INTRODUCTION

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 The Early Career of Demosthenes

Demosthenes (D.) was born in 384 to a prominent and wealthy family.[1] His father died when he was a child, in 376, and his earliest speeches were prosecutions of his appointed guardians for financial mismanagement of the estate, delivered in the late 360s, after he had reached the age of majority in 366.[2] Although the suits appear to have been successful, much of the money and property could not be recovered, and D. apparently published his early speeches against his guardians as a vehicle to launch his career as a speechwriter (a λογογράφος) for hire.[3] This work was lucrative; D. acquired the means to make substantial tax contributions to the city, both by paying special war levies for several years (the εἰσφορά), and by funding a ship in the Athenian navy as a voluntary trierarch in 357.[4] A few items in the Demosthenic corpus are perhaps speeches of this sort from early in his career; their content provides no reason to believe that D. (if he wrote them) had any ulterior personal or political motive beyond earning his fee.[5]

D. continued to write speeches for others in private court cases in the 340s, while at the same time cultivating a public role as a politician.[6] He composed speeches for several prosecutions in public cases of γραφὴ παρανόμων, in which he charged that other politicians had passed improper measures (3.12n. παθεῖν).[7] Cases of this sort, concerned with the general laws of Athens, were high-profile; D.'s involvement in them signals a move toward a political career. Three of these orations were written for others to deliver in court, but they differ from the private court

[1] D. was son of Demosthenes of the deme Paiania: *LGPN* s.v. 37, *PAA* 318625; also *APF* no. 3597. For a general discussion see MacDowell 2009: 14–58. Details of D.'s early life can be gathered from Plutarch's biography (Lintott 2013: 47–81), the anonymous life preserved in [Plut.] *Mor.* 844a–8d (see Roisman et al. 2015: 211–46) and from the Demosthenic speeches against his guardians (or. 27–31, MacDowell 2004: 9–11, 19–83).

[2] Or. 27–8: 364/3; or. 29–31: 362/1.

[3] Carey and Reid 1985: 18–19.

[4] D. 21.157, 161. D. had borrowed money to serve as trierarch in 364/3 (D. 28.17). For these types of service see 1.6n. χρήματα, 2.30n. τριηραρχεῖν.

[5] Usher 1999: 184–9 discusses 41 and 55 as speeches that D. wrote as a λογογράφος prior to his trierarchy in 357. There are, however, stylistic reasons for doubting D.'s authorship of both: McCabe 1981: 170.

[6] Surviving speeches written by D. for the court cases of others in the 340s: or. 39 (348/7) and 38 (346 or later). Other speeches unlikely to have been written by D.: 40 (347), 43 (late 340s), 48 (343/2 or 342/1).

[7] Or. 20 and 24 were written for a different, but related, legal procedure, the γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι. See Canevaro 2016b.

cases in that D. is able to discuss issues of public import, such as the public finances, the rule of law, and foreign policy.[8] During this period D. began to address the δῆμος directly on political matters, first in a public prosecution, and in the following years in speeches to the Assembly.[9] These speeches cover a variety of topics, and what links them is D.'s effort as a budding political advisor with the best interests of the city at heart; as in his recent public prosecution speeches, he continues to focus on public finance and foreign policy. In *Against Leptines* (or. 20) he argued against a proposal to curtail honorary exemptions from taxation; he maintained that the financial benefits accruing from the objectionable proposal were small, and that the measure would discourage benefactors and harm the city. In *On the Symmories* (or. 14) D. proposed reforms to the system for taxes and military funding as a response to the threat of Persian interference with Athenian allies.[10] And in *For the Megalopolitans* (or. 16) he argued that it was in the interests of the Athenians to prevent Sparta from dominating neighboring states in the Peloponnese.

At the end of the 350s D. commenced a series of Assembly speeches against Philip, which will be discussed below (Introd. §1.3), after a consideration of Philip's activity during the period leading up to the debates regarding him in Athens (Introd. §1.2). To conclude this account of D.'s activity prior to his focus on Philip, it should be observed that D. continued to address other topics in the Assembly even after taking notice of Philip. Indeed, in *For the Freedom of the Rhodians* (or. 15), delivered in 351/0, the year after the first *Philippic*, he advocated support for exiled Rhodian democrats opposed to the newly established government in Rhodes that was backed by the Persian king. In one brief aside he even suggested that Philip posed little threat to Athens.[11]

In summary, the first decade of D.'s career as an orator finds him engaged with various topics, private and public, both working as a speechwriter for hire and speaking in his own voice on key political issues, including, but not limited to, the question as to how Athens should respond to Philip of Macedon. Although D.'s positions in these early political speeches evince a real effort to serve the city, it is clear that he was not a prominent

[8] Public prosecutions written for others: 22 (355/4), 24 (353/2), 23 (352/1); for an overview see Canevaro 2015: 326–8. Dion. Hal. *Amm.* 1.4 presents the chronology for D.'s early public prosecutions and Assembly speeches; for a full discussion see Sealey 1955.

[9] Or. 20 (355/4) is a prosecution. D.'s earliest Assembly speeches are or. 14 (354/3) and 16 (353/2). Or. 13 is Demosthenic in style (McCabe 1981: 170); if it is authentic, it may have been delivered in 353/2. Or it may be a third-century pastiche of Demosthenic material: Sing 2017.

[10] For the symmories see 2.29n. πρότερον.

[11] D. 15.24. Dion. Hal. *Amm.* 1.4 provides the date, which has been doubted (Trevett 2011: 257–8) but is supported by historical detail in the speech (Badian 2000: 31–2).

leader in Assembly debate, and the policies he advocated may not have been realistic or well conceived; his speech *Against Aristocrates* (or. 23) does not notice Philip as a threat to Athenian interests in the Chersonese, and *For the Megalopolitans* perhaps misjudged the political situation in the Peloponnese.[12] These strengths and weaknesses would be visible in his later speeches too, after he focused his attention on Philip.

1.2 Macedon and the Rise of Philip

Macedon was a Greek kingdom extending northwest from the Thermaic Gulf, bordered by Thessaly to the south, Illyria to the west, Paeonia to the north, and Chalcidice and Thrace to the east.[13] It stood apart from other Greek states in various ways: it was ruled by a king, who held sway among a group of lesser tribal kings and leaders; the basis of the status of these men was their ability on the battlefield and in the hunt; settled cities were fewer in number, smaller in size, and established later than elsewhere in Greece. Macedon during the classical period is reminiscent of Homeric Greece, where local warrior kings banded together to fight for the cause of a powerful leader. Athenian critics focus on these distinctive aspects and ignore the Hellenic heritage of the Macedonian royal house; D. characterizes Philip as a violent tyrant opposed to Greek values (1.3n. τὰ δ', 2.18n. τήν, 9.16n. τό).

Philip II was born in 383 or 382, the third son of the Macedonian king Amyntas III.[14] After his father's peaceful death in 369, his two elder brothers ruled in succession. The eldest, Alexander II, was assassinated by a rival for the throne, just a year or two after his father's death. The next son, Perdiccas III, eventually consolidated his rule in 365 after a period of strife, only to die in battle against the Illyrians in 359. Philip inherited a kingdom that was politically unstable and threatened by its neighbors.

The situation was pressing, and from the start of his rule Philip devoted himself to training and leading a capable military force; his position depended entirely on its support. Its effectiveness was demonstrated quickly, as Philip defeated a royal pretender, Argaeus, close to home in 360 or 359, and then led campaigns against the Paeonians and Illyrians in order to secure the state's mountainous borders to the north and west.[15] These regions were the source of the most immediate and urgent threats, and once they had been stabilized, he was able to direct his attention to the east and south. From these quarters there was less fear of imminent

[12] Cawkwell 1978: 79–80.
[13] Macedon is the political state, Macedonia the geographic region. On the Greek ethnicity, see 3.16n. βάρβαρος.
[14] For a succinct biography see Heckel 2008: s.v. Philip [1].
[15] *HM* 210–14, Cawkwell 1978: 29–30.

invasion; rather Philip stood to gain material resources along with further stability on his borders.

To the east, the city of Amphipolis was strategically located not far from the mouth of the river Strymon; it was one of the few places where armies could cross, and the river provided access to valuable mines and timber. The Athenians had founded a military colony there in 437/6, only to lose it in battle with the Spartan general Brasidas in 424; they aspired to reestablish their presence in the years leading up to 357 (2.2n. πόλεων). To this end, they had supported the pretender Argaeus, and their fleet had gained control of the important northern port of Methone.[16] Philip was eager to reduce their influence in the region, and, according to D., he took advantage of their interest in Amphipolis by offering control of the city to them if they did not interfere with his assault on it, and if they would refrain from aiding their ally Pydna when Philip proceeded to march on it (1.5n. Ἀμφιπολιτῶν, 2.6n. τῶι). If there was such an agreement, Philip declined to keep it.[17] After his capture of Amphipolis his position was stronger, and the Athenians became tied down with the Social War.[18]

Philip took the opportunity to subdue and detach three key maritime positions from the Athenian alliance. Between late 357 and early 354 he gained control of Pydna and Methone, which were in the heart of Macedonian territory, just south of the royal cities, while also moving against Potidaea, on the Chalcidice (1.9nn.). He formed an alliance with the Chalcidian League, and by offering the League control of Potidaea he sought to reduce the prospect of Athenian influence in the Thermaic Gulf (2.1n. τάς).

In the late 350s Philip extended Macedonian control further south. Several considerations may have motivated him: he may have worried that conflicts between Thessaly and Pherae could destabilize his southern frontier; or he may have been drawn by the military capability of the large and skilled corps of Thessalian cavalry; perhaps he saw the potential advantages that the port of Pagasae offered. His support of the Thessalians in the third Sacred War against Pherae and Phocis prolonged that conflict and enabled him to pursue his goals in the north without worrying about interference from the south.[19] As part of this effort on behalf of Thessaly, he suffered his first military setbacks with a pair of losses to the Phocian general Onomarchus in 353. But after regrouping over the winter he gained a decisive victory at the battle of the Crocus Field in 352, which extended his sphere of influence into Thessaly and allowed him to gain and keep control of Pagasae (2.7n. Θετταλούς, 2.14n. νυνί).

[16] Heskel 1996.
[17] On the alleged pact see de Ste Croix 1963. D. consistently refers to Philip's seizure of Amphipolis as the beginning of war with Athens: 4.25n. Φιλίππωι.
[18] Cf. 3.28n. οὓς. [19] On the third Sacred War see Introd. §1.3.

These conflicts brought Philip into direct contact with central Greece, and that narrative will be continued in the next section. In conclusion to this account of Philip's activity over the years leading up to the first *Philippic*, we should add that Philip was considering expansion to the east too already in the 350s. In 356, after the capture of Amphipolis, Philip had established a settlement at Philippi in Thrace; later, in 352, after the victory at the Crocus Field, he initiated a siege of Heraion Teichos, on the shore of the approach to the Hellespont, but is reported by D. to have abandoned the mission due to illness (1.13nn. τούς and ἠσθένησεν). Philip's activity in central Greece and Thrace anticipates his direction in the 340s.

1.3 D., Athens, and Philip

Following Philip's victory over Onomarchus in 352, before his attempt on Heraion Teichos, he marched on the pass at Thermopylae, where he was met by Athenian forces and rebuffed without an engagement (1.13n. πάνθ', 1.26n. ἐάν). Philip also provoked the Athenians in late 352 with raids on their territories in the northern Aegean, at the islands Lemnos and Imbros, and on the coast of Attica itself at Marathon (4.34nn. εἰς Λῆμνον and εἰς Μαραθῶνα). His support of the Thessalians in battle against Pherae and Phocis involved him closely in the affairs of central Greece; these states had been opponents in the third Sacred War since 355 (3.8n. ἀπειρηκότων). Philip's role in ending that war in 346 will be considered below in this section as a defining moment in his relations with Athens, and in the career of D.

These provocations and, more generally, the future threat that Philip posed to Athenian interests, were the context for the debate in Athens at which D. delivered his first *Philippic* in 352/1.[20] At the start of the speech D. describes it as his first foray into the question of policy regarding Philip, and there is no clear indication of a precise point in time for the debate. Philip had not yet attacked Olynthus, but the Chalcidian League was increasingly wary of his intentions after he failed to keep his promise regarding Potidaea (D. 4.4, 2.1n. τάς), and they provoked him by harboring his step-brothers, rivals for the throne.[21] D.'s proposal to locate a permanent fleet in the north was unrealistic and unfeasible, due to the lingering financial pressure in the aftermath of the Social War. Instead, the Athenians decided to dispatch a small fleet with Charidemus at this time, though its departure was seriously delayed (D. 3.5).

Such a small force was unable to prevent Philip's operation against the cities of the Chalcidian League, and during the year leading up to his

[20] For the date and context see Badian 2000: 33–4, Cawkwell 2011: 370–7.
[21] *HM* 315, Harris 46.

siege of Olynthus in 349/8 he conducted an offensive campaign against the smaller cities of the League (2.1n. δύναμιν, 9.26n. δύο). After these cities were reduced, Olynthus was in a very weak position. D. presents their appeals for an alliance with Athens as an opportunity to stop Philip in the north and prevent him from renewing his attempts on central and southern Greece (D. 1.2–9, 25). The Athenians made a formal alliance with the Chalcidian League, and approved three separate forces to come to the aid of Olynthus that year (3.6n. παντί). D.'s three *Olynthiac* speeches address the question of aid for the Chalcidian League during the siege of Olynthus.[22] The Athenians' first two forces appear to have achieved little, and the third fleet arrived too late.[23] Philip destroyed the city and enslaved its inhabitants.[24]

After destroying Olynthus, Philip was in firm control of neighboring regions. He had already shown interest in extending his reach into Thrace, a territory with abundant natural resources and access to the Hellespont. The Athenians had long laid claim to the Chersonese, which was vital for the security of the grain trade from the Black Sea on which the city depended, and Athens had recently made an alliance with various kings in the region.[25] Philip saw that diplomacy could smooth his path in Thrace, but the Athenians were slow to respond to his overtures. However, in 346 the Athenian politician Philocrates passed a decree in the Athenian Assembly to initiate the peace process; after a period of protracted negotiations, Philip and the Athenians agreed to peace and an alliance.[26] D. was one of the ambassadors who negotiated the terms, and for a brief period he put aside his hostility to Philip and supported the peace.[27]

At the same time, Philip took a role in the Sacred War. His previous support for Thessaly aligned him with Thebes in opposition to Phocis. When in mid-346 the Phocian leader Phalaecus was forced to flee central Greece after being abandoned by his Athenian allies, Philip granted him safe passage. The Phocians had no choice but to surrender and agree

[22] It is tempting to take D.'s three *Olynthiacs* as documents from the three debates in which the Assembly decreed to send forces to support Olynthus. However, the speeches are too vague about their precise context and specific proposals to permit such an assumption. Discussions of the chronology have pointed to changes in tone and focus among the three speeches, but none of these differences amount to compelling evidence for a particular sequence; they could be placed in any order. See Tuplin 1998: 276–80.

[23] Sealey 138–43, Cawkwell 2011: 381–7.

[24] On current excavations at Olynthus see sites.lsa.umich.edu/olynthos-project (accessed August 11, 2017). Cf. 9.26n. Ὄλυνθον.

[25] *IG* II^2 127 = *GHI* no. 53. Cf. 9.16n. βασιλεύς.

[26] For the detailed terms see 9.1n. τήν.

[27] In late 346, in *On the Peace* (or. 5), he advises the Athenians to abide by the arrangement they have made with Philip and to wait for the right moment to go to war (5.17 ὁ μέλλων πόλεμος).

to the harsh terms set by the Amphictyonic Council. Philip probably welcomed the advantages granted to the Thebans, while the Athenians saw their hopes and expectations thwarted (9.11nn. εἰς and ἤριζον). In addition to this tension, the Athenians were frustrated by Philip's renewed activity in Thrace beginning earlier that year (9.15nn. Σέρριον and τούς). The peace had become an embarrassment to Athens, and in later years, D., among others, denied his own culpability during the peace process and accused his fellow ambassadors of corruption. The year 346 marked an important development in D.'s policy: he began to blame his political opponents in Athens for Philip's success (9.53n. μισῆσαι).

To Philip, the resolution of the Sacred War offered a new basis for power in central Greece. He assumed the seat of Phocis on the Amphictyonic Council, and at the Phocians' behest he sent a deputy to preside at the Pythian Games in 346 (9.32n. τίθησι). He was given special privileges in consulting the oracle at Delphi, which was a mark of his new standing in Greece (9.32n. τήν). More significantly, he now had control of Thermopylae, which made it possible for him to intervene readily in Greek affairs (9.32n. Πυλῶν). He demonstrated his power in central Greece by reorganizing the political system and installing military garrisons in Thessaly by 344 (9.26nn. οὐχί and τετραρχίας). He took an interest in the Peloponnese, where he sought to diminish the power of Sparta by supporting Argos and Messene (9.17n. τά). Outside of Athens, Philip came to be seen as a powerful ally, who could guarantee the independence and autonomy of smaller cities.[28]

D. presents these activities as evidence of Philip's disregard for the peace, but his perspective did not win approval in the Assembly until later. In 344 he went on a diplomatic mission that seems only to have prompted Argos, Messene, and Philip himself to complain to the Assembly about Athenian meddling and collusion with Sparta.[29] On that occasion D. delivered the second *Philippic* (or. 6), in which he decried Philip's plans to isolate Athens, and complained that the peace had helped Philip and was a hindrance to Athens (e.g., D. 6.7, 28–36). In the aftermath of this debate disagreement about the Athenian commitment to the peace grew. Philip proposed modifications that were rejected in Athens; furthermore, there were new efforts to undermine public confidence in the peace: Philocrates was prosecuted as a traitor in 343, and in the same year D. accused his political opponent Aeschines of corruption during the negotiation of the peace.[30] Philocrates fled Athens, and Aeschines was narrowly acquitted; this is an indication of how closely divided the city was over the issue.

Athenian dissatisfaction did not hinder Philip's efforts in Greece. According to D., in 343 Philip installed his partisans in the Peloponnesian

[28] Cawkwell 1963: 203. Cf. Plb. 18.14 on the Peloponnesians and Philip.
[29] Harris 110–12. [30] Harris 112–15.

city of Elis and, closer to Athens, at Megara (9.17nn. τά and Μεγάρων), and he was behind political revolutions in Euboea that began at this time (9.33n. τοὺς μέν, 9.58n. Ἱππόνικον, 9.59n. Φιλιστίδης). In early 342 Philip descended from Epirus toward the Ambracian Gulf on what was likely an exploratory mission; the Macedonians did not try to hold the position after the Athenians displayed their readiness to resist the incursion into western Greece (9.27n. πρότερον). Philip instead turned his attention to Thrace, and that brought him into direct conflict with the Athenians, who had sent their general Diopeithes to protect a military colony in the Chersonese in 343 (9.15n. οὔπω).

Philip's campaigning in Thrace from 342 added greatly to the tension with Athens arising from the recent political revolutions in various Greek cities. This tension is the background to the two speeches that D. delivered in the first part of 341. In *On the Chersonese* (or. 8), he defends Athenian activity in the region (9.2n. τούς), and then, not much later, in the third *Philippic*, he insists that the Athenians should regard Philip's activities as open warfare, and that they should send diplomats around Greece and mobilize a sizable force to join Diopeithes and fight Philip. Unlike in his earliest speeches against Philip, with the third *Philippic* D. succeeded in convincing the Athenians to follow his advice. At the end of 341, by D.'s proposal, embassies were dispatched, and an alliance was made with Callias of Chalcis that removed the tyrants in Euboea (9.71n. εἰς, 9.59n. οἵπερ).

Direct engagement with Philip was soon to follow. The third *Philippic* marked a turning point in D.'s career. The δῆμος followed his call to abandon the peace and commit to war with Philip. The king himself adopted a more aggressive stance too, first in 340 by attacking Athenian allies along the grain route at the Hellespont and impounding an Athenian transport ship, and then in 339 by invading central Greece and threatening Athens.[31] D.'s most glorious political act, in his own view at least, was brokering the alliance between Thebes, Athens, and other Greeks who fought Philip at Chaeronea in 338 (D. 18.153, 211–26). The result was a disaster for Athens, but the city stood by D.; he received honorary crowns and was chosen to give the funeral oration over the many who had died in battle.[32] The defeat ended Athens' role as a leading power in Greece. Yet, for the rest of his career, D. defended the policy of military resistance that he had

[31] Harris 124–33, Sealey 187–98, *HM* 566–81, 585–603.

[32] *On the Crown* (or. 18) is spoken in defense of a proposal to crown D. made by Ctesiphon after the battle. In that speech he refers to a similar decree before the battle, sponsored by Demomeles and Hyperides (D. 18.223–4). An extensive fragment of Hyperides' speech regarding that crown has been recovered from the Archimedes Palimpsest (Carey et al. 2008). D. was proud of his selection as orator over the war dead (18.285), and the funeral oration preserved in the Demosthenic corpus (or. 60) is likely to be authentic; see Herrman 2008.

long espoused in the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* by arguing that the Athenians had no alternative but to fight for the liberty of Greece, just as they had done in the Persian Wars.[33]

2 ASSEMBLY SPEECHES

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, a handbook on persuasive discourse, distinguishes three types of oratory, which differ according to the speaker's purpose and institutional context: forensic (or dicanic) speeches present accusations or defenses regarding past actions in a courtroom context; display (or epideictic) speeches praise or blame the present condition of their subject in the context of a formal ceremony or a rhetorical performance; deliberative (or symbouleutic) speeches advocate policy regarding future events at a political meeting such as the Athenian Assembly (Arist. *Rh.* 1.3.1–2 [1358a–b]).

The Assembly (ἡ ἐκκλησία) met in the open air at the Pnyx, a hill near the Agora and Acropolis in central Athens. Meetings were held at least 40 times per year, and the Assembly was the main democratic body in Athens, making policy decisions on a wide range of topics, including war and peace, public finances, and foreign diplomacy.[34] The agenda for each meeting was set in advance by the Council (ἡ βουλή), a group of 500 annually appointed representatives of the citizenry, and a rotating subset of the Council officiated at the Assembly meetings (9.60n. πρυτανευόμενοι); any citizen could debate or propose motions to be decided upon by the collective body of citizens in attendance (ὁ δῆμος), who typically numbered at least 6000 (cf. 2.29n. ῥήτωρ). Decisions were determined by majority vote, as demonstrated by a show of hands, but extensive debate and other institutional measures were designed to achieve a large degree of consensus among voters.[35] Meetings began with a public sacrifice (2.1n. τήν), and then speakers were invited to address the points on the agenda, with priority given to older speakers; in practice, there seems to have been a small number of 10 or 20 frequent contributors at any particular time, and a large number of men who spoke more rarely (4.1n. οἱ).

The surviving texts of the Attic orators preserve examples of the three types of speeches distinguished by Aristotle, but deliberative oratory is the least well represented.[36] The Demosthenic corpus includes 15 speeches addressed to the Athenian Assembly, and those works are the

[33] Yunis 2000.

[34] General background: Hansen 1991: 125–60, 1987. Frequency and schedule of meetings: E. M. Harris 2006: 81–120.

[35] Canevaro 2018, 2019. See also 3.4n. θορύβου, 9.38n. τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[36] The bulk of these texts are forensic speeches; surviving display speeches include the Athenian state funeral orations and most of the writings of Isocrates.

best sources for the nature of Assembly speeches, though there are serious limitations to their value as evidence: most speeches were written by a single politician; they concern a narrow range of topics; and they are chronologically concentrated, covering a relatively brief span of time. Let us consider these difficulties, and then look at other sources of information on oratory in the Assembly, before concluding with a brief assessment of what we can learn from these speeches.

13 of the 15 Assembly speeches in the Demosthenic corpus were composed by D.[37] The two remaining speeches must have been included in the corpus by an early scribe or editor because they concern war with Philip (or. 7) or his son Alexander (or. 17), or simply because they are Assembly speeches. They are similar in policy and outlook to the other speeches by D., though they differ in style and tone. Or. 7 addresses the same points as does the second *Philippic*, and it adopts an even more aggressive stance toward Philip in 344 (cf. 9.72n. Ἡγήσιππος). Or. 17 is later, probably from 331, and it too calls for the Athenians to abandon the terms of their alliance with Alexander and go to war.[38] Thus all these Assembly speeches reflect the perspective of D. and his political allies in opposition to Macedon. Or. 17 is the only surviving speech that was delivered after the period from 354 to 340.

No earlier Assembly speeches survive among the works of the Attic orators,[39] and it is likely that D. was innovative in his decision to circulate written versions of the speeches he made in the Assembly.[40] The surviving speeches must have been selected deliberately: they are thematically linked and represent two important phases of D.'s career. Or. 13–16 were designed to establish a place for D. among the politicians of Athens; older speakers spoke first at Assembly meetings, and in these written speeches the young D. takes an opportunity to show how he handles key questions of finance and international relations. Or. 1–6 and 8–10 all focus on Athenian policy regarding Philip, spanning the period from D.'s first speech on the topic to the outbreak of war in 340, during which he emerges as the leading politician opposed to Philip. We do not have later Assembly speeches by D., from the period after the

[37] D.'s Assembly speeches leading up to the third *Philippic* were surveyed above; on or. 13–16 see Introd. §1.1, and for or. 1–6 and 8–9 see Introd. §1.3. The fourth *Philippic* (or. 10) is also by D., and was delivered not long after the third *Philippic* in 341. For the authenticity of these see McCabe 1981: 170–1, 196–7.

[38] Herrman 2009a: 180–2.

[39] Andoc. 3 purports to be an address to the Assembly regarding peace with Sparta in 392/1 (or possibly 387/6). However, the speech uses anachronistic terminology, and its extensive historical account is based on Aesch. 2; it should be regarded as a rhetorical fabrication written after 343, probably after the fourth century. See E. M. Harris 2000.

[40] See further Introd. §4.