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978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

- Ackerman, Bruce, 86  
 Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 42, 43  
 “adverse selection,” 15, 34–36  
 Aguirre, Gary, 214, 224–227  
 AIG, 190, 207, 220  
 Akerlof, George, 32, 128–129  
 American Continental Corporation, 2, 4  
 anti-bureaucratic stances, 107, 232–234, 235  
 antitrust policy, Department of Justice, 141–143  
 appointment process, 115–117  
 Ariely, Dan, 148  
 Arnold, Richard D., 95  
 Arrow, Kenneth, 28–29  
 Atkins, Paul S., 197
- Bachman, Michele, 233  
 backward induction, 37, 59, 62, 130  
 Bair, Sheila, 216–217, 223  
 Banking Act of 1933. *See* Glass-Steagall Act (1933)  
 Banking Act of 1935: 110, 110n2, 173–174  
 Bank of America, 116, 184, 203, 205, 207, 222  
 Bawn, Kathleen, 42–44, 100, 154  
 Bear Stearns, 179, 183–184, 203, 205, 207, 213  
 Berger, Paul, 225–227  
 Bernanke, Ben, 53, 121, 180, 203–204, 205, 206–208, 209–210, 232, 233  
 Berner, Richard, 211  
 Bernstein, Marver, 8, 18, 66  
 Bertelli, Tony, 44, 70, 75  
 Besanko, David, 49, 92  
 Black, William, 2–3, 5, 10–11, 15, 190
- Blair, Sheila, 216–217  
 Blau, Peter, 132–133  
 Blumenthal, W. Michael, 115–116  
 bonus system, incentive-based, 30, 37–40, 42n3, 45–46, 51–52, 39n1, 169, 183–184, 193  
 Born, Brooksley, 197–199, 211, 218  
 boss politics. *See* machine politics  
 Box, George, 44  
 “BRAC Friday,” 77–78  
 Brams, Steven J., 102  
 Brehm, John, 145–146  
 Browder, William, 228–230  
 budget balancing, 87–92, 93  
 Buffet, Warren, 220  
 bureaucratic accountability  
   and congressional oversight, 27–28, 41–42, 47–48  
   and delegation, 75–76  
   deregulation and, 200  
   incentives and, 24–27  
   effective governance and, 7  
   in financial regulation, 176, 186–188, 189–190, 200, 208–209, 210, 215–216  
   in Friedrich-Finer debate, 14–16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 124  
   political unification and, 200  
   principal-agency theory and, 20, 49, 58  
   professionalism and, 143, 153, 176  
   structural policies and, 107–108, 110  
   versus professional responsibility, 10–12, 14–17  
   *See also* bureaucratic autonomy

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

262

Index

- bureaucratic autonomy  
 and anti-bureaucratic stances, 233–234  
 and bureaucratic discretion, 106–107, 121  
 as conditional, 17–18  
 congressional majorities and, 107–108  
 congressional oversight and, 27–28, 40–45, 47–48, 103  
 and contract enforcement and property rights, 140, 170, 232  
 control paradox and, 22, 121, 123, 128, 137–139, 140  
 and credible commitment, 65–66, 68, 79, 100, 140, 217, 231–232, 234  
 and democracy, 75–76  
 Dodd-Frank and, 236–237  
 Federal Reserve System and, 9–10, 69–70, 105–106, 108–115, 116, 118, 121, 174, 176  
 financial industry regulation and, 23, 170, 175–176, 191–197, 200, 208, 217  
 and Illinois Department of Aging nursing home case, 122–124  
 policy making and, 103–107  
 and political moral hazard, 21–22, 47–48, 77–99  
 and political stalemate, 50, 68, 102–103, 104, 106–107, 108, 111, 118, 119, 161, 176, 185, 218, 227, 232, 235  
 and professional expertise, 7–8, 100, 141, 143–146, 149–150, 151–152, 156, 160, 232  
 Progressives and, 14, 21, 49, 50, 197, 233  
 and regulatory policies, 12, 18–19, 66–67, 70, 83–86, 218, 224, 236–237  
 separation of powers and, 21–22, 23, 27, 68, 100–119, 200, 212, 217, 218, 232  
 structural features promoting, 15, 107–108  
*See also* control paradox; Federal Reserve System and Board of Governors; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- bureaucratic compliance, 48–49, 50, 114, 123, 125, 130, 132, 148, 166
- bureaucratic defiance, 10, 26–27, 41, 58
- bureaucratic discretion. *See* bureaucratic autonomy
- bureaucratic expertise. *See* professionalism
- bureaucratic independence. *See* bureaucratic autonomy
- Burns, Arthur, 115
- Bush, George H. W., 69, 158, 213
- Bush, George W., 8, 158, 185, 186, 190, 196, 203
- Caffrey, James, 196n2
- “capture,” 8, 18–19, 19n1, 66, 71–72, 167, 231–232, 234
- Carpenter, Daniel, 17, 81, 97, 98
- Carter, Jimmy, 8, 16, 104, 105, 106, 115–116
- Casey, Kathleen, 197
- Casey, William, 165
- CDOs. *See* collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
- central banking system. *See* Federal Reserve System and Board of Governors
- CFTC. *See* Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
- Chang, Kelly H., 117, 118
- “checks and balances.” *See* separation-of-powers system
- Chinn, Menzie D., 188
- Chubb, John E., 135, 136
- Cirona, James, 5–6
- Citigroup, 217–218, 222, 223
- civil servant tenure, 66
- Clarke, Edward H., 31
- Clayton Antitrust Act (1913), 141
- Clinton, Bill, 158, 187, 192, 197, 199–200, 217–218
- Coase, Ronald, 25
- collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 207, 213
- Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), 199
- Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 187–188, 197–199, 200, 203, 210, 218
- confiscation, powers of, 61, 64, 65, 71–72
- congressional dominance theory, 1, 4–5, 14, 96
- congressional committees, 1, 3, 5, 40, 41, 48, 96–97, 103, 106
- congressional oversight  
 and bureaucratic autonomy, 27–28, 40–45, 47–48, 103  
 and bureaucratic expertise, 42–43  
 and congressional dominance theory, 1, 4–5, 14, 96  
 through incentives, 40–41, 44  
 and interest groups, 42  
 and McNollgast hypothesis, 43, 44  
 and political moral hazard, 47–48  
 principal-agency theory and, 40–45, 47–48  
 “runaway bureaucracy” and, 27–28  
 in State Department example, 133–135, 138, 139

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

263

- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 211, 215
- contract enforcement and property rights  
bureaucratic autonomy and, 140, 170, 232  
credible commitment to, 63–64, 65–66, 75, 83–84, 143–144, 153, 159, 170, 217, 236, 237  
economic development and, 1, 21, 63–64, 65–66, 74, 83, 235–236  
financial regulation and, 23  
Progressive reform and, 74
- contractual incompleteness, 124–125
- control paradox  
and “autonomy for effort” trade, 123, 128, 137–139  
and bureaucratic autonomy, 22, 121, 123, 137–139, 140  
cooperative equilibrium solution in, 128–131, 133, 136–140, 167, 232  
in employment agency example, 132–133, 138, 139–140  
“gift exchange” in, 128–130, 136, 167  
in Illinois Department of Aging example, 122–124, 137, 138  
and Pareto optimality, 127–128, 127 (figure), 139  
public versus private schools and, 135–136, 139  
“rigidity cycle” in, 131–132, 140  
and rule monitoring/effort models, 125–128, 126 (figure), 127 (figure), 130–131, 137  
in State Department congressional oversight example, 133–135, 138, 139  
in Virginia public schools example, 124–125, 138  
and “work to rule” strategy, 124–125, 129, 130, 138, 140, 234
- Cordray, Richard, 211
- Countrywide, 190
- Cox, Christopher, 197, 213
- Cranston, Alan, 3, 4, 8, 9
- credible commitment  
bureaucratic autonomy and, 65–66, 68, 79, 100, 140, 231–232, 234  
in defense bureaucracy, 58–61  
through delegation, 58, 59, 60–61, 63–64, 65–66, 67–76, 79, 91–92, 94–95, 121–122  
and delegation of authority in kidnapping illustration, 56–58, 57 (figure)  
and economic policy and stability, 63–70, 83–84, 223  
and efficient incentive systems, 93–95  
investor–ruler game and, 62–63, 62 (figure), 63  
and military base closings, 77–79, 80, 81–82, 94–96, 107  
and moral hazard in political economy of Stuart kings, 61–62, 63–64, 65, 75, 93, 94  
National Labor Relations Board and, 156–157  
and political moral hazard, 21, 56–61, 64, 75–76, 91, 94–95, 96–97  
principal–agency theory in contrast to, 56, 57–58, 59–61, 62, 91–92  
and professionalism and expertise, 143, 153–154, 160, 166–167, 231–232, 237  
Progressive reform and, 74–75  
to property rights and contract enforcement, 63–64, 65–66, 75, 83–84, 143–144, 153, 159, 170, 217, 236, 237  
regulatory agencies and, 66, 75, 223  
and separation of powers, 65, 68  
temporary electoral coalition threats to, 157  
and time inconsistency, 56–58, 64, 65, 75  
credit default swaps, regulation of, 8, 211, 220, 221, 222–223, 237
- Crockett, William 133–135
- CRomnibus appropriations bill, 221–222
- Crotty, James, 184
- Cuban missile crisis, 58–59, 60
- Cuomo, Andrew, 184
- Curry, Boykin, 180
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, 191
- Darman, Richard, 69
- Debevoise & Plimpton, 225, 226–227
- Debreu, George, 28, 29
- DeConcini, Dennis, 4, 5, 6, 9
- Defense, Department of, 77–79, 82, 82 (table)
- De Groot, Henri L.F., 84
- delegation to professionals  
credible commitment and, 58, 59, 60–61, 63–64, 65–66, 67–76, 79, 91–92, 94–95, 121–122  
military base closings and success in, 94–96  
moral hazard and, 92  
and political stalemate and compromise, 100–103, 185  
and professional expertise, 101–103, 106, 144–145, 154  
and separation of powers, 100–102  
tradeoffs in, 224–231  
and whistleblowers, 224–227

- DeMint, Jim, 209
- deregulation, financial industry  
 academic support for, 185–186, 187  
 bipartisanship and, 185, 186–188, 217–218  
 bureaucratic autonomy and, 200, 217  
 the Fed and, 218  
 political contributions and, 185–186  
 Ronald Reagan and, 187, 188, 217  
 savings and loan crisis of 1980s and, 4, 189–190  
 SEC and, 187–188, 193–194, 218  
 and undermining of regulatory agencies, 185, 187–200
- derivatives, regulation of, 197–198, 199, 200, 203–204, 211, 217–218, 220, 221, 222
- Dewey, Thomas, 170
- DiIulio, John D., Jr., 145
- Dimon, Jamie, 222
- direct investment rule, 4, 5, 8
- Dixit, Avinash. K., 37–38
- Djankov, Simeon, 49, 224
- Dochow, Darrel, 12
- Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), 210–212, 217, 218–219, 220–223, 235, 236–237
- Donovan, Ray, 157
- Dotson, Donald, 157
- “double moral hazard,” 46–47, 49
- Douglas, Paul, 112, 113
- Dunlap, Al, 181–183
- Eccles, Mariner, 112, 113, 173–174
- economic development and policy making  
 central bank independence and, 67–70  
 contract enforcement and property rights and, 1, 21, 63–64, 65–66, 71, 74, 83, 235  
 credible commitment and, 65–66, 70  
 incentive system and, 16, 21, 28–34  
 and inflation, 21, 22, 67–68, 111–113, 114, 115–117, 120–121, 180  
 long-term growth and stability in, 61–62, 63–65, 75, 83–84, 93–94, 98, 144, 223, 235–236  
 majority-rule chaos in, 83–84  
 market failure and information asymmetry in, 29–33, 34  
 principal-agent theory and, 28–29  
 Progressive reform and, 67, 70–71  
 and regulatory agencies, 33, 66–67  
*See also* Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010);
- Federal Reserve System and Board of Governors; financial regulation
- Eisenhower, Dwight, 158, 163, 166
- Eizenstadt, Stuart, 116
- Elster, Jon, 58
- England, Robert E., 81
- Enron scandal, 6, 185, 186–187, 193, 196, 217
- Epstein, David, 44
- Estache, Anotonio, 66, 224
- Eswaran, Mukesh, 90, 91, 93, 184
- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 200, 205, 210–211
- FASB. *See* Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
- FDIC. *See* Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
- the Fed. *See* Federal Reserve System and Board of Governors
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 172–173, 176, 192, 203, 210, 215, 216–217, 223
- Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)  
 attacks on autonomy of, 188–190, 197  
 as bipartisan, 9, 55  
 bureaucratic expertise and, 55–56  
 bureaucratic independence and, 8, 9–11, 176  
 and Charles Keating investigation, 1–10, 11, 23, 223  
 creation of, 54–56  
 and direct investment rule, 4, 5, 8  
 elimination of, 12, 189–190, 210, 218  
 Great Depression housing bubble and, 53–55  
 political moral hazard and, 76  
 political stalemate and cooperation and, 176  
 principal-agency theory and, 56  
 Texas thrift investigation by, 2–3
- Federal Housing Finance Board, 11, 210–211
- Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 111–112, 115, 116, 117, 120–121, 172, 173, 174
- Federal Reserve Accountability and Transparency Act (2014), 120–121, 138
- Federal Reserve Act (1913), 108–110, 110n2, 114–115, 120, 171, 172, 207, 208, 217
- Federal Reserve System and Board of Governors  
 Alan Greenspan and, 69–70  
 anti-inflation policy and, 67–68, 116–117, 120–121  
 appointment process and, 114, 117

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

265

- autonomy of, 67–70, 75, 105–106, 108–116, 118, 121, 170, 174, 176
- Ben Bernanke and, 53, 121, 180, 203, 204, 205, 206–208, 209–210, 232, 233
- Federal Open Market Committee and, 111–112, 115, 116, 117, 120–121, 172, 173–174
- and Federal Reserve Act and, 108–110, 110n2, 114–115, 120, 171, 172, 207, 208, 217
- Federal Reserve Banks and, 49, 108–111, 171–172, 174, 207
- financial crisis of 2008 and, 203–204, 205, 206–210
- financial industry deregulation and, 218
- Jimmy Carter and, 104–106, 115–117
- 1933 Banking Bill and, 173–174
- policy impact of, 104–107, 105 (figure)
- political stalemate and compromise in creation of, 108–116, 118
- and Taylor rule, 120–121, 138
- and Treasury/Fed Accord, 111–115
- Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), 2, 6, 55, 188–189
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 31, 41, 84, 160–161, 170, 218
- Fenno, Richard, 48
- Ferejohn, Jphn, 103, 118
- FHLBB. *See* Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
- Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 194, 195, 196–197
- Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 11, 12
- financial crisis of 2008
- and attacks on bureaucratic autonomy, 208
- and the Fed, 203–204, 205, 206–210
- investment banks and, 23, 179, 185, 186–187, 201–208, 213, 216, 217–219
- liquidity crisis and, 204–205, 206
- political stalemate and, 206–208
- subprime mortgages and, 8, 190, 201–203, 206, 207, 211, 213, 220
- TARP and, 208, 217
- financial regulation
- competition and, 174
- contract enforcement and property rights and, 23
- and deposit insurance for commercial banks, 171, 172–173
- executive compensation and, 175, 194
- Federal Open Market Committee and, 111–112, 115, 116, 117, 120–121, 172, 173, 174
- Federal Reserve autonomy and, 170, 176
- and 1933 Banking Bill, 170–173, 175, 207–208, 211
- and 1935 Banking Bill, 110, 110n2, 173–174
- and 1933 Pecora investigation, 160, 168–170
- political stalemate and cooperation in, 176, 217, 218
- politicization of, 23, 170, 175–176, 185–200, 217–219
- and post-World War II stability in financial services industry, 174–176
- SEC and, 23, 170, 175–176, 191–197
- separation of powers and, 217
- and social costs of disorder, 13–14, 142, 166, 224
- See also* deregulation, financial industry; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Federal Reserve System and Governing Board; investment banking industry; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 210, 211
- Finer, Herman, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 124
- “fire alarm” oversight, 3–5, 42
- FIRREA. *See* Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
- Fisher, Ernest M., 53–54
- FOMC. *See* Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 97–98
- Ford, Gerald, 197
- Frant, Howard, 75
- Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board*, 215–216
- Freidson, Eliot, 146, 152–153
- Friedman, Milton, 204
- Friedrich, Carl, 14–16, 17, 18, 19, 23
- FSLIC. *See* Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
- FTC. *See* Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
- Fuld, Dick, 197

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

266

Index

- Gailmard, Sean, 17, 19–20, 144  
 Garn, Jake, 11  
 Gates, Scott, 145–146  
 Gazley, Beth, 145  
 Gaus, John, 15  
 GE Capital, 225, 226  
 Geithner, Tim, 209, 218  
 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 162  
 Gibbard, Allan, 30, 92  
 “gift exchange,” control paradox and, 128–130, 136, 167  
 Gilleran, James, 190  
 Gjerstad, Steven, 53  
 Glass, Carter, 161, 169–170, 171–172, 173, 174  
 Glass-Steagall Act (1933), 170–173, 175, 207–208, 211  
 Glenn, John, 4  
 Globerman, Steven, 70  
 Goldman Sachs, 184, 197, 198, 202, 207, 213–214, 217, 222, 227  
 Goldstein, Judith, 84  
 Gould, William B., IV., 158–159  
 Gouldner, Alvin W., 131, 132, 140  
 Gray, Ed, 1, 2, 9–10, 11, 15, 188, 189  
 Great Depression, 53–55, 65, 84, 155, 156–157, 160, 183, 204, 206  
 Great Recession  
   bureaucratic professionalism and, 200  
   and corporate profits and incentives for inefficiency, 184  
   deregulation and, 188  
   and discretionary power of regulatory agencies, 14, 121, 190  
   OTS and, 190–191  
   separation of powers and, 200  
   “shadow banking” and, 180–181, 181n1  
 Greenspan, Alan, 6, 53, 69–70, 198, 199, 203–204  
 Greenwald, Bruce C., 32  
 Grossman, Sanford, 32  
 Groves, Theodore, 31  
 Gutfreund, John, 176–177, 178, 179, 201  
 Hammond, Tom, 106, 107, 118, 150, 167  
 Hanson, Robert, 225–226  
 Harris, Milton, 36, 39  
 Hatch Act (1939), 66  
 Heller Financial, 225, 226  
 Henkel, Lee, 2  
 Hermitage Capital Management, 224, 228–229  
 hierarchical relationships  
   in academic literature and debates, 15–16, 28–29, 224  
   accountability and, 224  
   “invisible hand” theory and, 29–33, 36, 93  
   principal-agency theory and, 20, 27–28  
   professionalism and, 74, 154, 160  
   *See also* control paradox; incentive system  
 Holmström, Bengt, 50, 79, 86, 87–91, 87n1, 92, 93, 94, 124  
 Homans, George, 128, 129, 130  
 Homeowner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC), 55  
 Hoover, Herbert, 53, 54–55, 76  
 Hoover, J. Edgar, 8  
 Horn, Murray J., 66–67  
 housing bubble of 1920s, 53–54, 55, 65  
 Huizenga, Bill, 120, 121  
*Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* (1935), 9  
 Huntington, Samuel, 18  
 IBM antitrust case, 141–142  
 incentive system  
   and “adverse selection,” 15, 34–36  
   auto insurance industry case study on, 33–34, 35, 36, 37, 41  
   and bonuses in compensation, 30, 37–40, 42n3, 45–46, 51–52, 39n1, 169, 183–184, 193  
   and bureaucratic oversight, 24–27, 40–41, 44  
   efficiency in, 34–35, 37, 39–40, 50–51, 93–95  
   financial regulation and, 184, 185, 190, 196  
   hierarchical control through, 16, 28  
   hidden action in, 27–33, 35–36, 37–39, 93  
   and information asymmetry, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38  
   and moral hazard, 33–36, 78–80, 86–98  
   and organizational choice, 19–20  
   as outcome based, 28–30, 33, 37–39, 40, 45–46, 48–49, 51–52, 76, 124  
   and Pareto optimality, 30, 33, 51–52  
   in principal-agency theory, 16, 20, 22, 28, 33–36, 36–40, 48–50, 55–56, 59, 60, 181  
   professionalism and, 23, 143–144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 166  
   and rewards in public sector, 42n3  
   and risk preference, 33–35, 40

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

267

- in sharecropping system case study, 33, 34–36, 38, 41
- See also* control paradox
- India, spectrum license allocations case in, 24–27, 47
- information asymmetry, 12, 27, 30, 32–37, 38, 40, 87, 124, 219
- institutional design, 12–14, 19–20, 66, 67
- interest groups, 3, 19, 23, 41, 42, 48, 80–81, 86, 98, 139, 187, 222, 232
- interest rates, 120–121, 180
- International Trade Commission, 98
- investment banking industry
  - commercial banking distinguished from, 173, 175
  - corporate profit growth in, 183–184
  - and deregulation, 179–180
  - executive compensation in, 178, 179, 183–184
  - and leverage, 177, 179, 180, 184, 185, 197, 201–202, 202n1, 205, 207, 209, 211
  - and politicization of financial regulation, 185–200
  - post-World War II stability within, 173–176, 179–180
  - principal-agency theory and, 181
  - and public shareholding, 176–177, 179–180, 183–184
  - risk-taking culture of, 181–182, 181n1, 186, 188–189, 191, 193, 197, 199–202, 203, 208–209, 211–212, 218, 220
  - and trading expansion, 176–180, 185
  - and 2008 financial crisis, 23, 179–180, 185, 186–187, 201–208, 213, 216, 217–219
  - See also* individual investment banks by name
- “invisible hand” theory, 27–33, 36, 93
- Jackson, Andrew, 68, 233
- Jensen, Michael C., 153, 175
- Johnson, Simon, 198
- JP Morgan, 169–170, 184, 203, 205, 222
- Justice, Department of, 6, 31, 141, 142
- Kaiser, Robert G., 220
- Kaufman, Herbert, 22, 233
- Kauper, Thomas, 142
- Keating, Charles, Jr., and Keating Five, 1–11, 14, 19–20, 23, 26–27, 189–190, 219, 223
- Keefer, Philip, 68
- Kennedy, John F., 59, 60, 175
- Khademian, Anne, 164
- Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 228, 230, 231
- Khuzami, Robert, 213
- Kidney, James, 214, 227
- Knott, Jack, 106, 118, 167
- Koremenos, Barbara, 123
- Kotwal, Ashok, 90, 91, 93, 184
- Kramer, Andrew, 229
- Kreitman, Mark, 224–225
- Krugman, Paul, 168, 209
- Kwak, James, 198
- Kydland, Finn E., 49, 65, 67
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 28
- LaFollette, Robert M., 10
- Lance, Burt, 116
- Landis, James, 160, 161, 162–163, 192
- LaPuente, Victor, 74–75
- League of Local Building and Loan Associations, 54, 55
- Leavitt, Arthur, 198
- Lehman Brothers, 197, 203, 204, 205–206, 207
- LeMay, Curtis, 60
- Levitt, Arthur, 162, 192–193, 194–196, 198
- Lewis, David, 21–22, 107–108, 115, 118, 150
- Lewis, Michael, 177, 178, 227
- Lincoln, Blanche, 221
- Lincoln Savings and Loan, 2, 4, 5–7, 8–9, 11–12
- Linders, Gert-Jan, 84
- Loeb, Martin, 31
- Lohmann, Susanne, 68
- Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), 198–199, 201, 203–204
- machine politics, 10, 13, 71–75, 153–154, 233
- Mack, John, 224, 225–227
- Madoff, Bernie, 193, 213
- Magnitsky, Sergei, 229
- Majone, Giandomenico, 75–76
- majority-rule politics
  - chaos and instability in, 79, 83–84, 208, 232, 234, 235–236
  - delegation and, 76
  - machine politics and, 71–72
  - moral hazard in, 64, 76, 79, 81–86, 95, 98
- markets, competitive, 28–37
- Marschak, Jacob, 28, 30, 31
- Martimort, David, 28
- Martin, Roger F., 12
- Martin, William McChesney, 113, 114, 115, 176

- Mayer, Kenneth R., 96  
 McCabe, Thomas B., 112–113, 114  
 McCain, John, 4, 9, 97  
 McCarty, Nolan, 186  
 McCraw, Thomas, 8, 9  
 McCubbins, Mathew D., 3, 42, 43, 44  
 McDonough, J. E., 55  
 McNollgast hypothesis, 43–44  
 Meckling, William H., 153  
 Medvedev, Dmitry, 229  
 Meier, Kenneth J., 81, 142  
 Merrill Lynch, 178, 179, 201–203, 205, 207  
 Milgrom, Paul, 124  
 military base closings, moral hazard and credible commitment in, 77–79, 80, 81–82, 94–96, 107  
 Miller, G. William, 115  
 Miller, Gary J., 20, 146  
 Mitchell, Charles “Sunshine Charlie,” 168–169, 170, 171  
 Mitchell, John, 165  
 Moe, Terry  
 and hierarchical control in public versus private schools, 135, 136  
 and NLRB bureaucratic structure, 154, 155–156, 157, 158, 159  
 and political conflict resolution, 102  
 “political uncertainty” concept of, 67  
 on professionalism, 141, 143, 161  
 on standard delegation model, 101  
 and structural politics, 107  
 the “money trust,” 108–109, 169, 171  
 monopolies, 30, 31–32  
 moral hazard  
 bias in collective interests and, 79–81  
 in budget balancing, 87–92, 93  
 and bureaucratic autonomy, 21, 47–48  
 in congressional structure, 78–79  
 and credible commitment, 21, 56–61, 64, 75–76, 91, 94–95, 96–97  
 and delegation of authority, 82, 92  
 distributive state and, 21, 50, 86–94, 87n1  
 and financial deregulation, 188  
 incentive systems and, 33–36, 93–94, 96–97, 98, 100  
 in insurance industry case study, 33–34  
 and legislative logrolling, 78–79, 83–84, 86, 94, 96, 143  
 majority-rule politics and, 64, 76, 79, 81–86, 95, 98  
 and military base closings, 77–79, 80, 81–82, 87, 94–96, 107  
 and Nash equilibrium, 62, 87, 88–89, 91  
 in political economy of Stuart kings, 61–62, 63–64, 65, 75, 93, 94  
 and principal-agent theory, 45–47  
 and social efficiency, 25, 38, 46–47, 50–51, 60–61, 79, 88, 93–94  
 Moran, Mark J., 1, 5, 44  
 Morgan, J. P. *See* JP Morgan  
 Morgan Stanley, 184, 207, 222, 225, 226  
 Morris, Charles R., 202n1  
 Morris, Irwin L., 104, 105–106  
 mortgage crisis, subprime, 190, 202–203, 206–207, 211, 213, 220  
 Moses, Robert, 8  
 Mosher, Frederick C., 156, 164  
 Nalebuff, Barry, 37–38  
 Nash equilibrium, 62, 87, 88–89, 91  
 National City Bank (Citibank), 168–169  
 National Credit Union Administration Board, 210  
 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 154–160, 163, 165, 166, 167, 176  
 New Deal agencies  
 bureaucracy expansion and, 14, 53, 160–161, 233  
 financial regulation and, 167, 173–174, 200, 218  
 professionalism versus political accountability and, 16  
 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 160–161, 163, 170, 225  
 Nixon, Richard, 69, 115, 165  
 NLRB. *See* National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)  
 Noll, Roger, 43, 44  
 Norbeck, Peter, 168  
 Norris, George W., 10  
 North, Douglass  
 and credible commitment, 65, 67, 121–122  
 and moral hazard and credible commitment in Stuart kings political economy, 61–62, 63–64, 75, 92, 93, 94  
 and moral hazard in delegation of authority, 92  
 and separation of powers and credible commitment, 65  
 and stability in property rights and contract enforcement, 12–13, 21, 63–64, 121–122, 170, 235, 237  
 NYSE. *See* New York Stock Exchange, (NYSE)



Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

269

- Obama, Barack, 97, 210, 226–227, 229, 233
- O'Halloran, Sharyn, 44
- O'Neal, Stanley, 202
- Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC), 190, 191
- Office of Economic Policy, 142
- Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 3, 11, 190–191, 203, 210, 218
- Olson, Mancur, 79–80, 81
- OTS. *See* Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
- Otwell, Jan, 122
- Pareto optimal distribution
  - in competitive markets, 32–33
  - and control paradox, 127–128, 127 (figure), 137, 139
  - in incentive system, 30–33, 51–52, 89
  - in investor-ruler game, 62–63
  - in principle-agent theory, 38–40, 45–46, 48–49
  - in team production, 87–88
- Patman, Wright, 112
- Patriarca, Michael, 5, 6
- Patty, John, 17, 19–20, 144
- Paulson, Henry, 197, 205, 206
- Pecora, Ferdinand, 160, 168–170
- Peltzman, Sam, 18
- Pequot Financial Management, 225, 226
- Perino, Michael, 168
- Perry, Rick, 232, 233
- Philippon, Thomas, 186
- “police patrol” oversight, 3, 42
- Polanyi, Michael, 145
- political interference, 8–9, 15, 29, 69, 109, 121, 151, 166–167, 198, 215, 233
- political moral hazard. *See* moral hazard
- political stalemate
  - bureaucratic autonomy from, 50, 68, 102–103, 104, 106–107, 108, 111, 118, 119, 161, 167, 185, 227, 232, 235
  - delegation as compromise solution in, 50, 100–103, 114, 176, 185
  - and Dodd-Frank, 218–219, 235
  - and Federal Reserve System, 68, 108–116, 118
  - and financial regulation, 68, 176, 199, 217, 218
  - SEC and, 161
  - and 2008 financial crisis, 206–208
- Populists, 74, 108–109, 112, 173, 233
- Prescott, E. C., 49, 65, 67
- principal-agency theory
  - alignment of agent actions and principal preferences in, 37, 59–61
  - and “backward induction,” 37, 59, 62, 130
  - and bureaucratic accountability, 20, 36, 49, 58
  - and bureaucratic compliance, 48
  - codification of, 36
  - and congressional oversight, 20, 36, 40–45, 47–48
  - credible commitment in contrast to, 56, 57–58, 59, 60–61
  - in economic development, 28–29
  - and efficiency constraints and tradeoffs, 37, 38–40, 45–46, 48–49, 50–51, 61
  - FHLBB and, 56
  - five elements of, 36–37
  - hierarchical relationships and, 20, 27–28
  - and incentives, 16, 20, 22, 28, 33–36, 36–40, 44, 48–50, 55–56, 59, 60, 181
  - and information asymmetry, 32–33, 36–37, 38
  - investment bank industry and, 181
  - and moral hazard, 33–36, 45–49, 61
  - reciprocity-based trust in, 138–139
  - and risk aversion, 34, 39–40
- Procuracy, Russian, 230–231, 232
- professionalism
  - and authority in social code system, 142–144, 147, 153, 160
  - characteristics of, 144–152, 160, 164
  - and conflict with the state, 150–152, 160
  - congressional tradeoff between control and, 42–43
  - and credible commitment, 143, 153–154, 160, 166–167, 231–232, 237
  - in defining organizational culture, 23
  - discipline and training and, 147–149
  - financial industry regulation and, 218–219
  - and identity, 146–147
  - incentives and, 143–144
  - National Labor Relations Board and, 154–160
  - and organizational hierarchy, 149–150, 151, 152–153, 154, 160
  - and political stalemate and conflict resolution, 100–103
  - politicization and, 166–167
  - in Russian law enforcement, 228–230
  - at Securities and Exchange Commission, 160–167
  - as source of social control, 143–144
  - See also* bureaucratic autonomy

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-00875-5 - Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment

Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Index

[More information](#)

270

Index

- Progressive Era  
 and bureaucratic autonomy, 14, 21, 49, 50, 197, 233  
 and contract enforcement and property rights, 71, 74  
 and credible commitment in economic policy, 74  
 and machine politics, 10, 13, 74–75, 153–154, 233  
 and professionalism, 151–152, 153–154  
 and spoils system, 70–71  
 property rights, structure of, 12–13  
 property rights and contract enforcement and credible commitment in economic development, 63–64, 65–66, 83–84  
 Douglass North and, 21, 63–64, 170, 235, 237  
 and majority-rule instability, 83–84  
 and professionalism as source of social control, 143–144
- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 215–216
- Putin, Vladimir, 227, 228–231
- Raja, Andimutha, 24, 25–26
- Rauch, James E., 75
- Raviv, Artur, 36, 39
- Reagan, Ronald  
 anti-bureaucratic rhetoric of, 16  
 anti-inflation policies and, 116–117  
 antitrust policy and, 142  
 deregulation and, 187, 188, 217, 233  
 NLRB appointments by, 157, 158  
 Securities and Exchange Commission and, 163–164
- Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (1934), 84
- Regan, Donald, 9–10
- Regulation Q, 171, 175
- regulatory capture versus independence, 8, 12, 18–19, 19n1, 66–67, 70, 218, 224
- Reshef, Ariell, 186
- Rice, Ken, 193
- Riegle, Don, 3, 4, 9
- Rietveld, Piet, 84
- Riker, William H., 83
- risk aversion, 34, 40
- Roosevelt, Franklin, 53, 55, 159–161, 171, 173, 218
- Roosevelt, Teddy, 10, 108
- Rothschild, Michael, 34
- Rubin, Howie, 177–179, 201
- Rubin, Robert, 198, 203
- rule monitoring/effort models, 125–128, 126 (figure), 127 (figure), 130–131, 137  
 “runaway bureaucracy,” 27–28
- Safire, William, 230
- Salomon Brothers, 174, 176–178, 179–180, 193
- Samberg, Arthur, 225
- Sanchez, Richard, 5
- Sanders, Bernie, 209
- Sanders, Thomas H., 196n2
- Sappington, David, 37
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 196–197, 215
- Satterthwaite, Mark A., 92
- savings and loan (S & L) crisis of 1980s, 1–9, 11, 12, 186–187, 188–190
- Schapiro, Mary, 213
- Schattschneider, Elmer E., 83–84
- Scheer, Robert, 198
- Schelling, Thomas, 56–59, 60, 61, 69
- Scott, W. Richard, 149–150
- Schumpeter, Joseph, 7, 28
- Schwartz, Thomas, 3, 42
- SEC. *See* Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- Securities Act (1933), 160
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  
 accounting profession and, 161–163, 195–196, 196n2  
 and Aguirre whistleblower case, 214, 224–227  
 Bernie Madoff scandal and, 193  
 bureaucratic autonomy of, 23, 161, 163, 164, 165, 170, 175–176, 191–197, 215–216, 218  
 Congress and, 41, 164–165, 192, 194–195, 196, 215  
 and credible commitment to property rights and contract enforcement, 170  
 and deregulation of financial industry, 187–188, 193–194, 218  
 financial disclosure requirements of, 162–163, 196, 196n2, 213–214  
 establishment of, 160–163  
 James Landis and, 160, 161, 162–163, 192  
 PCAOB and, 215–216  
 and politicization of financial regulation, 23, 170, 175–176, 191–197  
 professionalism at, 160–167, 170, 191  
 and securities law, 164, 165  
 and 2008 financial crisis, 208, 212–213
- Segarra, Carmen, 227

## Index

271

- Seligman, Joel, 191–193, 194, 196  
 Senate Banking Committee, 2, 3, 161, 168, 196  
 Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act (2012), 229  
 separation-of-powers system  
   and appointment process, 115–117  
   bureaucratic autonomy and, 118  
   bureaucratic defiance and, 27  
   and bureaucratic expertise and, 23  
   bureaucratic structure, 107–115  
   credible commitment and, 65, 68  
   and delegation, 100–102  
   and financial regulation, 217  
 “shadow banking,” 180–181, 181n1  
 Shapiro, Daniel, 70  
 Shelby, Richard, 208, 215  
 Shipan, Charles, 103, 118  
 Smith, Adam, 28, 29, 64  
 Smith, Vernon L., 53  
 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 83–84  
 Snowe, Olympia, 77  
 social efficiency, moral hazard and, 25, 38, 46–47, 50–51, 60–61, 79, 88, 93–94  
 spoils system, 67, 70–71, 87n1, 153–154, 157, 233  
 Sproul, Allan, 111, 112, 113, 114  
 Spulber, Daniel F., 49, 92  
 Stasavage, David, 64, 68  
 Steagall, Henry, 172–173  
 Stewart, Joseph, Jr., 81  
 Stigler, George, 18  
 Stiglitz, Joseph, 24, 32–33, 34–35, 209  
 stock market crash of 1929: 53–54, 168–169, 171  
 stock options, 181–183, 194, 195  
 subprime mortgage crisis, 8, 190, 202–203, 206, 207, 211, 213, 220  
 Subramanian, Uma, 84  
 Summers, Larry, 185–186, 198, 199, 203, 218  
  
 Taft, William Howard, 108  
 Tariff Commission, 84  
 TARP. *See* Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)  
 Taylor, Brian D., 230  
 Taylor, John B., 120, 121  
 Taylor rule. *See* Federal Reserve Accountability and Transparency Act (2014)  
 Teodoro, Manuel P., 146  
 Thomsen, Linda, 225  
 thrifts and thrifts regulation, 1, 2–3, 9, 54, 55, 174, 178, 188–190, 210  
  
 Tonon, Joseph M., 146  
 time inconsistency, 20–21, 22, 44, 48, 49, 56–58, 64, 65, 75, 223  
 transactions-cost theory, 66–67  
 Treasury, Department of, 111–117, 172, 174, 198, 205, 206–208, 210, 211, 217, 221, 222  
 Treasury/Fed Accord of 1951, 111–115  
 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 208, 217  
 Truman, Harry, 111–114  
  
 Vandenberg, Arthur, 84  
 Vernon Savings and Loan, 189  
 Vesco, Robert, 165  
 Vickers, John, 53, 92  
 Vickrey, William, 30  
 Volcker, Paul, 53, 116–117, 180, 209–210, 211  
 Volcker Rule, 211  
  
 Wallace, George, 16, 60, 233  
 Wall, M. Danny, 2, 11–12, 14, 15  
 Walras, Leon, 28  
 Wall Street. *See* investment banking industry  
 Warren, Elizabeth, 211, 222  
 Warwick, Donald P., 133–134  
 Washington Mutual, 190, 203, 210  
 Waters, Maxine, 222  
 Weber, Max, 7, 14, 24, 26–27, 36, 38, 149, 155, 166, 218  
 Weingast, Barry, 1, 5, 40–41, 43–44, 49, 61–65, 67, 75, 92, 158  
 Wessel, David, 53, 201  
 whistleblowers, 214, 224–227, 232  
 White, Mary Jo, 225, 226–227  
 Whitford, Andrew B., 70, 75, 146  
 Whitney, Richard, 160, 163, 170  
 Wilensky, Harold L., 147  
 Wilson, Woodrow, 108  
 Wirth, Victor, 122–123, 137  
 Woodall, Roy, 211  
 Woodward, B., 69  
 Wooley, John T., 117  
 “work to rule” strategy, 124–125, 129, 130, 138, 140, 234  
 Wren-Lewis, Liam, 66, 224  
 Wright, Jim, 2–3, 189–190  
  
 Yoder, Kevin, 221, 222  
 Yukos Oil Company, 228, 231  
  
 Zakaria, Fareed, 180