Introduction

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The organizing focus of this volume is its exploration of themes associated with the multi-faceted Greek notion of *politeia*. *Politeia* is the Greek title of what the English-speaking world calls Plato's *Republic*. It figures in the title of other surviving works of the fifth and fourth century BC, such as Xenophon's *Spartan Politeia*, the so-called Old Oligarch's (or ps.Xenophon) *Athenian Politeia* and the Aristotelian *Politeia of the Athenians*, in which titles the term is generally translated by 'constitution'. It is picked up in later works such as the *Politeia* of Zeno of Citium and echoed in the Latin *De republica* of Cicero. Yet *politeia* as such – the meaning and range of the term – has received surprisingly little attention as a lens into ancient ideas about politics and ethics.[1]

The term's first extant occurrence in a non-fragmentary text of known authorship is in Herodotus 9.34, where it means the condition of citizenship (its core meaning, according to Schofield 2006c: 33). By extension the term comes, in the writing of *politeiai*, to refer to that system of laws and practices in the civic community that constructs, educates and constrains a person's condition of citizenship. Thus, for Aristotle, a *politeia* is the 'form of life of a city (*polis*)' (*Pol.* 4.11 1295a40, cited in Schofield 2006c: 33); for Isocrates, it is the 'soul of the city (*polis*)' (*Orat.* 12 (Panathenaicus), 138, cited in Bordes 1982: 128). Only secondarily is *politeia* a genre of writing focused on specific forms of rule or government, that is, on *constitution* (the most commonly used English translation of *politeia*) in the modern political sense. It is the term's focus on the condition of citizens and on civic forms of living that allows Plato, in the *Republic*, to extend *politeia* out from civic to psychological and indeed cosmological structures. This volume explores the term's resonances across and between these interconnected realms.

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[1] The volume's honorand is a notable exception: see, for example, Schofield 1999a: 59 and 2006c: 31–5; as is Bordes 1982.

In *Republic* 9, following the announcement of the establishment of the *Republic*'s central contention that the just person is many times better off than the unjust person, Plato has Socrates and Glaucon consider how the wise person will conduct himself in life, including the question of his engagement with politics. Instead of focusing on the kind of material rewards that the majority of people take to be key to happiness, he will, for example, in the matter of money,

> 'instead look to the constitution (*politeia*) within himself', I [Socrates] said, 'standing guard lest he should disturb anything of his there as a result of either a great or a little amount of money. It is by navigating in this way to the best of his ability that he will add to and spend from his money.' 'Quite.' 'Next, in the question of honours too, with this same object in view, he will willingly take and partake of those he thinks will improve him; both publicly and privately, however, he will avoid those he thinks would undo his existing disposition.' 'Then', he [Glaucon] said, 'he surely won't willingly go in for politics, if this is his concern.' 'By the dog', I said, 'he most certainly will, at least in his own city, though perhaps not in his homeland, unless some divine good fortune should occur.' 'I understand', he said. 'You mean in the city that we were just now establishing, the one that exists in words, since I don't suppose it is anywhere on earth.' 'But', I said, 'there is perhaps a pattern set up in the heavens for one who wants to see it and in seeing it to establish himself. It makes no difference whether it does exist somewhere or ever will; it is with the affairs of this and no other that he would concern himself.' 'In all likelihood', he said. (591e1–592b5)[2]

This famous passage serves as an apt introduction to the volume's themes, its range of contributions, and the questions addressed thereby. Leaving aside the familiar and much-debated question of what Socrates' remarks may tell us as to his (or Plato's) attitude to the possibility of the ideal city founded in the conversation of the *Republic*, this volume takes a fresh approach to the passage as setting out a thematic agenda. It introduces the range of contexts brought together by the notion of *politeia* as something that exists in writing, that may ideally be established in a city, but failing that in one's soul, and which can be found in a pattern laid up in the heavens or cosmos at large.

We begin, in Part I, with a focus on *politeia* in writing, in two aspects: the genre of writing of which the *Republic* is itself an example; and the reach and expression of political vocabulary. In Part II, we turn to politics in its conventional sense, both its theory and practice. In Part III, we turn from politics to political ethics. In Part IV, we conclude by exploring the boundaries of human ethico-political agency, delimited by non-human

[2] Here and elsewhere in the volume, translations are the authors' own unless otherwise noted.

animals, on the one side, and, on the other, by gods. The volume's papers draw on the work of philosophers spanning roughly one thousand years of the history of philosophy, beginning with Xenophanes of Colophon (mid sixth century BC) and ending with the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus (mid fifth century AD).

Much of the terrain covered in this volume by the collective efforts of a team of scholars has been surveyed by the individual efforts of a single man – Malcolm Schofield, our honorand, Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy and Fellow of St John's College in the University of Cambridge. Schofield has discussed our chronologically earliest figure, Xenophanes, and has reached back still further in time, having worked on a figure as early as Homer. And while the Neoplatonists have not been a major focus of his work to date, he has discussed Proclus, our chronologically latest figure, in print (Schofield 1996a: 52). Indeed Schofield is impressive among historians of ancient philosophy for the range of study, both chronological and thematic, which he commands.[3]

Schofield's first article (1970), on a fragment of Parmenides on time (DK B8.5–6a), presaged his monograph on Anaxagoras and his serving as the 'S' in the second edition of *The Presocratic Philosophers* affectionately known as 'KRS' (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983). Beyond this landmark research on the Presocratics, his first decade of scholarship also produced work on Plato (especially on the *Parmenides*); on Aristotle (on both metaphysics and epistemology), including the first of his numerous and distinguished editorial collaborations, the four volumes of *Articles on Aristotle* co-edited with Jonathan Barnes and Richard Sorabji; and on Hellenistic philosophy, in another editorial effort, *Doubt and Dogmatism*, co-edited with Jonathan Barnes and Myles Burnyeat, to which he contributed an analysis of Stoic epistemology. In a characteristically trenchant allusion to the later history of philosophy, Schofield wrote there that 'Zeno was the G.E. Moore of Hellenistic philosophy' (1980: 284). Schofield has continued to produce major studies within each of these areas – Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy – and indeed outside them, with the papers collected in his *Saving the City* stretching from Homer to Cicero.

While the present volume seeks to reflect a similar chronological range to that traversed by Schofield's works, it is more fundamentally indebted to his intellectual contributions to our understanding of the notion of a *politeia*, its significance as the title of Plato's *Republic*, and the connections it embodies between political thought and practice, ethics, theology and

[3] This is best demonstrated in the bibliography of his works which this volume contains; the remarks which follow here are illustrative rather than in any way exhaustive of his contribution in each area.

cosmology. In *Plato: Political Philosophy*, Schofield observes that part of the novelty of the *Republic* is its appropriation of the notion of *politeia* from the established genre of writing about the peculiar *politeia* of the Spartans, and its transformation of that notion into an exploration of the very nature of a *politeia* itself (2006c: 31–43). As he remarks, Plato in his *Laws* (832c2–5) goes so far as to claim that all existing political regimes are not true *politeiai* (unitary political communities) but are rather *stasioteiai* (faction-ridden divided regimes). And, of course, as *Republic* 9 reflects, Plato expands the need for an appropriate *politeia* informed by the virtues from the ordering of a healthy city to that also of a healthy soul.

If Schofield's oeuvre informs the theme and title of this volume, it has also shaped the conceptualization and organization of its four parts. Our consideration of 'The Vocabulary of Politics' in Part I takes its cue in part from Schofield's article 'Cicero, Zeno of Citium, and the Vocabulary of Philosophy' (2002a). Rejecting the complaints of Cicero and Plutarch that the Stoics held essentially the same substantive positions as the Academics and Peripatetics, but made them sound different by using a new vocabulary, Schofield shows that the choice of vocabulary is not neutral but is rather in itself a philosophical construction. He argues that Zeno's use of the terms *kathēkon* and *katorthōma*, for example, constitute a 'reorientation' of vocabulary used in common moral discourse by placing it within philosophical debate. Schofield concludes that, contrary to Cicero's critique, Zeno's linguistic innovation 'was not achieved by speculative verbal invention but by the exploitation and redirection of the resources of ordinary language' (2002a: 427), resulting in a substantive change in philosophical focus. In a similar vein, in Part I, Chapter 5, Miriam Griffin studies both literal and more metaphorical uses of the vocabulary of Roman law, as well as examples of legal practices and cases, as a means of assimilating Greek thinking into a Roman intellectual environment.

In other work too, Schofield has emphasized that political vocabulary must be assessed in light of its overall philosophical function, so that, for example, 'When Chrysippus uses words like "city" and "law", he intends a radical transformation of their meaning, robbing them of anything ordinarily recognizable as political content.' The effect of Chrysippus' work (itself a reflection on that of Zeno) is that 'political vocabulary is depoliticized' (1999b: 768). A similar depoliticization is effected, on Alexander Long's account in Chapter 1, by Plato's rejection in the *Republic* of the existing intellectual contours of the study of the political art and his effort to reconceptualize ruling as guarding (ἡ φυλακική), an art closer to animal husbandry than it is to conventional Greek constitutional debates.

Long argues that Plato presents political wisdom in the *Republic* not as a specifically *political* expertise, but rather as (Platonic) *philosophy*. The reappropriation of existing vocabulary in the reverse direction is the concern of Jaap Mansfeld's assessment in Chapter 4 of the way in which political terminology spreads from the soul to the body and into medical writings and in so doing shapes the definitions of health and disease attributed to Alcmaeon in Aëtius' *Placita* in terms ultimately inherited, he argues, from Herodotean discussion of the best *politeia*.

Elsewhere Schofield has developed the methodological implications for the study of the history of political thought of the view that political vocabulary must be interpreted with reference to the philosophical ideas best imputed to its users. Consider, for example, his assessment of Fred Miller's thesis that Aristotle's political thought should be understood as a rights theory. Schofield acknowledges that '[t]he constitutional position of Athenian citizens can uncontroversially be expressed in terms of rights', and that there is likewise a sense in which Aristotle's statement of views about political justice in *Politics* 3.9–13 concerns rights. Yet he points out that '[t]his is, of course, not at all the same thing as to allow that Aristotle himself [or *pari passu* the Athenians] possessed a crisply demarcated vocabulary of rights' (1996b in 1999a: 150). Instead, he argues, it is the rôle played by any such notion within a philosophical framework that matters most (so in the case of Aristotle, 'it is the notion of *axia*, "merit" or "desert", which plays the sort of role in his ... conceptualisation of political justice that Miller accords to "(a) right"' (1996b in 1999a: 152)). Thus 'from this perspective the significance of Aristotelian political theory is the *distinctiveness* of its vocabulary and idiom' (1996b in 1999a: 158), a significance which is lost when one attempts to translate its vocabulary into one more familiar to us. This attention to the competing and distinctive roles played by different vocabularies is in play in Cynthia Farrar's discussion in Chapter 2 of the competing languages, expectations and genres of history and philosophy in Thucydides' *History* and Plato's *Laws*, showing how the latter works to 'put history in its place'. The ahistorical perspective Farrar finds in the *Laws* mirrors *Republic* 9's lack of interest in where, if anywhere, the ideal *polis* in fact exists.

A concern with the fate of a given vocabulary in the history of political thought, meanwhile, animates Melissa Lane's exploration in Chapter 3 of the extent to which Plutarch's *Lycurgus* might be considered an intervention in the vocabulary of Platonic political philosophy. She reads that Plutarchan Greek 'life' as constructing an alternative kind of *politeia* to those of Plato's own models, one which responds to deep worries in Platonic philosophy

about law and writing by prescribing ethical habituation through a law code which is not to be written down. Plutarch's focus on internalized virtue is consistent with *Republic* 9's idea of the wise man who establishes a *politeia* within *himself*: the wise man's own *polis* is the one that matches his ideal psychological constitution and not the one in which he finds himself as a matter of historical contingency.

Part II, 'The Practice of Politics', equally responds to Malcolm Schofield's lead, both in word and in deed (λόγῳ τε καὶ ἔργῳ). Here it is worth noting that he did not begin his career as a political philosopher. His earliest works were largely on metaphysical topics and rooted in the careful philology which he has continued to practise while integrating it into broader investigations of conceptual change. It was in his first year as a University Lecturer at Cambridge that he made his initial foray into political philosophy, lecturing in the Easter Term on the treatment of justice in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 5. His subsequent development as a leading scholar of ancient political philosophy has been supported institutionally at Cambridge in collaborations with colleagues in history, philosophy and politics as well as his comrades in the B Caucus for ancient philosophy within Classics itself. He has in turn fostered the intellectual and personal camaraderie of the broader community of classicists at many levels, including locally those of the Cambridge Faculty, the national ranks of the Classical Association and the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, and the international community associated with the British School at Athens. He has also played a key rôle in the governance of those bodies and institutions to which he is devoted, including, in a far from exhaustive list, St John's College, the Faculty of Classics and the University of Cambridge; the successive Symposia Hellenistica; the journals *Phronesis*, *Classical Quarterly* and *Classical Review*; and the British Academy. In all these fora he has consistently spoken with civility and acted with shrewd humanity.

Thus the practice of politics has been at the heart of Schofield's academic life. It has also become central to his intellectual concerns. Whether reflecting on *euboulia* (good deliberation) in the *Iliad*, Aristotle's understanding of sharing in the constitution, Cicero's definition of the *res publica*, or Stoic approaches to justice, to name only a few of the political topics that he has explored, Schofield has recurrently returned to the attempts of the philosophers 'to save the city from itself, and to create or identify a basis for harmony which will preserve it in unity' (1999a: 1). This implies an indissoluble link between politics and ethics. Indeed, Schofield has mapped out an even closer connection, in arguing that, for Aristotle, politics and ethics are not two distinct spheres. Instead there is only one sphere,

politics, which is conceived in ethical terms – 'a startling truth which is generally downplayed (if not totally ignored) in many presentations of the *NE* [*Nicomachean Ethics*]' (2006a: 305).

Aware of the horizon of ethical idealism in politics, Schofield has at the same time acutely assessed the distorting rôle of ideology, while insisting – as in his analysis of Aristotle's natural slavery – that not all philosophical moves collapse into mere ideology. It is perhaps in his various studies of the 'noble lie' in the *Republic* that his analysis of ideology has been most influential. One half of the lie, the 'Cadmeian myth' of the citizens' autochthony, which is marked with some 'authorial embarrassment' (2009: 106), serves to produce a patriotism – loving *this* city – which cannot be justified by rational arguments. The other half, the 'myth of the metals', likewise appeals on a non-rational level. In the 'noble lie', then, Schofield finds that an essential part of political practice is independent of rational argument; this is one starting point from which Robert Wardy argues in his own consideration of the 'noble lie', in Part II, Chapter 6, that neither political practice nor political philosophy can escape such entanglement with ideology. Whether this entanglement with ideology can at the same time be made consistent with the *Republic*'s insistence on philosophy's orientation towards truth is the question addressed by Verity Harte, in Chapter 7, in her analysis of ignorance as the more fundamental concern than lying.

Political practice is nothing without political practitioners. But are all political theorizers also political practitioners, and if they are, to what extent is their practice actually informed by their theorizing? In Chapter 9 of this volume, Jonathan Barnes challenges the new conventional wisdom about the extent to which the late Neoplatonists – in particular Proclus – were politically *engagés*. He defends a version of the *status quo ante* view on which they were truly quietist, 'political' only in the sense that they were not socially isolated and did not entirely withdraw from the mundane world. Pagan Platonists, that is to say, lived up to *Republic* 9's image of the 'political' wise man who is his own city.

This question of political engagement is one that Schofield has explored in several arenas for the parallel case of Hellenistic philosophy. Unlike Barnes' Neoplatonist quietists, in the case of philosophers of the Hellenistic period Schofield has affirmed the existence and importance of an (early) Hellenistic political philosophy which is tied to a valuing of political practice. His aim is to refute the 'bad press' (1999b: 739) which Hellenistic political philosophy has traditionally received. Instead, '[f]or the most part the major philosophical schools appear to have been as committed to endorsing political activity of a conventional kind as they ever were' (1999b:

770). Zeno's *Politeia*, on Schofield's account, is a communist city of political fellows bound by concord; it is 'a specifically political ideal ... [of] friendship and concord' (1999c: 25–6), not yet the pure community of sages that will appear in Seneca or other imperial Stoics.

Among the other political practitioners considered by Schofield are the 'giants of the Sophistic era' whom Plato 'recall[s] from the dead' (2008b: 40). In his edition of new translations of the *Gorgias*, *Menexenus* and *Protagoras* (2010), Schofield remarks on the sophists as 'public figures of a new kind, given major diplomatic roles by their home cities not because of their aristocratic standing, but on account of their political skills, above all their abilities as speakers' (2010: ix). Protagoras in particular emerges in Schofield's reading of Plato's eponymous dialogue as so concerned with his political and intellectual standing as a speaker that he is shamed into admitting the Socratic thesis that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful motivations to action – even though '[k]nowledge (*epistēmē*) is Socratic, not Protagorean, vocabulary' (2010: xxviii). Nicholas Denyer's account of Protagoras in Chapter 8 rehabilitates a distinctive Protagorean political art, which creates standards through convention and agreement rather than relying on their being found in nature, and is highly attuned to the particular needs and practices of contemporary, democratic Athens. For Protagoras, unlike for Plato, the condition of being a good citizen – being good in respect of one's individual *politeia* in its original and core meaning – cannot be separated from excelling in the public affairs of one's particular, historically situated city.

Protagoras appears not only in Part II but also in Part III, which is dedicated to 'The Politics of Value'. Here, Catherine Rowett is concerned with the philosophical drama of the *Protagoras* between what she takes to be a relativist Protagoras and a Socrates who in conversation with him becomes 'more of a political animal' (Rowett), with a focus on the 'literary properties of the Platonic dialogue', which Schofield has likewise insisted upon taking seriously (1992: 122). Rowett in Chapter 10 and Myles Burnyeat in Chapter 11 explore contrasting visions of the relation between the values of the individual and those of his political community. The Protagoras of Plato's *Protagoras*, Rowett argues, carefully frames his teaching so as to allow his audience to fill out the relevant ethical and political values with their own meaning, constructed in their historically specific circumstances. Denyer has argued (Part II, Chapter 8) that the political skill of Protagoras sees no difference between the excellence of the individual and his excellent function in his immediate political community. Rowett here proposes that Protagoras' much-vaunted success in bringing

about such excellent integration with whatever specific community he and his pupil may happen to be in is a function of the relativist design of his teaching.

If Protagoras lets specific communities set values for individuals, Burnyeat (Part III, Chapter 11) argues that, in the *Republic*, the integration between (ideal) individual and (ideal) community is part of a carefully argued defence of the parallel (and more or less revisionary) accounts of a just social order and a just individual that Socrates offers in *Republic* Book 4. There is a mutually supporting relation between respect for the laws and customs – the *politeia* – of the ideal city, enshrined in the long process of education and acculturation described in *Republic* 2–3, and respect for the rule of reason in the ideal citizen's soul. It is this mutually supportive relation that ensures that an individual who is just – in virtue of the harmonious condition of his soul – will, as a matter of course, conform to the ethical prescriptions of his political community; thus Burnyeat argues as part of his rereading of the closing argument of *Republic* Book 4, an argument which has long been the object of considerable scholarly dissatisfaction.

Such an interest in the relation between individual and community is further developed in Part III in the context of Schofield's long-standing concern with Stoic justice, as Mary Margaret McCabe in Chapter 13 parses the second of the two Stoic approaches to justice, the 'theological' and the 'ethical', which Schofield had identified in 'Two Stoic Approaches to Justice' (1995b). McCabe examines how impartiality functions as a value operating as a constraint on moral and political relations. In considering how the demands of impartiality can be made intelligible within an ancient eudaimonist framework, she examines the Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* and the rôle it plays in the establishment of justice. What *oikeiōsis* accomplishes, she argues, when ideally realized in the Stoic sage, is an impartiality that will surpass the partial view from which every human being naturally begins through the self-reflective operation and recognition of shared activity. In this way, she suggests, Stoic *oikeiōsis* does a better job of providing a foundation for justice than later consequentialist or Rawlsian rivals.

Part III is rounded out in Chapter 12 by Richard Kraut's linking of the politics of value back to the vocabulary of politics, by contending that the best translation of *kalon* in Aristotle's practical treatises is often, though not always, 'beautiful'. Kraut argues that, in Aristotle's view, both the proper organization of individuals into a political community and the expression of their appropriate relations to one another through individually virtuous acts

can be properly characterized as being 'beautiful'. Defending the translation of the Greek term *kalon* as 'beautiful' in many contexts of Aristotle's ethical and political writings as opposed to alternatives such as 'fine' or 'noble', Kraut both argues for and commends Aristotle's recognition of an aesthetic dimension to ethico-political value.

Human ethical and political practice must negotiate the trade-off between the divine and animal aspects of actual human nature, at least as that nature is conceived by Plato or Aristotle. In the final part of our volume (Part IV: Politics Extended: Animals, Gods, Cosmology), we explore the boundaries of human political agency in both directions. Geoffrey Lloyd's investigation in Chapter 14 focuses on animals, while returning to Schofield's interest in the philosophical use of vocabulary, differentiating between Aristotle's description of non-human animals as *politika* and his denial that they have the capacity to form *poleis*. Outside his ethical and political writings Aristotle often ascribes to various non-human animals characteristics that differ from human traits only as a matter of degree. In his ethical and political writings, however, Aristotle seeks to drive a wedge between non-human and human animals in respect of their cognitive capacities. Lloyd examines certain apparent inconsistencies in the ways in which Aristotle marks out those distinctively human kinds of sociability that make us 'political' in ways other, non-human, animals cannot be. The explanation, Lloyd conjectures, is that Aristotle's interest in natural human capacities is subordinate to his interest in the construction of an ethico-political ideal. If this is right, then Aristotle departs rather less from the ethico-political idealism of the Platonic–Stoic tradition than popular contrasts between them might sometimes suggest.

From animals, we turn in the final three papers of the volume to gods. Here, Schofield's concern with Socratic politics, in his assessment of the controversy between I.F. Stone and Gregory Vlastos over whether Socrates was a democrat (2002b), is matched by Christopher Rowe's assessment in Part IV, Chapter 16 of Socratic piety as presented in texts by both Plato and Aristotle. Rowe argues for the restoration of the *Eudemian Ethics'* manuscript-supported reference to 'serving god' (τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν) as an ethical guidance point. In framing his ethical theorizing in this way, while at the same time pairing service to god with intellectual study (θεωρεῖν) of god, Rowe finds Aristotle deliberately aligning himself with a Socratic–Platonic tradition of transforming conventional conceptions of piety into a highly intellectualized notion. Such religiously inflected intellectual speculation is, one might imagine, what the wise man of *Republic* 9 would engage in when he observes the pattern of the ideal *polis* 'set up in the heavens'.