Introduction

A CHRONOTOPES AND COSMOLOGY

Drama is action in space and time that represents action in another space and another time. It transcends itself, both spatially and temporally. And beyond the space and time of a represented action (in Argos, say, in the time of Agamemnon), Aeschylean poetry imagines other spaces and times that may be more remote (Troy, the underworld, the time of Kronos). There is an Aeschylean *cosmos*.[1]

Where the spatial and temporal frameworks that are explicit or implicit in a text have the same form, this spatio-temporal form may be called a *chronotope*. I owe this concept to Mikhail Bakhtin.[2] But the use I make of the term is a radical extension of his method, and so differs from the existing applications of the term to ancient literature.[3]

Bakhtin insists on 'a sharp and categorical boundary between the actual world as the source of representation and the world represented in the work'. But he also refuses to 'take this categorical boundary line as something absolute and impermeable', and indeed 'out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and created chronotopes of the world represented in the work'.[4]

By contrast, I do not operate with a category of 'actual chronotopes' or 'real-life chronotopes'[5] antithetical to 'created chronotopes'. All my

[1] The only limitation is on the future: there is imagining of what will follow the represented action, but not (as in science fiction) of events following the representation.

[2] He defines it as 'the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature', and continues: 'This term is employed in mathematics, and was introduced as part of Einstein's Theory of Relativity. The special meaning it has in relativity theory is not important for our purpose; we are borrowing it for literary criticism almost as a metaphor (almost but not entirely). What counts for us is that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space)': Holquist (1981) 84.

[3] By Bracht Banham (2002) 161–272, Farenga (2006) and – on Aeschylus' *Eumenides* – Revermann (2008).

[4] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 253.

[5] One such 'real-life chronotope' is for Bakhtin constituted by the agora: Holquist (1981) 131.

chronotopes are – as socially constructed – 'created', and within this broad category of created chronotopes I do not isolate literature. Bakhtin's concern is almost entirely with numerous literary chronotopes. But my focus is on a small number of chronotopes that emerge in the context of certain socially integrative *practices* and are also embodied (with variations) in mythical, cosmological and dramatic *texts*.

The socially integrative practices (hardening into institutions) with which I am mainly concerned are reciprocity, payment in money, and polis ritual with its evocation or enactment of myth. My chronotopes, which I infer from practices and texts, are cognitive structures, socially constructed in the (conscious or unconscious) *mind*, but nevertheless closely associated with socially integrative *practices*, by which they are required, promoted and confirmed.

Bakhtin shares the Kantian evaluation of space and time (as indispensable to cognition), but differs from Kant 'in taking them not as "transcendental" but as forms of the most immediate reality'.[6] My chronotopes however are experienced as *transcendent* (as well as extending into the most immediate reality). By transcendence I mean comprehensive influence or power from the beyond. This differs of course from the Kantian sense of transcendental as a priori forms of thought. Rather, as in the subsequent tradition associated with Durkheim,[7] I regard basic forms of space and time as socially constructed, as experienced therefore as transcendent, and the chronotopes that unite these basic forms of space and time as partaking of their imagined transcendence. If I sometimes write as if chronotopes were impersonal agents, which of course they are not, this expresses the truth that they are experienced as transcendent, despite being constructed and imposed by human beings.

More specifically, basic forms of space and time are influenced by basic forms of social practice and organisation. For instance, sacrificial ritual may articulate conceptions of local space (e.g. by a procession to a temple) or of present time (e.g. by shaping a calendar), but may also play a role in the imagining of *cosmic* space and time – for instance in the smoke imagined as ascending to the gods above who demand the sacrifices, or in the myth of the ancient separation of immortals and mortals arising from the trick played in the sacrifice by Prometheus. Moreover (a) forms of state organisation (e.g. monarchy), (b) certain social codes and practices and (c) ritual – all these exemplify forms of social integration whose effectiveness may depend on being imagined as power that is external and comprehensive.

[6] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 85 n. 2.
[7] For his classic formulation see Durkheim (1976 [1915]) 10–11. A quite separate derivation of the Kantian categories from the social process of *exchange* is by Sohn-Rethel (1978).

Such external but comprehensive power (social transcendence) is naturally reified, in time and space, as *cosmic* transcendence. The comprehensiveness of the constructed cosmos is apt to embody the integrative (transcendent) power of social institutions.[8]

'Cosmisation' of social institutions is often explained by the need for their 'legitimation'.[9] But it may also be motivated by the need to explain the unknown (cosmic, comprehensive) in terms of the known (comprehensive social power). For Homer the world is ruled by a king, for Anaximander by the *apeiron* (unlimited) according to a social code of reciprocity (3A). Forms of social integration enter into the construction of space, time and the cosmos. Chronotope may extend to cosmology. Indeed ancient cosmology may be – because ultimately inaccessible to the senses – especially revealing of socially produced preconceptions of space and time.

To the extent that my chronotopes are ideas created in and by social practice (including ritual), they resemble the collective representations whose formation is located by Durkheim in ritual. Critics of the Durkheimian tradition have maintained that it is incapable of explaining social change, and indeed sometimes reject any suggestion of a static fit between ideas and practice, or between culture and social structure.[10] However, ritual is just one of my integrative social practices. And a social practice that is integrative in one respect can also create social tension and conflict: an obvious case is money, which on the one hand promotes, informs and simplifies a universal practice of peaceful exchange, but on the other hand may create tension – for instance as a result of unlimited individual accumulation. Moreover, socially integrative practices may conflict with each other, for instance when someone feels pulled in different directions by monetary advantage on the one hand and by ritualised solidarity on the other. My argument is based on the idea that the historical development of a monetised economy was a precondition for the *tension* between chronotopes that we find in Aeschylus. My emphasis on the tension or conflict between chronotopes[11] contrasts, once again, with Bakhtin.[12]

[8] Seaford (2004a) 11–12.

[9] E.g. by Berger (1969) 42–7, to whom I owe the term 'cosmisation'.

[10] E.g. Geertz (1973) 142–3.

[11] In Bakhtin's 'Concluding remarks' (written thirty-five years after the main text of his work on the novel) he states that within a single author or work 'we may notice a number of chronotopes and complex interactions among them', an interaction that he describes as 'dialogical' (in the special sense that he elaborates elsewhere): as such it 'cannot enter into the world represented in the work' ((Holquist 1981) 86, 252), whereas the interaction of my chronotopes within a single text or performance may be influenced by social practice.

[12] In each type of ancient novel Bakhtin identifies a *single* chronotope. In the later novel he identifies multiple chronotopes, such as the the rogue, clown and fool ((Holquist 1981) 159), the road (243), the castle (245–6), idylls (224–36), and the salon (246). These may seem more like stock themes:

Finally, Bakhtin calls *time* 'the dominant principle in the chronotope', and maintains that 'literature's primary mode of representation is temporal'.[13] This is generally true of Bakhtin's main concern, the novel.[14] But in drama the primary mode of representation is *spatial*. In its spatiality, especially as a *performance* in which a community is present as spectators (or even as choral participants), drama resembles ritual, and may embody the same chronotope. Greek drama was performed in a sanctuary. The primary dimension of individual biography is time, whereas of social interaction the primary dimension is space.[15]

B CHRONOTOPES AND HISTORY

The forms of social integration with which I will be mainly concerned are the social code of reciprocity, money, and communal ritual with its aetiological myths (*aitia*). In each is created its own chronotope, with cosmological reach.

Reciprocity I define as the (ostensibly voluntary) requital of benefit for benefit or of harm for harm. In the *reciprocal* chronotope time and space are imagined in terms of relations between two irreducibly distinct units. This will become clearer in Chapter 1.

In the *monetised* chronotope, by contrast, time and space are imagined as characterised by unlimitedness and by the reduction of distinctness (including opposites) to unity – a dissolution of internal limits that makes for (abstract) homogeneity. The unlimitedness of time may be imagined as cyclical, projected onto the temporal cyclicality of nature. The universal abstract power of money can early in its history be grasped only as occupying a place in time and space. I will describe this process of projection in Chapter 3.

The chronotope emerging from communal ritual is more complex. Reciprocity and money perform their integrative function by means of a series of (rule-bound) interactions between distinct parties (generally

similarly, Farenga (1998) 189 identifies 'the battlefield, the war council, the sea journey, the hunt, the funeral, the chieftain's hall' as 'typical chronotopes in heroic narratives'.

[13] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 86, 146.

[14] Bakhtin does mention, but without investigating, the chronotopes of epic and drama, which he associates with 'folk-mythological time': Holquist (1981) 104.

[15] Rehm (2002) 2 quotes the Japanese philosopher Watsuji (1889–1960): 'Temporality cannot be a true temporality unless it is in conjunction with spatiality. The reason that Heidegger stopped there [i.e. with temporality as the subject's structure of being] is that his Dasein is limited to . . . existence as the Being of the individual person. This is only an abstracted aspect when we consider persons under the double structure of being both individual and social.' For Rehm live performance involves a move 'away from private time into public space'.

individuals), interactions that have no essential connection to any particular time or place. But communal ritual defines a particular space and a particular time so as to transform a series of individuals into a cohesive group. Such definition is often implied and justified by the aetiological myth (*aition*) that may be evoked or enacted in – as well as accounting for – the performance of the ritual. The transformation effected by the ritual is linear, from the undefined (unlimited) to the defined, and so too is the aetiological narrative – concluding in the establishment of the ritual to be performed in this particular space at this particular time. It should be added that the resulting chronotope is, besides being linear, also in a sense cyclical and unifying, for in re-enacting or re-evoking the myth it annually imagines the presence of a remote time and a remote place, and this seems to merge what is remote with what is present. This is what I call the *aetiological* chronotope, which will be described further in 2E.

The aetiological chronotope embodies the transition from one kind of space and time to another, seen from the perspective of the conclusion. And so it contains another chronotope, or sub-chronotope, which expresses the space and time from which the transition is made, and which is accordingly the opposite or reversal of the definition or limitation embodied in the aetiological chronotope: this I call the *antideterminate* chronotope. Moreover, aetiological myth may also dissolve boundaries between fundamental opposites – for instance between human and animal in aetiological stories of human victims being sacrificed until the cult was founded. Another instance is the myth of the daughters of the Argive Proitos, who reject marriage, are forced in a frenzy from their father's house, moo like cows, wander for thirteen whole months around the woods of Arcadia, and finally – restored to their senses – found a shrine and cult for Artemis at distant Lousoi.[16] The linear movement ends with the foundation of the cult at Lousoi, after a preliminary phase in which spatial boundaries as well as boundaries between fundamental opposed categories (human–animal) are dissolved. This preliminary and contrasting phase exemplifies the antideterminate chronotope, which is frequent in *aitia* and in rites of passage. In its dissolution of boundaries, including those between opposites, it resembles – and may overlap with – the monetised chronotope. Such overlap forms, in Aeschylus, the basis of a partial synthesis of the monetised and aetiological chronotopes.

My contextualisation of chronotopes in practices permits an explanation of that *sharedness* of the form of space and time, the 'intrinsic connectedness'

[16] See esp. Bacchylides 11; Seaford (1988). Cf. Calame (2009) 7, 21.

of their structures, that defines the chronotope. Let us see how this works for our three main chronotopes.

The (spatial and temporal) distinctness of units characteristic of the reciprocal chronotope corresponds to the distinctness or autonomy of the two parties in the practice of reciprocity. This distinctness or autonomy underlies the ostensible voluntariness of reciprocity, and includes both a spatial and a temporal aspect – spatial because the moral pressure to requite is the same wherever the two parties are located, temporal because requital is not attached to any particular time period.

The monetised chronotope is different in form, but nevertheless – as a chronotope – also emerges from a practice in which space and time are similarly structured. The instantaneous cohesion of the parties to monetised exchange has an impersonal dynamic that aspires to unlimited (universal) homogenisation – unlimited not only in scope (this coin has the power to purchase all things) but also in both space (this coin has the same power elsewhere) and in time (this coin has the same power in the future).

As for the aetiological chronotope, in many communal rituals there is evoked transition from the remote undifferentiated to the specific here and now, i.e. in both space (the undefined area from or through which the god arrives) and in time (the crisis before the ritual was founded).

Such are my chronotopes. The integrative social practices with which I associate them are all to be found in the society to which Aeschylus belonged. Money was of more recent origin than the others and is absent from Homer. Also largely absent from Homer, though surely not from the society in which it was produced, is communal ritual. My main focus is on how the interplay between the aetiological chronotope and the (relatively recent) monetised chronotope in Aeschylean tragedy promotes the imagined unity of the polis.[17] But this will involve exploration of the social practices influencing the chronotopes (and cosmology) implicit in other texts and performances of the archaic and classical periods: Homer, the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (referred to here as the *Demeter Hymn*), mystery-cult, polis rituals and presocratic cosmology. Despite the influence of individual poetic creativity, the same socially transcendent chronotope, for instance the monetised chronotope, is detectable as implicit in both text and social practice.

Finally, there are two respects in which I must qualify my focus on a limited number of chronotopes. Firstly, it is – I emphasise – simplistic and reductive, but a necessary first step in the investigation of complexity. I

[17] It is of course possible that – while making for the solidarity of the polis as a whole – different chronotopes tended to promote the interests of different sections of the polis, but with this issue I will not be concerned except briefly in 16D.

do not mean to deny that texts and social processes can be analysed as yielding many different chronotopes, which may or may not overlap. The social construction of the chronotopes is no longer directly observable, and was shaped no doubt through the complex interaction of factors far more numerous than those I have selected.

Secondly, although a chronotope is a form shared by space and time, I will also have occasion to investigate forms of space and forms of time separately, whether or not the aim is to establish that they (by *sharing* a form) constitute a chronotope. In particular, I may discuss space, which is my main concern, with at most only a brief reference to the sharing of its form by time.

c PREVIOUS TREATMENTS

Although my debt to previous *scholarship* is enormous and obvious, it has not been my aim to produce a synthesis of previous *interpretations*. I have started not from those interpretations, despite the great value of many of them, but from the texts themselves in the light of my understanding of their religious, social and economic context. Similarly, although there have been several studies of space and of time in early Greek texts,[18] my concern is distinctively with the *social* determination of *chronotopes*.

I have nevertheless of course been influenced by earlier interpretation, for instance by the enquiry into the the *spatial* significance of Athenian drama pioneered by Oliver Taplin.[19] There is a mode of this enquiry, however, that I reject. Intra-theatrical space (i.e. space viewed or imagined by a theatre audience) tends to be divided into such categories as 'theatrical', 'scenic', 'dramatic', 'mimetic' and 'diegetic'. Such distinctions are satisfyingly systematic, and have their uses. But they sometimes encourage jargonisation of the obvious, or may even obscure the nature of theatrical viewing: the viewing of mimetic space may enter into the imagining of diegetic (narrated) space, for instance, and vice versa.[20]

More damagingly, such terms tend to reify intra-theatrical space, to imply that there are kinds of space that belong exclusively to the theatre.[21]

[18] For time see the survey by Csapo and Miller (1998) and the collection by de Jong and Nünlist (2007). For space in Homer see 1A n. 1, and in philosophy from Plato onwards Algra (1994). Most recently see Calame (2009), who – like me – insists on the practical function of the spatio-temporal manifestations of Greek texts (Bacchylides, Hesiod, the foundation myth of Cyrene, the gold leaves), albeit with a quite different analytical framework.

[19] Taplin (1977). [20] Wiles (1997) 17–18.

[21] And so to defend the autonomy of theatre studies. Nor do I project 'text' onto space, despite recognising that interpretation of space resembles perception of texts in certain ways. A welcome critique of metaphors of text and reading is by Rehm (2002) 8–12.

Extra-theatrical perceptions and conceptions of space cannot but enter into the viewing or imagining of all the categories of intra-theatrical space. We will see that even conceptions of *cosmic* space may be an important component of theatrical imagining. Intra-theatrical space is perceived through pre-existing schemata. It is not *sui generis*. And indeed it was for the ancient audience if anything probably even less separated from extra-theatrical space than it is for a modern one.[22]

I approach intra-theatrical space and time through the perceptions and conceptions of extra-theatrical space and time that entered into the synthesis created by Aeschylus, through the space and time embodied in *socially constructed chronotopes*. And just as I eschew terms for intra-theatrical space, so too I eschew the intra-textual terms[23] used in the discussion of *time* in the formalist analyses produced by narratology.

This is not the first treatment of pre-existing ideas of space, time and cosmology in the interpretation of Athenian tragedy. In particular, the visual details of tragic performances have been interpreted by David Wiles (1997) in the light of Greek cosmological ideas (for instance the privileging of east), and by Rush Rehm (2002) with experience of performance, scientific understanding of our perception of space, and an Appendix on Greek theories of space. The central purpose of my study, by contrast, is to broaden our understanding of performance through a *historical* account of the social construction of space, time and cosmology, as part of my attempt to show how Aeschylean tragedy is best understood as embodying a cosmology that can be related to the development of the polis. I use 'cosmology' in the broad sense of a set of views about the space, time and the fundamental nature of the universe. This should not, in my view, be separated from the performances. My aim is to integrate poetry, performance, cosmology and history. Such integration greatly enhances, I believe, our appreciation of the unique aesthetic power of Aeschylean drama.

D SUMMARY

In Part I I focus on three fundamental instruments of social integration: reciprocity, polis ritual (with its *aition*) and money. Historically, the reciprocal chronotope (Chapter 1) survives, but is nevertheless to some extent marginalised by – or transformed into – the aetiological chronotope (Chapter 2) and the monetised chronotope (Chapter 3). The Homeric code of

[22] See Chapter 6; Wiles (1997) 18.
[23] Such as 'prolepsis', as e.g. in narratological analysis of tragedy in de Jong and Nünlist (2007).

reciprocity is on elaborate display in the arrival of an outsider at a household (Chapter 1). An outsider arrives at a household also in the *Demeter Hymn*, but here reciprocity is marginalised or adapted to express the communality of the polis (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, inter-personal reciprocity is transformed by monetisation (Chapter 3). Each of these modes of social integration is unconsciously associated with transcendent power and so creates a specific cosmology.

The influence of the development and monetisation of the polis on the Dionysiac festival, and on the emergence therein of tragedy, is the theme of Part II. Chapter 4 describes the political significance of the arrival of the outsider (Dionysos) at the royal household in a festival, Chapter 5 the way in which this arrival is transformed into drama, and Chapter 6 the influence of monetisation on the form and content of the emergent drama.

From the historical processes described in Part I emerged a specific kind of *cosmology*, from those described in Part II a specific kind of *performance*. Their *combination* in the extant tragedies of Aeschylus is described in Part III. In passing from the genesis of tragedy to extant tragedy I am interested not in 'survivals' but in the *persistence and development* of the *basic pattern of action* described in Chapters 2, 4 and 5: a political confrontation between polis and household is expressed in the control of space (immediate, geographic and cosmic) by ritual. This basic pattern of action corresponds roughly to the aetiological chronotope, and indeed it is the kind of action which gives rise to – and is reinforced by – the aetiological chronotope. But its development was influenced by the historical process of monetisation described in Chapters 3 and 6. And so I begin Part III with an account of the similarities and differences between ritual and money as instruments of social integration, based on the opposition between *limit* and the *unlimited* (Chapter 7). Ritual exercises social control by limiting the potentially unlimited. Money exercises social control by limiting individual inter-personal exchanges, but promotes an unlimited cycle of exchanges in which it can tolerate no limit to its own accumulation, power, and extension in time and space. Our detailed discussion of the plays in Part III shows the aetiological chronotope interacting with the monetised chronotope: in particular, the aetiological crisis tends to be characterised by the unlimitedness and cyclicality (deferral of completion) of the monetised chronotope.

Part IV moves to a more general level. The aetiological chronotope is limited, linear, and associated with the polis, whereas the monetised chronotope is unlimited, cyclical, and associated with the individual and

the autonomous household. The former typically ends with the differentiation of opposites, whereas the latter is characterised by persistent homogeneity and the unity of opposites. Chapter 13 introduces a verbal form of ritual origin ('form-parallelism') that functions in Aeschylus as a compelling vehicle of the synthesis of the monetised unity of opposites with the differentiation of opposites in the the rite of passage. Chapter 14 describes the cosmic reach of the monetised chronotope in Aeschylus, and Chapter 15 its absorption into the final differentiation characteristic of the aetiological chronotope.

The monetised and aetiological chronotopes are not of course confined to Aeschylus. Part v concerns the similarity of the Aeschylean extended chronotopes (cosmology) to those found in Herakleitos and in early Pythagoreanism. The point is not to demonstrate influence, but to explore the relation – in tragic and 'philosophical' texts alike – of cosmology to the same transcendent modes of social integration. A final chapter tests our basic pattern of action by seeing how it differs according to the dramatic setting, and by locating it historically in the development of Attic literature through comparing its earlier form in the *Demeter Hymn* with its later form in Sophoklean tragedy.

I have almost entirely excluded the *Prometheus Bound* from consideration, because I concur with much current scholarly opinion[24] in believing that it is not by Aeschylus. And indeed, although my method of analysis finds much common ground between the six other plays attributed to Aeschylus, it does not work for the *Prometheus Bound*.

[24] E.g. West (1990) 51–72.