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Grand Strategy between the World Wars

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The turbulent two decades between the end of World War I and the outbreak of World War II represent a period of broken balances, when the global and regional balances of power shattered by war never fully reconstructed. Indeed, the balance remained broken in several ways. The United States, the most powerful actor in the world, failed to play a balancing role commensurate with its power from its failure to ratify the 1919 Versailles Treaty until its late entry into World War II. The Soviet Union, after its political revolution of 1917, was relegated to the sidelines of international diplomacy, preventing it from having a major effect on the international balance of power. Germany, which was kept artificially weak by the disarmament and territorial amputation clauses of the Versailles Treaty, eventually slipped its shackles, once again breaking the fragile equilibrium on the European continent. Great Britain and France, both economically devastated, struggled to maintain adequate geopolitical power to maintain the ephemeral post–World War I order. Japan emerged to dislodge the European states as the principal power in East Asia. These broken balances posed serious challenges for the great powers, each of whom was compelled to devise grand strategies under spectacular constraints in order to navigate this turbulent period in world history.

This era of broken balances, which British diplomat and historian E. H. Carr aptly called the Twenty Years’ Crisis, has had a profound impact on the study of international politics and the practice of statecraft.¹ Now that decades have passed since these events, analysts have both the objectivity of temporal distance and a greater range of primary-source materials to shed light on the events of the interwar years. The time is ripe for

a reassessment of great power politics and grand strategy during that important era.

Nonetheless, a skeptical reader picking up this book might ask three questions. First, what is the relevance of the interwar period to contemporary international relations? After all, the challenges facing the United States and other states in the twenty-first century, such as terrorism, global climate change, ethno-nationalist conflicts, cyber attacks, and nuclear weapons proliferation, are fundamentally different from the challenges the great powers of Europe and East Asia confronted in the 1920s and 1930s. Today the risks of great power war are lower than at any other time since the emergence of the modern state system in the seventeenth century. Political scientists, historians, economists, and policy makers disagree on the causes of the present “deep peace” among the great powers: a unipolar international system; nuclear deterrence; globalization and complex economic interdependence; the emergence of a security community of liberal democracies; a dense network of regional and global international institutions to facilitate cooperation in security and economic matters; the triumph of market capitalism and liberal democracy over Marxism and totalitarianism; or a combination of factors. Regardless of the cause, however, the fact remains that the age of territorial conquest, expansion, and great power war appears to be over.

Second, a skeptic might doubt whether there is anything left to learn about international politics and the grand strategies of the great powers in the interwar period. Everyone knows that the flawed peace settlement that ended the Great War of 1914–1918 sowed the seeds for the outbreak of a vastly more destructive war twenty years later. The territorial amputations, heavy reparations, the war guilt clause, and disarmament imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty delegitimized the fledgling Weimar Republic, embittered the German people, and paved the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. Moreover, appeasement and endless concessions enticed Nazi Germany to make greater and greater territorial demands in Central and later Eastern Europe. The story of

the 1930s is one of illegal rearmament and opportunistic expansion by Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the one hand, and feckless, shortsighted, and uncoordinated responses by Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, on the other hand, all of which took place against the backdrop of the Great Depression.

Finally, a skeptic might question the necessity of a book on the interwar period given the obvious and easy parallels to the contemporary period. In the aftermath of the September 2008 financial panic, some commentators, as well as respected economic historians and political scientists, have asked whether the United States, the members of the European Union, Japan, and other advanced industrial states risk repeating the mistaken fiscal and monetary policy of the 1920s and 1930s. Others have compared the United States today to the British Empire in the early part of the twentieth century: America is a proverbial “Weary Titan” that “staggers under the vast orb of its fate,” to quote the metaphor used by British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain to describe Britain’s strategic predicament in the aftermath of the 1898–1902 Anglo-Boer War in South Africa. Parallels that have been drawn include the Great Depression of the 1930s and the global financial crisis that began in 2008, the return of ethnic tension (in Russia, China, and Iraq), the perceived failure of international institutions, competition for scarce natural resources (especially oil and rare earth metals), and whether negotiation with Iran and North Korea over their respective nuclear weapons programs is tantamount to appeasement. Yet, these comparisons oversimplify many of the distinctions between these periods. Today, the United States is not isolationist but a global hegemon. The distribution of power is unipolar, not multipolar. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial panic, there has been significant cooperation among central bankers and global financial institutions instead of a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor economic and commercial policies of the 1930s.

So do we need a book on grand strategy between the world wars? The editors of, and contributors to, this volume believe we do, for five reasons. First, the tangible consequences of the interwar period continue to shape

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various aspects of international relations in the twenty-first century. For example, the 1975–1990 civil war in Lebanon between that country’s Sunnis, Shiites, Maronite Christians, and Druze; the ethno-nationalist civil wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s; and the large-scale violence among the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds of Iraq in 2006 and 2007 are the direct result of the treaties of Saint-Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, and Lausanne that divided the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires after World War I. Likewise, the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has its origins not only in the contradictory promises made in the 1914–1916 McMahon-Hussein correspondence and the 1917 Balfour Declaration, but also in the 1920 San Remo Convention that awarded the League of Nations’ mandate over Palestine to Britain. Indeed, the international institutions that predominate in today’s international system owe their origins to ideas that spawned the United Nations and lessons learned from its implementation. Given its enduring impact on contemporary international relations, it is important for international relations scholars to understand the history of this era to avoid flawed contemporary policy prescriptions based on mistaken interpretations of the past.

Second, there are some common themes that emerge when comparing the interwar years and the contemporary period. Both periods have witnessed major shifts in the distribution of power, which contributed to a broken balance in the interwar years. The rise of Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union, together with the decline of Britain and France, upset the existing European balance. Moreover, financial concerns delayed major military rearmament in Britain, while domestic constraints delayed American entry into the war. In the contemporary period, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union again altered the balance of power. In the 1990s, there was domestic and financial pressure on the U.S. government to scale back its global commitments and enjoy the

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5 The consequences of the interwar period are also evident in technological advances such as transoceanic and transcontinental aviation, radio, and television; in basic research in the fields of biology, chemistry, and physics; in advances in military technologies and doctrine; in the relationships between the state and society and between state institutions and economic activity; in the emergence of the United States as a net lender and the strengthening of internationalists and overseas interests such as the Council on Foreign Relations and its journal, Foreign Affairs, Wall Street as a lender and foreign investor, international finance, and export industry; and in the first stirrings of nationalist independence movements that would end the British and French colonial empires. Many of these developments would not be manifest until after the outbreak of World War II and especially the 1950s. Nonetheless, the interwar period laid the foundations for the military, political, ideological, and technological revolutions that continue to reverberate today. Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988), 59–90.
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peace dividend. The United States faces similar pressures today, as the Obama administration tries to simultaneously draw down troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the defense budget, and yet maintain U.S. leadership across a variety of regional and international issues ranging from the so-called Arab Spring, to famine relief in Somalia and Kenya, to the growth of Chinese military power in East Asia.

Moreover, both periods have experienced a cycle of economic prosperity and economic weakness. Periods of prosperity and growth in international trade were followed by a return to economic nationalism. As in the 1930s, contemporary trade, debt, and currency disputes could impair cooperation in other areas of economic policy, such as sanctions against Iran or even national security cooperation among the great powers. Finally, both periods experienced the emergence of weak but newly democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe, and the emergence of new potential great powers whose rise was possible but uncertain (Soviet Union then and China now). Of course, the two eras are not identical, and we should not overstate the similarities. To be sure, the Great Depression was far more severe than the global economic crisis of the 2010s, and the coordinated response to the latter is a substantial, self-conscious innovation. Moreover, economic nationalism and great power military competition in the 1930s was far more extreme than the geopolitical posturing and soft balancing in the era of American hegemony. Nonetheless, these similarities increase the relevance of the interwar years for the analysis of contemporary international politics.

Third, the lessons, analogies, and metaphors from the interwar years have guided successive generations of decision makers in the assessment of threats, the formulation of grand strategies, and the mobilization of domestic (and often international) support for those strategies. Consider, for example, the resilience of the general injunction against accommodating expansionist states or authoritarian leaders. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden drew an explicit parallel between his experience with Hitler in the 1930s and his present confrontation with Egypt’s president Gamal Abel Nasser over control of the Suez Canal. He wrote, “It is important to reduce the stature of a dictator at an early stage.” Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, President George H. W. Bush stated, “If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. . . . Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.”

Admittedly, with each passing year, the number of people with any direct experience of the interwar period diminishes rapidly. Yet, the “lessons” of the interwar period seem to resonate with the generation of leaders born after 1945. For example, President George W. Bush, speaking to the Israeli Knesset in May 2008 about negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, warned of the “false comfort of appeasement which has been repeatedly discredited by history.”

British Prime Minister Tony Blair drew a more nuanced analogy between the appeasement crises of the 1930s and his government’s support for the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in the House of Commons on March 18, 2003: “There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 1930s. No one here is an appeaser. Nevertheless, the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, we know what happened. We can look back and say: there’s the time; that was the moment; for example, when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis – that’s when we should have acted.”

The enduring relevance of “lessons” from the interwar period extends to how leaders interpret events, formulate a range of responses, and mobilize support for the economic components of grand strategy, namely foreign economic policy and monetary policy. The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, especially the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), stemmed from the lessons that the British and American policy makers drew from the collapse of international trade and finance during the Great Depression (e.g., German reparations, Inter-allied war debts, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, Dawes and Young Plans). A similar concern motivated the Truman administration’s European Recovery Program (better known as the Marshall Plan) and the Dodge Plan. Although the 1975 oil crisis was the catalyst for French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to invite his British, (West) German, and U.S. counterparts to an economic summit at Rambouillet, it is reasonable to infer that

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what has since evolved into the Group of Eight (G-8) forum represents another mechanism for advanced industrialized states to prevent a repetition of the beggar-thy-neighbor trade and monetary policies pursued by the great powers after 1929.\footnote{Charles P. Kindleberger, \textit{The World in Depression, 1929–39}, rev. and enlarged ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).}

The public pronouncements and policy responses of several U.S., British, and German leaders to the global economic crisis that began in the fall of 2008 also reveal a fixation with averting the perceived mistakes of the interwar years. For example, in an unprecedented televised interview on CBS's \textit{Sixty Minutes} in early 2009, Benjamin Bernanke, the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, drew an explicit analogy to the 1930s. He, like many other economic historians, believes the Federal Reserve helped turn the recession set off by the October 1929 stock market crash into a global depression. “They [his predecessors] made two mistakes,” Bernanke argued. “One was they let the money supply contract very sharply. Prices fell. Deflation [followed]. So monetary policy was, in fact, very contractionary. . . . And then the second mistake they made was they let the banks fail. They didn't make any strong effort to prevent the failure of thousands of banks. And that failure had terrible effects on credit and on the ability of the economy to right itself.”\footnote{Scott Pelley, “CBS 60 Minutes Interview with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke; Interviewer: Scott Pelley,” Federal News Service, March 15, 2009.}

Later in this chapter, we highlight some of the pitfalls policy makers and scholars encounter in relying on the lessons of the interwar period to diagnose current problems and/or to garner support for their preferred policies. Our point here is merely to illustrate the continued relevance of the period to contemporary foreign policy debates.

Fourth, the interwar period has had a profound effect on the development of the international relations subfield of political science. International relations, as distinct from political science, history, philosophy, law, and public administration, gradually emerged in North American research universities and colleges after World War I. It only achieved widespread recognition as a separate discipline on par with the other social sciences after World War II.\footnote{The popular characterization of the discipline of international relations emerging \textit{ex nihilo} in 1945 in the United States is simply incorrect. For example, the Department of International Politics opened at the University College of Wales Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University) in 1919. In the United States, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts College (now Tufts University), the first graduate school of international relations, opened in 1933.} One can debate the veracity of Stanley Hoffmann’s oft-cited characterization of international relations as
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an “American social science.” However, Hoffmann does identify two contradictory impulses on the parts of policy makers and scholars that contributed to the field’s emergence and subsequent development after 1945: “renewed utopianism, as exemplified by plans for a postwar international organization; and a mix of revulsion against, and guilt about, the peculiar prewar brew of American idealism (as symbolized by the ‘non-recognition’ doctrine), escapist isolationism (the neutrality laws), and participation in appeasement.”

The two contradictory impulses Hoffmann identifies stem from unresolved (and perhaps irresolvable) debates about the determinants of the grand strategies of the great powers in 1920s and 1930s, and what steps, if any, the United States, Britain, and France might have taken to prevent another major war. These debates helped define many of the major branches of international relations theory (or research programs) during the Cold War, including classical realism, classical liberalism, deterrence theories, power transition theories, neorealism (offensive and defensive realism), neoliberal institutionalism, democratic peace theory, and commercial liberalism. In the language of positivist methodology, each school identified different variables and causal mechanisms it believed to have been responsible for the instability of the interwar years and the outbreak of World War II: the clash between revisionist and status quo great powers and the unwillingness of liberal democracies to pursue the strategies necessary to maintain the balance of power; the collapse of international trade and finance; the absence of effective international institutions and the inability (or unwillingness) of Britain or the United States to play a hegemonic role in the world economy of the 1920s and 1930s; the war-proneness of multipolar international systems versus bipolar ones and the propensity of states to engage in buck-passing and chain-ganging, instead of balancing, under multipolarity; the power transition between a declining maritime hegemon (Britain) and a rising land power (Germany); and the failure of Britain and France to uphold their strategic commitments to small allies and carry out threats in the appeasement crises of the 1930s.


14 Hoffmann, “An American Social Science,” 43–44.

15 The international relations literature on each of these supposed causes of the instability of the interwar period and the outbreak of World War II is simply enormous.
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study international politics, it is essential to make certain that the historical interpretations that underlie contemporary theoretical constructs are sound, or else the whole theoretical edifice may be flawed and in need of revision.

Fifth, whereas the causes of World War I have long loomed large in the international relations subfield of political science, the grand strategies of the great powers during the interwar period have received less attention of late.\footnote{On the centrality of World War I in the development of international relations theory, especially defensive realism, see Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007), 155–191.} Perhaps this is not surprising. As one of the contributors to this volume, Dale Copeland, observes elsewhere, the outbreak of World War I (especially the July 1914 crisis) is the most analyzed and contested case in international relations scholarship. “Given its complexities, practically any theory – whether at the individual, domestic, or system level – seems to find some empirical support.”\footnote{Dale C. Copeland, Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 56.} Conversely, there is a temptation to view the interwar period as simply the prelude to the “inevitable” outbreak of World War II and the Cold War, or to view the two world wars as a single event interrupted by a twenty-year pause.\footnote{The long-cycle theory and power transition theory literatures treat the 1914–1945 period as single global war fought between Great Britain (the declining hegemon and a maritime power) and Germany (the rising challenger and a land power). See, for example, George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); George Modelski and Sylvia Modelski, eds., Documenting Global Leadership (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); George Modelski, “Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3 (September 1996): 321–342; Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, The Great Powers and Global Struggle 1490–1990, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994); William R. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics, 1st ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988).}

As others have observed, some of the extant literature in both international history and international relations on the interwar period veers between two extremes: “great leader” centrism and structural determinism.\footnote{See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 188–189; and Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy for World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 2–3.} The leader-centric camp sees the interwar period and the outbreak of World War II as a type of “epic morality play” dominated by a cast

Space considerations prevent us from citing even a representative sample of the relevant literature.
of “larger-than-life characters”: the Devil (Hitler), the lesser demons (Josef Stalin, Benito Mussolini, and Tōjō Hideki), the sinners (Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier), the false prophets (Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin), the hypocrites (David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Konoe Fumimaro), and the saviors (Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill). In this view, the Devil (Hitler) was the necessary and sufficient condition for the outbreak of World War II.

One can make a similar criticism about works that assign sole responsibility for the crises of the 1920s and 1930s to particular leaders. Such arguments privilege human agency over structural conditions and ideational factors that were crucial antecedent conditions for the foreign and security policies the great powers pursued, as well as for international systemic outcomes. While it is useful to conduct plausible counterfactual scenarios about a discrete sequence of events during the interwar period or for a particular foreign policy decision (e.g., what if Chamberlain had not acquiesced to Hitler’s demands during the 1938 Munich Crisis, or what if British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had not resigned in 1936), it is very difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a plausible and useful counterfactual when the explanation of a historical event or sequence of events is complex (e.g., would World War II have occurred if Churchill, instead of Chamberlain, had been Britain’s prime minister in September 1938, or would the 1936 Rhineland crisis have occurred if Franz von Papen and not Hitler had become chancellor in January 1933).

20 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 2.
21 On the orthodox scholars’ characterization of the outbreak of World War II and the interwar period as a morality play, see J. L. Richardson, “New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations,” World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988), 289–316. See also Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 3.