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978-1-107-02300-0 - Representation and Inequality in Late Nineteenth-Century America: The Politics of Apportionment

Peter H. Argersinger

Excerpt

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Introduction

“Gerrymandering has become so common,” declared Allen B. Morse, Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court in 1892, “that it threatens not only the peace of the people but the permanency of our free institutions.”¹ This book is a study of what so alarmed Justice Morse and many other Americans in the late nineteenth century: apportionment, political volatility, and the endangered institutions of American representative democracy. Informed by the new institutionalism, a scholarly approach that first emerged in related social sciences, it regards those institutions as including not merely formal organizations such as legislatures and parties but the various informal rules, procedures, practices, and beliefs that establish enduring patterns of political behavior. Such institutions obviously provided political actors with both capabilities and constraints and thereby shaped the interests and conduct of party leaders, public officials, and voters as well as the nature and resolution of political conflict. At the same time, however, they not only structured political actions but were themselves subject to change through creative decisions, deliberate actions, or external pressures, evident in the very fact that they were the products of earlier and perhaps controversial decisions, actions, or pressures. One scholar has aptly described this historical process as the continuing “dialectical interplay of meaningful decisions and structural constraints.”²

¹ *Giddings v. Blacker*, 52 N.W. 944, 948 (Mich., 1892).

² For accessible introductions to the origins, varieties, and implications of this analytical approach, see James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York, 1989); Rogers M. Smith, “Political Jurisprudence, the ‘New Institutionalism,’ and the Future of Public Law,” *American Political Science Review* 82 (Mar. 1988): 89–108 (quotation 103); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (New York, 1992), 1–32; David Brian Robertson, “The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in American Political Science,” *Social Science History* 17 (1993): 1–36; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Miller (New York, 2002), 693–721.

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By this more comprehensive definition, representative democracy is itself an institution, not merely particular organizational forms but an enduring set of beliefs and a persisting pattern of discourse about voting and government that shape political decisions and rhetoric but which are themselves subject to modification under certain critical conditions. Similarly, partisanship – in the late nineteenth century very much an inherited structure of convictions and attitudes – is an important institution that influences political behavior by denigrating political opponents and reinforcing party voting but which can deteriorate and lose salience in particular circumstances. So, too, do legal ideologies constitute institutional constraints on both litigants and judges while remaining open to revision through personal reinterpretation and dissent or external political pressures.

Historians have devoted varying degrees of attention to some of the more formal political institutions considered in this volume. Given the partisan nature of the polity in the late nineteenth century, political parties generally proved most influential. They dominated the political system, establishing many of its structures and rules, mobilizing and representing its electorate, and guiding its legislative and administrative activities. Legislatures, responsible for public policy, were by far the most important branch of state government. Their changing rules and procedures, committee structures and leadership roles, norms of behavior and other organizational characteristics often channeled legislative activity as readily as did party influences, legislators' personal attitudes, and constituent expectations. Governors have received less scrutiny, except as individuals – perhaps not surprising given their often limited power at the time. One governor of Ohio, lacking the veto power and confined to dealing with “small questions,” consoled himself with the thought that his office required “not too much hard work” while giving him “plenty of time to read, good society, etc.” Governors of other states, however, often wielded far more authority and influence in representing both their office and at least some part of the electorate. Attorneys General have been even more neglected by historians, but they had the responsibility to represent not only state officials but the public interest in litigation, while providing advisory opinions to legislatures, governors, and at times courts as well.³

Courts themselves played a large role in politics in the late nineteenth century, and politics played a large role in courts. Scholars have recognized courts as political institutions, particularly emphasizing their actions in overseeing economic regulation, and have analyzed the effects of judicial norms, legal traditions, and other institutional features in shaping judicial behavior. Few,

³ Ari Hoogenboom, *Rutherford B. Hayes: Warrior and President* (Lawrence, KS, 1995), 215, 233. A recent study emphasizing the domination of parties during this period is Mark Wahlgren Summers, *Party Games: Getting, Keeping, and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004). Two excellent studies of lawmakers during this time are Ballard C. Campbell, *Representative Democracy: Public Policy and Midwestern Legislatures in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA, 1980) and Philip R. VanderMeer, *The Hoosier Politician: Officeholding and Political Culture in Indiana, 1896–1920* (Urbana, IL, 1985).

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however, have regarded courts as institutions of representative government. Even in the late nineteenth century there were judges who dismissed that notion. Federal Judge J.M. Love of Iowa, for instance, insisted vigorously that “the people have no right to be represented in a judicial proceeding. The very idea of popular representation in a judicial proceeding is a false and odious idea.” Maintaining that legislative and judicial functions differed significantly, he declared that “the people ought of right to be represented in the making of the laws, but not in their administration by the courts.” But the very vehemence of his condemnation of the idea revealed that many other Americans did at times regard courts as representative institutions. Nominated by party conventions and elected on partisan ballots, state and local judges were often viewed (and sometimes saw themselves) as representatives of their parties. In some instances, judges were also regarded as representatives of particular geographic areas, even when elected at-large rather than by districts. And famously, some judges were considered, rightly or wrongly, as representatives of corporate interests while, in contrast, other judges emphasized their representative role for farmers and workers. Judges who had previously held other representative offices, especially in the legislature, as was common in the period, or who aspired to do so in the future were sometimes particularly responsive to their party and the electorate while on the bench. Of course, the conditions and cases in which judges might be expected to respond to constituents were limited, but in some instances, as one prominent legal scholar declared in 1893, the courts “claimed to be themselves the official guardians of the political interests of the state.” Judges did not always hold the same conception of their role as did other politicians or their own constituents, the principles of electoral accountability and judicial independence obviously clashed, and the proper scope of judicial power was a contested question, but certainly courts were influenced by their political context even as they, in turn, influenced the political environment. And courts, like parties and legislatures, had institutional interests they sought to preserve, if not enhance.⁴

⁴ J.M. Love, “The Election of Judges by the People for Short Terms of Office,” *Southern Law Review*, N.S. 3 (Apr. 1877): 26; John Mayo Palmer, “The Courts and Political Questions,” *Northwestern Law Review* 1 (May 1893): 122. For the important administrative role of the judiciary in a “state of courts and parties,” see Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (New York, 1982). A good introduction to the variety of institutionalist analyses of the judiciary is Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, *Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutional Approaches* (Chicago, 1999). For the representative role of judges, see Melinda Gann Hall, “Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,” *Journal of Politics* 54 (May 1992): 427–46; and idem, “Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States,” *American Politics Quarterly* 23 (Oct. 1995): 485–503. For important studies of a later period indicating the wide variety of types of cases over which judges divided along partisan lines, see Stuart S. Nagel, “Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions,” *American Political Science Review* 55 (Dec. 1961): 843–50; Sidney Ulmer, “The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court,” *Journal of Public Law* 11 (1962): 352–62; Kathleen L. Barber, “Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan,” *Case Western Reserve Law Review*

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The political institution most important to this study, the one at the center of the conflict and accommodation involving the others, is the system of representation and apportionment, particularly its most obvious component – congressional and legislative redistricting within states. This system deals with the very substance of political power and is central to democratic institutional arrangements. It establishes rules for the allocation of representatives; decides which groups or individuals effectively participate in elections; affects government stability by influencing turnover; shapes legislative performance by facilitating or impeding the creation of effective legislative majorities; helps determine the responsiveness of legislators and other officials to public opinion; and influences the construction and implementation of public policy. That it can at times have such consequences quite independently of changes in popular voting behavior simply emphasizes its influence in determining the possession, distribution, and exercise of political power.⁵

Despite its central importance to American politics, however, historians and political scientists have nearly completely ignored the role of apportionment in the nation's history. As Erik Engstrom has observed, "Almost everything that is known about the causes and consequences of gerrymandering comes from research conducted on the redistricting cycles that have occurred since the court-led reapportionment revolution of the 1960s."⁶ This neglect is remarkably curious, particularly for the late nineteenth century, when apportionment issues consistently dominated politics, disrupted legislatures and courts, enraged voters, and provoked constitutional crises. Apportionment was more than the elephant in the room of late nineteenth-century American politics, looming over and powerfully affecting nearly every activity while going unmentioned, for it regularly engrossed political discussion and often commanded public attention – at times even threatening, as Justice Morse feared, "the peace of the people." Historians' failure to address or even recognize the issue may suggest that they have mistakenly regarded apportionment as a given, merely the standing external framework within which the familiar and exciting politics of campaigning and elections takes place; worse still, it may suggest that they have implicitly assumed the existence of a democratic system of representation in which election results and government policies simply reflect public opinion; or it may suggest only that they have erroneously expected that apportionment as a topic would involve dull and dreary or, more accurately, interminable research. In any event, this neglect

20 (1969): 401–21. For a contemporary view of state supreme court justices as representatives of geographic areas, see *Autobiography of Roujet D. Marshall, Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin* (Madison, WI, 1923), I, 489–510.

⁵ See Peter H. Argersinger, "The Value of the Vote: Political Representation in the Gilded Age," *Journal of American History* 76 (June 1989): 59–90.

⁶ Erik J. Engstrom, "Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century," *American Political Science Review* 100 (Aug. 2006): 419.

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has left both their descriptions and their explanations of American politics incomplete and flawed.⁷

For Americans in the late nineteenth century, apportionment linked together nearly all aspects of politics: electoral rules and voting behavior, surely, but also political parties, party officials, and partisan editors; legislatures, Congress, and the courts; governors and presidents, attorneys general and judges; political ideology and political culture. It provided the link between voter behavior and political power and public policy. Far more than the mundane mapping of districts by self-interested legislators, apportionment was an issue, at base, of political legitimacy, where Americans wrestled with beliefs about equity and democracy.

By focusing on apportionment, then, this book does more than introduce an important new subject for historical analysis. It provides a valuable new perspective on American political history generally while also examining crucial aspects of political institutions that previous historians have overlooked and contributing to the study of electoral politics, legislative behavior, legal history, and political reform. Remarkably, given how intensely scholars have studied the crucial 1890s, it also reveals that dramatic conflicts over apportionment, perhaps even more so than the currency question or ethnocultural issues, actually dominated the divisive politics of that decade. Indeed, much of what appears in this book will prove not merely unfamiliar but startling.

Fierce struggles over apportionment and representation broke out in nearly every state during the late nineteenth century, but they took on extraordinary significance in the Midwest, where a particular constitutional and electoral context established important constraints and opportunities and where their resolution had momentous consequences for American politics in the twentieth century. Committed to the ideals of republican government and equal representation, Midwestern voters increasingly found that fierce partisanship produced apportionment laws that more subverted than implemented their valued principles. By distributing political power unequally among both individuals and parties, apportionments raised questions about the legitimacy of

⁷ A particularly telling example of historians' neglect of apportionment is the otherwise excellent book, *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History*, eds. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian Zelizer (Princeton, NJ, 2003). While admitting its indebtedness to the new institutionalism in its concern for "the interplay between specific contingent factors and large structural forces," and while examining "basic questions of who would be represented and how," "the mechanisms linking enfranchised citizens to political leaders," "the relationship of political elites to the voting public," "the changing meaning and mechanisms of representative government," the "mediating institutions that connected citizens to elected officials," and "the challenge to translate democratic preferences into public policy" (pp. 1–3), the book completely ignores apportionment, key to all such considerations. Even the most recent, and very valuable, encyclopedia of American political history contains no entry for apportionment or gerrymander. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of American Political History*, eds. Michael Kazin, Rebecca Edwards, and Adam Rothman (Princeton, NJ, 2010).

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political institutions and even the effectiveness of the very right to vote. By the 1890s, growing tensions challenged established patterns of political behavior – in the electorate, parties, legislatures, and courts – and precipitated intense conflicts scarcely hinted at by Justice Morse’s ominous worries about popular unrest and political instability. By destroying “the rights of the people” through virtual disfranchisement, otherwise sober observers warned, gerrymandering raised the specter of “the red rag, the rope, and the mob.”⁸

Political institutions structured this expanding conflict and thereby influenced its outcome but were themselves often dramatically changed in the process. Evaluating their shifting environments, political leaders made strategic decisions that, in turn, provoked other responses and accommodations in a dynamic interplay of constraints, decisions, and consequences that, as Morse recognized, imperiled America’s most important political values.

After losing intense electoral and legislative battles over apportionment, Republicans in state after state opened a new front in another political arena – the courts. Despite the prevalent belief that apportionment laws were not justiciable, state supreme courts overturned them in shocking decisions that the justices themselves saw as opening a new era in political history and challenging public attention as no opinion had for many years. Rather than resolving the issues of apportionment, however, judicial intervention prolonged and even intensified the political conflict and uncertainty, plunging states into turmoil, provoking bitter contention with governors and legislatures, and causing widespread public confusion and anxiety. Where some thought that an expanded political role by a newly responsive judiciary could allay public fears, protect political rights, and assure equal representation, others saw in “judicial usurpation” a step toward political chaos, undermining traditional power relationships, established prerogatives, and even the survival of the government itself. Zealous antagonists on each side exploited the situation, seeking to develop, obstruct, or apply new practices and rules in pursuit of long-standing goals, while making the politics of apportionment increasingly volatile in electoral, legislative, and judicial behavior.

Ultimately, America’s political ideal of representative democracy was frustrated by its own political institutions. The traditional constitutional apportionment principles requiring contiguous, compact districts of equal population did not address the partisan factors that propelled gerrymandering; judicial restraint helped return political power over apportionments from the courts to legislatures and parties; constitutional amendments shifted representation from a population to a geographic basis; partisanship drove governors and legislatures to outmaneuver the courts by exploiting the judicial precedents of the 1890s in order to entrench gerrymandering as a basic and profoundly undemocratic feature of American politics. The result in the twentieth century was increasing inequities in representation and the perpetuation of virtual

⁸ George Raymer to Andrew J. Turner, Nov. 16, Dec. 3, 1891, Andrew J. Turner Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

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disfranchisement coupled with decreasing popular concern with key issues of representative democracy, which had previously dominated the polity.

One point of emphasis and one caveat. First, institutional imperatives constrained but certainly did not fully determine political developments. Party officials worked to advance party interests, but they did not always reach the same conclusions as to what they were or how to achieve them. Governors sought to protect the executive's prerogatives but took into account varying political and personal factors in exercising their authority. Legislators attempted to construct safe districts but had to reconcile conflicting ambitions and interests and differed as to which election returns were most predictive. Procedural rules typically structured legislative activity, but they were sometimes ignored or overridden by particularly forceful speakers responding to other pressures, concerns, or plans. Legal ideologies and the institutional integrity of the courts weighed on judges, but so did varying partisan issues, public cares, and personal understandings. In short, it was the interaction between institutional factors and the persisting opportunities for political agency and choice that shaped the complexities of the politics of apportionment and gave them much of their unsettling nature.

The caveat: This book's focus on the relentless, at times obsessive, struggle over apportionment, especially when it absorbed nearly all of the time of state legislatures, may seem to revive the older view of politics in the late nineteenth century as simply an empty struggle for office, devoid of both issues and principles, with few real differences between the major parties. But apportionment was often directly linked with important policy issues, which similarly often turned on partisan lines. The future of both tariff and prohibition legislation, for instance, the first in Congress, the second in state assemblies, was widely viewed as dependent on controlling the districting of representatives. Apportionment helped determine control of the legislature, which would then determine other issues. At the same time, however, apportionment was itself widely regarded as a crucial political issue. While not part of either of the conventional categories of distributive or regulatory legislation, it was a key part of governance policy, the rules applying to government institutions. And in many ways, governance policy is more important than so-called substantive policies, for ultimately it deals with the structural conditions for democracy.⁹ As all recognized in the late nineteenth century, apportionment set the boundaries not just for districts but for the nature of representative democracy, the actual value and meaning of the vote for millions of Americans, and therefore the legitimacy of the government itself. This larger significance explains the concentrated ferocity of the battles in the politics of apportionment.

⁹ For an overview of the interaction between public policy and institutional factors in the politics of this period, see Peter H. Argersinger, "The Transformation of American Politics: Political Institutions and Public Policy, 1865–1910," in *Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775–2000*, eds. Byron E. Shafer and Anthony J. Badger (Lawrence, KS, 2001): 117–47. For governance policies, see Caroline J. Tolbert, "Direct Democracy and Institutional Realignment in the American States," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall 2003): 468.

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“Injustices and Inequalities”

The Politics of Apportionment, 1870–1888

After six weeks of bitter wrangling and the “threatened effusion of blood over the apportionment muddle,” reported the *Madison Democrat* in February 1882, the state legislature had finally agreed upon the composition of “the committee to gerrymander Wisconsin.”¹ The newspaper’s easy equation of apportionment with gerrymandering reflected both political practice and popular perceptions, but its matter-of-fact reporting of bitter conflict also revealed the keen interest both politicians and the public took in apportionment and related questions of representation in the late nineteenth century. No other issue, except perhaps the conjoined one of the election of United States senators, so absorbed the time, attention, and passions of state legislators; few, if any, regularly provoked more popular concern. At stake were not merely legislative and congressional seats but important policy issues and, as most Americans realized, questions of the efficacy of popular voting and the ability of American political institutions to implement and sustain the nation’s democratic principles.

Conflict over apportionment and representation, of course, reached deep into national history. Indeed, political leaders had adopted the practice of manipulating district lines well before the word “gerrymander” was introduced in 1812 to describe the contorted, salamander-like apportionment of Massachusetts approved by Governor Elbridge Gerry. With the rise of the competitive two-party system from the late 1830s onward, disputes over apportionment often intensified, shaping party formation and organization, influencing campaigns and elections – even propelling some states into constitutional revisions, as in North Carolina, where critics condemned the prevailing system as “anti-republican, unjust, and oppressive.” Contention over reapportionment raged so strongly in 1842 that Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and other states actually had to postpone their congressional elections to the following year. In many states, Democratic gerrymanders contributed to dramatic Whig electoral defeats. Wherever Whigs held political power they imposed their own gerrymanders. In Ohio, for instance, the 1848 Whig legislative apportionment

¹ *Madison Democrat*, Feb. 10, 16, 1882.

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was so partisan that Democrats declared it “a plain act of revolution”; in Tennessee, the Whigs’ 1853 “Henrymander” of congressional districts, named after its promoter, Gustavus Henry, effectively legislated Democratic leaders out of office.²

But despite these early political clashes, momentous political, economic, and social developments made conflicts over apportionment and representation particularly widespread and serious in the late nineteenth century. Political parties, led by a professionalizing elite, became increasingly institutionalized (popularly called “machines”), and organization politics placed a premium on details, none of which was more important in commanding the political arena than actually shaping that political arena through apportionment and districting. Rapid industrialization and urbanization, swelled by mass migration both from abroad and from the American countryside, created a vastly expanded and more disparate electorate, as did the establishment of black suffrage. Such forces both threatened to disrupt the traditional allocation of political power and increased the incentives for controlling apportionment, which everywhere became a focus of political and ideological controversy.

In congressional debates over apportionment, members argued over the political effects of mathematical principles, demanded protection of their states’ number of representatives, proposed schemes of minority representation, and exhibited such intense feelings that the House often became, as one horrified observer reported in 1882, “a mob” and “disorder became disgraceful.” Apportionment not only determined the power of different states in Congress but, because it allocated electors as well, directly affected the election of the president. Indeed, the peculiar apportionment of 1872, adopted in violation of the prevailing law mandating the method of allocating seats, was directly responsible for the 1876 election of Rutherford B. Hayes with a popular vote minority. Had the previous method been followed, even the Electoral Commission would have been unable to place Hayes in the White House. The 1872 apportionment also had important policy consequences.

² There is no systematic modern study of apportionment and gerrymanders for the antebellum period, but Elmer C. Griffith, *The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander* (Chicago, 1907) is still valuable for the period before 1840. Michael Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York, 1999) provides valuable analysis of the political effects of several reapportionments; see, e.g., 151–54, 157–60, 163. Other works that note significant apportionments include Ronald P. Formisano, *The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s–1840s* (New York, 1983), 112, 115–16, 329–30; Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era* (New York, 1966), 66, 344–45; Thomas E. Jeffrey, *State Parties and National Politics: North Carolina, 1815–1861* (Athens, GA, 1989), 54, 63, 66; Stephen E. Maizlish, *The Triumph of Sectionalism: The Transformation of Ohio Politics, 1844–1856* (Kent, OH, 1983), 122–23, 128–29; Paul H. Bergeron, *Antebellum Politics in Tennessee* (Lexington, KY, 1982), 122, 124. For a study of constitutional changes in the allocation of congressional representation, not congressional districting, see Charles A. Kromkowski, *Recreating the American Republic: Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change, and American Political Development, 1700–1870* (Cambridge, 2002).

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Reflecting demographic changes, it shifted political power from the East and thereby pushed the disruptive money question to the fore.³

Apportionment and districting also increasingly dominated state politics, often with further consequences for national politics. In much of New England, the fixed apportionment of legislative representatives, based on the traditional town, guaranteed the supremacy of small towns and rural interests over those of the city, of Yankee Protestants over Catholic immigrants, and not incidentally of Republicans over Democrats. Such “constitutional disfranchisement” of large numbers of voters generated bitter disputes, with demands for democratic electoral reform confronting fears of “the masses of ignorant voters in the cities.” Not surprisingly, the State Democratic Club condemned Connecticut’s government as “more unrepresentative than that of Spain, more undemocratic than that of Italy.” New York did not have a fixed apportionment of representatives, but its Republican legislators responded to the same demographic and political dynamics by simply refusing to reapportion in order to protect their own “rotten boroughs” upstate, a refusal that Democrats protested as striking at “the very root and foundation of representative government.” Nor were political effects merely local or regional. Time after time in the late nineteenth century, Republican senators elected by the malapportioned legislatures of northeastern states, in which a plurality of voters were Democrats, determined the control of the U.S. Senate and provided decisive votes on congressional roll calls over tariff, currency, pension, and other legislation. No wonder Southern Democrats complained that the North’s system of representation made “the ballot of a person living in one place five or perhaps ten times as powerful as in another place.”⁴

Republicans also gained advantages in the West. By admitting new, sparsely populated states into the Union, they increased their representation significantly in the Senate and the Electoral College and slightly in the House. From Nevada and Nebraska in the 1860s to Idaho and Wyoming in 1890 – all with much smaller populations than any non-Western state – Republicans eased, as one senator conceded, “the pathway of rotten boroughs into the Union.” By creating such overrepresented districts (i.e., states), under certain Republican control, they fashioned virtual gerrymanders as effective as more typical ones. Indeed, at times, Republican national supremacy depended on such overrepresentation. Apportionment within the Western states sometimes produced another form of political conflict, as newly settled areas protested their lack of representation under districting laws enacted earlier. In 1878, four western

³ *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1882, 1; *Congressional Record*, 41 Cong., 2 sess., 4735 and 46 Cong., 3 sess., 350–53; Michael Balinski and H. Peyton Young, *Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote* (New Haven, CT, 1982), 37; Nicolas Barreyre, “The Politics of Economic Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and the Realignment of American Politics,” *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 10 (Oct. 2011): 413–14.

⁴ Peter H. Argersinger, “The Value of the Vote: Political Representation in the Gilded Age,” *Journal of American History* 76 (June 1989): 59–90; *Hartford Daily Courant*, May 8, 1891; *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1877, 2.