

## INDEX

- additional distributable reserves,
  - creation of 153–54
- administration 224–53
  - administrators
    - appointment 226
    - powers 225
  - comparison of schemes and
    - administration as a debt restructuring device 230
  - cramdown 239–42
  - debtor-in-possession 233–34
  - early intervention 231–33
  - minority creditor protection 242–44
  - moratorium, existence of 234–38
  - recognition in the EU 238–39
  - scheme not an insolvency
    - procedure 230–31
  - summary 244–46
- development of administration in
  - English law 224–30
- difficulties with operation of
  - administration 225
- introduction of administration 224–25
- moratorium on remedies after
  - administration order 227
- reforms 225–26
- nature and purpose of
  - administration 225, 227–28
- outcomes of administration 228
- pre-pack administration
  - advantages 229
  - criticisms of 229
  - guidelines of Joint Insolvency Committee 229
  - nature/central feature of 228–29
- schemes twinned with
  - administration, use of 247–53
  - development of 247–49
  - valuation 249–53
- administrators
  - appointment 226
  - powers 225
- advantages of schemes of
  - arrangement 281
  - finality and certainty 3
  - flexibility 3, 15, 253
  - majority of members or creditors
    - able to bind minority 3–5
  - see also* cramdown; debt restructuring
- amalgamation
  - key features 159–60
  - meaning of 158–60
  - mergers 166
  - no definite legal meaning 158
- ancillary orders 160–61
- application to court for meetings to be
  - summoned 28–40
- court's role at first hearing 36–40
- classes of members 37
- decision on splitting members/
  - creditors into separate classes 36
- directions, giving 38
- discretion to order meetings on
  - terms as it thinks fit 38
- whether role should be more
  - definitive 37–38
- explanatory statements *see*
  - explanatory statements
- Practice Statement on consideration
  - of classes of creditors 37

- statutory provisions, assessment of 39–40
- who may apply for an order 29–33
  - application usually by company 29
  - hostile creditor schemes 33
  - hostile member schemes 31–33
  - whether hostile scheme is possible 29–31
- ‘arrangement’, meaning of 20–24
- ‘arrangement’
  - concept of 21
  - courts interpreting very broadly 21
- company must be party to arrangement 21
- give and take element in scheme, requirement of 21, 22–24
- guarantees, creditors releasing 23–24
- members/creditors giving up rights against third parties 22
- no precise legal meaning 20
- rights of shareholders/creditors varied 22
- terms widely construed by the courts 20, 21–22
- third parties, schemes binding 24
- third party claims, release of 24
- Australian schemes 326–33
  - ‘bear hug’ announcements 32, 102–3
  - creditor schemes 327–28
  - deed of company arrangement 327–28
    - advantages of a scheme over 328–29
  - English schemes, compared with 327–33
  - headcount test 62, 63, 66, 332–33, 371–76
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - procedure 326
  - takeover schemes 139, 146–47, 329–32
    - anti-avoidance provisions 145, 330–32
    - popularity of 329
  - scheme provisions and takeover regulation 330–32
  - specific statutory provision 329–30
- ‘bear hug’ announcements 32, 102–3
- Bermudan schemes 367–68, 371
  - court’s role 368
  - headcount test 62
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - statutory provision 367–68
- bondholder schemes of arrangement 184–87
  - contingent creditors 186–87
  - global custodian arrangements 184–85
- British Virgin Islands (BVI) schemes 366–67, 371
  - headcount test 62
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - plans of arrangement 366–67
    - schemes of arrangement, and 367–68
  - procedure 366
  - schemes of arrangement 367–68
    - creditor driven 367
  - voting 366
- Canadian schemes 340–47
  - Director of Corporations Canada, role of 342
  - dissenting members/shareholders 342–43
  - headcount test, no requirement for 62, 371–76
  - insolvent companies 344–47
  - minority protection 342–43
  - moratoriums 235
  - procedural aspects of schemes 39, 341–43
  - statutory provisions 340
  - stays 345–47
  - takeover schemes 140, 343–44
    - anti-avoidance 145, 343–44
    - impracticability requirement 343–44
  - voting 341–42

- cancellation schemes 87–89, 119, 154–57
  - reduction of capital 88–89, 119, 154–57
- capital, injecting 276–78
  - ambit of subordinated shareholder claims unclear 278
  - member claims arising independently of statutory contract 277
  - member claims founded on statutory contract subordinated 277
- Cayman Islands schemes
  - headcount test 62
  - meetings: views of those with an economic interest 41
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - Practice Direction 369–71
  - procedure 368–69
  - statutory provision 368–69
  - tax haven, implications of 371
- City Code on Takeovers and Mergers *see* Takeover Code
- class rights, use of schemes to alter 172–73, 383–84
- classes
  - approval at class meetings 57–68
    - headcount test *see* headcount test
    - level of approval 57
    - majority in value test *see* majority in value test
    - non-voting shareholders 57
  - class meetings in takeover schemes *see* takeover schemes, class meetings in
  - definition of ‘class’ 45, 120–21
  - Practice Statement on consideration of classes of creditors 37
  - separate class meetings 45–57
    - balancing act required 46, 121
    - correct comparator 52–54
    - court’s approach to class composition 54–57
    - definition of ‘class’ 45, 120–21
    - general test 45–47, 122
    - general test, timing of 47
    - rights and interests 47–52, 121, 122
- clubs 25–26
- ‘company’, meaning of 24–28
- ‘company’ for scheme purposes, meaning of 288–89
- foreign companies 26–28
- no territorial restrictions on court’s jurisdiction 288
- ‘unregistered company’ includes foreign companies 288
- statutory meaning 24–25
- unincorporated associations 25–26
  - clubs 25–26
  - unregistered companies, as 25
- Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) 191
- creditors 198–200
  - admitting or rejecting creditors’ claim 198
  - entitlement to vote 198
  - non-CVA creditors 199–200
  - secured and preferential creditors 199
- entitlement to vote 58–59
- introduction of 195
- majority in value test 58–59
- minority creditor protection in 206–12
  - majority requirements 206–7
  - material irregularity challenge 207–8
  - no court sanction/no separate class meetings 206
  - nominee in a CVA, role of 207
  - unfair prejudice challenge *see* unfair prejudice challenge
- purpose of CVAs 195–96
- use of CVAs and schemes, comparison of 195–224
  - creditors bound by CVA 198–200
  - initiating CVAs/procedure 196–98
  - members bound by a CVA 198
- use of CVAs and schemes in practice, comparison of 221–24
  - advantages of CVAs 221–22

- costs of CVAs for small companies 223
- larger companies, CVAs for 223
- scheme advantages in large restructurings 223–24
- ‘compromise’ and ‘arrangement’, meaning of 20–24
- ‘arrangement’, concept of 21
- courts interpreting very broadly 21
- company must be party to arrangement 21
- compromise, ordinary commercial meaning of 20–21
- give and take element in scheme, requirement of 21, 22–24
- guarantees, creditors releasing 23–24
- members/creditors giving up rights against third parties 22
- no precise legal meaning of ‘compromise’/‘arrangement’ 20
- rights of shareholders/creditors varied 22
- terms widely construed by the courts 20, 21–22
- third parties, schemes binding 24
- third party claims, release of 24
- contested bids 104–6
- court’s role in debt restructuring 214–15, 220
- court’s role in schemes of arrangement 214–15
  - application to court *see* application to court for meetings to be summoned
  - court’s discretion *see* discretion, court’s
  - jurisdiction and procedural rules, development of 19–20
  - minority protection 5, 6
  - more flexible approach to classes in schemes 6
  - provisions to deal with mechanics of schemes, development of 19–20
  - significant oversight 5–6, 19–20, 73
- court’s role in takeovers 106–7
- cramdown 4–5, 45, 72, 80, 130–31, 159, 239–42
- junior creditors, cramdown of 240–42
- lack of, issues flowing from 192–93
- nature of 239
- reform proposals 264, 387
- schemes enabling cramdown 281, 387
- schemes twinned with pre-pack administration 241–42
- US, in 260
  - increased power to subordinated creditors/shareholders 261–62
  - safeguards protecting minorities 260
- creditor schemes 15–16, 82, 175–269, 270–85
  - financially distressed companies
    - debt restructuring *see* debt restructuring
  - freedom to bargain 201
  - increase in 175
  - injecting capital into company with existing shareholder claims 276–78
  - liquidation, and *see* liquidation and schemes
  - member schemes, and 82–83
  - settling outstanding/future claims in insurance industry 270–76, 383–84
  - commutations 271, 272
  - comparator test 275
  - cut-off schemes/use where company in liquidation 271, 282
  - disadvantages of schemes 273
  - separate class meetings for creditors 273–75
  - solvent run-off, dealing with claims by 271–72
  - use of schemes to expedite run-off process 272
  - use of schemes to settle IBNR obligations 271, 273
  - use of schemes to effect solvent run off in doubt 275–76
- creditors
  - contingent claims 181–82
  - creditor schemes *see* creditor schemes

- creditors (cont.)
  - CVAs, and 198–200
    - admitting or rejecting creditors' claim 198
    - entitlement to vote 198
    - non-CVA creditors 199–200
    - secured and preferential creditors 199
  - definition of creditor 85–86, 119–20
  - definition of creditor for purpose of scheme of arrangement 179–87
    - beneficial owners 183–84
    - bondholder schemes of arrangement 184–87
    - contingent claims 181–82, 270
    - limitations 180
    - secured creditors 182–83
    - wide construction 179–80, 185, 270
  - irrevocable undertakings provided by 202–4, 211
  - minority creditor protection *see* minority creditor protection
  - secured creditors 182–83, 199, 223–24
    - remedies unaffected by liquidation 280
  - takeover schemes, in 119–20
- criticisms/disadvantages of schemes of arrangement 2, 5–7, 253–54, 384–86
- court's approach in relation to classes, and 6
- cross-border schemes and forum shopping 385–86
- see also* cross-border issues; forum shopping
- financially distressed companies, and 6
- foreign incorporated companies, and 6–7
- scheme procedure, criticisms of 20, 281
- takeovers, concerns about schemes effecting 6, 384–85
- see also* takeover schemes
- use of schemes combined with pre-pack administration 385
- see also* pre-pack administration
- cross-border issues 286–324
  - additional conditions imposed by the courts 289–91
  - conditions going to discretion of court to sanction scheme 290
  - sufficient connection with England, demonstrating 290–91, 322–23
  - winding up orders only made where useful purpose served 289
- EU regulations
  - avoidance of forum shopping 305, 321, 385–86
  - effect of 291, 292–306
  - English court's jurisdiction to sanction schemes unaffected by 292
  - Insolvency Regulation 293–94, 295
  - Insolvency Regulation, effect of 295–99
  - see also* Insolvency Regulation
  - Judgments Regulation 294–95
  - Judgments Regulation, effect of 299–304
  - see also* Judgments Regulation
  - sufficient connection 292, 304–5, 322–23
  - whether English schemes should be used for EU registered companies 304–6
- foreign companies making use of English scheme jurisdiction 288–306
  - additional conditions imposed by the courts 289–91
  - EU regulations, effect of 291, 292–306
  - meaning of 'company' for scheme purposes 288–89
- forum shopping 287, 385–86
  - advantages 305
  - cross-border schemes, and 321–23
  - objective of Regulations to avoid 305, 321, 385–86

- international effectiveness of
  - schemes *see* recognition of
  - schemes in foreign jurisdictions
- schemes of arrangement popular for restructuring non-English companies 286–87
- sufficient connection required 290–91, 292, 304–5, 322–23
- summary 323–24
- debt restructuring 15, 175–269
  - administration, and *see*
    - administration and schemes as debt restructuring device
  - complexity and speed 220–21
  - court, role of 214–15, 220
  - CVAs and schemes, comparison of 195–224
    - creditors bound by CVA 198–200
    - initiating CVAs/procedure 196–98
    - members bound by a CVA 198
  - CVAs and schemes in practice, comparison of 221–24
    - advantages of CVAs 221–22
    - costs of CVAs for small companies 223
    - larger companies, CVAs for 223
    - scheme advantages in large restructurings 223–24
  - see also* Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs)
  - definition of creditor for purpose of scheme of arrangement 179–87
    - beneficial owners 183–84
    - bondholder schemes of arrangement 184–87
    - contingent claims 181–82
    - limitations 180
    - secured creditors 182–83
    - wide construction 179–80, 185
  - insolvency practitioner, role of 212–14
  - introduction 175–79
    - disadvantages 178–79
    - flexibility of schemes 176
    - minority, binding 176
    - solvent or insolvent companies 176–78
    - members', role of 215–16
  - minority creditor protection in a CVA 206–12
    - majority requirements 206–7
    - material irregularity challenge 207–8
    - no court sanction/no separate class meetings 206
    - nominee in a CVA, role of 207
    - unfair prejudice challenge *see* unfair prejudice challenge
    - see also* minority creditor protection
  - minority creditor protection in a debt restructuring scheme 200–6, 243–44
    - classes in creditor schemes 200–5, 244
      - sanction of the court 205–6, 244
    - see also* minority creditor protection
  - reform, need for 253–67
    - suggestions for reform 263–67
    - US practice *see under* United States (US)
  - small company moratorium *see* small company moratorium
  - summary 267–69
  - use of CVAs and schemes, comparison of 195–224
    - creditors bound by CVA 198–200
    - initiating CVAs/procedure 196–98
    - members bound by a CVA 198
  - use of CVAs and schemes in practice, comparison of 221–24
    - advantages of CVAs 221–22
    - costs of CVAs for small companies 223
    - larger companies, CVAs for 223
    - scheme advantages in large restructurings 223–24
  - use of schemes as debt restructuring tool 187–91
    - purpose of debt re-structuring 187–88
    - typical scenario 189–90
  - workouts 191–95

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Jennifer Payne

Index

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396

## INDEX

- debtor-in-possession
  - comparison of schemes/
    - administration 233–34
  - debtor-in-possession financing,
    - proposal to introduce 266–67
  - directors in restructuring plans 212,
    - 213–14
  - advantages of 214
  - disadvantages of 213–14, 233
- definition of schemes of arrangement 1
- demergers 169–72
  - options to effect a merger 170
  - reasons for 169–70
  - s. 110 Insolvency Act 170–72
  - use of schemes in 169–72
- see also* mergers and demergers
- directors
  - debtor-in-possession 212, 213–14,
    - 233–34
  - material interests, disclosure in
    - explanatory statement of 34
  - mergers, directors' report in 163
  - restructuring by existing
    - management 212
  - advantages of 214
  - disadvantages of 213–14, 233
  - shadow directors 234
  - submission to nominee for
    - moratorium in CVA 217
- disadvantages of schemes *see*
  - criticisms/disadvantages of
  - schemes of arrangement
- disclosure obligations
  - explanatory statements
    - adequacy of 33, 34–35, 70
    - common law obligations 34–35
    - effect of non-disclosure 35
    - imperfections in explanatory
      - material 35–36
    - reasonableness and fairness 35
    - sophistication of recipients 36
    - strict standards applied by courts 35
  - India 359
  - Malaysia 356
  - material interests of directors 34
  - mergers 163
  - takeovers 31, 145
    - Takeover Code 114–16
  - discretion, court's
    - cross-border issues 290
    - exercise of court's discretion to
      - sanction schemes 5, 6, 73–78
    - commercial and factual context of
      - scheme 74
    - court's broad supervisory
      - jurisdiction 73
    - court's role in examining fairness
      - of scheme 73
    - court's role, limits on 77–78
    - low levels of voting 74–75
    - minority creditors and
      - shareholders 77
    - no obligation on court to sanction
      - scheme 68–69
    - non-voting creditors/
      - shareholders, interest of 77
    - special interests in takeover
      - schemes 75–76
    - test to be applied 73–74
    - third parties, effect on 74
    - unrepresentative meetings 75–78
  - greater discretion for court proposed
    - 388–89
  - India 358
  - meetings, court ordering 38
  - New Zealand 333–34, 335–36
  - recognition of schemes in foreign
    - jurisdictions 306
  - South Africa 362
  - takeover schemes 120
  - equal treatment/shareholder equality
    - 99–100, 124–26, 132–33, 134,
      - 145–46, 156
    - short term vs long term investors
      - 124–26
  - European Union (EU) 379–81
    - Companies (Cross-Border Mergers)
      - Regulations, mergers under
        - 166–69
      - application to court 168–69
      - completing cross-border mergers,
        - process of 169
      - employee participation rights 168
      - forms of merger 167
      - mergers, meaning of 165–66

- procedure 167
  - shareholders' approval 168
  - transferor company ceasing to exist 167
- cross-border issues
  - avoidance of forum shopping 305, 321, 385–86
  - effect of 291, 292–306
  - English court's jurisdiction to sanction schemes unaffected by 292
  - Insolvency Regulation 293–94, 295–99
  - Judgments Regulation 294–95, 299–304
  - sufficient connection 292, 304–5, 322–23
  - whether English schemes should be used for EU registered companies 304–6
- forum shopping 305, 321, 385–86
- Insolvency Regulation *see* Insolvency Regulation
- Judgments Regulation *see* Judgments Regulation
- recognition of schemes in foreign jurisdictions
  - Insolvency Regulation, under 307–8
  - Rome I Regulation, under 312–13
- Rome I Regulation 312–13
  - exclusion, whether schemes within 312–13
- schemes of arrangement generally lacking in EU 379
- explanatory statements 33–36
  - advertising class meetings, explanatory statements in 36
- clear language required 33
- disclosure
  - adequacy of 33, 34–35, 70
  - common law obligations 34–35
  - effect of non-disclosure 35
  - imperfections in explanatory material 35–36
  - reasonableness and fairness 35
  - sophistication of recipients 36
  - strict standards applied by courts 35
- hostile bids 104
- mandatory requirement 33
- material interests of directors 34
- mergers 163
- misleading statements 35
- financial assistance 96–99
  - concept construed broadly 97
  - holdco schemes 163–64
  - see also* holdco schemes
  - no financial assistance where target a public company 96–97
  - exceptions 97, 98–99
  - schemes, rules applying in 97–99
- Financial Services Authority 115–16
- financially distressed companies 2, 27
- creditor schemes 175
- debt restructuring *see* debt restructuring
- debtor-in-possession strategy, restructuring by 212, 213–14
- economically distressed companies, and 188
- external agents and company creditors, restructuring by 212, 213–14
- use of schemes disenfranchising junior creditors 6
- foreign incorporated companies and schemes 6–7, 26–28, 286–324
- additional conditions imposed by the courts 289–91
  - conditions going to discretion of court to sanction scheme 290
  - sufficient connection with England, demonstrating 290–91
  - winding-up orders only made where useful purpose served 289
- EU regulations
  - avoidance of forum shopping/creditor uncertainty 305, 321
  - effect of 291, 292–306
  - English court's jurisdiction to sanction schemes unaffected by 292



- foreign incorporated companies and schemes (cont.)
  - Insolvency Regulation 293–94, 295–99
  - see also* Insolvency Regulation
  - Judgments Regulation 294–95, 299–304
  - see also* Judgments Regulation
  - sufficient connection 292, 304–5, 322–23
  - whether English schemes should be used for EU registered companies 304–6
- foreign companies making use of English scheme jurisdiction 288–306
  - additional conditions imposed by the courts 289–91
  - EU regulations, effect of 291, 292–306
  - meaning of ‘company’ for scheme purposes 288–89
- forum shopping 287
  - advantages 305
  - cross-border schemes, and 321–23
  - objective of Regulations to avoid 305, 321, 385–86
- international effectiveness of schemes *see* recognition of schemes in foreign jurisdictions
- schemes popular for restructuring non-English companies 286–87
- sufficient connection required 290–91, 292, 304–5, 322–23
- summary 323–24
- foreign/overseas shareholders
  - overseas shareholders in target company 123
  - US shareholders in takeover target 99–101
- forum shopping 287, 385–86
  - advantages of ‘good’ forum shopping 305, 322–23, 385–86
  - cross-border schemes, and 321–23
  - objective of EU Regulations to avoid 305, 321, 385–86
- fraudulent forum shopping 322, 385–86
- fraud, setting aside schemes of arrangement for 3, 79, 86–87
- geographical development of schemes of arrangement 16–17, 325–82
  - Australia *see* Australian schemes
  - Bermuda *see* Bermudan schemes
  - British Virgin Island (BVI) *see* British Virgin Island (BVI) schemes
  - Canada *see* Canadian schemes
  - Cayman Islands *see* Cayman Islands schemes
  - Europe *see* European Union (EU)
  - functional equivalents to English schemes in other jurisdictions 376–81
  - Hong Kong *see* Hong Kong schemes
  - India *see* Indian schemes
  - Malaysia *see* Malaysian schemes
  - New Zealand *see* New Zealand schemes
- overview of overseas scheme provisions 371–76
- Singapore *see* Singaporean schemes
- South Africa *see* South African schemes
- summary 382
- US *see* US
- Germany
  - change of control transactions 380
  - voting thresholds 380
- corporate restructuring of financially distressed companies 381
- creditor schemes 380–81
- debt restructuring 178
- headcount test 61–68
  - abolition suggested 39–40, 68, 244, 386–87
  - arguments in favour 63–64
  - criticisms of 61
    - intermediary ownership 66–67
    - scheme blocking by minority 64, 68

- origins 61
- other jurisdictions, in 61–63
  - Australia 62, 63, 66, 332–33, 371–76
  - Bermuda 62
  - British Virgin Islands (BVI) 62
  - Canada 62, 371–76
  - Cayman Islands 62
  - Hong Kong 62, 63, 141, 348–50, 371–76
  - India 62, 358, 371–76
  - New Zealand 62, 337, 339
  - Singapore 62, 63, 353, 371–76
  - South Africa 62, 371–76
- rationale 61, 63–64, 244
- share-splitting, circumvention by 64–66
- takeover offers, not applicable to 143
- historical development of schemes of arrangement 7–12, 175
- Companies Act 2006 (Part 26) 10, 11
- explanatory statements provision 9–10
- Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act (1870) 7–8, 175
- limited liability partnerships, extension to 11
- Loreburn Law Amendment Committee 8–9
- origins of schemes of arrangement/Companies Act (1862) 7
- voting arrangements, development of 9
- holdco schemes 151–64, 384
  - additional provisions of Companies Act 2006: reconstructions/amalgamations 157–63
  - ancillary orders 160–61
  - meaning of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘amalgamation’ 158–60
  - Part 27 Companies Act (2006) 161–63
  - use of holdco schemes 151–54
    - creation of additional distributable reserves 153–54
    - redomicile of a corporate group 152, 384
  - usual form of a holdco scheme 154–57
  - procedure 154–57
  - why schemes might be valuable as tool to reorganise corporate groups 157–64
  - additional provisions of Companies Act: reconstructions/amalgamations 157–63
  - financial assistance 163–64
  - legal advantages 157
- Hong Kong schemes 349
  - bidder and its subsidiaries in takeovers, position of 129
  - court’s approach 348
  - headcount test 62, 63, 141, 348–50, 371–76
  - options under new legislation 349–50
  - no statutory moratorium 235, 350–51
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - popularity of schemes 350
  - procedure 348
  - statutory provisions 347–48
    - new Companies Ordinance 348, 349–50
  - takeover schemes 141, 142
- hostile bids 102–4
  - ‘bear hug’ announcements 32, 102–3
  - difficulties facing hostile bidders
    - information, lack of 104
    - not clear that scheme will secure approval of company 103–4
- hostile schemes
  - hostile creditor schemes 33
  - hostile member schemes 31–33
  - practical difficulties 31
  - whether possible 29–31
- Indian schemes 357–60
  - court’s discretion 358
  - creditor schemes 360
  - disclosure obligations 359
  - headcount test, no requirement for 62, 358, 371–76
  - minority protection 358
  - no statutory moratorium 235

- Indian schemes (cont.)
  - popularity of schemes 357–58
  - procedure 357–58
  - reverse listings 358–59
  - SEBI's role in scrutinising schemes 359
  - statutory provisions 357–58
  - voting 359–60
- injecting capital into a company 276–78
  - ambit of subordinated shareholder claims unclear 278
  - member claims arising independently of statutory contract 277
  - member claims founded on statutory contract subordinated 277
- insolvency practitioners, role of 212–14
- Insolvency Regulation 238–39, 292, 293–94, 295
  - effect of 295–99, 304, 323
    - criticisms of 'domestic' approach 298–99
    - direct effect arguments 295–96, 298–99
    - potential to impact on schemes 294, 295–98, 299
    - purposive approach adopted by courts 296
    - Regulation inapplicable to schemes, argument that 296–98
  - forum shopping, aim of Regulations to avoid 305, 321, 385–86
  - Judgments Regulation, and 293, 303, 308
  - modified universalism, as 316
  - proposals to amend 293–94, 303–4
  - recognition of insolvency proceedings 314
  - recognition of schemes 307–8
  - scope 293, 307–8
- insurance industry claims 270–76, 383–84
  - commutations 271, 272
  - comparator test 275
  - cut-off schemes/use where company in liquidation 271, 282
  - disadvantages of schemes 273
  - separate class meetings for creditors 273–75
  - solvent run-off, dealing with claims by 271–72
  - use of schemes to expedite run-off process 272
  - use of schemes to settle IBNR obligations 271, 273
- irrevocable undertakings 126–27
  - creditors, provided by 202–4, 211
- Judgments Regulation 292, 294–95, 304
  - aim of 308–9
  - effect of 295, 297, 299–304, 323
    - Regulation's effect on English court's scheme jurisdiction 301–3
    - uncertain state of the law 303–4
    - whether schemes fall within the Regulation 300–1, 303–4
- Insolvency Regulation, and 293, 303, 308
  - 'judgment', wide definition of 309
  - recognition of schemes 308–12
    - insolvent companies, schemes involving 311–12
    - solvent companies, schemes involving 308–11
    - whether Member States recognise English scheme decisions 309–11
  - scope 294, 300
- liquidations
  - advantages of a scheme instead of insolvency process 281
  - allowing more rapid identification of assets/liabilities 282
  - classes of creditors 283–84
  - mandatory set-off rules, departure from 282
  - pari passu* principle, setting aside 282
  - varying rights of creditors against third parties 282–83
- concept of 279
- creditor schemes as alternative to liquidation/within liquidation 280, 383–84

- common for schemes to be used alongside liquidation 281
- disadvantages of a scheme instead of insolvency process 281
- distribution
  - assets beneficially owned distributable 280
  - avoiding transactions that may defeat creditors 280
  - maximising distribution to creditors 280
- liquidators 225
  - appointment 280
  - duties 280
  - powers 280
  - role 279
- main methods of winding up insolvent companies 279
- summary 285
- winding-up order, effect of 280
- liquidators 225
  - appointment 280
  - duties 280
  - powers 280
  - role 279
- long term investors vs short term investors 124–26
- lost and untraceable shareholders 101
- majority in number test *see* headcount test
- majority in value test 57–61
  - beneficial/nominee ownership 45, 59–61
  - enfranchising beneficial owners 60–61
- CVAs 58–59
- debt, value of 58
- requirement of per cent 57
- takeover schemes 57–58
- Malaysian schemes 355–57
  - disclosure 356
  - moratoriums 235–36, 355–57, 371
  - procedure 355
  - schemes used as debt restructuring devices 355
  - statutory provisions 355
  - takeover schemes 357
- management buy-outs 118–19
- mandatory bid rule 133–34
- mechanics of schemes of arrangement 12–13, 18–81
  - application to court *see* application to court for meetings to be summoned
  - ‘company’, meaning of *see* ‘company’, meaning of
  - ‘compromise’ and ‘arrangement’ *see* ‘compromise’ and ‘arrangement’, meaning of
  - delivery of sanction order to Registrar of Companies 78–79, 86–87, 117
  - main steps in implementing scheme of arrangement 12–13, 18–19
  - meetings of members or creditors *see* meetings of members or creditors
  - sanction of the court *see* sanction of the court
  - scheme procedure, criticisms of 20, 281
  - setting aside schemes after sanction order 79
  - summary 79–81
  - ‘meeting’, meaning of 40
- meetings of members or creditors 40–68
  - approval at class meetings 57–68
  - headcount test *see* headcount test
  - level of approval 57
  - majority in value test *see* majority in value test
  - non-voting shareholders 57
  - meaning of ‘meeting’ 40
  - persons needing to consider the scheme 40–45
  - legal, not beneficial owners 40–42
  - ‘no economic interest; argument 42–45
  - right to vote on scheme of arrangement 42–45
  - voting for persons with economic interest 41–42
- separate class meetings 45–57
  - balancing act required 46, 121
  - correct comparator 52–54

- meetings of members or creditors (cont.)
  - court's approach to class composition 54–57
  - definition of 'class' 45, 120–21
  - general test 45–47, 122
  - general test, timing of 47
  - rights and interests 47–52, 121, 122
  - takeover schemes *see* takeover schemes, class meetings in
- member, definition of 85–86
- member schemes of arrangement
  - 14–15, 82–150, 151–74
  - class rights, use of schemes to alter 172–73, 383–84
  - creditor schemes, and 82–83
  - definition of 'member' for purpose of scheme of arrangement 85–86
  - introduction 82
  - holdco schemes, reorganising corporate groups by *see* holdco schemes
  - mergers and demergers, use of schemes in *see under* mergers and demergers
  - minority shareholders, use of schemes to remove 173–74
  - summary 174
  - takeover schemes *see* takeover schemes
- mergers and demergers 161–63
  - Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations, mergers under 166–69
  - application to court 168–69
  - completing cross-border mergers, process of 169
  - employee participation rights 168
  - forms of merger 167
  - procedure 167
  - shareholders' approval 168
  - transferor company ceasing to exist 167
  - demergers 169–72
    - options to effect a merger 170
    - reasons for 169–70
    - s.110 Insolvency Act 170–72
  - directors' report 163
  - explanatory statements 163
  - material changes, reporting of 163
  - mergers, meaning of 165–66
    - Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations 165–66
  - use of schemes in 164–72
    - demergers 169–72
    - mergers 164–69
- minority creditor protection 200–12
  - administration 242–43
  - unfairness challenges to administrator 243
- classes in creditor schemes 200–5, 244, 283
  - common sense approach to classes 200–1
  - correct comparator 201–2, 283
  - different levels of seniority 202
  - irrevocable undertakings 202–4, 211
  - persons in more than one class 204
  - voting interests and economic exposure decoupled 204–5
- minority protection in a CVA
  - 206–12
  - majority requirements 206–7
  - material irregularity challenge 207–8
  - no court sanction/no separate class meetings 206
  - nominee in a CVA, role of 207
  - unfair prejudice challenge *see* unfair prejudice challenge
- minority protection in debt restructuring scheme 200–6, 243–44
  - classes in creditor schemes 200–5
  - sanction of the court 205–6, 244
  - rights not interests 200
- minority protection 14
  - abuse, protection from 135–36
  - Canada 342–43
  - close court oversight of scheme process 5, 6
  - court's role 5, 6
  - creditors' protection *see* minority creditor protection

- India 358
- minority protection in an offer
  - 132–34
  - justifications for 134–36
  - mandatory bid rule 133–34
  - shareholder equality 132–33
  - squeeze-out and sell-out rules 133
- minority protection in a scheme
  - 130–31
  - justifications for 134–36
  - scrutiny of court at sanctioning hearing 131
  - shareholders meeting in classes 130–31
- minority protection in schemes and offers, comparison of 130–38, 384
- comparison of minority protection provisions 134–38
- justifications for minority protection in an offer 134–36
- justifications for minority protection in a scheme 134–36
- minority protection in an offer 132–34
- minority protection in a scheme 130–31
- New Zealand 145, 146, 336
- reform proposals 265
- sanction of the court 77, 131
- sell-out rules 133
- squeeze-out rules 133, 137–38, 363–64
- unfair prejudice, minority protection in a scheme
  - compared with 209–12
  - court taking account of similar issues 210–11
  - onus, differences in 209–10
  - unfair prejudice challenge as ongoing risk for company 211–12
- US 260, 378–79
- minority shareholders, use of schemes to remove 173–74
- moratoriums
  - administration order, after 227
  - Australia 235
  - Bermuda 235
  - British Virgin Islands (BVI) 235
  - Canada 235
  - Cayman Islands 235
  - definition of moratorium 227
  - directors' submission to nominee for moratorium in CVA 217
  - existence of 234–38
  - Hong Kong 235, 350–51
  - India 235
  - Malaysia 235–36, 355–57, 371
  - New Zealand 235
  - no statutory moratorium pending sanction of a scheme 234, 281
  - nominee monitoring during 218
  - reform proposals 236–38, 263–64, 350–51, 388
  - Singapore 235–36, 354–55, 371
  - small company moratoriums
    - cost and complexity 218–19
    - directors' submission to nominee 217
    - effect of moratorium 217–18
    - eligibility requirements 217
    - introduction 216–17
    - justifying restriction to small companies 219–20
    - meeting to approve the CVA 218
    - monitoring by nominee 218
  - South Africa 235
  - standstills 192–94, 234
  - workouts 192–94
- New Zealand schemes 333–40
  - amalgamations 334–35
  - flexibility/discretion of court 333–34, 335–36
  - headcount test
    - no requirement for 62
  - takeovers 337, 339
  - minority protection 145, 146, 336
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - procedural aspects of schemes 39, 333
  - reform process 334
  - statutory provisions 333
  - takeover schemes 139–40, 336–40
    - exemption from Code 337
    - minority protection 145, 146

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Index

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404

## INDEX

- New Zealand schemes (cont.)
  - reform proposals 337–40
  - takeover regulation and schemes of arrangement 337–40
  - voting 339–40
  - voting 335–36
- nominee in a CVA
  - insolvency practitioner as 212
  - moratoriums, directors' submission to nominee for 217
  - persons aggrieved by acts/omissions 220–21
  - role 207, 220
    - due diligence 221
    - monitoring during moratorium 218
    - reporting offences 213
- offers
  - comparison of schemes/offers as takeover mechanisms *see under* takeover schemes
  - importance of synchronised approach to takeovers by 110–13
  - minority protection
    - minority protection in an offer 132–34
    - minority protection in an offer, justification for 134–36
    - minority protection in schemes and offers, comparison of 130–38
  - takeovers effected by offers 89–93
    - bidder's initial offer to target board 90
    - bidder's offer to target shareholders 89–90
    - conditions 91–92
    - formal offer 90–91
    - independent advice 90
    - revised offers 92
    - sell-out rules 93
    - squeeze-out rules 92–93
    - unsuccessful offers, consequences of 93
  - use of schemes as alternative to takeovers 86–108
    - comparison of schemes/offers as takeover mechanisms 93–108
    - scheme takeover compared to traditional offer 86–93
    - takeovers effected by offer 89–93
  - see also* takeover schemes
  - option holders 85–86, 119–20
- parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
- Panel on Takeovers and Mergers *see* Takeover Panel
- pari passu* principle 282
- pre-pack administration 228–30, 384
  - advantages 229
  - criticisms of 229
  - guidelines of Joint Insolvency Committee 229
  - nature/central feature of 228–29
  - schemes twinned with pre-pack administration as cramdown 241–42, 385
- recognition of schemes in foreign jurisdictions 287, 306–21
  - contractual documents governed by English law 306, 307
  - de facto recognition of a scheme 307
  - domestic private international law of the jurisdiction, under 307
  - enforcing English scheme overseas as judgment 320–21
  - Insolvency Regulation, under 307–8
  - legal effectiveness of scheme as factor in court's discretion 306
  - risk of unfairness if scheme not legally effective 306
- parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
- practical solution 321
- Rome I Regulation, under 312–13
- UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, under 313–14
- universalism concept, under 316–19
- US Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 15 under 314–16
- reconstruction
  - key features 158
  - meaning of 158–60

- mergers 166
- no definite legal meaning 158
- reform proposals 159
- redomicile of a corporate group 152, 384
- reductions of capital 88–89, 119, 154–57
- Registrar of Companies, delivery
  - of sanction order to 78–79, 86–87, 117
- Rome I Regulation 312–13
  - exclusion, whether schemes within 312–13
- sanction of the court 68–78
  - compliance with statutory provisions 70–72
  - explanatory statement 70
  - failure to obtain appropriate consent 72
  - no flexibility to sanction scheme with technical defects 71–72
  - resolutions passed by statutory majority of each class 70–71
- exercise of court's discretion to
  - sanction schemes 5, 6, 73–78
- commercial and factual context of scheme 74
- court's broad supervisory jurisdiction 73
- court's role in examining fairness of scheme 73
- limits on court's role 77–78
- low levels of voting 74–75
- minority creditors and shareholders 77
- no obligation on court to sanction scheme 68–69
- non-voting creditors/
  - shareholders, interest of 77
- special interests in takeover schemes 75–76
- test to be applied 73–74
- third parties, effect on 74
- unrepresentative meetings 75–78
- proposal falling within proper scope of Part 26 69–70
- sufficient connection between scheme and England 70
- ultra vires* acts 69
- schemes of arrangement 383–89
  - administration, and *see*
    - administration and schemes as debt restructuring device
  - advantages *see* advantages of schemes of arrangement
  - court's role *see* court's role in schemes of arrangement
  - cross-border issues *see* cross-border issues
  - definition 1
  - disadvantages/criticisms of *see* criticisms/disadvantages of schemes of arrangement
  - dual nature of 5
  - geographical development *see* geographical development of schemes of arrangement
  - historical development *see* historical development of schemes of arrangement
  - importance of 1, 2, 383
  - international effectiveness of *see* recognition of schemes in foreign jurisdictions
  - mechanics *see* mechanics of schemes of arrangement
  - member-focused and creditor-focused schemes 12
  - member schemes of arrangement *see* member schemes of arrangement
  - mergers and demergers, use of schemes in *see under* mergers and demergers
  - overview of schemes 1–7
  - proposed changes to schemes 386–89
    - abolition of headcount test 386–87 *see also* headcount test
    - cramdown of whole classes, enabling 387 *see also* cramdown
    - greater discretion for court 388–89 *see also* court's role in schemes of arrangement
    - statutory stay, introduction of 388 *see also* moratoriums
  - statutory basis 19–20



- schemes of arrangement (cont.)
  - takeovers *see* takeover schemes
  - uses, wide variety of 1–2, 3, 12, 14–15
- sell-out rules 93
  - minority protection 133
- setting aside schemes of arrangement 79
  - fraud 3, 79, 86–87
- shadow directors 234
  - see also* directors
- shareholder equality/equal treatment
  - 99–100, 124–26, 132–33, 134, 145–46, 156
- short term vs long term investors
  - 124–26
  - different interests 124–25
  - perceived problem, consultation on 125–26
- Singaporean schemes 351–55
  - headcount test 62, 63, 353, 371–76
  - moratoriums 235–36, 354–55, 371
  - parallel schemes of arrangement 319–20
  - procedure 351–52
  - reform proposals 352–53
  - schemes as popular option 351
  - statutory provisions 351
- small company moratorium 216–20
  - cost and complexity 218–19
  - directors' submission to nominee 217
  - effect of moratorium 217–18
  - eligibility requirements 217
  - introduction 216–17
  - justifying restriction to small companies 219–20
  - meeting to approve the CVA 218
  - monitoring by nominee 218
- South African schemes 360–65, 371
  - appraisal right 362–64
    - minority shareholders exercising 363
  - compromises and arrangements
    - with creditors 361, 364–65
    - English scheme, compared with 365
  - court's power to sanction schemes 362
    - court's discretion 362
  - Fundamental Transactions 361–62
  - headcount test 62, 371–76
  - no statutory moratorium 235
  - procedure under 1973 Act 360
  - procedure under 2008 Act 361–64
  - schemes of arrangement 360–61
    - court's discretion 362
    - court's powers 362
    - Fundamental Transactions 361–62
  - valuable corporate tool, schemes
    - regarded as 360
  - voting 361–62, 364–65
- Spain
  - change of control transactions 380
  - pre-insolvency composition
    - proceedings 306
- squeeze-out rules 92–93
  - minority protection 133, 137–38, 363–64
- stamp duty 89, 94
- standstills 192–94, 234
  - see also* moratoriums
- sufficient connection
  - foreign companies 290–91, 292, 304–5, 322–23
  - proposal falling within proper scope of Part 26 70
- Takeover Code (Code) 89
  - equal treatment/shareholder
    - equality 99–100, 132–33, 134, 145–46, 156
  - short term vs long term investors 124–26
- hostile schemes of arrangement 32
- impact on takeover schemes 108–18
  - importance of synchronised
    - approach to takeovers by schemes/offers 110–13
- purpose of Code 109
- role/involvement of Panel in
  - schemes 108–18, 376, 384–85
- scope 109–10
  - application to schemes of
    - arrangement codified 110
- statutory footing 109
- substantive provisions 113–18
  - announcement 114
  - Panel consents and consultations 117–18

- scheme circular and disclosures 114–16
- scheme timetable 116–17
- undistorted choice as crucial aspect of regulation 134–35, 136
- Takeover Panel (Panel) 84
  - consents and consultations 117–18
  - creation 109
  - role/involvement in schemes 108–18, 376, 384–85
  - statutory body administering Code, as 90, 109
- takeover schemes 13–14, 82–150, 383–84
  - class meetings in *see* takeover schemes, class meetings in
  - comparison of schemes/offers as takeover mechanisms 93–108
  - ability of dissenting shareholders to block a bid 101–2
  - acquiring 100 per cent control of target 94–96
  - contested bids 104–6
  - financial assistance *see* financial assistance
  - hostile bids *see* hostile bids
  - involvement of the court 106–7
  - lost and untraceable shareholders 101
  - need to separate members into classes in schemes 108
  - speed 96
  - structural flexibility 107
  - summary 108
  - tax 94
  - US shareholders 99–101
- criticisms/concerns about schemes effecting 6, 384–85
- definition of ‘member’ for purpose of scheme of arrangement 85–86
- disclosure obligations 31, 145
  - Takeover Code 114–16
- impact of Takeover Code/Panel *see* Takeover Code; Takeover Panel
- majority in value test 57–58
- minority protection in schemes and offers, comparison of 130–38, 384
  - comparison of minority protection provisions 134–38
  - minority protection in an offer 132–34
  - minority protection in an offer, justifications for 134–36
  - minority protection in a scheme 130–31
  - minority protection in a scheme, justifications for 134–36
- schemes as mechanism of choice 2, 3
  - choice as to scheme of arrangement or offer 58
  - concerns about 6
- special interests in takeover schemes 75–76
- summary 148–50
- takeovers effected by offers 89–93
  - bidder’s initial offer to target board 90
  - bidder’s offer to target shareholders 89–90
  - conditions 91–92
  - formal offer 90–91
  - independent advice 90
  - revised offers 92
  - sell-out rules 93
  - squeeze-out rules 92–93
  - unsuccessful offers, consequences of 93
- takeovers effected by schemes 86–89
  - cancellation schemes 87–89
  - procedure 86–87
  - transfer schemes 87
- use of schemes as alternative to takeovers 86–108
  - comparison of schemes/offers as takeover mechanisms 93–108
  - scheme takeover compared to traditional offer 86–93
- takeovers effected by offers 89–93
- takeovers effected by schemes 86–89
  - use of schemes to effect takeovers increasingly common 83–84
- whether takeovers should be allowed by schemes of arrangement 139–48

- takeover schemes (cont.)
  - approval thresholds 142–45
  - English approach compared to other jurisdictions 139–42
  - maximising value for target shareholders 147–48
  - use of schemes to bypass takeover regime 145–47
- see also under* individual countries
- takeover schemes, class meetings in 117–18
- division of members into classes for purpose of takeover scheme 120–30
- balance to be struck 121
- bidder and its subsidiaries, position of 128–30
- definition of a class for scheme purposes 120–21
- different rights not different interests 121, 122
- different treatment of members of the same class 123
- extent to which rights are dissimilar 122
- irrevocable undertakings 126–27
- members must meet in classes 120
- members with shareholdings across different classes 123–24
- members with shares in the bidder 124
- overseas shareholders in target company 123
- separate classes of shares 122
- short term vs long term investors 124–26
- general 118–20
  - company free to decide who it proposes to 118–19
  - creditors, position of 119–20
  - court's general fairness discretion 120
  - no need to consult with unaffected members/creditors 119
- takeovers *see* offers; takeover schemes
- tax 94
- territoriality 316
- transfer schemes 87, 154
- UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency 313–14
  - foreign proceedings, definition of 313
  - harmonisation, promoting 313
  - incorporated into national legislation 313
  - modified universalism, as 316
  - recognition of foreign proceedings 313–14
    - consequences of 314
    - foreign main proceedings 313
    - foreign non-main proceedings 313–14
  - recognition of insolvency proceedings 314
- undertakings, irrevocable 126–27
  - creditors, provided by 202–4, 211
- unfair prejudice challenge 207–9
  - comparisons to determine existence of 208
  - concept of unfair prejudice 208
  - differential treatment requiring explanation 208
  - minority protection in a scheme compared with 209–12
  - court taking account of similar issues 210–11
  - onus, differences in 209–10
  - unfair prejudice challenge as ongoing risk for company 211–12
- unincorporated associations 25–26
- United States (US)
  - Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, corporate reorganisations under 45, 80, 254–62, 388
  - consideration of plan by creditors/shareholders 258–59
  - court's confirmation of plan 259–62
  - formulating a plan 256–58
  - general 254–56
  - valuation/valuation tests 253, 262
  - Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 15, recognition of schemes under 314–16
  - adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law 314

- consequences of recognition 315–16
- creditor schemes 314–15
- foreign proceeding, definition of 314, 315
- requirements for recognition 314, 315
- solvent companies 315
- cramdown 260, 387
  - increased power to subordinated creditors/shareholders 261–62
  - safeguards protecting minorities 260
- Delaware 377–79
  - court approval not required for mergers 378
  - mergers 377–79
  - minority protection 378–79
  - offers 377
- mergers 164
- US shareholders in takeover target 99–101
- valuation tests 253
- universalism
  - concept of 316
  - modified universalism 316–17
    - broad approach developed 317–19
  - recognition of schemes under 316–19
- unregistered companies 25
- valuation 249–53
  - going concern valuations 250–52
    - calculating going concern value 252
    - future going concern value 252–53
  - key consideration 249
  - liquidation valuation 249, 251
  - reform proposals 265–66
- voting
  - beneficial shareholders 60–61
  - British Virgin Islands (BVI) 366
  - Canada 341–42
  - CVAs 58–59
  - development of voting arrangements 9
  - economic exposure and voting interests decoupled 204–5
  - economic interest, voting for persons with 41–42
  - empty voting 204–5
  - Germany 380
  - India 359–60
  - low levels of voting 74–75
  - New Zealand 335–36, 339–40
  - non-voting shareholders 57, 77
  - right to vote on scheme of arrangement 42–45
  - South Africa 361–62, 364–65
- workouts to restructure company's debts, use of 191–95
  - advantages of agreeing informal workout 191–92
  - London Approach principles 194
  - problems associated with workouts 192–94
    - all creditors bound by agreement will need to agree 192–93
    - difficulty in identifying all creditors 193
    - hold-up, possibility of 193–94
    - standstill agreements required as no moratorium 192–94