishing campaign – leadership, journalists, operatives, supporters, sympathisers – it is possible to set out a more comprehensive portrayal of the dynamics of revolutionary organisation. Violent escalations require some kind of explanatory marker to make narrative sense as legitimate action, and it is necessary to question how the dynamiters made sense of such a contentious departure from previous tactics to themselves and their intended audience.

In discussing these aspects, this book seeks to go beyond specifically Irish contexts. Charles Townshend’s Political Violence in Ireland (1983) maintained that nationalist violence was symptomatic of social and political alienation, but also stressed that the Fenians’ commitment to violence ‘in the face of a great deadweight of reality cannot be explained by the intellectual or even the emotional power of republican ideology, but only by an inheritance of communal assumptions validating its methods as much as its ends. Indeed its methods have, at times, appeared to be ends in themselves.’24 Covering nearly 150 years of political violence, Townshend makes a convincing case that it

is impossible to ignore the influence of inherited attitudes when studying violent groups in Ireland, a view that finds echoes across several histories of Irish nationalism. Yet one wonders if tradition is stressed too strongly in the historiography, to the point that other causal factors are excluded.

It is necessary to challenge the frequent analytical collapse of militant Irish nationalism into ‘traditions of violence’ explanations, moving beyond vertical frameworks and instead investigating how the skirmishing campaign was contingent upon horizontal contexts. Though revisionist debates greatly advanced Irish historiography they also produced insular scholarship, perhaps more so on the nineteenth than other centuries. Looking back it is hard not to agree with Margaret MacCurtain and Mary Dowd’s sentiment that ‘the debate on revisionism has revealed the limited and inward looking nature of Irish historical dialogue. Few of the contenders in the debate have recommended new methodologies or fresh ways of looking at Irish history.’

The past number of years have witnessed the opening-up of a new research agenda that challenges such insular approaches. The ‘new wave’ of imperial history has advanced wider frameworks to re-examine national questions. ‘Nationalism in Ireland was not built in a vacuum’, Paul Townend contends in his 2007 essay, stressing two key points: that ‘modern Irish identities were essentially cosmopolitan, inseparable from imperial, Atlantic and European circumstances … that these identities must be analysed as relational and dynamic, not incorporated as axiomatic’. Historians of the Irish diaspora Timothy Meagher, Enda Delaney and Kevin Kenny have also compellingly argued for the necessity to measure Irish experiences within a wider framework, and the extended vistas employed in recent studies are appealing for a study of political violence. To investigate the genesis of the skirmishing campaign it is necessary to look across all the different contexts within