Introduction

This book is not a political history of Chinese security and intelligence apparatuses. Rather, it is an analysis of several interrelated issues at the intersection of security and intelligence apparatuses and elite politics. First, the book analyzes the evolution and development of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) security and intelligence organizations during the CCP revolution before 1949, as well as the practices and policies that have controlled those organizations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Second, it examines the organizations’ pursuit of social control over the Chinese populace and their influence over elite politics, a result of the privilege of virtually inscrutable authority. Third, it explores the function of the security and intelligence apparatuses as the paramount shields for protecting the regime and as potent forces guaranteeing compliance to party leadership. Last, it reveals the manner in which the CCP organizes and motivates the security and intelligence organizations to ensure effective social control and the compliance of party and state officials with party discipline. The study of these agencies serves to promote understanding of the CCP’s mechanisms for control over party members, military personnel, government officials, and the general population. In addition, this book investigates how security and intelligence apparatuses have been organized, how they have evolved, and how they have operated, with attention to the role they have played in ensuring the CCP’s political dominance. Although the role of security and intelligence agencies has largely been hidden from public view, few scholars dispute their importance in CCP politics. In the process of


2 Many China studies scholars have provided insight into the crucial role of security apparatuses in CCP politics. See Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic,
exploring these dimensions, this book highlights important historical activities and developments in China’s security and intelligence agencies, provides a compelling guide to these enigmatic organizations, and suggests a framework for future inquiry.

In the scholarship of communist politics, few institutions have received as much weight but as little weighty analysis as China’s security and intelligence agencies and their role in elite politics. Besides substantive monitoring over security and intelligence agencies by party leadership (e.g., Politburo members), there have been specific organizations within both party and army leadership that lead or guide these agencies. These organizations include the Central General Office (zhongyang bangongting), the General Staff Department (zong canmou bu) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the PLA Political Department (zong zhengzhi bu), and the General Office of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition, Chinese security and intelligence apparatuses are party and government entities that often are categorized as civilian, paramilitary, or military organizations; they therefore are tasked with domestic security and external defense missions. These organizations include the Ministry of Public Security (MPS); the Ministry of State Security (MSS); and the Chinese Armed Forces, which consists of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Because the missions and chains of command of each organization are different, some of the functions of the individual entities overlap. Given that Chinese military involvement in politics has a long tradition, the first and foremost military objective of the PLA, according to David M. Finkelstein, “is to be the guardian of the CCP.” Moreover, certain central party and governmental organizations have been involved in activities regarding China’s security and intelligence services, such as intelligence and counterintelligence, political surveillance, anticorruption, information gathering and analysis, as well as secret operations (mainly designed to exert political influence). These organizations include the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and the Ministry of Supervision;
the Central Political and Legal Commission; and several subdivisions of the CCP Central Committee, such as the Central Investigation Department (the predecessor of the MSS) and the Central United Front Department. Given that Chinese security and intelligence apparatuses are responsible for protecting party leadership, countering domestic dissent, blocking coups or mass insurrections, preventing external threats to the regime, and conducting foreign operations, they are the CCP’s ultimate instruments of state control, and they have been instrumental to the survival of the regime. Thus, it can be argued that security and intelligence apparatuses are an integral and multifaceted part of China’s political system: they suppress political opposition, unify party factions, collect information on the political opinions of the Chinese population in country and in the diaspora, and assist the party and government with member supervision and discipline.

The internal security apparatuses such as the paramilitary, civilian police, intelligence services, and civil affairs and emergency rescue forces have increasingly taken the lead in maintaining domestic social order and have facilitated the PLA’s transformation into a modern military with a predominately externally oriented mission. These apparatuses, which comprise public security bureaus, state security agencies, judicial and procuratorial organs, and PAP forces, form the first and second lines of internal security; the PLA is the third line. As Murray Scot Tanner indicates, “The Party-state’s capacity to successfully carry out its internal security mission by relying overwhelmingly upon its civilian and paramilitary security organs with only limited support from the PLA is critical to freeing the PLA to reform its overwhelming historical orientation toward ground forces, and allow it to modernize and concentrate its resources and capacity on mastering its Taiwan mission as well as its other largely externally-oriented missions.”

Specifically, the CCP has established powerful and pervasive internal security apparatuses to ensure political and social dominance, relying greatly on police forces, security apparatuses, intelligence, and justice agencies to deal with internal threats from criminals, mass protests, ethnic separatists, underground religious groups, and political dissidents. The CCP regime is convinced that strengthening internal security is critical to China’s long-term prospects for governance and stability. China’s internal security institutions encompass six broad areas. The first area includes the myriad police forces, namely, the nationwide public security agencies. Paramilitary forces, including the People’s Armed Police, the militia, and the reserve force, constitute the second area. The third area of internal security institutions is the garrison commands of the PLA and other security organizations, and the fourth area is the justice system,
which includes public security agencies, the procuratorates, the courts, and the Ministry of Justice.9 The fifth area includes the internal intelligence organizations, such as the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the military intelligence departments (organized as the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments of the PLA’s General Staff Department). The sixth area includes the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Central Political and Legal Commission, and the Central General Office, which constitute the primary coercive organizations that lead domestic security and intelligence and are responsible for the detention, corruption, and criminal investigation, party supervision, and punishment of party members. In addition, these central organizations ensure civilian oversight of army and police personnel and impose disciplinary sanctions and legal penalties on state officials and party cadres who commit disciplinary violations or crimes.

This book examines the roots of security and intelligence in contemporary China, that is, the legacy of those institutions and the practices inherited from the early communist movement of the 1920s. However, its greater purpose is to analyze how security and intelligence apparatus were created, how they evolved, how they have been shaped by party politics, and how they have influenced the politics of the party elite who wield political power in the most important party organizations Although this study seeks to provide comprehensive research from a historical perspective on China’s security and intelligence agencies, its central focus is to investigate the patterns of leadership politics from the vantage point of security and intelligence organizations and operations; it does so by providing detailed information about the structure and operation of these organizations and offering alternative interpretations of major events throughout CCP history. This theoretical and practical investigation supplies the reader with an understanding of the salient dynamics underlying elite politics. From the security and intelligence perspectives, the book specifies some of the broader implications for theory and research that help our understanding of how the security and intelligence services will develop in the future, as well as the nature of Chinese politics. This book therefore seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge regarding the role of security and intelligence organizations in the Chinese communist movement and in party elite politics.

This book makes six major contributions. First, this work is the first full-length scholarly study of Chinese security and intelligence organizations and their role in elite politics. Second, the book presents a broad comparative perspective on key mechanisms used to consolidate power and maintain political control through security and intelligence apparatuses in different communist regimes, particularly the profoundly different roles that Chinese and Soviet security and intelligence organizations have played in politics. Third, it develops an analytical framework that outlines how CCP security and intelligence

9 Although China’s criminal justice system has built-in checks and balances, the public security agencies, procuratorate, and courts collaborate with one other to meet party objectives.
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agencies function and how their operations affect party politics. Fourth, it offers case studies of the involvement of security and intelligence apparatuses in intraparty conflicts throughout CCP history; these case studies employ new empirical material that is both descriptive and analytic in terms of the various organizations’ methods, actions, influences, and relationship to elite politics. Fifth, the book highlights major implications for the future of China’s security and intelligence agencies and services. Finally, it provides a guiding framework for future research on this subject and on Chinese politics in general.

Evolution and Features

The emergence of the CCP’s security and intelligence apparatuses resulted from the abandonment of the united front between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in 1927. Although a few security and intelligence organizations had been created in the CCP-led labor unions and in the peasant associations during the early communist movement (mostly to protect regional CCP leaders in places such as Shanghai and Hunan), the CCP leadership did not establish central security and intelligence agencies until the spring of 1927, when Nationalists massacred Communist Party members, thus destroying the previous cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. These new security and intelligence organizations served to provide internal security, maintain discipline within the ranks, protect party leaders and organizations from external threats, sabotage the enemy, and punish traitors. The violence of the GMD against the CCP in the spring of 1927 catalyzed a number of underground groups, which had been formed by survivors of the persecutions and killings in GMD-controlled areas. In response to the violence, CCP leadership established a security and intelligence organization – the Central Committee’s Special Services Division (SSD, Teke) – to arrange clandestine meetings and protect party leaders and organizations. The

10 For example, the Shanghai General Labor Union was established in June 1925 following the May Thirtieth Movement, an incident triggered by anti-imperialist sentiment and fueled by the heroism and radicalism of the Chinese working class. The Department of Policing Duties was one of four departments within the Shanghai General Labor Union (which also included the departments of General Affairs, Communications, and Accounting). See Zhang Guotao, Wode huiyi [My reminiscences], vol. 2, p. 429; the departments in charge of the jiucha were also created in Guangzhou and Hong Kong after the May Thirtieth Movement. See Tian Min and Xu Jianchuan (eds.), Gonghui da cidian [The big dictionary of labor unions], p. 172.

11 Under the leadership of Chen Duxiu, the CCP followed a policy of collaboration with the Nationalists, as dictated by the Comintern. The failure of the united front resulted directly in Chen’s fall from leadership. See William Theodore De Bary, Sources of East Asian Tradition: The Modern Period, vol. 2, p. 730.

12 “Zhongguo renmin jingcha jianshi” bianxiezhu, Zhongguo renmin jingcha jianshi [A brief history of Chinese policing], p. 4; Zhongguo renmin gong’an shigao bianxie xiaoza, Zhongguo renmin gong’an shigao [Draft of Chinese people’s public security history; hereafter, Gong’an shigao], pp. 4–20.
SSD’s antiespionage network enabled the CCP to access classified information of GMD intelligence organizations and the Shanghai Municipal Police, which controlled the Shanghai International Settlement (where most of the CCP leadership was located at the time).\(^\text{13}\) These efforts were intended not only to contend with Nationalist agents and to punish communist turncoats but also as a preventive measure to intimidate those who were disloyal to the party and divulged party secrets.

In the Jiangxi base areas, where the party was to soon establish its government and consolidate control,\(^\text{14}\) the Political Security Department (later renamed the State Political Security Bureau) was created in March 1931 through a reorganization of the Commission for Suppressing Counterrevolutionaries (the leading security and intelligence organization that had been established in the base areas in 1929).\(^\text{15}\) Anti-counterrevolutionary campaigns in the base areas were launched by the CCP against opposition both outside and inside the revolutionary movement, as the CCP had suffered setbacks as a result of repeated betrayals and the exposure of underground organizations, as well as the political intrigue of noncommunist politicians against the CCP and its leaders.\(^\text{16}\) These setbacks that the CCP suffered directly contributed to the large-scale purges and killings launched by political leaders such as Mao Zedong in the Jiangxi base areas. The Futian Incident, in which thousands of Red Army soldiers who mutinied against Mao’s leadership were massacred, took place in the context of a hunt to weed out counterrevolutionaries. The CCP believed the soldiers to have been organized by the Anti-Bolshevik Corps, a secret GMD faction that sought to infiltrate the Red Army and communist base areas.\(^\text{17}\) Over time, the CCP leadership, controlled by Returned Students, a group of Chinese students who studied in the Soviet Union from the late 1920s until early 1935, sent a large number of followers to the Jiangxi base areas. The Political Security Department (PSD) and State Political Security Bureau (SPSB) of those base areas essentially copied the structure of the Soviet security services, such as the GPU (Государственный политический управление – State Political Administration) and the NKVD (Народный комиссариат внутренних дел – People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). In this manner the PSD/SPSB amassed an enormous network of agents who penetrated all levels of the Soviet

\(^{13}\) Mu Xin, *Chen Geng tongzhi zai Shanghai: Zai zhongyang teke de douzheng jingli* [Comrade Chen Geng in Shanghai: Battle experience in the Central Special Service Division], p. 22.

\(^{14}\) In the base areas, the CCP established its guerrilla army and governments by organizing the poor peasants against landlords and rich peasants, often violently.


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Republic in the base areas, the Red Army, and the party itself. The top leadership of the CCP organized the PSD/SPSB in base areas nationwide to train agents to uncover enemy intelligence; to investigate counterrevolutionary activities, espionage, and counterintelligence matters; and to solve cases related to espionage, imprisonment, and execution of anyone considered an enemy or to be training an enemy of the Soviet Republic and the Red Army.

The PSD/SPSB directly commanded local branches at the provincial and county levels and sent special representatives to handle security issues, including by spying on local party and government agencies at the district and township levels. In the Red Army, the PSD and its successor SPSB (the PSD was renamed the SPSB in winter 1931) controlled local branches of the front armies (fangmian jun), army groups (juntuan), and army corps (jun) levels; sent commissioners to supervise the officials and soldiers at the division, regiment, and company levels; and recruited a large number of the secret informers (wang yuan) to penetrate every level of the Red Army. The State Political Security Bureau often operated in secrecy for the purpose of protecting the CCP from internal and external threats. Subordinated security departments and commissioners penetrated the entire party and army organizations, holding executive powers to conduct surveillance, investigations, and arrests, as well as to detain suspected party members, army officers, and soldiers. The SPSB aimed to achieve control over every level of the CCP and the Red Army by any means possible, including military operations, torture, and execution of suspected traitors. The SPSB’s powers were unlimited and unchecked because the security apparatus received vertical commands from SPSB leadership, and local governments had no authority to intercept decisions or orders.

The use of the party’s administrative body, such as the administrative office in charge of the day-to-day operation in the top leadership to control the security and intelligence agencies, began in the winter of 1930, when Mao appointed Gu Bo, general secretary of the General Front Committee and a trusted follower of Mao, to take charge of the leadership security forces. After Mao regained his party leadership position in the winter of 1935, Wang Shoudao, another of Mao’s trusted followers and the general secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, became head of the security forces. In reality, though, the power was in Mao’s hands. Following the Sixth Central Committee Plenum in 1938, in

18 The Chinese communists split with the nationalists due to the failure of the First United Front in 1927, the CCP fled from the cities to the countryside, where it founded the semi-autonomous “Chinese Soviet Republic” as well as its local governments.
20 Gong’an shigao, p. 27.
22 In October 1935, Mao appointed Wang Shoudao, Mao’s longtime trusted follower and the director of the Central Secretary Office, to take charge not only of the confidential materials and communications of the top leadership but also of the SPSB. See Zuozhi shi ziliao, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 87; Fei Yundong and Yu Kuihua, Zhonggong misbu gongzuo jianshi, 1921–1949.
October 1939, the State Political Security Bureau was abolished and the Social Affairs Department (SAD) was established as the party’s leading body for handling security and intelligence for the CCP. The SAD was the Politburo’s chief security organization, and it exercised control over both internal and external functions of the party’s security, such as protecting party leaders and agencies; conducting surveillance of party members, government, and military organizations; and undertaking espionage operations. As part of the SAD’s emphasis on intelligence and espionage, it was also responsible for training security and intelligence personnel. For this purpose, it operated the Northwest Public School, a secret school in Yan’an. The power of the SAD increased in 1941 with an all-out intelligence campaign directed against the Japanese in addition to operations directed against the GMD. The power of the SAD was also enhanced by the Yan’an rectification campaign in which Mao consolidated his ideological domination of the Chinese communist movement and his position of preeminence in the CCP, especially when the campaign escalated into a violent hunt for enemy spies. The violent rectification campaign contributed to overwhelming paranoia in the base areas, where the situation was already tense because of military pressure from the Nationalists. The campaign was a positive-sum game for Mao and Kang Sheng, Mao’s “pistol” who had been trained by the Soviet secret police in Moscow before returning to China. Unlike the SPSB, which retained a segmented structure and reported along a vertical chain of command, the activities of the SAD were governed through a complex two-tiered system that horizontally linked area, or “host,” party committees with SAD organizations at each level of administration. Even with this additional accountability to party committees, SAD organizations were still under the professional guidance of the next-highest SAD agency. Local party committees were granted control over internal security forces as a result of the party’s effort to promote checks and balances for the highly centralized, independent, and secretive Soviet-style internal security system. This was also one of Mao’s strategies to undermine the influence of Zhou Enlai and Zhou’s followers such as Li Kenong who dominated the central security apparatuses. As such, the origins of local party committee control over internal security, according to Tanner and Green, “lie in classic ‘crisis learning’ – a major,
self-inflicted security crisis the Party faced in the late 1930s that caused it to 
reject USSR-style security work.”28

The Central General Office (CGO) was founded in Yan’an in 1940 and 
1941, when the party was establishing rules and regulations in an effort to 
“straighten out” the relationships among the various departments of the CCP 
organs.29 The goal was to improve the management of logistics and supplies; 
to systemize and standardize administrative work for all CCP organizations 
in Yan’an; and to strengthen preexisting regulations regarding the supply and 
allocation of archives, finances, accounting, and critical party documents.30

More important, the CGO was responsible for leadership communication, 
management of the flow of classified and unclassified documents among top 
leaders, security for top leaders, leadership offices and activities, arrangement 
of party meetings, and the security of top leaders’ residences and travels. 
These responsibilities and activities demonstrate the CGO’s key role in serv-
ing top leadership and managing the sensitive administrative and logistical 
affairs of the entire CCP leadership. Throughout its existence the CGO has 
been a top administrative body of the party bureaucracy: it is the communi-
cation center for top party leaders and the central party apparatus, it coor-
dinates policy implementation and leaders’ important affairs, and it serves 
as a center for providing luxurious benefits and security for high-ranking 
leaders.31

The evolution of the CGO reflects the development of Chinese elite poli-

tics: from Mao’s reliance on statecraft, coercion, ideology, and charisma to 
Hu Jintao’s emphasis on power sharing, consultation, and consensus building. 
Between the 1950s and the early 1960s, the CGO was the top administrative 
agency that served the Politburo and CCP leadership, including the paramount 
leader, Mao Zedong. Although the CGO was the nerve center that helped Mao 
communicate with and control high-ranking leaders, it was for the most part 
directly commanded by top party organs, such as the Politburo and the Central 
Secretariat. As consensus had been a primary principle of party leadership, 
the indiscriminate use of the CCP’s top organs and security apparatuses in 
elite conflicts went against party dogma. The Great Leap Forward was disas-
trous for the Chinese economy, and thus created a near-irreconcilable conflict

28 Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local 
Control over Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” in Donald C. Clarke (ed.), 

29 See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [At the side of a colossus: Memoirs of Shi 
Zhe; hereafter, Shi Zhe huiyilu], pp. 161–5.


1989,” in Kenneth Lieberthal (ed.), Perspectives on Modern China: Four Anniversaries, 
p. 91.
between Mao and party bureaucrats in the early 1960s. If Mao’s withdrawal from some leading posts (e.g., PRC chairman) and willingness to share responsibilities with his associates in the late 1950s derived from his initiative to release some of his tedious and time-consuming duties while maintaining the monopoly of his undisputable power, his withdrawal from party leadership after the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962 was because many party leaders at different levels questioned his ability to lead the national economy. Although Mao was still venerated as the father of the revolution and there was no split in the top party leadership, his influence on economic policy had been greatly eclipsed, and many high-ranking leaders viewed him as unqualified to lead the nation’s economy. A strong sentiment within the leadership was that China’s economic policy needed to be revised and authority over party bureaucrats restored. These sentiments were most strongly voiced by the frontline leaders, headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, in an attempt to lead a multidimensional “rectification” and economic adjustment. Their attempts inevitably offended the frustrated Mao, who, because of his responsibility for the disastrous radical economic policy, was cut out of the state’s planning process. In addition to Mao’s emphasis on the importance of ideology (e.g., that the CCP should never forget the class struggle), which helped him return to the political arena, Mao attempted to maintain control over high-ranking party leaders by dominating the CGO, the CCP organ that had been the key administrative and service body for frontline leaders since the 1940s. The dismissal of Yang Shangkun, director of the CGO at the time, was undoubtedly part of Mao’s plan to secure control over the high-ranking leaders. With control of the CGO, Mao could indiscriminately use his personal security forces, retain control over the frontline leaders and party bureaucracy, and monopolize access to intraparty communication. The CGO served as Mao’s personal tool during the Cultural Revolution; he called on the CGO when he needed assistance commanding the radical mass movement, protecting his personal security, ensuring his dominance over party leadership, punishing or rewarding high-ranking leaders, and controlling those deemed radicals. The CGO’s role changed significantly after the arrest of the Gang of Four — a group of Maoist radicals, including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan — and the leadership conflict between the senior veterans, led by Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng’s neo-Maoist faction. In the post-Deng era, all paramount leaders have taken an

33 Ibid., p. 186.
34 Liu Yuan and He Jiadong, “Siqing’ yituan” [Doubt about the “Four Cleanup” campaign], in Wang Guangmei and Liu Yuan (eds.), Nisuo bu zhidao de Liu Shaoqi [Liu Shaoqi, whom you don’t know], pp. 95–6.
35 Ibid.