Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) has been endur-ingly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many com-mon presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play in scientific inquiry. He examines the core concepts of *Structure* and explains the main characteristics of both Kuhn's evolutionary epistemology and his social epistemology, relating *Structure* to Kuhn's developed view presented in his later writings. The discussion includes analyses of the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the plate tectonics revolution in geology. The book will be useful for scholars working in science studies, sociologists, and historians of science, as well as philosophers of science.

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KUHN’S EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

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For Lori
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Acknowledgements

I began working on Kuhn’s epistemology in 2001. After a series of publications, and with a sabbatical leave approaching, I began to think about writing a book on Kuhn’s epistemology of science, one that would take account of his later work, much of it published in *The Road since Structure*. I believed that this work was largely and unfortunately neglected by philosophers, and that a fuller picture of his view was available to those who attended to it. I also believed that there were still many important insights that philosophers of science could gain from his work as we seek to develop an epistemology of science.

My interest in Kuhn’s work, though, extends back further to my time as a graduate student at the University of Western Ontario. I was fortunate enough to study Kuhn in a directed reading with my thesis supervisor, John Nicholas. And my understanding of Kuhn’s views has been enriched from teaching Kuhn’s work. In my efforts to present Kuhn’s views to my students over the years I have been able to discover common sources of resistance to and misunderstandings of his work.

The secondary literature on Kuhn is vast, and necessarily I have had to be selective in whose work I discuss. In writing the book, though, I have benefited from a number of Kuhn scholars. I have found the most useful to be the following: Ernan McMullin, Ian Hacking, Larry Laudan, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Hanne Andersen, and Alexander Bird. These scholars have offered both valuable insights into understanding Kuhn’s views and interesting interpretations and criticisms that warrant serious consideration. Though I disagree with each of them on some point or other, their research has helped me clarify my own thoughts on Kuhn’s view.

Once I set about writing the book, I relied on the generosity of many people, who, in one way or another, helped me complete the project.

I presented various papers on Kuhn at a variety of conferences, including the following: the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of
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