



## *Public Forces and Private Politics in American Big Business*

What are the political motivations behind firms' decisions to adopt policies that self-regulate their behavior in a manner that is beyond compliance with state, federal, and local law? *Public Forces and Private Politics in American Big Business* advances a new understanding of the firm as a political actor that expands beyond the limited conceptualizations offered by economists and organization theorists. Timothy Werner develops a general theory of private politics that is tested using three case studies: the environment, gay rights, and executive compensation. Using the conclusions of these case studies and an analysis of interviews with executives at *Fortune* 500 firms, Werner finds that politics can contribute significantly to our understanding of corporate decision-making on private policies and corporate social responsibility in the United States.

TIMOTHY WERNER is an assistant professor of business, government and society at the University of Texas at Austin, where he teaches courses on corporate political strategy, and business and public policy. He previously worked as a legislative and regulatory analyst for a major energy firm, which inspired him to place the investigation of corporations' private political decision-making at the heart of his research.

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# Public Forces and Private Politics in American Big Business

TIMOTHY WERNER

*The University of Texas at Austin*



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