

INDEX

- ABM Treaty (1972)
 - amendment provisions 33–51
 - as bilateral treaty 99, 103
 - as contractual arrangement 105
 - provisional application provisions 69–70
 - US withdrawal from 71, 152–167, 251–257
 - withdrawal provisions 170, 251–257
- Abromeit, H.
 - on interpretation of treaties 100–101, 103
- accounting for nuclear material
 - safeguard system 122–132
- amendment and modification of
 - treaties
 - approaches generally 32–51
 - ‘bifurcated amendment procedure’ 39–40, 53
 - main issues 17–19
 - procedures as special regime 51–54
- VCLT provisions for
 - amendment of bilateral treaties 32–34
 - amendment provisions (Article 40) 21–22
 - deviation from amendment provisions 37–39
 - divergence from
 - ‘bifurcated procedure’ 39–40
 - patterns of specialness 271–273
 - ‘tacit acceptance procedure’ 37–51, 53–54
 - ‘institutional’ elements 48–51
 - inter se* agreement provisions (Article 41) 23–26
 - introductory provision (Article 39) 19–21
 - limitations on right to propose amendments 44–48
 - majority requirement 36–37
 - modification provisions (draft Article 68)
 - modification by subsequent emergence of new rule of customary international law 29–32
 - modification by subsequent practice 26–29
 - relevant provisions 19–32
 - unanimity rule 35
- ‘amendment’, ‘modification’ and ‘revision’ distinguished 21–22
- Amerasinghe, C.F.
 - on interpretation of treaties 97–99
- Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty *see* ABM Treaty (1972)
- application of treaties *see* provisional application of treaties
- Articles on State Responsibility (ILC)
 - classification of multilateral obligations 206, 208–211, 244–245
 - countermeasures (Article 42) *see* countermeasures
 - duty of cooperation (Article 41) 251–257
 - injured states (Article 42) *see* injured states
 - integral obligations 183–184
 - lex specialis* (Article 55) 10–11, 192–193, 193–194

- relevance 275
- secondary rules 7–8
- ‘special rules’ 4
- bargain
 - treaties as 105–108, 110, 176–190
- Belarus
 - and ABM Treaty 251–257
- bilateral or bilateralizable obligations
 - classification of 24, 176–190
 - continuing obligations 265
 - countermeasures 204–219, 225–226
 - dispute settlement 266–267
 - international law as 175
 - status as 204–219, 241–242, 249
 - treaty regime as 176–190
- bilateral treaties
 - amendment by negotiation 48–49
 - as contractual arrangement 87–88, 99–100, 101, 103
 - entry into force provisions 61–62
 - examples 18, 67–68, 99, 103
 - modification by subsequent practice 27–28
 - provisional application 57, 82–83
 - termination 60
 - VCLT provisions for amendment and modification 21–34
 - withdrawal provisions 251–257
- Biological Weapons Convention (1972) (BWC)
 - compliance measures 144–147
 - consultation provisions 227
 - CWC compared 87–88, 109–111, 115–116, 118
 - interpretation 111, 115–116
 - lawmaking nature 87–88, 108–111
 - monitoring of compliance 147–148
 - Review Conferences 147–148
 - supervision 149–150
 - verification generally 144
 - withdrawal provisions 152–167, 170–171, 255, 257–266
- biological weapons programmes
 - states maintaining 109–110
- breach provisions
 - countermeasures 225–226
- breaches of treaties *see* violation of treaties
- Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC)
 - ‘bifurcated amendment procedure’ 39–40, 53
 - BWC compared 87–88, 109–111, 115–116, 118
 - constitutionality 110
 - countermeasures 220, 222, 225–226, 228, 242–243, 246
 - dispute settlement 267
 - as global agreement 82
 - inspections 134
 - interdependence of obligations 204–219
 - internal organization (OPCW) 49–51, 104, 109–110, 149–150, 223
 - interpretation 88, 99, 111, 115
 - lawmaking nature 87–88, 108–109, 110–111, 116
 - provisional application 74–75, 273
 - supervision
 - collection function 133–136
 - correction function 133–137, 149–150
 - creative function 136
 - generally 133
 - review function 133–136
 - verification 133–136, 213, 274–275
 - withdrawal provisions 171, 255, 257–266
- chemical weapons programmes
 - states maintaining 109–110
- China
 - biological weapons programme 109–110
 - chemical weapons programme 109–110
 - and NPT 107, 176–190
- classification of multilateral
 - obligations *see* multilateral obligations
- compliance *see* violation of treaties

- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) (CTBT)
 - ‘bifurcated amendment procedure’ 39–40, 53
 - countermeasures 220, 222, 223, 225–226, 228, 246, 247–248, 249
 - dispute settlement 267
 - as global agreement 82
 - internal organization (CTBTO) 49–51, 83
- International Data Centre (IDC) 140–142
- International Monitoring System (IMS) 140–142
- national technical means (NTM) 140–142
- object of treaty 120–121
- provisional application 63–64, 66, 75–81, 83, 84–85, 273
- supervision
 - collection function 140–142
 - correction function 142–144, 149–150
 - generally 137–138
 - by Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) 138–140
- verification 140–142
- violation 142–144
- withdrawal provisions 251–266
- constitutional instruments
 - treaties as 105, 108–109, 110–111, 117
- consultation provisions
 - compliance review 144–148
 - countermeasures 227
 - dispute settlement 144–148
 - verification regime 137–144, 149–150
 - withdrawal from treaties 152
- content of book 13–14
- contractual arrangement
 - treaties as 105, 108–109
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (1972) (BTWC) *see* Biological Weapons Convention (1972) (BWC)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1993) (CWC) *see* Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC)
- cooperation
 - as basis for non-proliferation 257–266
 - continuing duty of 257–266
 - duty of (Article 41 ILC Articles) 251–257
 - promotion of 83
 - requirement for 263, 275
 - treaty provisions for 49–51, 72–73, 137–148
- COP/MOP (conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties) meetings 49–51
- countermeasures
 - classification of obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
 - general law of
 - expansion 246–249
 - non-proliferation rules excluding application of 230
 - non-proliferation rules expressly dictating compatibility with 228–229
 - non-proliferation rules silent on compatibility with 221
- main issues 196–199
- non-proliferation rules
 - breach provisions 225–226
 - categories 220
 - consultation provisions 227
 - excluding application of general law of countermeasures 230
 - expressly dictating application alongside general law of countermeasures 228–229

- generally 219–220
- silent as to compatibility with
 - application of general law of countermeasures 221
- patterns of specialness 275–276
- permitted measures
 - expansion of general law of countermeasures 246–249
 - generally 241–242
 - limitations on object of 244–245
 - reciprocal measures 242–244
- scope of study 199–200
- standing to take
 - generally 204–205
 - multilateral treaties generally 206–211
 - non-proliferation treaties 211–218
 - summary of issues 219
- summary of issues 248–249
- timing of measures 221
- Crawford, James
 - on integral obligations 176–190
 - on interdependent obligations 204–219
- CTBT *see* Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (1996)
- Cuba
 - BWC compliance 144–148
- current intent (subjective) approach to
 - interpretation of treaties VCLT rules (Articles 31 and 32) 94–99
- customary international law
 - amendment of treaty by 26–27, 34–51, 38–51
 - application of treaties 60
 - countermeasures 196–197, 229, 230
 - emerging rule of
 - modification of treaty by 20–32
 - provisional application of treaty by 79–81
 - interpretation of treaties 92, 99
 - Martens Clause 259–260
 - provisional application of treaties 70–71, 85
 - removal from obligation under 152–167
 - status as 12, 80, 84–85, 137–144, 141–142, 273
 - and VCLT 152–167
 - withdrawal from treaties 152–167, 251–257
- CWC *see* Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
- Den Dekker, G.
 - on interpretation of treaties 116
- dismantling or return of nuclear material and equipment
 - after withdrawal from treaty 265–266
- dispute settlement
 - compliance mechanisms as
 - procedures for 193–195, 275
 - forums 2
 - general requirement to support 268–269
 - obligations after withdrawal from treaties 266–268
 - recourse to 128–129, 133–138, 150
 - secondary rules 7–8
 - treaty provisions for 137–144, 176–190
- Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
 - countermeasures rules 230–234
- domestic legal systems
 - fragmentation into specialized regimes 1–2
 - procedural unity within 3
 - substantive unity within 3
- DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) *see* North Korea
- Dupuy, Pierre-Marie
 - on secondary rules in international law 7–8
- duty of cooperation *see also* cooperation
 - ILC Articles (Article 41) 251–257
- Dworkin, Ronald
 - on interpretation of treaties 89–90, 99

- Egypt
 biological weapons programme 109–110
 chemical weapons programme 109–110
 entry into force provisions
 provisional application of treaties 61–64
 European Court of Justice (ECJ)
 jurisprudence
 amendment and modification of treaties 44–48, 53
 European Union
 NPT compliance 197–198
- Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald
 classification of multilateral obligations 24–32, 89–90, 99, 206–209
- fragmentation in legal regimes *see also* special regimes
 conflicts arising from *see* normative conflict
 doctrine of fragmentation 4
 domestic legal systems 1–2
 ILC study 1, 5, 10–11, 51–52, 199–204
 international law tools applied to 3–4
 in special regimes 270–271
- France
 and NPT 107, 176–190
- fundamental change of circumstances (*rebus sic stantibus*)
 application of 152–167
- general law of countermeasures *see* countermeasures
- ‘grand bargain’
 treaties as 105–108, 110, 176–190
- Greece
 ECJ jurisprudence 45–51, 53
- Hart, H. L. A.
 on distinction between primary and secondary rules 6–7
 on interpretation of treaties 93–94, 99
- Hitzel-Cassagnes, T.
 on interpretation of treaties 100–101, 103
- Hobbes, Thomas
 and ‘social contract’ theory 106–107
- IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) supervision *see* Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
- ICJ (International Court of Justice)
 jurisprudence
 dispute settlement 257–266, 267
 extent of 88, 99
 gaps in treaty law 257–266
 injured states 176–190, 192–193
 interpretation of treaties 90–91, 99, 111, 113
 ‘self-contained regimes’ 8–10
 withdrawal from treaties 259–260
- ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)
 jurisprudence
 ‘self-contained regimes’ 8–10
- ILC (International Law Commission)
 Articles *see* Articles on State Responsibility (ILC)
- India
 bilateral treaties 32–51
 CTBT ratification 77–78
 and NPT 107
 underground nuclear tests 80–81
- injured states *see also* countermeasures
 definition (Article 42 ILC Articles) 176–190
 in non-proliferation treaties
 generally 176–179
 obligations owed to all states
 parties
 breach affecting all other states (Article 42(b)(ii) ILC Articles) 183–190
 breach affecting single state (Article 42(b)(i) ILC Articles) 181–182
 obligations owed to other states
 parties individually (Article 42(a) ILC Articles) 179–181

- situations where arising 178–179
 - and treaty violation generally 175–176
- inspections
 - CWC 134
 - NPT 126–127
- integral obligations
 - identification 183–184
- inter se* agreements
 - technique of 3
 - VCLT provisions for 23–26
- internal organizations *see specific treaties*
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
 - differences from other supervisory bodies 123–124
 - foundation, objective and structure 122–132
 - supervision by *see* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
- International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) (SOLAS)
 - jurisprudence 45–51
 - ‘tacit acceptance procedure’ 40–44
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) *see* ICJ jurisprudence
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
 - and ‘self-contained regimes’ 8–10
- international law *see also* customary international law
 - application of general international law 10
 - as bilateral or bilateralizable obligations 175
 - fragmentation into specialized regimes 1
 - general rules on treaty withdrawal 153–159
 - legal tools applied to legal fragmentation 3–4
 - procedural unity within 3
 - secondary rules 7–8
 - substantive unity within 3
- International Law Commission (ILC) *see also* Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT)
 - Articles on State Responsibility *see* Articles on State Responsibility (ILC)
 - classification of multilateral obligations 206, 208–211, 244–245
 - fragmentation study 1, 5, 10–11, 51–52, 199–204
 - and VCLT 17–18
 - and DSU regime 230, 232
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
 - amendment of treaties 50–51 *see also* International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) (SOLAS)
- interpretation of treaties
 - different types of treaties
 - interpretation issues 101–103
 - types of treaties generally 99–101
 - interpretation of non-proliferation treaties 111–117
- main issues 87–88
- nature of non-proliferation treaties 104–111
- patterns of specialness 274
- summary of issues 117–118
- VCLT rules of interpretation (Articles 31 and 32)
 - generally 88–92
 - purposive approach 94
 - subjective (current intent) approach 94–99
 - textual approach 93–94
- Iran
 - biological weapons programme 109–110
 - chemical weapons programme 109–110
 - ICJ jurisprudence 176–190, 192–193
 - NPT compliance 122–132, 152–167, 236–240
- Iraq
 - NPT compliance 152–167

- Israel
 biological weapons programme 109–110
 chemical weapons programme 109–110
 and NPT 107
- Japan
 NPT compliance 197–198
 Joyner, Daniel H.
 on interpretation of treaties 105–106, 108–113
- Kazakhstan
 and ABM Treaty 251–257
- Kelsen, Hans
 on gaps in treaty law 257–266
- Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch
 on gaps in treaty law 257–266
- law of state responsibility
 ILC Articles *see* Articles on State Responsibility (ILC)
 injured states *see* injured states
 in non-proliferation context 192–195
 patterns of specialness 275
 secondary rules 6
 withdrawal from treaties *see*
 withdrawal from treaties
- law of treaties *see* non-proliferation
 treaties; special regimes;
 specific treaties; United
 Nations Security Council;
 Vienna Convention on the
 Law of Treaties (1969)
 (VCLT)
- lawmaking instruments
 treaties as 108–111, 115–116
- lex lata*
 state responsibility consequences of
 withdrawal from treaties
 251–257
- lex posterior*
 and *lex specialis* 31–32
 technique of 3
- lex specialis*
 application of 10–11
 emerging rule of 245, 249
 ILC Articles (Article 55) 192–194
 and *lex posterior* 31–32
 lex specialis derogat legi generali
 10–11
 perspective from 244, 249
 practice of provisional application of
 treaties as 81–85
 of provisional application 85–86
 special regimes as 4, 5
 status as 30–32, 152–167, 230,
 232–233, 234, 240–241
 technique of 3
- Libya
 NPT compliance 152–167
- Locke, John
 and ‘social contract’ theory 106–107
- majority requirement
 for amendment and modification of
 treaties 36–37
- Martens Clause
 application of 259–260
- McDougal, M.S.
 on interpretation of treaties 91–92,
 95, 99
- McNair, A.D.
 on interpretation of treaties 100
- methodology of book 13–14
- ‘modification’, ‘amendment’ and
 ‘revision’ distinguished
 21–22
- modification of treaties *see* amendment
 and modification of treaties
- multilateral environmental agreement
 (MEA)
 COP/MOP meetings 49–51
- multilateral obligations
 Fitzmaurice’s typology 24–32,
 89–90, 99, 206–209
 ILC Articles classification 206,
 208–211
- multilateral treaties *see also* non-
 proliferation treaties
 amendment and modification *see*
 Vienna Convention on the
 Law of Treaties (1969)
 (VCLT)

- countermeasures *see*
 - countermeasures
- dispute settlement *see* dispute settlement
- examples 18
- injured state provisions *see* injured states
- interpretation *see* interpretation of treaties
- proliferation 20
- provisional application *see*
 - provisional application of treaties
- termination *see* withdrawal from treaties
- violation *see* violation of treaties
- withdrawal from *see* withdrawal from treaties
- national implementation obligations
 - typology 213
- national security
 - implications of treaties 61, 161–162
 - and violation of treaties 119–121
 - violation of treaties 276
 - withdrawal from treaties 257–266
- New START (2010)
 - amendment provisions 33–51
 - provisional application provisions 57, 71–72
 - withdrawal provisions 254
- non-proliferation law *see also* non-proliferation treaties
 - content and methodology of book 13–14
 - definitions 11–12, 200
 - degree of ‘specialness’ 202–204, 276–277
 - inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 11–12
 - purpose of book 10, 266–268
 - secondary rules in 11
 - as special regime 10, 12–13, 200–202, 270–277
 - strengthening of regimes 257–266
- non-proliferation obligations *see*
 - typology of non-proliferation obligations
- non-proliferation treaties
 - amendment *see* amendment and modification of treaties
 - application *see* provisional application of treaties
 - compliance *see* violation of treaties
 - gaps in treaty law 257–261
 - general characteristics 104–111
 - injured states *see* injured states
 - interpretation *see* interpretation of treaties
 - parties to *see* injured states
 - patterns of specialness 271–273
 - as special regime 200–202, 211–218
 - supervision *see* violation of treaties
 - termination *see* withdrawal from treaties
 - typology of obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
 - verification *see specific treaties*
 - violation *see* countermeasures, violation of treaties
 - withdrawal from *see* withdrawal from treaties
- normative conflict
 - arising from special regimes 2–3, 10–11
 - definition 10–11
 - fragmentation in legal regimes 1
- North Korea
 - bilateral treaties 32–51
 - biological weapons programme 109–110
 - chemical weapons programme 109–110
 - CTBT ratification 77–78
 - underground nuclear tests 80–81
 - withdrawal from NPT 107, 119–120, 163–167, 251–257
- NPT *see* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
- nuclear material accountancy
 - safeguard system 122–132
- nuclear material and equipment
 - dismantling or return after withdrawal from treaty 265–266

- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
 amendment provisions 37–51
 constitutionality 87–88, 109, 110–111, 117
 as contractual arrangement 108–109, 111–112
 countermeasures 197–198, 213, 223
 as final say on regulation 104
 as ‘grand bargain’ 105–108, 110, 176–190
 injured states 184
 inspections 126–127
 internal organization *see* International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
 interpretation 111–115
 lawmaking nature 110–111
 as ‘political’ treaty 103
 provisional application provisions 80
 supervision
 collection function 124–128
 correction function 129–132
 creative function 128–129
 generally 122–124
 review function 124–128
 safeguards system generally 122–132
 UN Charter compared as bargain 105, 110
 verification 124–128, 149–150, 274–275
 violation 129–132
 withdrawal by North Korea 119–120, 151–152, 163–167, 251–257
 withdrawal issues
 continuing responsibility for violations committed prior to withdrawal 257–266
 dismantling or return of nuclear material and equipment 265–266
 maintenance of international peace and security 262–264
 national security 257–266
 safeguards 264–265
 withdrawal provisions 152–167, 169, 251–257, 267
- Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) *see also* Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1968) (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
 establishment 127, 122–132
 referral to 176–190
 unanimity rule for amendment 35
- obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
- pacta sunt servanda*
 amendment and modification of treaties 19–32, 37–51
 interpretation of treaties 89–90, 91–92, 99, 109–110
 provisional application of treaties 60
 withdrawal from treaties 252–253
- Pakistan
 bilateral treaties 32–51
 CTBT ratification 77–78
 and NPT 107
 underground nuclear tests 80–81
- Partial Test-Ban Treaty (1963) (PTBT)
 amendment provisions 37–51, 53
 ‘bifurcated amendment procedure’ 39–40
 provisional application 63
 withdrawal provisions 169, 251–257
- PCIJ (Permanent Court of International Justice)
 jurisprudence
 ‘self-contained regimes’ 8–10
 international peace and security
 states’ responsibility to aid maintenance of 262–264
- Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
 and ‘self-contained regimes’ 8–10
- Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2000)
 provisional application provisions 72–73

- 'political' treaty
 - status as 103
- primary rules
 - classification of special regimes by 4
 - relationship between sets of 8–10
 - secondary rules distinguished 6–7
 - supplemented by secondary rules 5
- provisional application of treaties
 - agreement where no provision in treaty
 - examples 74–81
 - generally 74
 - ancillary role in development of treaties into customary international law 84–85
 - application to core provisions 84
 - confidence-building role 83
 - entry into force provisions 61–64
 - main issues 55–58
 - non-proliferation context 64–66
 - non-proliferation practice as *lex specialis* 81–85
 - patterns of specialness 273
 - as preparatory function 82–83
 - reciprocal quality 83–84
 - scope of 84
 - summary of issues 85–86
 - treaty provisions for
 - examples 67–73
 - generally 67–68
 - VCLT provisions for (Article 25) 58
- PTBT *see* Partial Test-Ban Treaty (1963)
- purposive approach to interpretation of treaties
 - VCLT rules (Articles 31 and 32) 94
- Raz, Joseph
 - on interpretation of treaties 101, 103
- rebus sic stantibus* (fundamental change of circumstances)
 - application of 152–167
- reciprocal countermeasures
 - apparent preclusion of 242–244
- 'regime'
 - meaning of 4
- regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones *see* Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)
- regional treaties *see also* Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1968) (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
 - examples 18
 - unanimity rule for amendment 34–35
- return or dismantling of nuclear material and equipment
 - after withdrawal from treaty 265–266
- Review Conferences
 - work of 147–148
- 'revision', 'amendment' and 'modification' distinguished 21–22
- Russian Federation/USSR
 - bilateral treaties with USA 32–51 *see also* ABM Treaty (1972); New START (2010); Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2000); START I (1991); START II (1993)
 - biological weapons programme 109–110
 - and NPT 107, 176–190
 - treaty ratification 63
- safeguard obligations
 - after withdrawal from treaties 264–265
 - development of agreements 113–114
 - IAEA safeguards system *see* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
 - implementation of national systems 122–132
 - inspections 126–127
 - nuclear material accountancy 122–132
 - submission to 111–112
 - typology *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
 - withdrawal from 152–167

- secondary rules
 - classes of 6–7
 - identification 6
 - in international law 7–8
 - in non-proliferation law 11
 - patterns of specialness 272–273, 274–275
 - primary rules distinguished 6–7
 - regulation of normative conflict by 6–7
 - special regime as to 276–277
 - in special regimes 5
 - in state responsibility law 6
- security *see also* national security
 - states' responsibility to aid maintenance of 262–264
- 'self-contained regimes'
 - special regimes distinguished 8–10
- 'social contract' theory
 - and interpretation of treaties 106–107
- SOLAS *see* International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974)
- South Korea
 - bilateral treaties 32–51
- 'special'
 - meaning of 4
- special regimes *see also* fragmentation
 - in legal regimes
 - conflict with other legal regimes 2
 - degree of 'specialness' 8, 12, 202–204
 - and doctrine of fragmentation 4
 - in domestic legal systems 1–2
 - elements of definition 5
 - examples 3
 - general international law rules
 - applied to 10
 - in international law 1
 - as *lex specialis* 4
 - meaning of 'regime' 4
 - meaning of 'special' 4
 - meaning of 'special regime' 270
 - non-proliferation law as special regime 10, 12–13, 200–202, 270–277
 - non-proliferation treaties as 200–202, 211–218
 - normative conflict arising from 2–3, 10–11
 - patterns of specialness 271–273, 276–277
 - secondary rules *see* secondary rules
 - 'self-contained regimes'
 - distinguished 8–10
 - treaty amendment and modification
 - procedures as special regime 51–54
- standing
 - taking of countermeasures *see* countermeasures
- START I (1991)
 - provisional application provisions 67–68
 - withdrawal provisions 171
- START II (1993)
 - as bilateral treaty 18, 67–68
 - non-ratification by Russia 251–257
 - provisional application provisions 68–71
- states parties *see* injured states
- Stone, Julius
 - on gaps in treaty law 257–266
- subjective (current intent) approach to interpretation of treaties
 - VCLT rules (Articles 31 and 32) 94–99
- substantive obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
- substantive peaceful use obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
- supervision of treaties *see* violation of treaties
- Sweden
 - ECJ jurisprudence 46, 53
- Syria
 - biological weapons programme 109–110
 - chemical weapons programme 109–110
 - NPT compliance 131–132, 152–167
- termination of treaties *see* withdrawal from treaties

- textual approach to interpretation of
 - treaties
 - VCLT rules (Articles 31 and 32) 93–94
- Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963) *see* Partial Test-Ban Treaty (1963) (PTBT)
- Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1968) (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
 - amendment provisions 36–37, 49–51
 - dispute settlement 176–190
 - injured states 176–190
 - internal organization ('the Agency') 49–51
 - withdrawal provisions 169–170
- Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II (1993)) *see* START II (1993)
- Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START (2010)) *see* New START (2010)
- Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972) (ABM) *see* ABM Treaty (1972)
- Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) *see* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
- Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1991) (START I (1991)) *see* START I (1991)
- typology of non-proliferation
 - obligations
 - categories of obligations 212–213
 - generally 211–212
 - interdependence of obligations 214–218
 - national implementation
 - obligations, typology 213
 - substantive obligations
 - as interdependent obligations 214–216
 - typology 204–219
 - substantive peaceful use obligations
 - as interdependent obligations 204–219
 - typology 212–213
 - verification/safeguard obligations
 - as interdependent obligations 216–218
 - typology 204–219
- Ukraine
 - and ABM Treaty 251–257
- unanimity rule
 - for amendment and modification of treaties 35
- underground nuclear tests
 - United Nations Security Council resolutions 80–81
- United Kingdom
 - and NPT 107, 176–190
 - treaty ratification 63
- United Nations
 - object and purposes as limitation to practice 96, 99
 - as supervisory mechanism 223
 - support for pacific settlement of disputes 268–269
- United Nations Charter
 - as bargain 105, 110
 - and injured state provisions 176–190
 - interpretation 95, 99
 - and post-1945 legal order 105
- United Nations General Assembly
 - notice of treaty withdrawal to 169–170
 - recognition of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) 35
 - referral to 257–266
- United Nations Secretary-General
 - notice of treaty withdrawal to 169–170
 - referral to 257–266

- United Nations Security Council
 - countermeasures rules in Resolution 1929 (2010) 235
 - and CTBT violation 142–144
 - notice of treaty withdrawal to 169–171
 - and NPT violation 129–132
 - referral to 185–186, 193–194, 257–266
 - and underground nuclear tests 80–81
 - and withdrawal from NPT 162–167, 169
- United States of America
 - bilateral treaties 32–51
 - bilateral treaties with Russian Federation/USSR 32–51 *see also* ABM Treaty (1972); New START (2010); Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2000); START I (1991); START II (1993)
 - CTBT ratification 77–78
 - ICJ jurisprudence 176–190, 192–193
 - and NPT 107, 176–190
 - NPT compliance 197–198
 - treaty ratification 63
 - withdrawal from ABM Treaty 71, 152–167, 251–257
- USSR *see* Russian Federation/USSR
- verification of treaties *see specific treaties*
- verification/safeguard obligations *see* typology of non-proliferation obligations
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT)
 - amendment and modification of treaties (Articles 39–41 and draft Article 68) *see* amendment and modification of treaties
 - distinction between ‘amendment’, ‘modification’ and ‘revision’ 21–22
- interpretation of treaties (Articles 31 and 32) *see* interpretation of treaties
- provisional application of treaties (Article 25) 58
- violation of treaties
 - application of *rebus sic stantibus* (fundamental change of circumstances) 156–159
 - compliance mechanisms as dispute settlement procedures 193–195, 275
 - continued responsibility after withdrawal from treaty 257–266
 - countermeasures *see* countermeasures
 - dispute settlement *see* dispute settlement
 - injured states *see* injured states
 - legal consequences 190–192
 - national security issues 119–121
 - patterns of specialness 274
 - summary of issues 148–150
 - supervision
 - collection function 124–128, 133–136, 140–142
 - correction function 129–132, 133–137, 142–144
 - creative function 128–129, 136
 - functions of 121
 - by IAEA *see* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) (NPT)
 - review function 124–128, 133–136
 - within specific treaties *see specific treaties*
 - verification *see specific treaties*
- weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
 - inclusion within non-proliferation law 11–12
- Williamson, R.L.
 - on interpretation of treaties 107, 110–111
- withdrawal from treaties
 - general rules 152
 - main issues 151–152

INDEX

291

- patterns of specialness 274–275
- specific rules
 - compared to general rules of
 - international law on treaty withdrawal 153–159
 - compared to withdrawal rules in
 - other kinds of treaties 159–162
 - examples 169–171
 - generally 152–153
 - United Nations Security Council 162–167
- state responsibility consequences
 - continued responsibility for
 - violations committed prior to withdrawal 257–266
 - dismantling or return of nuclear material and equipment 265–266
 - dispute settlement obligations 266–268
 - effects on existing safeguards 264–265
 - gaps in treaty law 257–261
 - general conditions for withdrawal 252–253
 - lex lata* consequences 251–257
 - limitations on withdrawal 253–257
 - main issues 250–251
 - obligation to aid maintenance of
 - international peace and security 262–264
 - specific aspects 257–266
 - strengthening of non-proliferation regimes 257–266
 - summary of issues 268–269
 - summary of issues 167–169
 - World Trade Organization (WTO)
 - countermeasures 246, 247–249
 - DSU countermeasures rules 230–234
 - wrongful acts *see* ILC Articles