

Index

- adaptive preferences, 33, 70, chapter 3 *passim*
 deep, 78, 101–2
 and expensive tastes, 180–2
 and preference coherentism, 98–100
 shallow, 78, 101
 and well-being, 81–9
- Aristotle, 25
- Arneson, Richard, 28n47, 139, 166, 186–8
- autonomy, 62–5, 67
 and adaptive preferences, 85–7
 and agency, 63–4, 67
 and options, 64
- basic human dignity, 23–5, 56–62
- basic minimum, the
 capabilities approach to, *see* capabilities approach
 concept of, 2–8
 as context-sensitive, xiv
 as fulfillment of social needs, 15–17, 21
 intrinsic value of, 110, 115–46
 as maintenance of basic needs 11, 17–19
 as morally special, 4–5, 37
 as overriding, 109–15
 right to, 147, 149–75
 as subsistence, ix, 13–15
 as threshold of primary goods, 8–12
 welfarist approach to, *see* welfarism; *Welfarist Basic Minimum*
- Basic Minimum as Proto-autonomy, The*, 30–4, 37, 55, 89, 108
- Beitz, Charles, 171
- benefit rights, 150–67
 defined, 150
 and explanation, 169–70
 general argument against, 162–7
 as limited by practicalities, 152, 156–62
 as limited to standard threats, 152–6
 and source of duties, 167–70
- BM1*, 2–7, 71
BM2, 7
- BM3*, 7, 71, 109, 148, 160, 175
- Braybrooke, David, 200
- Brighouse, Harry and Swift, Adam, 136
- Brink, David, 94
- Brown, Campbell, 52n33
- Buchan, John, 45–6
- Buchanan, Allen, 167–8
- capabilities approach, 18–32
 and adaptive preferences, 79–81, 100–2
 and basic human dignity, 57–8
 and *Capabilities not Welfare*, 21, 26–32
 defined, 20–2
 and *Expansive List*, 21, 24–6
 and functionings, 26–9
 and *Guarantee see Guarantee*
 and *No Trade-offs*, 21, 23–4
 and respect for persons, 193–4
 as solution to problem of imprudent choices, 187
 as solution to the problem of operationalization, 201–3
 as vulnerable to objections from political neutrality, 206n41
- Celie*, 90–1, 102, 103–8
- Color Purple, The*, 90
- comparison monism, 195
- cosmopolitanism, xv–xvi
- Crisp, Roger, 140–5
- da Vinci, Leonardo, 23, 25
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1, 178
- egalitarianism, 135–8, 144, 163–5
 conditional, 137–8
 deontic, 163–5
 leveling-down objection to, 136
 paretian, 137–8
 pluralistic, 136–8
 strong, 135–6
- Erin*, 82–8, 102, 107–8, 181

Famine, 9, 15, 20, 32

Glen and Jerry, 71–3

Greta, 119, 129

Griffin, James, 17, 63, 90, 95–8, 157

Guarantee, 22–3, 109–14, 145, 147, 151–8, 161–2, 167
 defined, 22

Han, 63–4

Hawkins, Jennifer, 80, 90

hedonism, 36, 76–7

Henry, 194

Holtug, Nils, 138, 166

honoring, moral stance of 6, 173–5, *see also*
 promotion, moral stance of
 distinguished from promotion, 6

human nature, 58–62

Hume, David, xii–xiii

Hurka, Thomas, 25, 58–62

Hutcheson, Francis, xii–xiii, 188

Hutcheson's Move, 188–91

Hutcheson's Move 2, 190–1

Impersonal Project Fungibility, 128–9

Impersonal Satisfaction Fungibility, 123–7

Jackie, 179–80

Jake, 183–5, 191

Keller, Simon, 43n17

Kenny, 186, 191

Knievel, Evel, 29–30

Lexical, 116–17, 123–7, 134, 143, 176, 184, 206–7
 defined, 116
 distributive argument against, 128–31
 sequence argument against, 126–7

leximin, 138–9, 144, 163
 deontic, 163

Locke, John, ix, 12

luckism, 188–91

Mary, 70

Mason, Andrew, 137

Maximize, 111, 114–15, 145, 147, 149n2, 151, 162, 170
 defined, 114

mere capabilities, 31
 distinguished from substantive capabilities, 31

mere risk, 204–6
 distinguished from substantive risk, 204

Mill, John Stuart, 63

Miller, David, 17–18, 152, 156–62

mitigated lexical dominance, 130–2
 distinguished from total lexical dominance, 130

neutrality, 134–5

non-harm right, 150, 161
 defined, 150

Norcross, Alastair, 126, 141–2

Nussbaum, Martha, 1, 19–31, 36, 57, 66–8, 79–81, 88, 100–2, 111–13, 161, 171, 191, 193

perfectionism, 58–62
 wrong properties objection to, 58–9

policy reasons, 200–4
 distinguished from moral reasons, 200–1

political liberalism, xvi

political neutrality, doctrine of, xvi–xvii, 206

preference coherentism, 89–101, 200, 206
 and coherence, 92
 and completeness, 92–4
 defined, 89
 distinguished from Griffin's theory of value judgments, 95–8
 distinguished from moral epistemological coherentism, 94–5
 and minimal mutilation, 94
 and preferences as beliefs, 90–1
 as solution to adaptive preferences, 98–100
 as solution to objection from expensive tastes, 180–2
 and value data, 93–4, 98–100

preference for the worse, 79, 84–5, 102–8

primary goods, *see* basic minimum, as threshold of primary goods

Prioritarianesque, 116–17, 132–45, 176, 184, 206–7
 as distinguished from prioritarianism, 133

prioritarianism, 133
 deontic, 164–6

problem of weight, 109, 115, 147, 176

projects, global, 38
 defined, 40–4
 goal-like as distinguished from state-like, 39
 as narrative unifiers, 40–2
 and self-directed meaning, 47–50

projects, unvalued, 118, 121–3

projects, valued, 38, 50–3, 66
 content-based assessment of, 103–8
 defined, 51–3
 magnitude of, 117–18

promotion, moral stance of, 6, 72
 as distinguished from honoring, 6, *see also*
 honoring, moral stance of

proto-autonomy, 28, 87

- Railton, Peter, 122
 Rawls, John, 9–11, 18–19, 183
 Raz, Joseph, 44n19
Reggie, 184, 191
 resourceism, *see* basic minimum, as threshold of
 primary goods
Robin, 178–81
Roy, Gus, and Lee, 128–32
- Sarah*, 62–3, 65, 68–72
 satisfactions, 38
 self-respect, social bases of, 10
 Sen, Amartya, 15–16, 19, 36, 79
Severe Disability, 114–15, 128, 139, 147, 152–3,
 156–7, 162, 165, 175
 Shue, Henry, 12–14, 66–8, 151–6
 Sidgwick, Henry, 90
 Smith, Adam, 16
 Sobel, David, 93
Steve, 192
 substantive capabilities, *see* mere
 capabilities
 substantive risk, *see* mere risk
 substitution monism, 195–8
 sufficientarianism, 139–44
 Crispian, 140–4
 Crispian, deontic, 164–5
- Teleological View, The*, 148–51, 166–8, 170, 172–3,
 206–7
 defined, 148
Teleological View 2, The, 173
Thesis, 39, 44–50
 defined, 39
*Thesis**, 119–21, 123, 132
 defined, 119
Thirty-Nine Steps, The, 45
 total lexical dominance, *see* mitigated lexical
 dominance
 Townsend, Peter, 15–16
 truly human functioning, *see* basic human
 dignity
- Tsunami*, 112–14, 147, 152, 157–9, 161–2, 175
 Tungodden, Bertil and Vallentyne, Peter, 137
- United Nations Development Goals, xiii
 United Nations Human Rights Council, 171
 upward distribution, 26, 55, 106
 utilitarianism, x, 146, 148, 183
 compatibility of basic minimum with, 146
- Velleman, David, 47, 119–21
 politician case of, 47–8, 119, 129
- weak moral priority, 5, 183
 Weirich, Paul, 133
 welfare, theories of, 35
 objectivism, 73
 Strong Strong Subjectivism, 35, 74–5, 195–7
 Weak Strong Subjectivism, 73–5, 196–7
 Weak Subjectivism, 73–5
 welfarism, 30–7, Chapter 6, *passim*
 objection to, from cash compensation, 195–9
 objection to, from expensive tastes, 177–83
 objection to, from imprudent choices, 186–91
 objection to, from offensive tastes, 183–5
 objection to, from operationalization, 199–203
 objection to, from respect for persons, 191–5
 objection to, from risk, 203
 as responsibility-catering, 187–91
Welfarist Basic Minimum (WBM), 53–6, 78, 95,
 151, 176, 206
 defined, 53–6
 objection to, from low level, 65–72, 82, 103–8
 as time-relative (WBM*), 55–6
Welfarist Basic Minimum 2 (WBM2), 104–8, 151,
 178n2
 defined, 104
 as solution to objection from low level, 104–7
 welfarist's dilemma, 32–5, 78, 83, 108
 White, Stuart, 1
 Williams, Bernard, 48, 58
 Wolff, Jonathan and De-Shalit, Avner, 36, 195–9,
 203–5