Introduction

In December 2009, Israel's Minister of Defense Ehud Barak ordered that Yeshivat Har Bracha, headed by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, be removed from the *hesder* program. The result of this action was that the students of the yeshiva were not allowed to be part of the arrangement that combines religious studies in the institution with a shorter military service. The minister's decision was made following Melamed's ruling that urged soldiers to defy military orders to evacuate settlements in the West Bank, and the resulting demonstration against the evacuation of settlements held by two Har Bracha yeshiva graduates during the end of their basic training ceremony. This removal of Har Bracha from the *hesder* program can be understood to date as the height of the escalating alienation mounting between messianic religious Zionism and the State of Israel.

The call to disobey military orders and the removal of a yeshiva from the *hesder* program are the product of a theological crisis faced by the national religious movement. This book aims to get to the roots of this crisis: to both examine the response of the messianic religious Zionist elite to Israeli territorial compromises and present the changes taking place within that group.

The book starts with the examination of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Hacohen Kook's ideology. Rabbi Kook was the head of the prestigious Mercaz Harav yeshiva and the spiritual founder of the Gush Emunim movement, which was established in 1974. The book then presents the reactions of the settler's rabbis to the Israeli evacuations of the Sinai Peninsula, areas in Samaria and Judea (the West Bank), and the entire Gaza Strip, as part of several peace processes and unilateral acts. The political compromises resulting in the territorial withdrawal also served to challenge the messianic expectations prevalent amongst religious Zionists. Against the backdrop of what was an apparent setback in the path toward the coming of the Messiah, a response was required for religious Zionist thinkers that could account for the new situation. Chapter 8 describes the American Christian Evangelical response to Israeli territorial compromises, as a comparison case study.

Historical Background to Messianic Religious Zionism

Very soon after its emergence, religious Zionism undertook a process aiming to understand how the development of the secular Zionist movement actually represented a stage in an unfolding messianic process. These approaches are identified, in particular, with the religious philosophy of Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook's father, Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook (1865–1935). According to Dov Schwartz, many Orthodox Jews found it difficult to identify with the emerging Zionist movement and act within classic Zionist definitions. Zionist rhetoric spoke of the need to "normalize" the Jewish people and make it "a nation like all the others." The purpose of Zionism was described as being "to build a safe haven for the Jewish people." All of these definitions are inconsonant with Jewish tradition, which emphasizes a distinction between Israel and the other nations, and proclaims that the Land of Israel has a unique theological function. Accordingly, many of those who developed the religious Zionist approach, integrate the religious purpose as part of the Zionist idea.

These thinkers used the traditional rabbinical technique of *pshat* and *drash* (the literal meaning as opposed to the exegetical meaning) to justify supporting Zionist political activity. While ostensibly adopting the general Zionist definition of the movement's purpose, this approach also imbued it with specific religious meaning: While Zionist activity calls for action in the material realm, simultaneously its innermost core aspires to eternal spiritual life – and this constituted the "real" foundation for the Zionist movement's operations and aims, even if the movement itself was not aware of this.[1] The argument contended that the long-awaited messianic era was about to arrive, and would be realized once secular Zionism chose the true path: the complete worship of God. Zionism would then advance to its second phase, known as the revival of the biblical Davidic monarchy, the reinstitution of sacrifices on the Temple Mount, and the reestablishment of the Sanhedrin.[2]

Though this position was present within religious Zionist circles almost from their inception, it occupied only a marginal position. Thus, although this vision of transformation to a Torah nation was advocated by certain religious Zionist voices during the period immediately preceding the establishment of the State of Israel (1948), it was soon abandoned. Asher Cohen argues that many religious Zionists did continue to aspire for the establishment of a theocratic regime; but, during the transition to statehood, they recognized this was unachievable and unrealistic at the time, as they were a minority with limited public power and status. Accordingly, the vision of a Torah state was not manifested in Religious Zionist's overt political demands. They instead focused mainly on preserving the status quo on religious matters – agreed to during the pre-state

[1] Dov Schwartz, *Faith at a Crossroads – A Theological Profile of Religious Zionism*, Leiden, Boston & Koln: Brill, 2002, 156–92.
[2] Motti Inbari, "Religious Zionism and the Temple Mount Dilemma: Key Trends," *Israel Studies* 12 (2) 2007: 29–47.

era – on the right of the religious public to maintain its own way of life. Overall, religious Zionist leaders confined themselves to recognizing the secular state, while struggling to preserve its religious character in certain fields.[3]

This all changed with the Israeli victory in the Six Day War (1967) in which Israel captured additional areas of its Biblical homeland. These dramatic events led to the strengthening of religious Zionism's activist wing, dominated mainly by the younger generation of the National Religious Party.[4] Additionally, it created a groundswell of opinion that would ultimately fuel the establishment of the Gush Emunim settlement movement, which would soon after become the dominant stream within religious Zionism.[5]

Gush Emunim

The Six Day War (June 1967) created a new reality in the Middle East. In the course of the war, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. These areas were not annexed to Israel, and have continued to have the status of occupied territories administered by Israel pending their return in the framework of a peace agreement. Immediately after the war, Israel did not, on the whole, initiate Jewish settlement in the occupied areas, with the exception of East Jerusalem, which was formally annexed to the State of Israel. From the outset, however, this principle was not strictly applied, and soon after the war a number of Jewish settlements were established in the occupied territory.[6]

In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Although Israel would eventually push back the attacking armies and win the war, the Israeli public was shocked and outraged at both the large number of fatalities Israel suffered and by the military's poor performance, at least at the beginning of the war.

Immediately following the war, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger undertook intensive diplomatic activity aimed at attaining a ceasefire between the sides that would invariably include Israeli territorial concessions. It was against the backdrop of these two events – the trauma of the war and the expectation of imminent territorial retreat – that the Gush Emunim

[3] Asher Cohen, *The Tallit and the Flag – Religious Zionism and the Vision of the Torah State during the Early Days of the State*, Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1998: 48–55 (in Hebrew).

[4] Yoni Garb, "The Young Guard of the National Religious Party and the Ideological Roots of Gush Emunim," in: Asher Cohen and Yisrael Harel (eds.), *Religious Zionism: The Era of Change*, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2005: 171–200 (in Hebrew); Eliezer Don Yihya, "Stability and Change in the Camp Party – the National Religious Party and the Young Revolution," *State, Government and International Relations* 14 (5740–1980) 25–52 (in Hebrew).

[5] Gideon Aran, "A Mystic – Messianic Interpretation of Modern Israeli History: the Six Day War as a Key Event in the Development of the Original Religious Culture of Gush Emunim," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 4 (1988), 263–75.

[6] Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire – Israel and the Birth of the Settlements*, 1967–1977, New York: Times Books, 2006, 72–98.

("Block of the Faithful") movement was founded in February 1974. Led by young religious Zionist activists, Gush Emunim was supported by both Orthodox bourgeois urban circles and secular supporters of the Whole Land of Israel movement.[7] Gush Emunim sought to prevent territorial concessions and to push for the application of Israeli sovereignty to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. It attempted to actualize its objectives by settling Jewish communities in the occupied territories.

At the time of its establishment, Gush Emunim did not project a messianic vision. The first settlement action undertaken by activists from the organization came when, without official permission, they established a makeshift settlement at a site in the West Bank called Sebastia. Israeli authorities evicted the settlers several times. Finally, the settlers reached a compromise with Minister of Defense Shimon Peres in which they agreed to instead be housed in a neighboring Israeli Defense Force (IDF) base. This decision effectively led to the establishment of the settlement, despite some opposition within the Israeli government led by Yitzhak Rabin. In 1977, with the rightist Likud party coming to power, settlers suddenly enjoyed enthusiastic support from the government, including provision of financial benefits, assistance in the construction of settlement infrastructure, and legal protection.[8] As a result, the pace of construction in the settlements quickly increased. Since then, the number of Israeli citizens living in the settlements has risen steadily. As of 2010, the settlements' population was estimated at 300,000, and some 40 percent of the Judea and Samaria territory was included in the settlements' municipal areas of jurisdiction.

Immediately following its inception, Gush Emunim was joined by a group of Mercaz Harav yeshiva's graduates under the spiritual leadership of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Hacohen Kook, who soon assumed leadership roles in the movement. The members of this group held a religious perspective, which motivated them to political action. They believed that the return of the Jews to the Land of Israel under the auspices of the secular Zionist movement reflected the first stage in God's will to redeem His people. Accordingly, the spectacular Israeli victory in the Six Day War of 1967 was perceived as a manifestation of the Divine plan, and as a preliminary stage in the process of redemption.[9]

In general, Mercaz Harav followers then as now, see themselves as implementing the philosophy of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook.[10] They try to integrate the senior Kook's philosophy into Israeli reality, emphasizing two key concepts: the holiness of the land of Israel and the holiness of the

[7] Dov Schwartz, *Religious Zionism: History and Ideology*, Boston: Academic Press, 2009.
[8] Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land: the War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007*, New York: Nation Books, 2007.
[9] Moshe Hellinger, "Political Theology in the Thought of 'Merkaz HaRav' Yeshiva and its Profound Influence on Israeli Politics and Society since 1967," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 9 (4) (2008) 533–50.
[10] Dov Schwartz, *Faith at a Crossroads – A Theological Profile of Religious Zionism*, Leiden, Boston & Koln: Brill, 2002, 156–92.

State of Israel. According to the junior Kook, the Land of Israel – comprised of land within the 1948 borders, the territories acquired in 1967, and even Transjordan – is one unit, a complete organic entity imbued with its own will and holiness. This entity is connected and united with the entire Jewish people – present, past, and future – so that the people and the land are in a complete oneness. Therefore, no one has a right to give away part of the land.[11] Since the unity of the Whole Land came as a result of the actions of the Zionist movement, it could, therefore, be understood as a tool that was and could be further implemented to actualize God's will. As such, the Israeli state, though secular, should be sanctified as it is part of the messianic process.[12]

According to the Mercaz Harav philosophy, the sanctity of the Whole Land of Israel and the sanctity of the State of Israel are expected to complement and complete one another. However, this has not always been reflected in Israeli reality. After the peace process between Israel and Egypt (1978) and the resulting Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (1982), many Gush Emunim supporters were forced to confront the increasing erosion of their basic beliefs regarding the character and destiny of the State of Israel. The Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, together with the subsequent Madrid talks (1991) and Oslo process (1993), which led to an Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank, provoked a theological crisis for followers of Mercaz Harav's philosophy. The fundamental religious dilemma this presented is of a profound character: How can a state that uproots settlements and hands over parts of the Biblical Land of Israel to Arab rule be considered "absolutely sacred" as it had been? What sublime religious meaning can be attributed to the actions of a secular state which threatens to destroy, by its own hands, the chance of realizing the messianic hope? Could it be that viewing the Jewish state as a fulfillment of the divine will was a mistake? These questions constitute the background for this book's study of religious disappointment.

Cognitive Dissonance

The subject of prophetic failure is critical to an understanding of the development of any messianic faith. With this in mind, it is worth drawing on the theory of cognitive dissonance. *When Prophecy Fails* (Festinger, Reiken & Schachter 1956) presented the salient features of this theory: If a person believes in something fervently, he attempts to maintain his faith, often by taking irreversible steps. However, if confronted by irrefutable evidence that the path he had followed in the name of his faith was mistaken, the believer nonetheless becomes strengthened in his faith, making a renewed effort to convince and convert others to adopt his worldview. Therefore, according to the theory, crisis of faith that results from prophetic failure may paradoxically lead to the

[11] Aviever Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, 122–44.
[12] Ibid., 136–41.

strengthening of religious commitment rather than to its dilution. In other words, while in logical terms the failure of the prophecy might be expected to weaken its justification, a diametrically opposite phenomenon sometimes develops, characterized by a strengthening of faith and religious practice in an attempt to set the messianic process back on course.

According to Festinger, the process ensues in the following manner: The gap that develops between expectation and experience generates cognitive tension. This dissonance creates discomfort in the believer, thus producing pressure to reduce it. Individuals must then either change their beliefs, opinions, or behavior, secure new information that mitigates the dissonance, or forget or belittle the importance of the information that resulted in the internal contradiction. In order to succeed, the believer must receive support from either his psychological or his social environment. Without such support, the chances are that the effort to moderate the dissonance will prove unsuccessful. Thus, prophetic failure increases the believer's devotion as well as his proselytizing efforts. In some cases, it is easier to cope with dissonance than to admit that a belief has failed. Accordingly, the believer will not abandon his faith, but at the same time he cannot deny that it has failed to materialize, as he had understood it would. Therefore, the believer must secure new information that corroborates his faith. One sure way to do so was to reassert his belief and attract new committed followers. This argument revolves around the idea that if he is able to convince more people that his beliefs are correct, then his beliefs must indeed be correct.[13]

Testing Festinger's Thesis

The theory of cognitive dissonance has also been examined by other scholars in additional studies. However, these studies have not necessarily reached the same conclusions as those presented by Festinger and his colleagues.

Accumulated research has shown that the response to a failure of prophecy generally tends to focus on mystical interpretations that deny the failure and argue that prophecy has been maintained on divine or ethereal levels. The liberating power of mysticism, especially in Jewish history, lies in the fact that it is rooted in paradox, exposing inner truth outward appearances.[14] Thus, mystical interpretation enables the rejection of reality as it appears externally, and acceptance instead as covert spiritual fulfillment. In rationalizing the apparent failure of prophecy, the believer may also argue that the crisis was a test of faith; that human errors occurred in calculations; or, that others were to blame for the failure.[15]

[13] Leon Festinger, Henry W. Reiken, and Stanley Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 3–32.
[14] Gershom Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, New York: Shocken Books, 1960, 1–39.
[15] Gordon Melton, "Spiritualization and Reaffirmation: What Really Happens When Prophecy Fails," *American Studies* 26 (2) (1985), 17–29; Lorne L. Dawson, "When Prophecy Fails and Faith Persists: A Theoretical Overview," *Nova Religio* 3(1) (1999) 60–82.

A different and pragmatic course is also possible, however, which admits that the failure of prophecy indicates a misappraisal of what was understood as impending messianic redemption.

An example of this may be found in the history of the Sabbatean movement in the Jewish world, disciples and believers in Shabbtai Zvi (1626–1676), who was proclaimed to be the Jewish Messiah in 1665. In his study, Gershom Scholem described how the Sabbatean movement split into two groupings following the conversion of its leader, Shabbtai Zvi to Islam in 1667. Following the prophetic failure, most of the movement's supporters returned to normative Judaism; meanwhile those who remained in the movement adopted a mystical interpretation of their leader's conversion to Islam, depicting it as part of his battle against the forces of impurity.[16] A more recent example from the Jewish world is the case of the Chabad movement, which acknowledge its leader, Rabbi Menachem-Mendel Schneerson, as messiah and was then forced to confront his death in 1994. Following the failure, a split occurred within the movement between those who recognized his demise and concluded that he was not the messiah, and those who refused to accept this. (Some accepted that he had died but urged him to return to complete his mission, while others refused to accept his death, claiming that he was actually merely "concealing himself.")[17]

A further example is the Millerites movement, based on the leadership of William Miller, who calculated that the end of the world would arrive in 1843. After the calculation proved incorrect, he twice postponed the date to 1844. *When Prophecy Fails* claimed that after the third failure the movement collapsed,[18] but this is inaccurate. After the failure of the calculation and the "great disappointment" this created, the supporters of the prophecy developed from a disorganized mass awaiting the end of the world into two distinct sects – the Advent Christian Association and the Seventh Day Adventist Church.[19] The former of these sects admitted that the calculation had failed, but still expected the imminent coming of Jesus; the latter claimed that William Miller's prophecy had been accurate in terms of the date, but not in terms of the nature of the event. Indeed, two of the three prophecies (redemption and absolution) occurred on the predicted date, but in the divine sphere. The third prophecy, they claimed, would occur only when God returned to earth.[20]

[16] Gershom Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, [Translated by R. J. Zwi Werblowsky], Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

[17] David Berger, *The Rebbe, the Messiah and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference*, London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2001; Simon Dein, "What Really Happens When Prophecy Fails: The Case of Lubavitch" *Sociology of Religion* 62 (3) (2001) 383–401; Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem M. Friedman, *The Rebbe: the Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

[18] Festinger, *When Prophecy Fails*, 22.

[19] David Rowe, *Thunder and Trumpets – Millerites and Dissenting Religion in Upstate New York, 1800–1850: AAR Studies in Religion* 38, California: Scholars Press, 1985.

[20] Douglas Morgan, "The Adventist Tradition," in: Eugene V. Gallagher and Michael Ashcraft (eds.) *Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America*, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2006, 38–61.

In his study of the Jehovah's Witnesses movement, which itself experienced six failures to predict the end of the world, Joseph Zygmunt claimed that failure was interpreted as a wakeup call to the movement to arouse the members that they needed to more fully repent and prepare themselves for the coming of the messiah; accordingly, they argued, the prophecy had not in fact failed, but had been realized in the spiritual realm rather than in the physical realm. Failure in this world was perceived as partial realization in the divine world. They contended that the divine plan resembles a jigsaw puzzle in which all the pieces must fall into place. Every day that passes brings redemption closer.[21]

Therefore, we can see that contrary to Festinger's theory, there is no single way that is used to overcome prophetic failure through conversion. The failure of prophecy does not necessarily mean the end of the movement. In some cases, failure can be interpreted as a trial of faith or a warning to the world. Accordingly, failure can paradoxically lead to the strengthening of the movement. True believers can continue to maintain their vision regardless of where it takes them, whether in logical or illogical terms.[22]

This book sheds new light on what happens when prophecy fails. However, conditions in this case are somewhat different: Though the territorial withdrawals create *fear* of a failure of faith because of the vision for the Whole Land of Israel's being shattered, it has not yet become apparent beyond doubt that *redemption itself* has failed. Therefore, in this specific case study, messianic believers have a third option: to take the necessary actions that will prevent failure of the redemptive process.

I argue that the messianic Religious Zionist's response to failure of faith due to territorial compromises in certain circumstances may go in one of these ways:

1. There may be a logical explanation to an acknowledged failure of prophecy, in which they admit that a religious mistake had been made, and thus they retreat from their expectant messianic perspective.
2. Alternately, they may have the opposite reaction in which followers reject the idea that the prophecy failed, instead arguing that messianic realization is indeed taking place, but in the unseen sphere. Therefore, they may argue that since messianic failure is definitely not certain, nothing should be changed in their theology and practice.
3. Finally, they may acknowledge the failure of their original messianic prophecy, and yet still be strengthened in their religious zeal in order to prevent complete collapse. The followers of this pattern can be described as "hastening the end." The end vision is political, the establishment of a theocratic regime, therefore, they may be involved in political action, in order to fulfill prophecy.

[21] Joseph F. Zygmunt, "Prophetic Failure and Chiliastic Identity: The Case of the Jehovah's Witnesses," *American Journal of Sociology* 75(6) (1970) 926–48.

[22] Jon Stone, *Expecting Armageddon: Essential Readings in Failed Prophecy*, New York and London, Routledge, 2000, 1–30.

This book seeks to identify the circumstances that lead to each of these three distinct responses.

Religious Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is a pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled "true believers" attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to the secular institutions and behavior. All fundamentalist movements interact with the outside world: Some retreat from society in order to avoid the influence of secularity and others attempt to take over the secular regime. The study *Strong Religion* (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003) attempts to define fundamentalists' interactions with the world in four categories: world conqueror, world transformer, world creator, and world renouncer. Religious movements are not frozen and they can move from one category to the other.[23]

The world creators and the world renouncers focus mainly on strengthening their own enclaves. World renouncers build high walls that separate them from the rest of society. They do not want to transform world outlook or political-legal structure; they just want to be left alone to their beliefs and practices. The world creators also focus on their own enclaves, but they show some interest in changing the secular world, at least for their own benefit. Accordingly, the world creators act in order to recruit more followers from the secular world to their lifestyle.

It is tempting to argue that all fundamentalist movements hold a desire to have their theological-political vision come to dominate the world. However, the desire to rule society can be moderated. Fundamentalist world transformer movements know that they must act in a specific time and place, and if they do not hold enough power, they may lose their battle. Therefore, fundamentalist movements may instead adjust themselves to the secular regime, and to be part of it even though they reject the values of the secular world. In order to pursue their goals, they may enter the political arena and try to influence the institutions, structures, laws, and customs of their society. By contrast, a different pattern of fundamentalism – world conqueror – has sought to replace secular government through revolution.

In this situation, patriotism could become an integral part of the religious identity of certain fundamentalist movements. This pattern is particularly evident in the case of American Christian fundamentalism. A long-standing tradition of the separation of church and state, alongside encouragement for freedom of religion in America, led to the emergence of a cultural climate of religious and ethnic pluralism, that ensured the independent and autonomous presence of religious expression and competition amongst sects of believers. Against this background, American evangelical Christianity could develop social and

[23] Gabriel A. Almond, Scott R. Appleby & Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion – The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003.

organizational networks that separate it from the liberal streams of Christianity without developing hostility to the government or revolutionary aspirations.[24]

The Gush Emunim movement can also be identified as a world transformer movement. Its theological framework sees redemption as a gradual process that may take centuries. Therefore, its mission is protracted. When the movement was established, it had some government opposition, but after the 1977 general elections and the victory of the Likud party, there was a gradual support for the movement's goals. The fact that 300,000 Israelis live in the West Bank today is a direct result of the movement's ongoing political campaign over the past three decades.

What creates change in the behavior of a fundamentalism movement, pushing it from a stance of world transformer to that of world conqueror? In what circumstances does a movement no longer maintain its position of reconciliation vis-à-vis the world and instead move into a confrontational posture? In what conditions can the movement no longer conform to the secular regime?

The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt underwent this type of development process. In 1928, the movement was established by Hassan Al-Banna in order to correct the flaws of Egyptian society, which Al-Banna attributed to the penetration of modernization and western values into Egyptian society. Al-Banna saw the establishment of a theocratic regime as the sublime goal of his movement, but the way to achieve it was through mass education and re-Islamization of the society. The movement was persecuted by the Egyptian regime and Al-Banna was assassinated. This situation did not change even after Gamal Abed Al-Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952, partly through the help of the Muslim Brothers. The new Nasser regime instead continued to persecute followers of the Muslim Brothers. As a result, the movement underwent a period of radicalization, and some of its followers turned to terrorism. The most prominent example was the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Saadat in 1981.[25]

Shiite revolutionaries in Iran learned the lesson of the Society of Muslim Brothers. Due to the ongoing failure of the Brothers to win the hearts of the masses in Egypt, a new tactical approach was taken. The conclusion the Shiite reached was that they must first take control over the state powers, and only then restore the role of Islam over the populace. This conclusion was also the result of the severe government persecution of religious leaders in Iran. All those persecuted pushed the religious establishment into the revolution that took place in 1979.[26]

[24] Ibid., 168–9; Paul Boyer, *When Time Shall Be No More*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, 225–53.

[25] Laurence Davidson, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998, 19–30; Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[26] Laurence Davidson, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 31–48.