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978-1-107-01227-1 - The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach

Edited by Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow

Index

[More information](#)

INDEX

- actions
 - abandonment 58–60
 - cause of action 79
 - class *see* class actions
 - common law rule 64
 - cost *see* costs
 - derivative *see* derivative actions
 - direct *see* direct actions
 - discontinued *see* discontinuance
 - Foss* rule *see Foss v. Harbottle* rule
 - frivolous *see* unmeritorious actions
 - loser pays *see* ‘loser pays costs’ rule
 - settlement 58–60
 - strike suits 16, 28–29, 65, 66
- agency conflict
 - companies/shareholders 26–27
 - corporate governance 12–15
 - minimized 13
- agency costs
 - majority/minority shareholders 14
 - reduction 15
 - see also* shareholder management
 - agency costs
- Asia
 - background 90–97
 - complexity 90–127
 - derivative actions 90–127, 398–403
 - economically rational shareholder theory 6, 93–95
 - grand theory 6, 90–97
 - inconvenient reality 124–127
 - legal origins theory 5–6
 - overview 100–124
 - reluctant Asian litigant theory 5, 90–92
 - selected jurisdictions 5–6, 98–100
 - statute law 93
- Asian culture 5, 6, 90–92, 234–235, 359–365
- attorneys *see* entrepreneurial attorney system
- Australia, public enforcement 62
- Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 62
- Baum, Harald 1–89, 398–403
- benefit
 - cost–benefit analysis 20–21, 30, 35
 - Japan 144–150
 - share price 34
 - Shareholder Benefit Rule 20, 137
 - Substantial Benefit Doctrine 22, 28, 39, 40
- board of directors
 - approval 48–52
 - conflict of interest 48–49, 57, 66, 350, 391, 397
 - filtering role 48–49
 - judicial review 50, 65
 - notice/demand requirement *see* demands
 - special litigation committees (SLCs) 50–52, 65, 66
 - United States 49–50
- China
 - actions
 - 2006 to date 275–288
 - before 2006 260–269
 - pre-2006 cases 263–269
 - straddling actions 278
 - ‘Approving Response’ 263–267
 - associated causes of action 273–275
 - autonomy/acceptance 280–282

- China (cont.)
- avoidance of derivative pleadings 279–280
 - background 243–244
 - company forms 249–253
 - company law 269–275
 - complexity 111–114
 - corporate governance 244–245
 - corporatization 245–249
 - costs 258–260
 - demands 272–273
 - derivative actions 111–114, 243–295
 - economic/legal reform 244–260
 - judicial initiative 112
 - judiciary 254–257
 - law reform 288–293
 - legal representative 253–254
 - local protectionism 254–257
 - locus standi* 270–272
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 287–288
 - mass litigation avoided 254–257
 - minority shareholder protection 111–114, 243–295
 - non-statutory rule making 260–263
 - party control 254–257
 - political motives 94–95, 112–113
 - publicly listed companies 275–278
 - regulation 113
 - representative actions 257–258, 286
 - statute law 269–275
 - substantive claims 284–286
 - supervisors 286–287
 - technical competence 282–284
 - widely held companies 267–268
- Clarke, Donald C. 243–295
- class actions
- derivative actions distinguished 12
 - private enforcement 63, 66
 - South Korea 189–192
- closely held companies
- deterrence 26
 - United States 66
- Commodore Perry 132
- common fund doctrine 21, 39, 40
- common law
- Hong Kong 114–117, 315–319
 - ratification 79
 - rule, actions 64
- Singapore 331–336
- superiority theory 92–93
- companies
- agency *see* agency conflict
 - board *see* board of directors
 - China 249–253, 269–275
 - close *see* close companies
 - decision to sue 27, 33–34
 - Delaware 75
 - directors *see* directors
 - first option 46–47
 - governance *see* corporate governance
 - India 123, 371–377, 386–388
 - legitimate interests 27–28
 - members 78–79
 - notice/demand *see* demands
 - Singapore 328–330, 345–346
 - Taiwan 231–233
 - wrongdoers *see* wrongdoers
- compensation
- compensatory value 15–19, 20
 - Delaware 17–18
 - empirical studies 15–19
 - financial cost 20
 - Japan 22–23
 - South Korea 189–190
 - United States 17–19, 20–23
- conflict, agency *see* agency conflict
- conflict of interest, board of directors 48–49, 57, 66, 350, 391, 397
- contingency fees
- South Korea 203–205
 - United States 21–22, 39, 41, 76, 137
- continuing ownership rule
- France 84
 - Taiwan 220
 - unmeritorious actions 56–57
- corporate actors
- behaviour 57–58
 - board *see* board of directors
 - directors *see* directors
- corporate duties/liabilities, economic deterrence 14–15
- corporate governance
- agency conflict 12–15
 - China 244–245
 - efficiency 14

- Hong Kong 307–308
- overlapping mechanisms 30–31
- private enforcement 63–64
- Taiwan 235–237
- corporate information
 - asymmetry 43–46
 - inspection of documents 45–46
 - regulatory strategies 44
 - shareholders 43–46
 - sufficient access 43–46
- costs
 - agency *see* agency costs
 - China 258–260
 - conditional fees 40
 - contingency *see* contingency fees
 - cost–benefit analysis 20–21, 30, 35, 155–158
 - financial cost 20
 - indemnities 41–42
 - loser pays *see* ‘loser pays costs’ rule
 - shareholder risk rule 20, 35–36, 137
 - shareholder management *see* shareholder management
 - agency costs
 - United Kingdom 81–82
- courts
 - filtering role 52–54, 79
 - US federal courts 75–76
- damages
 - enriching monetary incentives 37–38
 - share price 33–34
- Delaware
 - company incorporation 75
 - shareholder compensation 17–18
- demands
 - China 272–273
 - excused 50
 - Germany 53
 - judicial review 50
 - notice/demand requirement 47, 49–50, 53
 - refusal 50, 65
 - South Korea 206–210
- derivative actions
 - advantages 1
 - agency conflict 12–15
 - Asia 90–127, 398–403
 - background 1–6
 - bounties 37, 38
 - characteristics 8–10
 - China 111–114, 243–295
 - class actions distinguished 12
 - codification 2
 - compensatory value *see* compensation
 - decline 18
 - definition 7–8
 - delegation of right to sue 8–9
 - delimitation 10–12
 - deterrence 14–15, 16, 23–26
 - direct actions distinguished 11
 - divergent interests 27–28, 29–30
 - economics *see* economic perspective
 - empirical studies 15–19
 - equitable rights 64
 - features 7
 - functional alternatives 60–64
 - functional perspective 7–64
 - history *see* historical perspective
 - Hong Kong 114–117, 296–322
 - India 92, 120–124, 369–397
 - Japan 92, 100–104, 128–169
 - macroeconomic threat 15
 - messenger/representative 9
 - negative effects 26–31
 - oppression remedy 11–12
 - practicality *see* practical perspective
 - reflective loss 10
 - scope 7–12
 - Singapore 117–120, 323–368
 - South Korea 92, 104–108, 186–214
 - Taiwan 108–111, 215–242
 - terminology 1
 - three parties 9–10
- deterrence
 - close companies 26
 - corporate law rules 25
 - derivative actions 14–15, 16, 23–26
 - deterrence effect 23–26
 - economic deterrence 14–15
 - enforcement 24
 - ex ante effect 24–25, 30
 - frivolous cases *see* unmeritorious actions

- direct actions
 - derivative actions distinguished 11
 - private enforcement 63
 - South Korea 189–192
 - Taiwan 228–230
- directors
 - board *see* board of directors
 - liability insurance 28, 30, 40, 59
- discontinuance
 - Germany 59–60, 87
 - regulation 58
 - United Kingdom 59
 - United States 59
- economic perspective
 - benefit *see* benefit
 - economic deterrence 14–15
 - efficiencies/inefficiencies 12–31
 - incentives/disincentives 31–35
 - perfect markets 31–32
 - public listed companies 37
 - rationality *see* economically rational shareholders
 - scope 4, 7–64
- economically rational shareholders
 - Asia 6, 93–95
 - economic perspective 6, 32
 - Japan *see* Japan
 - partial ownership 32–33
- efficiency
 - corporate governance 14
 - economic perspective 12–31
 - empirical studies 24
 - macroeconomic inefficiencies 30
- empirical studies
 - ambiguous picture 23–26
 - comparative value 19–23
 - contradictory lessons 18–19
 - efficiency 24
 - United States 15–19
- enforcement
 - comparative law 30
 - deterrence 24
 - employment market 63
 - external 63
 - hostile takeovers 63
 - India 371–377
 - internal 63–64
 - market-based 63
 - oppression remedy 63–64
 - private law 61–64
 - product market 63
 - public enforcement 24
- England
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 41–42
 - UK *see* United Kingdom
- entrepreneurial attorney system
 - Japan 142–143, 150–155
 - quorum requirement 55
 - South Korea 200–206
 - United States 39, 40, 42
- equitable rights
 - derivative actions 64
 - share ownership 78
- fiduciary duty
 - behaviour 57
 - shareholder management agency costs 13–14
- filtering out roles
 - board of directors 48–49
 - courts 52–54, 79
 - general meetings 54
 - unmeritorious actions 47–58
- financial cost, compensation 20
- Foss v. Harbottle* rule
 - Hong Kong 114, 297–304
 - India 121, 381–383
 - majority rule principle 68
 - negligence 57, 114
 - partnerships 67–68
 - proper plaintiff principle 68
 - requirements 67–72
 - Singapore 324, 332–336
 - statutory regime 52, 66–69, 77–82
 - United Kingdom 57, 65, 66–69
- France
 - continuing ownership rule 84
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 84
 - procedure and practice 82–84
 - quorum requirement 82–83
 - wrongdoing 83
- fraud on the minority
 - criteria 69–70
 - exception 69

- India 382–383
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 69–70
 - wrongdoing 69–70, 79
- free-rider problem 34, 87–88
- Fujita, Tomotaka 141
- functional perspective
 - functional alternatives 60–64
 - scope 7–64
- general meetings
 - filtering role 54
 - ratification 54
- Germany
 - admission procedure 86–87
 - contemporaneous ownership rule 56
 - discontinuance/settlement 59–60, 87
 - enriching monetary incentives 37
 - historical perspective 72–74
 - inspection of documents 45
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 41–42, 64, 87
 - negative incentives 87
 - notice/demand requirement 53–54
 - oppression remedy 64
 - procedure and practice 84–89
 - quorum requirement 63–64, 85–86, 88
 - unmeritorious actions 53–54, 87–88
- Goo, S. H. 114–117, 296–322
- Haley, John 135–136
- historical perspective
 - case law 64–65
 - Germany 72–74
 - scope 4, 64–74
 - Singapore 326–330
 - United Kingdom 66–72
 - United States 64–66
- ‘Holy Grail’, appropriate balance 1–2, 4, 15, 47–48, 77
- Hong Kong
 - background 296–297
 - common law 114–117
 - consultancy report 304–305
 - consultation paper 307–308
 - corporate governance 307–308
 - derivative actions 114–117, 296–322
 - Foss v. Harbottle* rule 114, 297–304
 - judicial pronouncements 311–315
 - law reform 114–117, 304–310
- Standing Committee report 305–307
- statute law 115, 308–310, 319–321
- success factors 310–322
- Howson, Nicholas C. 243–295
- incentives/disincentives
 - bounties 37, 38
 - design 35–43
 - direct damages
 - enriching monetary incentives 35, 36–39
 - need 31–35
 - negative *see* negative incentives
- India
 - actions
 - desirability 371–377
 - Indian context 378–380
 - rationale 371–380
 - background 369–370, 380–393
 - Civil Procedure Code 384–386
 - clean hands 384
 - company law 371–377
 - Company Law Board (CLB) 123, 387–388
 - constraints 390–393
 - controlling shareholders 391–392
 - cultural concerns 392–393
 - derivative actions 92, 120–124, 369–397
 - directors’ duties 390–391
 - Foss v. Harbottle* rule 121, 381–383
 - fraud on the minority 382–383
 - future prospects 396–397
 - law reform 394–397
 - litigiousness 120–124
 - ‘loser pays costs’ rule 393
 - oppression/mismanagement 386–388
 - political motives 94–95
 - procedure and practice 383–386
 - remedies 386–390
 - SEBI 388–390
 - special resolutions 382
 - ultra vires 382
- information, companies *see* corporate information
- insurance, directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability 28, 30, 40, 59

- Japan
- actions
 - absence of shareholder litigation 132–138
 - increasing number 139–143
 - background 128–132
 - Commercial Code 101, 132–133, 141, 155–156
 - compensation 22–23
 - cost–benefit analysis 155–158
 - Daiwa Bank case 143, 156
 - derivative actions 92, 100–104, 128–169
 - economically irrational litigation 158–168
 - enriching monetary incentives
 - damages 37–38
 - economic incentives 35, 36–39
 - jurisdictions 36–37
 - entrepreneurial attorney system 142–143, 150–155
 - financial benefit 144–150
 - financial tracking hypothesis 155–158
 - hypotheses tested 144–158
 - irrational shareholders 95, 102–104, 128–169
 - Japanese mystery 23
 - Kabunushi Onbuzuman* (KO) 103, 143, 152, 154, 160–162, 166–167
 - Meiji Era (1868–1926) 132
 - Mitsui Mining case 165–166
 - Nikko Securities case 141
 - non-economic litigiousness 100–104, 128–169
 - political motives 94–95
 - purely irrational behaviour 163–168
 - quasi-rational behaviour 160–163
 - rational shareholder litigant 132–143
 - rational/irrational behaviour 158–159
 - security for expenses 155–156
 - Shareholder Benefit Rule 137
 - Shareholder Risk Rule 137
 - sokaiya* 130, 160, 162–163
 - stamp fee (*inshi*) 103, 137–138, 141–142, 144–145
 - utility maximization 131
 - yakuza* 130, 162
- judicial review, demand refused 50, 65
- Khanna, Vikramaditya 120–124, 369–397
- Kim, Kon-Sik 104–108, 186–214
- Kondo, Mitsuo 168
- Law Commission, shareholder remedies 71–72
- liabilities
 - D&O insurance 28, 30, 40, 59
 - economic deterrence 14–15
 - South Korea 205–206
- locus standi*
 - China 270–272
 - shareholders 54–55
 - Singapore 342
 - South Korea 196–199
- ‘loser pays costs’ rule
 - China 287–288
 - England 41–42
 - France 84
 - fraud on the minority 70
 - Germany 42, 64, 87
 - India 393
 - limited exceptions 41
 - risk 41, 42–43, 52
 - South Korea 201–203
 - United States 34, 39, 40
- Low, Chee Keong 114–117, 296–322
- Milhaupt, C. J. 161
- Nakahigashi, Masafumi 100–104, 128–169
- negative incentives
 - costs *see* ‘loser pays costs’ rule
 - Germany 87
 - risk 26–31, 32–33
 - Taiwan 108–111
 - United States 76
- negligence
 - Foss v. Harbottle* rule 57–58, 114–115

- shareholder management agency
 - costs 13
 - United Kingdom 57–58
- Netherlands, public enforcement
 - 62–63
- oppression remedy
 - derivative actions 11–12
 - enforcement 63–64
 - Germany 64
 - India 386–388
- political motives
 - China 94–95, 112–113
 - India 94–95
 - Japan 94–95
 - South Korea 94–95
- practical perspective
 - France 82–84
 - Germany 84–89
 - scope 4–5, 74–89
 - United Kingdom 77–82
 - United States 74–77
- PRC *see* China
- procedure and practice
 - France 82–84
 - Germany 84–89
 - India 383–386
 - Taiwan 223–228
 - United Kingdom 77–82
 - United States 74–77
- public listed companies, economic
 - perspective 33
- Puchniak, Dan W. 1–89, 90, 127, 128–185, 323–368, 398–403
- quorum requirement
 - entrepreneurial attorney system 55
 - France 82–83
 - Germany 64, 85–86, 88
 - unmeritorious actions 54–55
- Ramseyer, Mark 135–136
- ratification
 - common law 79
 - general meetings 54
 - ultra vires 68
- rationality
 - bounded rationality 159
 - Japan *see* Japan
 - shareholders *see* economically rational shareholders
- regulation
 - appropriate balance 1–2, 4, 15, 47–48
 - board approval 48–52
 - China 113
 - corporate information 44
 - discontinuance 58
 - ‘Holy Grail’ 1–2, 4, 15, 47–48, 77
 - key design elements 31–60
 - strategies 44
 - United States 20, 66
 - unmeritorious actions 47–58
- remedies
 - alternative remedies 30
 - oppression *see* oppression remedy
- Rho, Hyeok-Joon 104–108, 186–214
- risk
 - de minimis* stake 28–29
 - litigation expenses 41
 - Shareholder Risk Rule 20, 35–36
- Romano, Roberta 17, 22, 147, 149
- Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 124
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 62
- security for expenses
 - Japan 155–156
 - Taiwan 220–223
 - unmeritorious actions 58, 65
- settlement
 - actions 58–60
 - Germany 59–60, 87
 - South Korea 210–211
 - Taiwan 227
 - United Kingdom 59
 - United States 59
- share price
 - damages 33–34
 - economic benefit 34
- Shareholder Benefit Rule, share value 20

- Shareholder Risk Rule, financial cost
20, 35–36
- shareholder value
maximization 32
Shareholder Benefit Rule 20
- shareholder management agency costs
categories 13–14
fiduciary duty 13–14
mitigation 14
negligence 13
- shareholders
compensation *see* compensation
contemporaneous ownership rule
55–56
continuing ownership *see*
continuing ownership rule
corporate information 43–46
de minimis stake 28–29
economically rational *see*
economically rational
shareholders
fair and adequate representative 76
fraud on minority *see* fraud on the
minority
locus standi 54–55
majority/minority agency costs 14
personal rights 68
quorum *see* quorum requirement
special majority provision 68
- Simon, Herbert 159
- Singapore
actions
increasing number 354–358
law 341–348
Asian values 359–365
background 323–326, 331
common law 331–336
company law 328–330
corporate relief 349–351
critique 332–336
derivative actions 117–120, 323–368
English tradition 326–328
evolution of law 330
evolution of society 354–358
Foss v. Harbottle rule 324, 332–336
good faith 344
historical perspective 326–330
interests of company 345–346
law reform
impetus 336–337
scope 338–341
locus standi 342
minority protection 326–351
notice 342
personal/corporate rights 348–351
realities 354–365
statute law 336–348
substantive requirements 342–343
success factors 365–368
Western stereotypes 351–365
- South Korea
actions
basics 187–196
statistics/features 193–196
structure 192–193
background 186–187
chaebol firms 187–188
class actions 189–192
compensation 189–190
contingency fees 203–205
controlling minority shareholder
(CMS) 188
decision not to sue 207
demands 206–210
derivative actions 92, 104–108,
186–214
direct actions 189–192
directors, liabilities 205–206
double derivative action 198–199
entrepreneurial attorney system
200–206
financial crisis (1997) 105
incentives 200–206
Korean Commercial Code (KCC)
104, 187, 192–193, 196–197
law and reality 187–196
legal fees 203–206
legal institutions 187–192
limiting collusive settlement
210–211
litigiousness 104–108
locus standi 196–199
'loser pays costs' rule 201–203
no demand process 207–209
passive role model 211–213
political motives 94–95

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Index

[More information](#)

INDEX

451

- Securities Class Action Act (SCAA)
191–192
shareholder protection 189–192
shareholding requirement 196–197
shareholding structure 187–188
Solidarity for Economic Reform (SER) 105–106, 194
unmeritorious actions 206–211
unpredictability 104–108
statute law
Asia 93
China 269–275
Foss v. Harbottle rule 52, 66–69, 77
Hong Kong 115, 308–310, 319–321
Singapore 336–348
strike suits 16, 28–29, 65, 66
substantial benefit doctrine 22, 28, 39, 40
- Taiwan
actions, requirements 216–223
ambiguity 223–228
Asian values 234–235
background 215–216
civil procedure 223–228
company code 231–233
continuing ownership rule 220
controlling shareholder system 230–231
corporate governance 235–237
court fees 227–228
criminal/administrative sanctions 233
cultural norms 108–111
culture/institutions 230–235
derivative actions 108–111, 215–242
direct actions 228–230
government-sanctioned non-profit 240–241
idiosyncrasies 240–241
legal culture 233–234
legal mechanisms 216–223
legal/cultural hurdles 215–216
negative incentives 108–111
notification 224–225
paternalism/mass dispute resolution 234–235
professional services 237–240
- Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) 111, 240–241
security for expenses 220–223
settlement 227
shareholder rules 219–220
shareholdings, involuntary decrease 225–226
Tseng, Wang Ruu 108–111, 215–242
- ultra vires*
India 382
ratification 68
- United Kingdom
behaviour 57
cause of action 79
conditional fees 40
contemporaneous ownership rule 56
costs 81–82
discontinuance/settlement 59
Foss v. Harbottle rule 57, 65, 66–69
historical perspective 66–72
inspection of documents 45
leave to proceed 80–81
‘loser pays costs’ rule 41–42
negligence 57–58
prima facie case 80
procedure and practice 77–82
statutory regime 52, 66–69, 77–82
unmeritorious actions 52–53
- United States
actions, declining number 66
alternative remedies 30
board of directors 49–50
close companies 66
common fund doctrine 21, 39, 40
compensation 17–19, 20–22
contingency fees 21–22, 39, 41, 76, 137
decline 66
Delaware *see* Delaware
discontinuance/settlement 59
discovery 45
empirical studies 15–19
entrepreneurial attorney system 39, 40, 42
fair and adequate representative 76

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Index

[More information](#)

452

INDEX

- United States (cont.)
 - federal courts 75–76
 - historical perspective 64–66
 - inspection of documents 45
 - negative incentives 28, 76
 - no ‘loser pays costs’ rule 34, 39, 40
 - practical perspective 74–77
 - procedure and practice 74–77
 - regulation 20, 66
 - SEC 62
 - shareholder compensation 17–19, 20–22
 - special litigation committees 50–52, 65, 66
 - state law 74–75
 - strike suits 28–29, 65, 66
 - substantial benefit doctrine 22, 28, 39, 40
 - unmeritorious actions 49–50
 - verification 75–76
- unmeritorious actions
 - behaviour 57–58
 - contemporaneous ownership rule 55–56
 - continuing ownership rule 56–57
 - filtering out 47–58
 - Germany 53–54, 87–88
 - quorum requirement 54–55
 - regulation 47–58
 - security for expenses 58, 65
 - South Korea 206–211
 - special litigation committees 50–52, 65, 66
 - time restrictions 55–57
 - United Kingdom 52–53
 - United States 49–50
- value
 - compensatory value *see* compensation
 - empirical studies 19–23
 - shares *see* shareholder value
- Varottil, Umakanth 120–124, 369–397
- von Nessen, Paul 114–117, 296–322
- Wang, Wen Yeu 108–111, 215–242
- Wee, Meng Seng 117–120, 323–368
- West, Mark 136–137, 140–141, 142–143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 153–155, 166, 167
- Wood Report (1944) 16, 65
- Woon, Walter 337, 340
- wrongdoing
 - decisions 27
 - France 83
 - fraud on the minority 69–70, 79
 - ratification *see* ratification