

From Utterances to Speech Acts

Most of the time our utterances are automatically interpreted as speech acts: as assertions, conjectures and testimonies; as orders, requests and pleas; as threats, offers and promises. Surprisingly, the cognitive correlates of this essential component of human communication have received little attention. This book fills the gap by providing a model of the psychological processes involved in interpreting and understanding speech acts. The theory is framed in naturalistic terms and is supported by data on language development and on autism spectrum disorders. Mikhail Kissine does not presuppose any specific background and addresses a crucial pragmatic phenomenon from an interdisciplinary perspective. This is a valuable resource for academic researchers and graduate and undergraduate students in pragmatics, semantics, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics and philosophy of language.

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Abbreviations

1P	first person
2P	second person
3P	third person
$\mathcal{H}(p)$	linguistic mode of presentation of the content p
$\Psi(p)$	psychological mode of presentation of the content p
A	the addressee
AC	Affirming the Consequent
ASDs	autism spectrum disorders
CLASS	classifier
DCCS task	Dimension Change Card Sorting task
DPM	Direct Perception Model
e	event variable
FUT	future tense
IM	Inferential Model
IMP	imperative mood
IND	indicative mood
MP	Modus Ponens
NP	nominal phrase
$P(e)$	probability of the event e
PART	particle
PL	plural
PR	present tense
s	shared information state
S	the speaker
SBJV	subjunctive mood
SG	singular
VP	verbal phrase
w	possible world
x	individual variable