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Introduction

> While the political organization of society still takes the form of the Nation-State, we all recognize that every other great expression of human thought and activity transcends national boundaries. The intellectual, moral, and spiritual ideas of mankind recognize no territorial limits, nor any particular form of sovereignty. … The political organization of society has not kept pace with human progress.[1]
>
> —Newton Rowell

> The main world event of the twentieth century is the birth of the world. The world did not exist before. There were empires, nations, continents, seas, "zones" (either of influence or exploitation); there were open doors, and God only knows how drafty they made the earth. But no one knew the world. The world was born in the World War, which, as its name shows, was a world event. And now all men of sense realize that the world once born is going to grow. It is going to claim a right to its own history, its own economy, and its peace. But … the nations and the empires are not quite sure that the world is born, and even when they admit it to themselves, they are not quite happy about it. … They wish the world was not here; they consider it a nuisance and they try to go on as they did in the good old days – each in its own way, the way of anarchy and freedom.[2]
>
> —Salvador de Madariaga

The Versailles Treaty crafted by the Allied victors after the First World War is among the most significant, and most analyzed, international events of the twentieth century. It not only marked the political settlement of five years of conflict unprecedented in size and scope, but it also was a bold attempt to impose order on the anarchy of international relations. In the eyes of its framers, Versailles was a means of forging a new world order. For the idealistic Woodrow Wilson, the treaty promised a more pacific international order. For

[1] Newton Rowell, *The British Empire and World Peace* (Toronto: Victoria College Press, 1922), 3.
[2] Madariaga quoted in Rt. Rev. George Ashot Oldham, "The Church's Responsibility for World Peace," 9–10, General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Washington DC, 21 Oct. 1928, National Archives of Scotland, Lord Lothian Papers, GD40/17/98.

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the more practical, and perhaps cynical, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, it was a means to punish and contain Germany. The rise of political extremism by the 1930s threatened each of these goals, and the Second World War left them in pieces. This is the familiar story of the interwar years, the focus firmly on mass politics, ideology, and the cut and thrust of foreign relations. But what of the broader public response to the currents of internationalism unleashed by Versailles? How did ideas of internationalism resonate amongst politically conscious citizens outside of parliaments and foreign chancelleries?

This book is about the emergence of international society in the 1920s. While internationalism long pre-dated the First World War, present in Marx's socialism, functional international organizations such as the Red Cross and the International Postal Union, and the legal internationalism of the Hague system, it existed in the sizable shadow of nationalism. This changed in the 1920s, when the shock of the First World War led to a broad array of overlapping initiatives in international cooperation. The 1920s witnessed the birth not only of the League of Nations but also, as the historian Akira Iriye reminds us, of a myriad of other international bodies from the Third International (the Comintern) to some of the earliest non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[3] Ordinary citizens, too, increasingly found common cause and interest with peers beyond their borders, whether in politics or in religion, culture, or sport. Just as would happen seventy years later in the aftermath of the Cold War, survivors of the First World War came to see their world as one marked by the increased interconnectivity of people across the globe. Some saw this development as a threat to be countered through international cooperation. Others saw opportunities to foster greater social, economic, political, and ethical ties with their fellow "international citizens." These were the building blocks of international society.

Whether it was the League of Nations, a turn to a more decentralized British Empire, the beginning of the international ecumenical movement, or the broad resonance of audacious plans for the international abolishment of war, internationalism came of age in the 1920s. State actors played an important role in these developments, but they were aided, and in some cases led, by private actors who were themselves manifestations of the new internationalist spirit. International voluntary organizations, church groups, and international networks of academics, sportsmen, women, pacifists, humanitarian activists, and other private actors all took a leading role in the formation of international society. These groups and the international networks that they constructed are

[3] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 20–30. See also John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture: Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1875* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22–4, 109–15; Paul Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 12–18; and David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond, *International Organisation in World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 16–33.

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the antecedents of the modern phenomena of international NGOs and global governance.[4]

Internationalism took shape after the First World War under the direct influence of both imperial and anti-imperial dynamics. The Versailles settlement extended the British, French, and Belgian empires through the absorption of captured German and Ottoman territories as League mandates, whereas the message of Wilsonian self-determination gave new sustenance to anti-colonial movements across the colonial world. At the same time, imperialism itself, as given shape in the various post-war European empires, became even more internationalized than it had been before 1914. Always a transnational endeavour, European imperialism, though demarcated along national lines, came under collective stress from the nascent language of universality encapsulated in the internationalist ethos. Whether in proto–human rights discourses, the League's attacks on domestic sovereignty in pursuit of international conventions to define and combat transnational problems or colonial subjects' increasingly vociferous demands either for autonomy within or outright separation from their "international" imperial community, internationalism proved corrosive for European empires. As the proprietor of the world's largest colonial Empire, Britain felt these pressures most directly of all.

Connected with these global developments but operating on a more human level were a host of international cooperative initiatives, political, cultural, economic, and spiritual. They included international communities of pacifists, feminists, humanitarians, athletes, religious leaders, academics, and ethnic migrants. Each of these groups, and many others that I do not address directly in this book, expanded in the decade between the end of the First World War and the beginning of the Great Depression. They represented the post-war spirit of internationalism on a personal and collective level. These individual internationalist projects and the interconnections that developed amongst them constitute one of the striking features of the 1920s – the emergence of international society.

International society attracted supporters and adherents from across the political spectrum and from around the world. At its heart, however, it was a liberal and progressive idea. One of its major formative influences was the efforts of Anglo-American internationalists who saw the task of rebuilding the international system after the First World War as an opportunity to recast international relations, both systemically and culturally, on a more international basis. The liberal nature of Anglo-American internationalism contrasted with other forms of post-war internationalism, such as the more "muscular" French variant. Unlike their Anglo-Saxon allies, most French internationalists believed that the use of force remained a necessary feature of international politics.[5] The

[4] See Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[5] Peter Jackson, "French Security and a British 'Continental Commitment' after the First World War: A Reassessment," *English Historical Review* 126, 519 (2011), 349.

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dominance of American and British negotiators and diplomats at the Versailles peace deliberations did not necessarily create an "Anglo-American moment" in international relations over the following decade, but it did give American and British internationalists the opportunity to pursue a wider variety of internationalist efforts than were open to internationalists elsewhere. The centrepiece of interwar internationalism, the League of Nations, bore the imprint of both Wilson's vision of national self-determination and collective security and the cooperative "unity in diversity" model championed by proponents of the British Empire. It is thus unsurprising that internationalist ideas both influenced and were influenced by British imperialism and Anglo-American cooperation in the 1920s. These reciprocal influences manifested in political and cultural terms. They also emerged through a complex inter-relationship between traditional state actors and new or newly ascendant international sub- and supra-state actors, from private actors and organizations to the new international governance structures emanating from the League of Nations.

Anglo-American internationalism was not, however, a case of a "special relationship" in either practical or rhetorical terms. Indeed, as many of the following chapters illustrate, there were many Anglo-American differences over what type of "international society" to build, not least caused by the U.S. decision to stay out of the League. Nor is it to ignore the many expressions of internationalism emanating from outside the British Empire and the United States during the 1920s, whether they came from Western Europe, the post-1917 communist world, or beyond the West in Asia or Africa.

Continental Europeans inspired or took a leading role in many international initiatives in the 1920s, particularly those centred on functional or technical work. Some of these efforts were affiliated with the League, which both undertook substantial efforts of its own, from minority rights work to the quest for a universal language, and served as an information and publicity clearinghouse for many private international voluntary and regulatory organizations.[6] Others took place outside the League. The French played a leading role in the International Labour Organization (ILO) created at Versailles in 1919. Whereas the ILO worked in close collaboration with the League, it was (and is, as a specialized agency of the United Nations) an autonomous international organization.[7] International intellectual cooperation also was largely a European

[6] Helen McCarthy, "The Lifeblood of the League: Voluntary Associations and League of Nations Activism in Britain," in Daniel Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 189–93; Barbara Metzger, "The League of Nations and Human Rights: From Practice to Theory," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2001; Carolyn N. Biltoft, "Speaking the Peace: Language, World Politics and the League of Nations, 1918–1935," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2010, 88–113; Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 367–71.

[7] Jasmien Van Daele, "The International Labour Organization (ILO) in Past and Present Research," *International Review of Social History* 53, 3 (2008), 485–511; Van Daele, "Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas, and the Founding of the International Labour Organization," *International Review of Social History* 50, 3 (2005), 435–66.

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initiative. The International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation was formed by the French government in 1926 and took under its wing the League's International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, whose first chair was the French philosopher Henri Bergson. Both groups sought to foster greater transnational cooperation amongst intellectual workers. This French–League partnership was formalized at the League in 1928 as the International Bureau and Intellectual Cooperation Section, later the Intellectual Cooperation Section.[8] Europeans also played a leading role in efforts to extend and strengthen international law. The spirit of Grotius was present at the League's International Court of Justice, in international law societies, in the long-standing campaign to expand international humanitarian law in which Dutch jurists played a key role, and in bodies promoting the harmonization of international law and policing, such as the International Bureau for the Unification of Penal Law and the International Criminal Police Commission.[9] Nineteenth-century organizations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which promoted collaboration between national officials, although weakened through the course of the First World War, also continued their efforts in the 1920s.[10]

Europeans furthermore were instrumental in more literal international endeavours. The European federalism movement laid the foundation in the interwar years for the integration of Europe that began in the 1950s with the Schumann Declaration and the European Coal and Steel Community. Notable interwar federalists included the Romanian David Mitrany and the French economist Jean Monnet, both of whom worked at the League, as well as Aristide Briand and Philip Kerr, whose respective efforts to facilitate international peace are detailed in Chapters 8 and 9.[11] Regional governance as a form of internationalism also intensified outside Europe in the 1920s. The United States itself, while rejecting the more tangible internationalism centred at the League, continued to pursue another form of internationalism under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine in the Pan-American Union, the world's oldest regional organization, dating to its founding in 1889–90 as the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics.[12]

[8] Laqua, "Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order," *Journal of Global History* 6, 2 (2011), 223–8; Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: la Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle, 1919–1946* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999).

[9] Leon Radzinowicz, "International Collaboration in Criminal Science," *University of Toronto Law Journal* 4, 2 (1942), 307–37; Mathieu Deflem, *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 124–52.

[10] Yefime Zarjevski, *The People Have the Floor: A History of the Inter-parliamentary Union* (Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1989), 68–80.

[11] "European Union: Replies of Twenty-Six Governments of Europe to M. Briand's Memorandum of May 17, 1930," *League of Nations Publication: VII. Political. 1930, VII. 4*; Andrea Bosco, "Lord Lothian and the Federalist Critique of National Sovereignty," in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 247–76; Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 3–4.

[12] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 283–7.

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Whereas the Allied victory in 1919 led to the intensification of a trans-Atlantic-centred internationalism embodied in both the League of Nations and the wider world of international functional bodies (most of which were domiciled in Washington, London, Paris, or Geneva), the Russian Revolution in 1917 gave birth to a separate, Western form of internationalism. Marxism–Leninism was an international revolutionary political ideology, and the Bolsheviks sought to spread revolution abroad even before the civil war was won. The Comintern was founded in Moscow in March 1919, the Bolsheviks established their anti-imperial credentials in Asia by convening the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920, drawing representatives from thirty-seven nationalities, and the Chinese Communist Party was founded under Bolshevik tutelage in 1921.[13] The appeal of socialist internationalism went far beyond these institutional manifestations, however, drawing in both workers and intellectuals in the West and anti-colonial and peasant groups in Africa and Asia. The Soviet Union, as Bolshevik Russia became known from 1922 on, distrusted the League of Nations, from which it had been excluded, as a tool of the capitalist powers, although it did participate in several international functional initiatives outside the League during the 1920s.[14] The international growth of Bolshevism in the interwar years prefigured the emergence of communism as a global ideology after 1945.

Non-Western internationalist visions also proliferated in the 1920s, manifested in pan-ethnic, pan-regional, and diaspora movements. Some of these were explicitly anti-imperial, drawing on W. E. B. Dubois's prophetic assertion that "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the *color line*." Pan-Africanism was a case in point. Over two thousand activists from more than fifty countries had come to London for the 1911 Universal Races Congress to discuss means of generating racial amity. Delegates included both older anti-slavery campaigners and younger activists drawn to anti-colonialism, communism, and pan-Africanism.[15] This diverse alliance re-emerged after the war, when pan-African conferences were held in 1919, 1921, 1923, and 1927. Whereas Western internationalism itself could initiate a "revolt against the West," as Erez Manela has shown regarding Egyptian, Korean, Indian, and Chinese interpretations of Wilsonian self-determination,[16] other forms of

[13] Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49–53; John Riddell, ed., *To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (New York: Pathfinder, 1993); Jonathan Spence, *Mao Zedong* (New York: Viking, 1999), 47–52.

[14] Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, 353–4.

[15] W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1903), xxxi; Tracie Matysik, "Internationalist Activism and Global Civil Society at the High Point of Nationalism: The Paradox of the Universal Races Congress, 1911," in A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local* (London: Palgrave, 2007), 131–59; Susan Pennybaker, "The Universal Races Congress, London Political Culture, and Imperial Dissent, 1900–1939," *Radical History Review* 92, 2 (2005), 105–8.

[16] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). As Manela acknowledges (224), this argument draws on Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to*

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pan-Islamic and pan-Asian world order struck a more autonomous line. Pan-Islamic visions of a resurgent caliphate were quickly dashed. An aggressive pan-Asianism based in Japan also was relatively weak in the 1920s when Japan wished to integrate with European internationalism, its highlight sparsely attended pan-Asiatic conferences in Nagasaki in 1926 and Shanghai in 1927, but it expanded rapidly in the 1930s when Japan turned its back on the West.[17] Diaspora movements also intensified during the interwar years. Some, like that of overseas Indians detailed in Chapter 4, comprised part of existing imperial networks. Others, such as the Chinese diaspora of *huaqiao* ("sojourning" Chinese), mobilized by Sun Yat-Sen and later by both the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, played a role in forging "transnational" nationalisms that transcended their "home" nation-states.[18]

As these varied global examples indicate, internationalism was a leitmotiv of the 1920s. Understanding what contemporaries meant by this concept and the various ways in which it drove change in politics, cultural relations, and international relations helps to explain why the 1920s were seen by many as an era of hope and optimism. Jeremy Bentham introduced the word "international" in 1780 to express his progressive view of international relations, denoting "the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the law of nations."[19] Whereas subsequent internationalists have not always shared Bentham's utilitarianism, the internationalist movement largely has been a progressive one. Some have sought to improve conditions between states. These internationalists have been reformers seeking a more pacific and integrated international system. Others have been more idealistic, transcending the international system in pursuit of cosmopolitan forms of human community. Both types of internationalists proliferated in the 1920s.

As Mark Mazower reminds us, however, it is important not to confuse the wish for internationalism with its fulfilment.[20] A case in point is interwar international law, a cornerstone of the liberal internationalist view of a new and better world order. International law was predicated on reciprocal behaviour between what in the 1920s were termed "civilized" nations. Its impetus was to prevent a repeat of the failed diplomacy that led to the Great War, but its concentration on the Anglo-European world largely excluded Asia,

Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 1964), chap. 6. For a revisionist argument that Wilson asserted the more narrowly construed right of self-government in his Fourteen Points rather than a world order based on national self-determination, see Trygve Throntveit, "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination," *Diplomatic History* 35, 3 (2011), 445–81.

[17] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 128–39, 154–5.

[18] Pransenjit Duara, "Transnationalism in the Era of Nation States: China, 1900–1945," *Development and Change* 29, 4 (1998), 656–60, 662.

[19] Jeremy Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789). Bentham wrote the treatise in 1780.

[20] Mark Mazower, "An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century," *International Affairs* 82, 3 (2006), 565.

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Latin America, and the vast colonial world, whose inhabitants by and large were seen by Europeans as "uncivilized" and thus outside the boundaries of international legal discourse.[21] Such circumscribed notions of international law were used by Europeans to justify the large-scale imperial expansion of the late nineteenth century. While the international legal bifurcation of the world into "civilized" and "uncivilized" jurisdictions came under increasing stress after the First World War as elements of sovereignty began to be transferred from ruler to nation – whether through the idea of trusteeship, colonial reform initiatives such as dyarchy in British India, or Wilson's nebulous but revolutionary ideas of self-determination – this foundational principle of the international system remained a firmly European construct throughout the interwar period.[22]

Like new shoots, the liberal internationalist ideals that began to grow in the 1920s were fragile. If the practice of internationalism is by definition contingent on the willing cooperative participation of nation-states or transnational alliances of like-minded internationalists, the idea of internationalism itself is also precarious, at risk as much from its own ambiguities as from realist geopolitics. The German jurist, political theorist, and fascist Carl Schmitt, contemptuous of liberal attempts to establish an internationalist world system based on international law, the League system, and collective security, argued that liberal internationalism either misconstrued or obfuscated humanity's natural and necessary proclivity to define and divide itself into friend and enemy. In his view, liberal internationalism merely shifted interstate conflict onto the ground of sanctions, treaties, and "pacification." "This allegedly non-political and apparently even anti-political system," Schmitt concluded, "serves existing or newly emerging friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of the political [by which he meant the necessity to distinguish oneself from one's enemies]."[23]

[21] See Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Arnulf Becker Lorca, "Sovereignty Beyond the West: The End of Classical International Law," *Journal of the History of International Law* 13, 1 (2011), 7–73.

[22] Mazower, "An International Civilization?," 559; Barraclough, 148–9. While international law was eclipsed as a significant global discourse after the Second World War by the language of universality and human rights, its conceptual building block, state sovereignty, has remained the organizing concept of the international system. Nowhere has this development been more apparent than in post-colonial states' firm embrace of state sovereignty and its concomitant international validation, membership in the United Nations. Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 212–3.

[23] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1975 [1932]), 79. Schmitt described the Versailles settlement and, by implication, liberal internationalism more broadly as a "polarity of ethical pathos and economic calculation" (73). He renounced international law as pious cover for its Anglo-American proponents' rapacity, arguing instead that *Grossraum*, a concept of geographic or spatial hegemony, could best counter liberalism's dangerous pretensions to universality. *Grossraum* would guarantee peace by realigning geopolitics along cultural or, in Schmitt's terms, "friend and enemy" lines (26–7).

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If Schmitt's attack on liberal internationalism was compromised by his extremism, more traditional defenders of the national interest also criticized the difficulty internationalists had in squaring ideas with reality. For E. H. Carr, liberal internationalist ideals were merely "historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interests."[24] While Carr had supported liberal internationalism while working at the Foreign Office in the 1920s, the dark events of the 1930s led him by the eve of the Second World War to a far less optimistic position.[25] Morality was a dangerous guide to international politics, he argued in *The Twenty-Years' Crisis* (1939), because it was a product of power. The nations that evinced their faith in internationalism and the "harmony of interest" invariably were those which stood to benefit most from the status quo.[26]

Carr's focus was on security, however, not on broader realms of potential international cooperation. As I argue through the various case histories presented in this book, liberal internationalism's pluralistic ethos created space for numerous successful and innovative endeavours in the more circumscribed arena of international society. Interwar experiments in international governance were premised on a de-territorialization of world politics. If the First World War had been caused by traditional geopolitical conflicts, the path to international peace lay in separating politics from spatial ordering. The ideas of Halford Mackinder were replaced by the more abstract conceptions of international law and international society.[27] Here, liberal internationalism's faults could become virtues. Interwar internationalists emphasized the importance of transnational cooperation between both states and their citizens, constructing a dense web of networks that sometimes included but as often as not bypassed official channels. Instead of sovereignty and power, the foundations of the Westphalian international state system, internationalists favoured interpersonal relations that either existed outside the bounds of official international relations or permeated them to varying degrees. Instead of seeing the state as the highest form of legitimate authority, with international relations a realm of fear and mistrust, internationalists sought to project their various domestic political ideals into the rapidly expanding space of international politics. State actors in

[24] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (New York: Perennial, 2001 [1939]), 68.

[25] Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999), 33, 49; Stefan Collini, *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 159–60.

[26] Carr, 81–5; Paul Rich, "E. H. Carr and the Quest for Moral Revolution in International Relations," in Michael Cox, ed., *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 198–205.

[27] On Mackinder's geopolitics, see Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* (April 1904), 421–44; Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. chap. 4; and John Darwin, "Geopolitics and Imperialism: The British Empire and Halford Mackinder 1890–1940," Department of International History annual lecture, LSE, 25 Feb. 2010, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2010/20100225t1830vHKT.aspx.

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the 1920s were influenced, in turn, by these currents of internationalism, leading them, as several later chapters illustrate, to sometimes craft official policies that were international in scope. The very absence of a sovereign authority in the international system, a fact that most traditional interwar diplomats lamented and that exponents of the international relations school of realism subsequently would reify as a "law,"[28] was seen by liberal internationalists as an opportunity to conduct experiments in transnational cooperation.

My aim in this book is to explore how and why international society developed in the highly charged and malleable situation immediately after the First World War and assess the implications of transnational connections and conflicts for the British Empire, Anglo-American ideas of internationalism, and international governance.[29] The case histories I focus on represent two broad elements of post-1919 international society: the internationalization of the British Empire, revealed through its interactions with the League of Nations and in the acceleration of calls for autonomy throughout both the settlement and dependent Empire, and the active role played by individual Anglo-Americans in leading or inspiring particular international initiatives in the 1920s. Each chapter assesses the interaction between "political middle-men," thoughtful pragmatists, and pragmatic thinkers who acted in the space between academic political theory and the *sturm und drang* of party politics and the state and League actors to whom they looked to implement or support their various initiatives. These men and women led internationalist campaigns, lobbied their governments on behalf of internationalist causes, carried out publicity work, built personal transnational networks, created international events, and volunteered for the first international civil service at the League. The internationalists addressed in each chapter did not always hold shared conceptions of "internationalism" or "international society," but they were united in their belief in the need to direct change in the conduct of international politics and interpersonal relations. They also reveal that while structural factors retained

[28] The principal post-1945 statement of this realist position is Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). Kenneth Waltz reasserts the anarchical nature of the international system in the face of rising pluralism and neo-liberal cooperation in the 1970s in *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). See also Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *International Organization* 38, 2 (1984), 287–304.

[29] For a selected introduction to transnational history, see Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Patricia Clavin, "Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International Contexts," *European History Quarterly* 40, 4 (2010), 624–40; Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism," *Contemporary European History* 14, 4 (2005), 421–39; "AHR Conversation: On Writing Transnational History: Participants: C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyer, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed," *American Historical Review* 111, 5 (2006), 1440–64; Patrick Finney, ed., *Palgrave Advances in International History* (New York: Palgrave, 2005); and Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105, 3 (2000), 807–31.

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