

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i>	vii
Introduction		I
0.1 Causalism and evidentialism		I
0.2 Evidence		3
0.3 Causality		4
0.4 Decision theory		5
0.5 Evidential Decision Theory and Causal Decision Theory		7
0.6 Predestination		9
0.7 Why it matters		13
1 Savage		16
1.1 Simplifications and idealizations		16
1.2 States, events, outcomes and acts		17
1.3 Rational preference and the Savage axioms		20
1.4 From preference to probability		23
1.5 Utility and the representation theorem		26
1.6 Dominance and fatalism		30
2 EDT and CDT		35
2.1 Preference over news items		36
2.2 The Jeffrey–Bolker axioms		38
2.3 Credence		40
2.4 Evidential Decision Theory		43
2.5 Newcomb's problem		46
2.6 K-partitions		48
2.7 Causal Decision Theory		52
2.8 Matters arising		54
3 Causalist objections to CDT		60
3.1 Egan–Gibbard		61
3.2 The Piaf maxim		68
3.3 Objective Decision Theory		74

4	Realistic cases	81
4.1	Remedial cases	82
4.2	Medical cases	89
4.3	The Tickle Defence	91
4.4	Economic cases	99
4.5	Psychological cases	102
4.6	<i>Prisoners' Dilemma</i>	108
5	Deterministic cases	120
5.1	<i>Betting on the Past</i>	120
5.2	<i>Betting on the Laws</i>	130
5.3	Objections	135
5.4	The openness of the past	141
6	Quantum-mechanical cases	146
6.1	The device	146
6.2	Identical settings	148
6.3	Non-identical settings	149
6.4	QM versus CDT	155
6.5	Objections	157
7	The standard Newcomb case	166
7.1	Deflationary responses	166
7.2	The Discontinuous Strategy	170
7.3	The case for one-boxing	180
7.4	The case for two-boxing	194
7.5	Conclusion	211
8	'The ultimate contingency'	213
8.1	Dualism and the Ramsey Thesis	215
8.2	Arguments for the Ramsey Thesis	217
8.3	Dynamic inconsistency and Dutch books	226
8.4	Anti-dualism	233
	<i>References</i>	236
	<i>Index</i>	247