

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction

For centuries, the Netherlands functioned as a “political dwarf” in Europe but a “colonial giant” on the world stage.¹ To be sure, the Dutch colonies in the East and West Indies were smaller than those of Britain and France. Still, generations of Dutch political and military leaders boldly proclaimed that their possession of the resource-rich East Indies afforded the small continental nation a disproportionately prominent position alongside the larger imperial powers. This book explores the inner workings of this self-styled colonial giant, as seen during a pivotal moment in its history: the wartime years of 1940 to 1945. Occupied by the Germans in May 1940, the Dutch metropole would spend the remainder of the war essentially cut off from its overseas colonies in the East and West Indies. The West Indies would remain under the formal jurisdiction of the Dutch government-in-exile located in London for the duration of the war, whereas colonial officials in the East Indies governed the archipelago until their surrender to invading Japanese forces in March 1942. These circumstances may have separated metropolitan society from the nation’s traditional overseas colonies, but despite this break – or perhaps because of it – the Dutch became extremely attached to their empire and, above all else, the East Indies. Wartime discussions of the colonies emphasized both continuity and change, a desire to forge a future that both resembled and improved on the country’s colonial past. For this to happen, however, the Dutch would need to look beyond their present circumstances of foreign domination and oppression, and instead set their sights on the liberation of both metropole and colony. Liberation held out the promise of the “resurrection of the Netherlands,” although

¹ As described by H. L. Wesseling in his “The Giant That Was a Dwarf or: The Strange Case of Dutch Imperialism,” in Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of Dutch Expansion* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997); and “Myths and Realities of Dutch Imperialism,” *Proceedings of the Second Indonesian Dutch Historical Conference* (Working Papers), 1978.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

the precise contours of this purported resurrection were subject to heated debate in occupied Holland. Leading the charge to create this new “imperial consciousness” was a small but authoritative group of anti-Nazi resisters who specialized in clandestine press work.

At least on the surface, these resisters had little reason to be so concerned with the colonies. Most obviously, of course, they had more pressing matters with which to contend. By virtue of their underground work, these resisters were constantly on the run from German authorities, who in the spring of 1942 had prescribed the death penalty for those found guilty of organizing resistance. Further, in the decades immediately preceding the war, the overseas territories – as they had been called since the Constitutional Revision of 1922 – hardly commanded front-and-center attention for most Dutch citizens in the metropole. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Dutch policy makers and members of the general public were infinitely more concerned with the effects of the international economic crisis, such as massive unemployment, and with the rise of fascist parties in neighboring countries. At this time, the continued presence and importance of the colonies were simply assumed as fact. Certainly, the Dutch Communist Party (CPN) had begun to call for immediate and unequivocal Indonesian independence, but the politically marginal position of this group ensured that its demands for independence would be ignored or rejected out of hand. Within the two halls of parliament, talk of colonial reform – prompted largely by Indonesian nationalists’ demands in the colony itself – could be heard on occasion, but little came of such discussions. In the interwar period, European empire was, as stated by Raymond Betts, “just there”: A small but vocal minority of the public opposed continued colonial rule, but the majority was “casually and contentedly supportive.”² Such was indeed the case in interwar Holland.

If Dutch resisters were not steeped in a prewar political culture dominated by colonial concerns, they also lacked the kind of personal connections to the Indies that would explain their wartime preoccupation with the empire. In the 1920s and 1930s, the leading Dutch socialist and communist parties maintained connections with like-minded Europeans, Indo-Europeans, and Indonesians living in the colony, but they did not create truly imperial parties uniting colony and metropole under one organizational roof. Further, only a handful of the resisters examined in my work could claim first-hand experience in the East Indies, let alone the Dutch West Indies, those colonial step-children in South America and the Caribbean. Among resisters, Abraham Rutgers of the *Trouw* organization was exceptional for his overseas work and extensive knowledge of the colonies. A botanist and zoologist by training, Rutgers spent nearly twenty years in the East Indies, where he held an array of governmental and nongovernmental positions before

² Raymond F. Betts, *Decolonization*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 19.

Introduction

3

being appointed by the queen to serve as governor of the Dutch colony of Surinam. Upon his return to the metropole, he advised the queen, ministers, and parliament on economic cooperation between the Netherlands and the East Indies, a position he would hold until the German invasion of May 1940. The trajectory of Rutgers's career was exceptional by any measure, but his prior involvement in colonial administration was especially unique among his clandestine peers. By contrast, a number of former colonial administrators, military officials, and experts held prominent leadership positions in both the Dutch Nazi Party (NSB) and the *Nederlandse Unie*, an extremely popular mass organization that sought to promote national unity and represent Dutch interests under German occupation. The colonies were no mere abstraction for these men, but rather an integral component of their private and public lives. For instance, when these Dutch Nazis spoke about the Indies – and since the party's founding in late 1931, they had much to say on this subject – they did so out of direct experience, vested interests, and organizational ties with the party's East Indies branch, established in 1933.

Admittedly, no amount of prewar contacts could have bridged the physical divide separating metropole and colony during the World War II period. With the German invasion of May 1940, Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers fled to London, where they would remain for the duration of the war. From unoccupied England, the Dutch government continued to rule the colonies in accordance with prearranged plans specifying that, in case of precisely this type of emergency, the overseas territories were to sever all ties with the European metropole. Dutch colonial officials, ordered to maintain limited contact with the queen's London government, were largely left to their own devices in administering the colonies. The West Indies would remain “free” for the duration of the war, although both Surinam and Curaçao were later placed under American and British guardianship at the request of Queen Wilhelmina. The fate of the East Indies was quite different: Japan invaded the colony in January 1942 and, with the Dutch surrender in early March, assumed control of the Netherlands' precious East Indies. From this point until the Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the Dutch metropole was largely cut off from the East Indies. Only sporadic, highly censored information left the East Indies, and all personal lines of communication between those living in the German-occupied territory and those living in the Japanese-occupied territory were severed. As well-connected as the Dutch underground considered itself, neither these clandestine activists nor the public at large truly knew what was happening in their overseas domains. They may have suspected the tenor of developments then unfolding, but they could not confirm their suspicions. When the resisters – or anyone else in occupied Holland, for that matter – wrote about the East Indies, they did so in an informational vacuum of sorts, and they did so without guidance from their government-in-exile.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Taken together, then, these factors raise the following question: Why did these resisters, seemingly so removed from the colonies and constantly on the run from German authorities, concern themselves with the Dutch empire? These resisters did not treat the colonies as a tangential concern, a trivial matter to be resolved once the motherland got its affairs in order. Rather, with each passing month of the war, the so-called colonial question, and, specifically, “the Indies question” assumed an ever-more prominent role. Particularly after the Japanese occupied the East Indies in March 1942, these resisters focused their attention and that of the Dutch public on the future of the East Indies and the kingdom. With an increasing sense of urgency, the major clandestine organizations in the occupied Netherlands charged themselves with producing concrete guidelines and policies concerning the country’s imperial future. In the absence of legitimate Dutch rulers, these resisters came to see themselves as colonial policy makers, lobbyists, and experts. All of them were determined to see their wartime plans put into effect, to the benefit of Dutch and Indonesians alike.

It is against this background of foreign occupation at home and imperial loss overseas that this work explores how the experiences of the war-time years shaped and even transformed Dutch perceptions of their empire. I explore whether the experiences of domination, oppression, and the loss of sovereignty and self-determination at the hands of the Germans led the Dutch to reconsider their historical position as imperial rulers. As the colonial occupiers found themselves in the awkward and unexpected position of being occupied by a foreign power, they now began to question the very meaning of empire. Was there a place for a Dutch empire, or for any European empire, in a postwar world expected to bear little resemblance to that which came before? Were the Indonesian people prepared to govern themselves at this moment in time, and, if not now, then when would they be? Further, and perhaps most disturbingly for some, had the Dutch colonizers treated the Indonesian people as brethren or as mere subjects to be exploited and abused? That is, were the Dutch no better than their new Nazi masters? This book examines how, during the period of 1940 to 1945, certain segments of Dutch society struggled to answer these questions in the absence of their legitimate government and, in the process, attempted to create a general “imperial consciousness” deemed to be lacking in prewar Holland.

The experiences of war and occupation at home could have resulted and indeed did result in two very different trajectories of imperial-minded thinking and policy. On the one hand, the presence of this foreign and highly oppressive occupier could have resulted in an upsurge of sympathy, even support, for colonial subjects in the East and West Indies. Such was the stance taken by the politically leftist clandestine organizations, which sought to prepare their fellow citizens for the tremendous political reforms expected to follow in the wake of liberation. On the other hand, this occupation, which swiftly removed the Netherlands from a world community

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

5

in which it had long considered itself a leading power, could have made the Dutch hold on ever more tightly to the overseas territories they considered to be their rightful properties. Those who saw the war as proof of the indivisibility of the Dutch empire drew on a decades-old idea – known simply in English translation as “Indies lost, disaster born” – which prophesied catastrophic consequences should the Netherlands lose its precious colony. Without the East Indies, not only would the Dutch economy collapse, but the Netherlands would lose its prominent international standing. So, for those falling on this side of the spectrum, colonial reform remained out of the question, at least in the foreseeable future, especially if such reforms were granted in response to Indonesian nationalism or pressure from other outside forces such as the United States. Any changes, whether affecting the larger imperial structure or the individual colonies, would be determined solely by Dutch authorities in The Hague and in the colonies.

With my presentation of these two opposing responses on the part of the Dutch resistance, I do not mean to imply that the clandestine colonial dialogue revolved solely around these two poles. On the contrary, these underground discussions and attempts to formulate policy directives were marked by ambiguity and ambivalence, especially among those most eager to see change. Also evident was the attempt to obtain a workable consensus, an approach that had characterized Dutch political life for centuries. During the war, this drive toward consensus building in the colonial realm found expression in the idea of a Dutch commonwealth modeled on that of Great Britain. The commonwealth option seemed to stand solidly between the two poles, one calling for the resurrection of the Netherlands’ traditional empire and the other calling for the implementation of far-reaching reforms. Neither empire nor nation-state, this commonwealth would allow the Dutch to maintain their historic relationship with the people and resources of the Indies, but at the same time would allow the Indonesians to work toward autonomy and independence, albeit under Dutch tutelage. Lastly, and no less importantly, proponents of a Dutch commonwealth anticipated that this structure would find favor with the purportedly anti-imperialist United States, widely expected to dominate the postwar peacemaking process and to preside over the dismantling of the traditional European empires.³

³ For further discussion of this enduring “American anti-imperialism” idea, particularly as it concerned the Dutch empire and the East Indies/Indonesia, see Frances Gouda with Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 26–27; Gerlof D. Homan, “The Netherlands, the United States and the Indonesian Question, 1948,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 1 (Jan., 1990): 123–141, pages 124–125 especially; Gerlof D. Homan, “The United States and the Netherlands East Indies: The Evolution of American Anticolonialism,” *Pacific Historical Review* 53, no. 4 (Nov., 1984): 423–446, pages 434–435; and Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 43–44.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Tentative clandestine discussions concerning a potential Dutch commonwealth assumed concrete form in early 1943, after the queen herself, speaking in a radio broadcast from London, explicitly referred to this possibility. In her speech of December 7, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina announced her intention to convene, after the war, a conference that would address the structure and form of the postwar Kingdom of the Netherlands. Without committing herself to its creation, she envisioned a “renewed commonwealth” that would include the European Netherlands and its overseas territories: The Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curaçao would each have complete freedom regarding internal affairs but would cooperate on matters of mutual concern, such as foreign affairs and defense. Importantly – and contrary to enduring perceptions in both the Netherlands and the English-speaking world – the queen did not promise Indonesian independence, whether inside or outside the bounds of a Dutch commonwealth, but she also did not preclude the possibility of far-reaching political changes either.⁴ Yet in the occupied metropole, this particular speech, intended to commemorate the first anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, was seen by resisters as promising both Indonesian autonomy and the creation of a commonwealth. Not only did the queen’s public statements validate their previous suggestions about the need for democratic reform, but they provided these resisters with a workable framework on which they could now build. Henceforth, the clandestine publications would situate their discussions of the future of the Dutch empire within the context of this speech, regardless of whether they saw in it a means of effecting positive change or a dangerous experiment that could only harm Dutch interests. Importantly, too, the commonwealth option allowed the oft-conflicting clandestine organizations to achieve a rare moment of consensus. In the final weeks of the war, the Indies Commission, a newly formed organization consisting of representatives from the major underground organizations, expressed its support for the postwar imperial conference to which the queen had referred in her speech of December 7, 1942. This interresistance group also anticipated the creation of what it termed a “reborn Commonwealth,” which in their view would only work if freely accepted by a majority of people in both the European Netherlands and the Indies.

⁴ Mark Mazower, for instance, notes that the entire colonial discourse in the occupied Netherlands was limited to the queen’s famous December 1942 speech in which she “offered to turn the Dutch Empire into a commonwealth”: *The Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999), 195–196. On the other side of the interpretative spectrum stands David Barnouw, who states the queen did not raise the prospects of independence but rather wished only to restore the Kingdom of the Netherlands: N. David J. Barnouw, “Dutch Exiles in London,” in *Europe in Exile: European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–1945*, ed. Martin Conway and José Gotovich (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 229–246, with these comments appearing on page 244.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

7

As a result of both their individual and joint efforts along these lines, the resisters of the underground press played a pivotal role in shaping and promoting a general awareness of empire, even if they firmly and at times vehemently disagreed as to how this awareness should inform governmental policy toward the Indies. Especially during the final two years of the war, theirs was an ambitious and earnest discussion of the political, ethical, religious, and economic aspects of Dutch colonialism, whether past, present, or future. Each group of resisters trusted that its wartime work to these ends would better prepare the country's political leadership and the Dutch people for what lay ahead of them after their own liberation from the Germans. Even as they focused on seemingly mundane matters, such as the precise type of army to be employed in the military battle to liberate the Indies from Japan, these underground writers and organizers engaged in a high-stakes political project: They realized, and they wished to impart to their fellow citizens, that the very future of the kingdom was at stake. With each passing year of the war, these discussions also became increasingly mutual, as leading Dutch resisters on the political left joined forces with like-minded Indonesian nationalists in the German-occupied European Netherlands. Together, they advanced the cause of colonial reform and Indonesian autonomy. In turn, these resisters came to expect that these particular Indonesian colleagues – Western-educated, nationalist but cooperative, fervent and moderate at the same time – would lead a newly autonomous or possibly independent Indonesia.

I contend that the colonial question, as articulated during the wartime years, was never concerned with the colonies alone, nor was it simply another topic to be hashed out by the resistance while they lived their lives in hiding. The colonial question, in fact, tapped into the Dutch psyche in a manner nothing short of profound. It encompassed numerous other topics with which these underground movers and shakers were concerned, such as the prospects of a new postwar political system and society guided by the principle of “renewal.” The very future of the Netherlands as a regional, continental, and international power was made to hinge upon the projected status of the East Indies within – or outside of – the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Through their consideration of the colonial relationship, the Dutch were reminded of their nation's Golden Age of the seventeenth century as well as its more humble present-day position as a middling power caught between much larger and more powerful entities. The questions swirling around the fate of the East Indies also made the Dutch question their purported traditions of tolerance and neutrality as well as their moralistic worldview that for generations had placed the ethical, respectable Netherlands in a category different from that of its imperial neighbors. At their core, these wartime discussions about this “Indies question” concerned the very identity of the Netherlands.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

For generations of Dutch political and military leaders, the East Indies had long served as a vital source of riches that accorded the small continental nation a disproportionately prominent position alongside the larger imperial powers. Yet the East Indies were much more than this. In the words of Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, European colonies constituted “an imaginary and physical space in which the inclusions and exclusions built into the notions of citizenship, sovereignty, and participation were worked out.”⁵ Certainly, the East Indies both reflected and in turn helped shape metropolitan culture and politics in the Netherlands, just as British India and French Algeria did for their respective metropolises. However, I would posit that these phenomena were amplified in the Dutch empire, with its emphasis on quality over quantity. When their fellow Europeans were seizing new territories on the supposed “Dark Continent,” the Dutch consolidated their rule in regions where their explorers, merchants, and trading companies already held sway. In this environment, the Asian archipelago assumed an importance beyond all realities, and so by the time the Germans entered the European Netherlands in May 1940, the Dutch had long since staked their identity on their possession of the East Indies. They would continue to do so under German occupation, even as they considered the prospects of colonial reform.

Naturally, contemporary readers know the ultimate fate of the Dutch-Indonesian relationship. Indeed, the decolonization of the Indies and the creation of the independent nation of Indonesia in 1949 lurk in the background of this wartime story. The European Netherlands was liberated from German rule in early May 1945, at which point Dutch colonial officials began to plan their return to the East Indies. They would not return, however, at least not in the manner they had expected. On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Indonesian nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Although the timing of this announcement took the Dutch by surprise, the involvement of these two men did not: Considered enemies of the colonial state because of their noncooperationist stance during the 1920s and 1930s, both men had spent years in Dutch detention. Once freed by their new occupiers, Sukarno and Hatta elected to cooperate with the Japanese, at least to the extent allowable by Indonesia’s position as part of the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” However, their August 1945 declaration of independence failed to impress lawmakers in The Hague, who dismissed it as a meaningless gesture offered by marginal and desperate extremists. The Netherlands’ first postwar government refused to

⁵ Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–56, with this quotation appearing on page 3.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

9

recognize either Sukarno or his Republic, a policy adopted by successive governments. The next four years saw both intense, protracted negotiations and violent conflict in the forms of two Dutch “police actions” intended to subdue the republic by military force. Finally, in late 1949, the Dutch agreed to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia, giving rise to the independent nation of Indonesia. Viewed through this prism of decolonization, we can see the wartime years as the final heyday of European imperialism. We know that independence lay on the horizon not only for Indonesia, but for scores of other European colonies in Asia and Africa as well. Still, these postwar events were not preordained; the Kingdom of the Netherlands need not have fractured as it did, at the exact moment it did. In order to understand this final collapse, we must redirect our efforts backward to the wartime years, and we must look for continuities bridging the wartime and prewar periods.

In the larger course of Dutch history, the pivotal years of 1940 to 1945 occupy an exceptional yet surprisingly marginal position. To be sure, popular audiences and scholars alike remain highly captivated by – if not wholly obsessed with – the wartime years, and any visit to a Dutch bookstore would reveal a seemingly endless supply of new works examining the Holocaust of the Dutch Jews or the achievements of famed resisters. Typically, however, such studies examine the wartime years in chronological isolation, as if this five-year occupation constituted a mere blip on the radar screen of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Indeed, the first postwar historians deemed this “a special period, demanding a special historiography” emphasizing the exceptional, even “un-Dutch” nature of the German occupation.⁶ This approach has proven remarkably difficult to shake, especially because the wartime experiences of the Kingdom of the Netherlands have been examined in geographical isolation as well. For decades, historiography of the Dutch empire at war has examined either the German-occupied metropole or the Japanese-occupied East Indies, but not both simultaneously. Admittedly, within the first two years of the war, the European Netherlands had lost contact with the East and West Indies, but this does not mean that after 1940 the Dutch simply wrote off their empire. In fact, quite the contrary seems to have been true in the metropolitan Netherlands. The presence of German troops at home and the Japanese threat overseas only served to underscore the centuries’ worth of historic, economic, and cultural connections existing

⁶ Hein A. Klemann, “Did the German Occupation (1940–1945) Ruin Dutch Industry?” *Contemporary European History* Vol. 17 No. 4 (Nov. 2008): 457–481, pages 461–462 especially. Similarly critical commentary appears in Pieter Lagrou, “The Nationalization of Victimhood: Selective Violence and National Grief in Western Europe, 1940–1960,” in *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s*, eds. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, Publication of the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 243–257, page 244.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-01580-7 - Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands

Jennifer L. Foray

Excerpt

[More information](#)

between the Netherlands and the East Indies. This is not to say, as recently alleged by one scholar, that unrequited longing and delusional nostalgic fantasies dominated Dutch colonial thinking during the period of 1940 to 1945.⁷ This view also oversimplifies a nuanced, complex reality and imposes clarity and conformity where none existed.

Further, in the extensive Dutch- and English-language historiography concerned with Indonesia and the Dutch-Indonesian relationship, 1945 or even 1942 denotes a clean break with the Dutch colonial past. This preoccupation with a “zero hour” has obscured significant long-term developments, such as the Netherlands’s refusal to grant the Indonesians greater participatory powers during the first few decades of the twentieth century. These policies isolated moderate Indonesian nationalists and further entrenched the views of more radical nationalists, thus souring Dutch-Indonesian relationships long before the Japanese arrived in the archipelago. Contrary to those who would focus solely on postwar Dutch missteps or the Indonesians’ “political awakening” under Japanese rule, the historical subjects of my study – both Dutch and Indonesian – perceived more durable processes at work. For instance, during the war, politically leftist resisters behind the clandestine publication *Het Parool* continued the discussion first initiated by the country’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) in the 1930s. By contrast, the communist resisters of *De Waarheid* both explicitly reaffirmed and deviated from their party’s prewar stance calling for immediate and unqualified Indonesian independence. These and other organizations responded to the shifting political terrain around them, but they did not place their experiences into tidy “prewar,” “wartime,” and “postwar” boxes, as more contemporary analyses would have it. With my focus on these clandestine writings and plans, I aim to connect these various periods, thus locating this wartime discourse within the larger discussion of the colonial situation that began well before World War II and continued, with increasing urgency, in the immediate postwar years.

At first glance, the wartime situation in the Dutch metropole seems comparable to that of other European imperial powers during this time. After all, as Eric Jennings has demonstrated in his study of Vichy imperialism, France also saw renewed interest in its colonies during the beginning of the

⁷ Anne L. Foster also states that “memories of anticolonial rebellion, of why the Dutch believed they had to create the island prison of Boven Digoel, of indigenous political parties so contentious they had been banned, had faded from Dutch minds in the midst of four years of longing and not knowing.” Foster provides no documentation in support of these claims, and, on a more trivial level, does not explain her focus on “four years” as opposed to five (the entire duration of the war) or even three (the duration of the Japanese-occupation of the Indies): “Avoiding the ‘Rank of Denmark’: Dutch Fears about Loss of Empire in Southeast Asia,” in *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962*, eds. Christopher E. Gosha and Christian F. Ostermann (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2009), 68–83, pages 70–71 especially.