Narcissism and Politics

*Dreams of Glory*

In this age of narcissism, the proliferation of politicians with significant narcissistic personality features is dramatic. Driven by dreams of glory, they seem to find irresistible the spotlight that the arena of politics provides. This book analyzes narcissism and politics and systematically explores the psychology of narcissism – the entitlement, the grandiosity and arrogance overlying insecurity, the sensitivity to criticism, and the hunger for acclaim – illustrating different narcissistic personality features through a spectrum of international and national politicians. It addresses the power of charismatic leader–follower relationships, as well as the impact of age and illness on leaders driven by dreams of glory.

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Narcissism and Politics

Dreams of Glory

JERROLD M. POST

The George Washington University
To my wife Carolyn, a spectacular woman, with unbounded gratitude, for your steadfast support and nurturance

and

To my three wonderful daughters: Cindy, Merrie, and Kirsten, whose love and caring I always felt during the long voyage of bringing this book to closure
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If one were to strip from the ranks of political figures all those with significant narcissistic personality traits, those ranks would be perilously impoverished. It seems that scarcely a day goes by that we are not greeted by a headline trumpeting that Senator X or Governor Y, noted for strongly espousing family values, has been caught in a sordid affair. Typically, a televised news conference, with the wife loyally by his side in a show of support, follows. This seems to be a bipartisan affair. And although the punditocracy regularly bemoans the blatant hypocrisy of such miscreants, I would suggest that another factor is at work: namely, that this behavior reveals significant narcissism in the character of the newly revealed sinner, that he somehow considers himself above the law and not subject to the usual moral, ethical, and legal constraints governing behavior.

But this apparent epidemic of narcissism is not confined to politicians. The rise of the “me generation” has been the subject of frequent commentary. There is growing concern that, intensified by the social media use of the “Facebook generation,” an exaggerated concern with self and narcissism is increasingly widespread in society: College students’ scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory rose twice as fast in the five years from 2002 to 2007 as in the decades between 1982 and 2006.4

It has been estimated that upward of 10 percent of the American public have significant narcissistic features, so much so that consideration was given to eliminating narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) from the revised version of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the diagnostic bible of psychiatric and psychological clinicians, because it was rapidly becoming “the new normal.”

Social psychologists Jean Twenge, author of Generation Me, and Keith Campbell, co-author (with J. D. Miller) of The Handbook of Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Findings, and Treatments, have written a book provocatively entitled The Narcissism
Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement, commenting on the acceleration of this phenomenon within American culture. They observe, for example, that in the past decade the frequency of cosmetic plastic surgery has increased fivefold and that, in preschool, children sing “I’m special; look at me,” a song their adoring mothers have taught them.

Arrogant, vain, egocentric, extremely ambitious, entitled to succeed and to be followed by throngs of admirers, the narcissist believes he is a very special person; he is full of himself. He is so entranced by himself that there is little room for genuine, mutual loving relations with others; his relations are regularly distorted and difficult to sustain.

In support of their provocative title, The Narcissism Epidemic, Twenge and Campbell provide convincing social psychological data on the increasing prevalence of individuals with narcissistic traits in our society, especially among the young, and discuss some of the dangerous implications. After all, if our globalized society requires collaboration, how can individuals consumed with themselves work creatively on collaborative teams?

Epidemics have foci, places where the infection is especially widespread and nearly everyone is infected, as with the Black Plague during the Dark Ages in Europe. The epidemic of individuals with significant narcissistic traits seems to have reached pandemic proportions among politicians. This is not to say that all politicians are narcissistic but that the arena of public service and its limelight is particularly attractive, indeed irresistible, to individuals with narcissistic propensities.

In saying this, I am speaking about narcissism writ large, about individuals with many narcissistic traits in their personalities. I am not – repeat not – saying that these political figures are suffering from NPD. Indeed, to have features that warrant a diagnosis of severe NPD is probably inconsistent with being able to sustain a political career in a democracy, although, as discussed later in this volume, a number of dictators unconstrained by democratic systems seem to manifest the characteristics of a particularly severe form of NPD – malignant or primitive narcissism.

This book, for the most part, then, is not concerned with political figures with NPD but rather is about the ubiquity of narcissistic features in the world of politics in the broader sense of the word. After all, at one level, to have abundant self-confidence and ambition combined with ability and opportunity is to have the ingredients for success. The ranks of executives and academics are disproportionately weighted with healthy, ambitious individuals with significant narcissistic traits.

Psychoanalyst Helen Tartakoff has written of the Nobel Prize Complex, describing individuals who, from early on, are driven to pursue the highest honors. Although Shakespeare, in Act II Scene 5 of Twelfth Night, has observed that “some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them,” in fact, without reaching for the stars, without pursuing dreams of glory, greatness is rarely achieved. Some who seek the Nobel Prize...
will, after all, have the gold medal draped around their necks in Stockholm, Sweden, or, if dreaming of the Nobel Peace Prize, in Oslo, Norway.

I take pains to emphasize that I am not proffering a clinical diagnosis, and perhaps a word of explanation for this caution is necessary. I discuss a number of contemporary politicians in this book as I review the overrepresentation of narcissistic personality traits in the population of political leaders. I offer my impressions as a political psychologist, educated as a psychiatrist to be sure, but these impressions do not constitute a clinical diagnosis that a forensic psychiatrist would offer in courtroom testimony.

Questions concerning what makes leaders “tick” have often led journalists to turn to social scientists, including psychiatrists, to offer commentary on public figures. Such questions include, for example, the effects of health and alcoholism on Boris Yeltsin’s decision making; the mind of the Unabomber; the psychology and decision-making process of Saddam Hussein of Iraq (who was initially characterized by the U.S. government as “the madman of the Middle East”); the psychology of David Koresh and the Branch Davidians who were involved in an extended siege with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that ended tragically on April 19, 1993; and the psychology of the 19 al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the tragic events of September 11, 2001, in which they claimed thousands of lives while giving their own, “killing in the name of God,” and of their charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden.

In weighing whether and how to respond, psychiatrists find themselves caught between the Scylla of public service and public education and the Charybdis of the ethical prohibitions spelled out in Section 7 “The Principles of Medical Ethics, with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry.” This principle, a masterpiece of internal contradiction, states that:

*A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing to an improved community.*

Psychiatrists are encouraged to serve society by advising and consulting with the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government.

Psychiatrists may interpret and share with the public their expertise in the various psychosocial issues that may affect mental health and illness. Psychiatrists should always be mindful of their separate roles as dedicated citizens and as experts in psychological medicine.

On occasion psychiatrists are asked for an opinion about an individual who is in the light of public attention, or who has disclosed information about himself/herself through public media. It is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he/she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.4

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Because I have devoted my career to the application of psychiatry to international affairs and the field of political psychology, and because I wish to conduct my professional activities in an ethical manner, this principle has regularly concerned, confused, confounded, and constrained me. But the opportunity to offer public commentary on public figures often arises for mainstream psychiatrists. Because of my background as the founding director of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which prepared political personality profiles on world leaders to assist the president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, and other senior officials before summit meetings and other high-level negotiations and to assist in crisis situations, I have often been called on to testify before Congress and the United Nations and invited to offer commentary by mainstream media. Consequently, a discussion of my reactions to the quandary posed by the principles enunciated in Section 7 of the American Psychiatric Association Code of Ethics is in order.

The dilemma was no more dramatically and absurdly evidenced than during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–91. On the basis of a political personality profile that I developed of Saddam Hussein from my base at the George Washington University, one that was widely featured in print and electronic media, in late 1990, I was invited to testify before two congressional committees holding hearings on the Gulf Crisis – Les Aspin’s House Armed Services Committee and Lee Hamilton’s House Foreign Affairs Committee. Saddam Hussein had been widely characterized as “the madman of the Middle East,” and there was considerable perplexity concerning what made him tick.

Policies were being developed that, in my judgment, were insufficiently informed by an accurate picture of Saddam Hussein’s political psychology. This was an extraordinary opportunity for a political psychologist to present the principal conclusions of Hussein’s profile to legislators charged with the responsibility for the policy-development process and to contribute to their understanding of the complex cultural, historical, political, and psychological influences on Saddam Hussein’s decision making. After this testimony was presented, in a public forum, the president of the U.S. Institute of Peace cited the profile as a “contribution of the highest order to the national welfare.” It assuredly was a career high point.

b This was a notable occasion for the discipline of political psychology, being the first time that a political personality profile of a foreign leader was presented in testimony to Congress. The testimony can be found in the Congressional Record, December 5 and 12, 1990, under the title “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile.” It has also been printed in Political Psychology (Post, 1991). The testimony was cited by several congressmen as having contributed to their decision making during the crisis.
But my moment of pride was short-lived. When the chair of the APA’s Council of Psychiatry and International Affairs, on which I served, called, indicating that he wished to speak to me about the profile, I was anticipating a compliment for my contribution to American psychiatry. You can only imagine my consternation when he dolefully intoned, “Jerry, the APA has received letters about your profile of Saddam, and there is reason to believe you may have violated the Canons of Ethics of the American Psychiatric Association.”

Apparently, as he went on to explain, a “profile of the profiler” article about personality profiling, one that drew on the Saddam Hussein profile, had appeared in the Science News section of the New York Times. This led to several letters complaining that I had violated Section 7 of the Canons of Ethics of the APA because I had presented publicly a professional opinion about Hussein without interviewing him and without his authorization.

I nearly exploded. “Have you read the profile?” I asked.

“Well, no,” he acknowledged.

“Then perhaps you should before rendering such judgments. The profile is not a psychiatric expert opinion. It is a political personality profile, an art form I have crafted, informed, to be sure, by my education as a psychiatrist, but concerned with such matters as leadership style, crisis reactions, negotiating style, relationship with leadership circle, etc.

“Moreover,” I went on, “I think there is a duty to warn, involving a kind of Tarasoff principle, for the assessments of Saddam’s political personality and leadership that are guiding policy seem to me to be off – he had been widely characterized as ‘the madman of the Middle East’ – and policy decisions are being made based on errant perceptions, which could lead to significant loss of life. In fact he is a rational decision maker who, however, often miscalculates.

“Accordingly,” I continued, “it would have been unethical to have withheld this assessment. I believed I had a duty to warn.” I faxed the profile to him and heard no more on the matter, but the conversation continued to trouble me.

How can it be that a presentation deemed to be “a contribution of the highest order to the national welfare” could simultaneously raise questions concerning an ethical violation? Other academic specialists from the ranks of psychology, political science, and history regularly contribute to public discourse on political figures without having interviewed the subject, but for psychiatrists to do so is considered an ethical violation. The ethical principle seemed extreme and overdrawn.

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* The Tarasoff principle derives from a controversial case (*Tarasoff v. State of California*) in which a client in counseling told his therapist that he was obsessed with a co-ed and that if she would not go out with him, he would kill her. She would not, and he killed her. In the trial, the therapist claimed that he could not warn her because to do so would violate confidentiality. The California Supreme Court overruled this previously all-encompassing principle of confidentiality, indicating that when specific danger emerged in the course of counseling, there was a “duty to warn.”
To understand the severity of the principle requires examining its development. As is often the case, bad cases make bad law. The historical background for this ethical prohibition can be traced to the Lyndon Johnson–Barry Goldwater election of 1964. During the 1964 presidential election campaign, *Fact Magazine*, which had somehow acquired an APA mailing list, surveyed the membership of the APA asking whether the Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater, was psychiatrically fit for office. The results led to a front-page headline: “1189 Psychiatrists Say Goldwater Is Psychologically Unfit to Be President.” Mr. Ginzburg, editor of the magazine, said that “over a quarter of a million words of professional opinion were received; never in history has a political figure been the subject of such an intensive character analysis.” The article was littered with juicy quotes, including comments from prominent academic psychiatrists. Among the internationally prominent American psychiatrists who responded to the survey was Jerome Frank, chair of the department of psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, who wrote that the “ill-considered, impulsive quality of many of Goldwater’s public utterances is, in my mind, sufficient to disqualify him from the presidency.” A number of psychiatrists, in whose opinion Goldwater was not psychologically fit to serve as president, cited his apparent paranoid tendencies. Dr. Carl B. Young of Los Angeles addressed the danger of this apparent impulsivity in combination with his paranoid tendencies: “The main factors which make me feel Goldwater is unfit to be president are: (1) His impulsive, impetuous behavior. Such behavior in this age could result in world destruction. This behavior reflects an emotionally immature, unstable personality. (2) His inability to dissociate himself from vituperative, sick extremists. Basically, I feel that he has a narcissistic character disorder with not too latent paranoid elements.”

The poll gave American psychiatry a black eye. In a column entitled “Psychiatric Folly,” James Wechsler of the *New York Post* wrote that while the survey provided no new insights about Goldwater, “it reveals a good deal about a segment of the psychiatric profession. It is a simultaneous affront to responsible psychiatry and journalism.” In a press release from the APA medical director, the APA disavowed the survey and criticized both *Fact Magazine* and the naiveté of those members who responded, citing embarrassment to the profession. It was observed that “[a] physician can properly render an opinion on the psychological fitness or mental condition of anyone only in the traditional doctor-patient relationship in which findings are based on a thorough clinical examination.”

Reaction from its members and from the press created a public relations nightmare for the APA, which attempted to put a positive spin on the story by citing the overwhelming majority of its membership that did not respond to the poll. The headlines that appeared after public repudiation of the poll by both the American Medical Association and the APA were brutal and continued the humiliation: “5 of 6 Psychiatrists Won’t Comment on Barry ‘Fitness,’”

This, then, was the background of the formulation in 1973 of the Annotation in the Ethics Code relating to public statements. As Lazarus has observed, “Those who drafted the first edition of the Annotations in 1973 still had a good memory of the dramatic events of the 1960s and wanted to include a clear statement in the Code to remind psychiatrists of their ethical duties related to public statements regarding public figures.” The initial wording of the Annotation proscribed rendering a diagnosis without examination. It was subsequently broadened in later editions from diagnosis to professional opinion.

While the ethical prohibition in Section 7.3 was prompted by the damage to the individual under consideration, as well as to the reputation of the psychiatric profession, the prohibition as developed did not specify the intended audience. It is unequivocal: “On occasion psychiatrists are asked for an opinion about an individual who is in the light of public attention, or who has disclosed information about himself/herself through public media. It is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he/she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.”

By then, however, programs had been developed within the FBI and the CIA that made use of psychological data to produce classified psychological profiles. These profiles were developed, in the case of the FBI, to assist criminal investigations and, in the case of the CIA, to provide assistance to U.S. government foreign policy officials conducting summit meetings and other high-level negotiations with foreign leaders, as well as to assist in dealing with political-military crises. The CIA studies were conducted by the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, of which, as previously noted, I was the founding director. Insofar as the Annotation did not make a distinction concerning such psychological profiles, it would seem that these efforts also fell within the scope of the ethical prohibition – a matter of considerable concern to me.

As a consequence of the unresolved questions in this area, the APA appointed a task force on “The Psychiatrist as Psychohistorian,” lumping together within its purview the psychological profiles developed by U.S. government security agencies as well as psychohistories and psychobiographies.

In the course of examining the use and potential for abuse of psychiatric profiles, the Psychohistory Task Force carefully considered the use of profiles in national security. The report made an exception for psychiatric profiles that were prepared for the use of the government, not only indicating that they were not considered unethical, but also singling them out as positively contributing to the national welfare. The task force determined that profiles of significant international figures could be helpful – and were in fact necessary in some cases – to the national interest. They made positive reference to the profile “The Mind of Adolf Hitler” prepared during World War II by psychoanalyst
Walter Langer at the request of Bill Donovan, the director of the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor organization to the CIA.\(^d\)

This judgment was of great comfort to me in my national security role, but provided no comfort when I assumed my position as director of the Political Psychology Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. There, part of my role was to contribute to the national dialogue from the perspective of political psychology, as exemplified by my testimony concerning Saddam Hussein.

Thus, on several occasions when I believed I had something useful to contribute, I did not, constrained by the ethical canon. One such occasion, which I continue to regret, was the FBI siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, in 1993. Based on a profile of David Koresh by an FBI consulting psychologist who had judged Koresh to be a psychopath, the FBI employed a strategy of increasing escalation of pressure, with sound bombardment and flashing lights going around the clock. I had been following Koresh for several years, and I had come to see him, like many charismatic cult leaders, as a narcissistic borderline. I was concerned that these FBI tactics could drive him “over the border” and lead him to seek martyrdom. I was interviewed by Sam Donaldson on ABC’s Prime Time Live, and, although I expressed concern about the possibly counterproductive effects of the FBI tactics, I did not provide my at-a-distance personality profile assessment of David Koresh, which would have given substance to my concerns.

Troubled by the constraints posed by overly broad ethical guidance, I sought an audience with the APA ethics committee. Although they reassured me that they considered my contributions to be positive and not ethical violations, they suggested that I formally seek guidance from the committee in terms of submitting a question.

So, in 2008, I submitted the following question:

**Question:** Does the ethical prohibition embodied in Section 7, Paragraph 3 of the Annotations apply to psychologically informed leadership studies based on careful research that do not specify a clinical diagnosis and are designed to enhance public and governmental understanding?

This is the response, which is now included in the commentary designed to clarify ambiguities:

**Answer:** The psychological profiling of historical figures designed to enhance public and governmental understanding of these individuals does not conflict with the ethical principals outlined in Section 7, Paragraph 3, as long as the psychological profiling

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Preface

does not include a clinical diagnosis and is the product of scholarly research that has been subject to peer review and academic scrutiny, and is based on relevant standards of scholarship.

For many years, a book on the topic of narcissism and politics has been percolating within me. I believe narcissistic traits are associated with many of the behaviors of political leaders, especially those contradictory behaviors that highlight a contrast between words and deeds. I believe that these behaviors are consistent with narcissistic traits and that a book on this topic will be of great interest to the well-educated public. Knowing of my interest in narcissism and politics, Stanley Renshon, a distinguished presidential scholar, during his service as the editor of Political Psychology, invited me to write a review article on “Current Concepts of Narcissism: Implications for Political Psychology,” but I felt constrained from writing a comprehensive book on this topic by the overly broad ethical prohibitions in the Canons of Ethics. However, with the clarifying answer provided by the APA Ethics Committee just cited, I now feel able to address the pervasive influence of narcissistic personality traits on political behavior. Many political leaders will be cited as examples in this book: this does not imply that I am providing a clinical diagnosis of NPD for them, but only that the behaviors discussed would seem to reflect narcissistic personality traits.

This book is designed to explore the manner in which narcissistic personality traits are abundantly represented (indeed, overrepresented) in the world of national and international politics. It should not be so surprising, after all, that narcissism would flourish in the political environment and that narcissistic individuals would find irresistible the attractions of the public life.

After presenting two cases of narcissistic grandiosity in its extreme – individuals with delusions of grandeur – I then consider the formative influences on narcissistic personalities and explore what generates their dreams of glory. I discuss profoundly wounded individuals such as Saddam Hussein, who developed compensatory dreams of glory after a very traumatic childhood and the tendency for retaliatory narcissistic rage when those dreams of glory were shattered. I consider those leaders who were selected to be vehicles of their parents’ success, whose parents had “great expectations” for their special children, such as President Woodrow Wilson and General Douglas MacArthur. Two South Asian women – Indira Gandhi, prime minister of India, and Benazir Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan – who also followed the paths set by their parents and grandparents, are then considered.

Benazir Bhutto, in particular, had a remarkably charismatic relationship with the wounded Pakistani people. Using this example, the powerful phenomenon of charismatic leader–follower relationships is examined, emphasizing the lock-and-key fit between two postures of narcissistically wounded individuals: “mirror-hungry” individuals as leaders and “ideal-hungry” individuals as
followers. Distinctions are made between reparative charismatics, such as Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela, and destructive charismatics, including Adolf Hitler, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden.

This emphasizes that leaders with narcissistic personality traits have not only been associated with some of history’s most violent and evil episodes, but also with some of history’s most heroic moments, when remarkable leaders with self-confidence and persistence have overcome formidable obstacles to change their nation’s history, whether it was Mohandas Gandhi’s role in liberating India from its colonial status under the British Empire through nonviolent resistance or Martin Luther King’s heroic nonconstituted leadership of the civil rights movement in the United States.

An observation that weaves a thread throughout this book is that the narcissist’s surface grandiosity overlays great insecurity, which can lead to sycophantic relationships with key advisers who tell the leader what he wants to hear rather than what he needs to hear. Saddam Hussein is an important exemplar of this phenomenon. Wives can play a similar role, “for better or for worse.” The concept of the wife or adviser as selfobject, a concept developed by psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, is also discussed, which elaborates the manner in which narcissists do not relate to individuals around them as separate individuals but rather incorporate them within their own psychology to complete them, reassure them, and provide a sense of stability.

I then consider and illustrate narcissistic entitlement and the exceptional conscience, with a summary review of political figures who made exceptions of themselves while righteously emphasizing the necessity for maintaining exemplary moral standards while in public office. Case studies of an international exemplar of this trait, Silvio Berlusconi, and of a U.S. politician, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, follow.

The effects of ill health and aging on narcissistic leaders, for whom there never is enough glory, is then reviewed, including such examples as King Hussein of Jordan, the Shah of Iran, Jaafar Nimeiri of the Sudan, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and, as the most recent example, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

Some narcissistic leaders who played important and heroic founding roles are unable to leave the position of leadership, leading to extremities of behavior, such as becoming “president for life.” Often, such behaviors have tragic results for their nations, as exemplified by Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Declaring oneself “president for life” is one way of ensuring that the throne of power is not abandoned, with the narcissistic leader holding on to life by holding on to power. Another is to seek immortality through one’s progeny, as Saddam Hussein attempted to do and as North Korea’s founding father, Kim Il-sung did with his son Kim Jong-il, who in turn designated his son Kim Jong-eun as his successor only after suffering a severe stroke shortly before his death. This is followed by a chapter discussing the psychological consequences of being leader by default – the “second-choice
sons,” which describes a group of leaders who were not their parents’ first choice to bear the family honor: John F. Kennedy, Benjamin Netanyahu, Rajiv Gandhi, and Bashar al-Assad.

This book is designed to shed light on the manner in which narcissistic personality traits, overrepresented among domestic and international political leaders, can affect political behavior. It is all too easy to be hypnotized by the allure of the grandiose surface and neglect the insecurity that lies beneath. The dreams of glory that drive narcissists have been associated with some of the most heroic moments in history, but frustrated dreams of glory have also been associated with violent adventures and mass movements of hatred.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of five young scholars to this work: Ruthie Pertsis, Kristen Moody, Jessica Chaudhary, Jennifer McNamara, and Jessica Zayas. It has been a pleasure mentoring you; your research, writing, and administrative skills have enriched this study. And to the excellent team at Cambridge University Press, first Lewis Bateman, who shepherded this work through an often difficult process, to Sathishkumar Rajendran for his fine editorial touch, and to Mark Fox, for his care and discrimination in bringing the book to final production.

Notes
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.