There is extensive discussion in current Just War literature about the normative principles that should govern the initiation of war (jus ad bellum), and also the conduct of war (jus in bello), but this is the first book to treat the important and difficult issue of justice after the end of war (jus post bellum). Larry May examines the normative principles that should govern post-war practices such as reparations, restitution, reconciliation, retribution, rebuilding, proportionality, and the Responsibility to Protect. He discusses the emerging international law literature on transitional justice, and the problem of moving from a position of war or mass atrocity to a position of peace and reconciliation. He questions the Just War tradition, arguing that contingent pacifism is most in keeping with normative principles after war ends. His discussion is richly illustrated with contemporary examples, and will be of interest to students of political and legal philosophy, international law, and military studies.

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AFTER WAR ENDS

A Philosophical Perspective

LARRY MAY
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Acknowledgments

In this book I provide the first full-length philosophical treatment of the often neglected third branch of the Just War tradition, the normative principles governing various practices after war ends, *jus post bellum*. I have written book-length treatments of the principles governing the decision to go to war, *jus ad bellum* (Aggression and Crimes against Peace, Cambridge, 2008) and principles governing conduct during war, *jus in bello* (War Crimes and Just War, Cambridge, 2007). As in my previous writings, I look to both historical and contemporary literatures to construct moral and legal principles at the end of war.


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