We take it for granted that a person persists over time: when we make plans, we assume that we will carry them out; when we punish someone for a crime, we assume that she is the same person as the one who committed it. Metaphysical questions underlying these assumptions point toward an area of deep existential and philosophical interest. In this volume, leading metaphysicians discuss key questions about personal identity, including “What are we?, “How do we persist?” and “Which conditions guarantee our identity over time?” They discuss whether personal identity is “complex,” whereby it is analyzable in terms of simpler relations such as physical or psychological features, or whether it is “simple,” i.e. something that cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental relations. Their essays offer an innovative discussion of this topic and will be of interest to a wide readership in metaphysics.

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PERSONAL IDENTITY:
COMPLEX OR SIMPLE?

EDITED BY
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and
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To our parents for their love and support
Contents

List of illustrations  ix
List of contributors  x
Acknowledgments  xi

Introduction
GEORG GASSER AND MATTHIAS STEFAN  1

PART I  FRAMING THE QUESTION  19
1 Chitchat on personal identity
DAVID BARNETT  21
2 In search of the simple view
ERIC T. OLSON  44
3 Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation
RYAN WASSERMAN  63
4 Personal identity and its perplexities
HAROLD W. NOONAN  82

PART II  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SIMPLICITY  103
5 How to determine which is the true theory of personal identity
RICHARD SWINBURNE  105
6 Against simplicity
SYDNEY SHOEMAKER  123
7 The probable simplicity of personal identity
E. J. LOWE  137
Contents

8  Reply to E. J. Lowe
   SYDNEY SHOEMAKER  156

9  The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beings
   MARTINE NIDA-RÜMELIN  157

PART III RECONSIDERING SIMPLICITY  177

10 Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view
    LYNNE RUDDER BAKER  179

11 Is “person” a sortal term?
    CHRISTIAN KANZIAN  192

12 Materialism, dualism, and “simple” theories of personal identity
    DEAN ZIMMERMAN  206

13 The morphing block and diachronic personal identity
    HUD HUDSON  236

References  249

Index  257
Illustrations

Figure 1 A taxonomy of views about personal identity over time.  
Figure 2 Different sums of person-stages.
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Acknowledgments

The origin of the present volume dates from a conference on personal identity at the conference center of Innsbruck University in Obergurgl, Austria, July 19–22, 2010, where preliminary drafts of the papers were discussed. Sydney Shoemaker’s, Hud Hudson’s and David Barnett’s papers were not presented at the conference, but were written especially for this volume.

We wish to thank the following individuals for their role in the production of this volume. First, we owe a debt of thanks to Josef Quitterer, Daniel Wehinger and Monika Datterl for their help in organizing the conference. Dean Zimmerman and Mike Rea were kind enough to offer valuable advice on proceeding with this project after the conference. Our warmest thanks to Katherine Munn for her valuable suggestions for improving the readability of some contributions. We also thank Hilary Gaskin and Thomas O’Reilly of Cambridge University Press for all her help and thoughtful advice in preparing this book for publication. Finally, we would also like to thank all the contributors for their great patience during the completion of the volume.

It does not happen as a matter of course that international philosophical conferences receive a great deal of funding. Therefore, we wish to express our deepest gratitude to the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), grant P20186–G14, whose generous support made it possible to organize the conference and to edit this volume. Furthermore, we are also greatly indebted to the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and to the Vice-Rector for Research of Innsbruck University for co-funding the accommodation expenses of the invited speakers.